

CIVIC AND UNCIVIC VALUES IN KOSOVO

History, Politics, and Value Transformation

Edited by Sabrina **P. Ramet**, Albert **Simkus** and Ola **Listhaug**



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Edited by

**SABRINA P. RAMET, ALBERT SIMKUS,
and OLA LISTHAUG**



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For Stefano Bianchini

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Preface

This volume is the sixth in the series “Civic and Uncivic Values in the Yugoslav Successor States.” Previous volumes in the series are:

- Sabrina P. Ramet and Danica Fink-Hafner, eds., *Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media* (Texas A&M University Press, 2006);
- Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić, eds., *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media* (Texas A&M University Press, 2007);
- Ola Listhaug, Sabrina P. Ramet, and Dragana Dulić, eds., *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era* (Central European University Press, 2011);
- Sabrina P. Ramet, Ola Listhaug, and Albert Simkus, eds., *Civic and Uncivic Values in Macedonia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media* (Palgrave, 2013);
- Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet, eds., *Bosnia-Herzegovina Since Dayton: Value Transformation, Education, and Media* (Longo editore, 2013).

We are grateful to the Centre for the Study of Civil War of the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) for providing funding in support of a conference held in Oslo in November 2012 at which most of the chapters included herein were originally presented. We would especially like to

thank Andrew Feltham at PRIO for his superb administrative support of the conference. We also wish to thank David Kanin and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript, and Krisztina Kós, the chief editor at Central European University Press, for her efficient processing of the work.

Kosovo, as it is called in English, is written Kosovë or Kosova in Albanian. Although only the English spelling is standard in British and American media, we have decided to allow all three spellings in this volume. We have also allowed three alternative spellings of the country's capital city: Pristina (English), Prishtina (Albanian, but increasingly accepted for English usage), and Priština (Serbian). The standard adjective derived from the noun Kosovo is Kosovar, as used in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Guardian*, and *The Daily Telegraph*, among other media. However, a few of the contributors to this volume have preferred to use the noun Kosovo as an adjective and, again, we have decided to permit linguistic pluralism.

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CHAPTER 1

Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: An Introduction

SABRINA P. RAMET¹

The region which today comprises the Republic of Kosovo (spelled *Kosovë* or *Kosova* in Albanian) has enjoyed self-rule only since 2008. Conquered by Rome in 168 BCE, the region—which was included within a province which the Romans called *Illyricum*—passed under East Roman (Byzantine) rule when the empire split in the third century CE. It remained under Byzantine rule until the mid-ninth century, and then, in succeeding centuries, alternated between Bulgarian, Byzantine, and Serbian rule until the Ottoman Empire absorbed Serbia, including Kosovo, in 1455. Thereafter, Kosovo was ruled by the Ottomans until 1912, when—in October of that year—a Serbian army marched into Kosovo, annexing the region without regard to the wishes of Kosovo’s majority Albanian population. From then until 1999, with interruptions during World Wars I and II, Belgrade ruled Kosovo, whether during the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929), or the communist federation set up by Josip Broz Tito after World War II, or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which was set up in 1992, consisting of Serbia (with Kosovo included) and Montenegro.

The Albanians of Kosovo were never reconciled to their region having the status of a mere province of Serbia, and resented the fact that, for most of the post-war period, they were treated as second-class citizens,

¹ I am grateful to Shemsi Krasniqi and James Pettifer, as well as the two reviewers contracted by the press, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this introduction.

and wanted to change their status. For some within Kosovo, elevation to the status of a republic, equal in status with Serbia, within the pre-June 1991 Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), was acceptable;² for others, either independence or adhesion to Albania was the goal. But Slobodan Milošević, who held the office of president of Serbia from May 1989 until July 1997 and that of president of the FRY from July 1997 until October 2000, terminated such autonomy as Kosovo had enjoyed under the 1974 federal constitution, imposed martial law in Kosovo, removed roughly 130,000 Albanians from positions of responsibility between 1990 and 1995, brought Serb “colonists” to Kosovo by offering them free housing and the jobs made available by the firing of Albanians, and expelled Albanian students from the University of Prishtina, sacking all of the Albanian faculty at that institution. The Milošević regime also closed Albanian-language schools (in 1990), changed the names of streets to Serbian, and backed up these policies by brute force.³ A system of *de facto* apartheid emerged in Kosovo but, lacking weapons adequate to challenge the Serbian forces, the Albanians maintained a pacifist profile until 1996–97. Ibrahim Rugova, a Shakespeare scholar, organized and led the movement of pacifist resistance. Kosovo’s Albanians set up parallel systems of education, health, and social security. The Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) began attacking Serbian police stations already in spring 1996, as James Pettifer notes in his chapter for this volume. The growing impatience of Albanians for change drove the uprising, while the declining efficiency of Milošević’s security apparatus offered encouragement. The following year, when Albania sank into chaos, “large numbers of small arms” flowed out of the country, as Pettifer notes. Some of these arms made their way to Kosovo. In autumn 1997, the KLA announced itself publicly, continuing to strike at local police stations and other targets.⁴ The conflict between Serbian forces and the KLA escalated until a quarter of a million Albanians were hiding in the forests of Kosovo by late summer 1998; by 2 February 1999, some 20,000 Kosovar Albanians had fled to Albania, more

² See Miloš Mišović, *Ko je tražio republiku: Kosovo, 1945–1985* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1987).

³ See Sabrina P. Ramet, *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 147–51.

⁴ See also James Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

than 30,000 were in Montenegro, and about 7,000 had taken refuge in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵ A peace conference was convened in Rambouillet on 6 February 1999, but the Serbian delegation was not authorized to sign anything. Moreover, even while these negotiations were in progress, "Serbian forces attacked Kosovar villages, while additional forces massed on Kosova's borders. Before the first NATO bomb was dropped they began a systematic attack aimed at deporting a large number of Albanians from Kosova."⁶ As Judith Armatta has noted, based on her analysis of the proceedings of the subsequent trial of Slobodan Milošević in The Hague, the "evictions [of Albanians] occurred across Kosova in a highly organized manner [and] . . . could only have been designed and carried out with approval at the highest level."⁷ By 23 March, on the eve of NATO's bombing campaign, an estimated 459,000 Albanians had been driven from their homes—about 199,000 having fled abroad.⁸ In the meantime, after a massacre of Albanians at Raçak in January 1999 and after mediated negotiations at Rambouillet (in March 1999) failed to produce an agreement between the partners to the conflict, NATO intervened and began bombing various targets in Serbia. At first,

[i]nstead of backing down, . . . Serbian forces on the ground intensified their "scorched earth" attacks on the noncombatant Albanian civilians, torching villages, driving the Albanians out, and even confiscating the documents from the fleeing Albanians. At peak, some 855,000 Albanians had fled Kosovo to neighboring countries. . .⁹

⁵ "Kosovo: situation on the ground grim," UNHCR Briefing Notes (2 February 1999), at <http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b81c40.html> (accessed on 17 May 2013).

⁶ Judith Armatta, *Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 19–20.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸ Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005* (Washington, D.C. and Bloomington, IN: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Indiana University Press, 2006), 516 (see multiple sources on p. 718, note 141).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 517. The figure of 855,000 is confirmed in *New York Daily News* (6 June 1999), at <http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/pushing-serb-pullout-commanders-discuss-kosovo-withdrawal-balkans-crisis-article-1.830030>; *Global Policy Forum* (10 June 1999), at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/israel-palestine-and-the-occupied-territories/38861.html>; and *Congressional Record—House*, no. 14986 (1 July 1999), at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/israel-palestine-and-the-occupied-territories/38861.html> (all accessed on 19 May 2013).

Eventually, after 78 days of war, Milošević capitulated—albeit declaring “victory” on Serbian television—and the international presence in the region began.¹⁰

Nine years later, after the Serbian government rejected a plan sketched by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari¹¹ and after intensive coordination with the USA, Britain, Germany, and other members of the international community, the Kosovar parliament declared the independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008 on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan, which had called for Kosovar independence.¹² Within a week, 18 states extended recognition, including the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Albania, Australia, Poland, and Turkey. By mid-March 2013, 99 out of the United Nations’ 193 member states had recognized the Republic of Kosovo, including also all the Baltic states, all the Nordic countries, Austria, Croatia, Italy, and Macedonia. At this writing, 19 countries have established embassies in Prishtina. Those states which have opened embassies in Prishtina include the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Albania, Austria, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Turkey.

The Republic of Serbia has, however, refused to extend recognition to Kosovo, maintaining that its multilaterally coordinated declaration of

Tim Judah reports a lower figure (848,000) of the number of Kosovar Albanians driven out of the country by early June 1999. See Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2000), 250. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that “nearly 860,000” Albanians were forced to flee the country, which corresponds to the figure cited in the text. See UNHCR—Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, *The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR’s Emergency Preparedness and Response*, prepared by Astri Suhrke, Michael Barutciski, Peta Sandison, and Rick Garlock (pre-publication edition, February 2000), at <http://www.unhcr.org/3ba0bb4.pdf> (accessed on 19 May 2013).

¹⁰ For a comprehensive discussion of the background to the war, the conduct of the war, and the international involvement, see Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing, eds., *Der Kosovo Konflikt: Ursachen, Verlauf, Perspektiven* (Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 2000).

¹¹ Concerning the Ahtisaari Plan, see Ksenija Petrovic, “Die Rolle Serbiens in der zukünftigen Entwicklung des Kosovo,” in *Die Republik Kosovo—Der jüngste Staat Europas. Eine politische Bestandsaufnahme seit der Unabhängigkeitserklärung*, eds. Olaf Leiße, Martin Roth, and Christian Gesellmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 281; and Dijana Basic, “UNMIK, OSZE, EULEX, NATO, ICO—Struktur und Interaktion internationaler Organisationen im Kosovo seit der Unabhängigkeitserklärung” in *ibid.*, 166, 168–70. For the text of the proposal, see “The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement,” United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo, at <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html> (accessed on 12 June 2013).

¹² Jeton Mehmeti and Agron Demi, “Institutions and political structures—how far is Kosova?” in Leiße et al., eds., 29, 33.

independence was “unilateral” (although no one seems to remember that the declarations of independence on the part of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 and, for that matter, of Macedonia in September 1991 were more clearly unilateral than the carefully coordinated declaration by the Assembly of Kosovo). More serious are the facts that no government likes to lose territory and that the Serbian constitution, adopted in 2006, describes Kosovo as an integral and inalienable part of Serbia; the latter has the legal consequence that any Serbian politician who would advocate the formal recognition of the new republic would immediately be accused of showing contempt for the country’s constitution. It is in this context that Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić declared, in March 2013, that Serbia would never recognize the independence of Kosovo and that his government would not permit “any armed force” to be sent to Northern Kosovo, where most Kosovar Serbs (60,000) now live.¹³ Meanwhile, the Serbian government entered into negotiations over an EU-brokered deal over Kosovo, which Nikolić claimed would protect the autonomy of Serbian institutions and police in Northern Kosovo.¹⁴ Both states seek admission to the European Union and, for both of them, an agreement would smooth the process considerably; indeed, for Serbia, it is a prerequisite.

Civic Virtues: The Virtues of Citizens

Put simply, *civic virtues* and *civic values* are oriented to the interests of the community as a whole; *uncivic virtues* or *values* are oriented to the interests of a segment of the community, such as a specific religious or ethnic group, *at the expense of the community as a whole*. Self-seeking may also become uncivic when it involves adopting measures that harm the community. Half a century ago, Seymour Martin Lipset argued that the population’s acceptance of the laws and legal institutions of a country as legitimate is a key determinant of political stability.¹⁵ Nowadays, political legitimacy tends to entail some form of democracy or, as Mill put it more

¹³ Tanjug (Belgrade), 25 March 2013, at <http://www.tanjug.rs/news/81743/nikolic--serbia-will-not-recognize-kosovo.htm> (accessed on 11 May 2013).

¹⁴ B92 Radio (Belgrade), 9 May 2013, at http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2013&mm=05&dd=09&nav_id=86078 (accessed on 11 May 2013).

¹⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959).

precisely, representative government.¹⁶ In turn, certain civic virtues have been shown to be conducive to democratic politics. In a previous publication devoted to civic virtues and liberal values, I have enumerated eight central civic virtues, practiced (or not practiced) by the citizens of a country.¹⁷ First, in pride of place, is *respect for the harm principle*, which entails the admonition not to harm others except in defense of oneself, another living being, or something of value, with harm not exceeding the minimum necessary for an effective defense. Harm may be physical or financial, or may consist in calculated damage to a person's (or institution's) reputation. The harm principle has been recognized for nearly four millennia (going back to Hammurabi's Code), if not even longer. The harm principle is the guarantor of personal freedom. Thus, as I wrote in the aforementioned publication, "if heterosexuals are, literally, *required* [by law] to be heterosexual, they themselves are not free as such, even if they are, in fact, heterosexuals."¹⁸ Second in importance is the principle of *tolerance* of ethnic, racial, religious, and sexual minorities, as well as of eccentric behavior; but, as Habermas has noted, there can be no tolerance without intolerance of harmful behavior and of pernicious ideologies.¹⁹ Not only individuals, but also religious associations, political parties, private organizations, and, of course, governing authorities are all bound by the harm principle. These first two principles already imply some measure of *equality*, although there are various interpretations of equality, ranging from a narrow conservative interpretation to a more ambitious, left-liberal interpretation, as well as interpretations which fall outside the liberal tradition broadly conceived. Equality pertains not only to individuals but also to religious, racial, and ethnic groups and their members, as well as to sexual minorities. Fourth in this set is *reasonableness*, defined by Rawls²⁰ as the readiness to justify one's posi-

¹⁶ John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, in J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government* (hereafter *Collected Works*), ed. Geraint Williams (London: Everyman Library, 1972).

¹⁷ Sabrina P. Ramet, "Civic virtues, liberal values, and the civic culture," in *Civic and Uncivic Values in Macedonia: Value transformation, Education, and Media*, eds. Sabrina P. Ramet, Ola Listhaug, and Albert Simkus (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15 (emphasis in the original).

¹⁹ See Jürgen Habermas, "Intolerance or Discrimination," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 1 (2003), no. 1: 3.

²⁰ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, revised ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 48–54.

tion, combined with open-mindedness and even a readiness to be persuaded by others to change one's mind. *Civility*, involving treating other people with respect—a duty according to Stephen Carter²¹—, is no. 5 in our list of civic virtues. Civility entails also observing the rules of etiquette which are assumed in the society in which one lives. According to Peter Johnson—who credited R. G. Collingwood as his source—, “civility means refraining from diminishing another's self-respect . . . [and] implies a willingness . . . to conciliate and adjust in contacts with others.”²² Sixth is *empathy*, involving the identification of one's own well-being with that of others. Empathy works best when it is blind to religious, racial, or ethnic differences or differences in sexual orientation. *Truthfulness* is seventh, involving the commitment to tell the truth insofar as one knows it, while respecting at the same time the harm principle and norms of civility; where telling what one knows can cause irreparable harm, the harm principle sets a clear limit. And finally, there is *engagement*, which may be understood as “the duty to inform oneself from reliable sources about the issues of the community” and to “take part in public life *only* on the basis of meaningful information.”²³ But, as Kristen Ringdal shows in his contribution to this volume, the citizens of Kosovo score very low on tolerance and respect for gender equality, while the explosion of violence against Serb and Roma civilians after the end of the 1999, while understandable, may nonetheless be interpreted as incompatible with respect for the harm principle. Albert Simkus and Shemsi Krasniqi, in their contribution to this volume, note, however, that younger Albanians seem to be more tolerant than members of the older Albanian generation. Where engagement is concerned, voter turnout in Kosovo—consistently less than 50% since 2004²⁴—compares unfavorably with voter turnout in Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Croatia, among other countries. Kosovo would seem to have quite a distance to traverse before it can hope to have achieved a stable, liberal democracy.

²¹ Stephen L. Carter, *Civility: Manners, Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 279–83 and *passim*.

²² Peter Johnson, “Talking with Yahoos: Collingwood's Case for Civility,” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 16 (2008), no. 3: 598.

²³ Ramet, “Civic virtues, liberal values,” 18, *emphasis added*.

²⁴ Voter turnout data for Kosovo, at <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=123> (accessed on 12 May 2013).

Civic (Liberal) Values: The Values of Systems

Civic virtues relate to the behavior of citizens and other residents of a country; *civic, or liberal, values* are those values which relate to the behavior of government authorities, the functioning and behavior of institutions, and the content of law. The chief civic or liberal values are: the rule of law; individual rights and duties; toleration of ethnic, religious, sexual, and cultural minorities; respect for the harm principle; equality; and neutrality of the state in matters of religion. It is obvious that there is an overlap between civic virtues and civic/liberal values. The point is that the civic/liberal values are those principles which should guide a government which wishes to uphold some version of liberal democracy.

What is meant by *rule of law* in the first place is that the law applies to all equally and, ideally, that no one is able to use personal influence, bribes, favors, coercion, or other means to corrupt legal processes. In the years Kosovo was ruled from Belgrade, corruption was especially serious in the interwar kingdom²⁵ and in the years when Serbia was ruled by Milošević²⁶ and subsequently by the government headed by Vojislav Koštunica.²⁷ Corruption remains a problem today, as Günal notes in his chapter for this volume.

Individual rights and duties and *toleration* may be considered together, since an individual whose choices are not tolerated, whether by the government or by local people, is not able to exercise his or her rights. The recurrent pattern of discrimination against the Albanians of Kosovo, carried over into persecution during the interwar years, the first two decades of communist rule, and the Milošević era²⁸ shows that rule by Belgrade signified for most of the twentieth century—though not for the years 1968–87—the deprivation of the rights of Kosovar Albanians.

²⁵ See Zvonimir Kulundžić, *Politika i korupcija u krajevskoj Jugoslaviji* (Zagreb: NIP Stvarnost, 1968).

²⁶ See Maja Miljković and Marko Hoare, "Crime and the economy under Milošević and his successors," in *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milošević and After*, eds. Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2005), 192–226.

²⁷ See Vesna Pešić, *State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia*, CEPS Working Document No. 262 (March 2007), ISBN-13: 978-92-9079-705-0.

²⁸ For documentation, see Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, Chapters 2–3, 5, 10, 17.

Respect for the harm principle was repeatedly violated in interwar Yugoslavia, again during the years 1945–66, and again during the years Milošević was at the helm of power in Belgrade. Dismissals from work, beatings, expulsions, and false imprisonment were all inflicted upon innocent Albanians.

Equality is, of course, a term which may be understood narrowly, as in equality before the law, or more broadly. Although conservatives sometimes suggest that equality before the law is all one needs, there have always been demands for other forms of equality, including equal pay for equal work and various forms of gender equality. Nita Luci and Linda Gusia address this last aspect in their contribution to this volume.

Finally, *neutrality of the state in matters of religion* provides a bedrock for both toleration and equality, and secures the rule of law from ecclesiastical influence. Again, reviewing some 80 years of rule by Belgrade—1912–15, 1918–41, and 1945–99—one finds that, while the 46 years of socialist Yugoslavia (1945–91) were characterized roughly speaking by a fairly consistent policy toward the major religious communities in the country (though not in Serbia after 1987 or Croatia after 1990), the remaining years were marked by overt discrimination in favor of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Uncivic values, to be explicit, would be the inverse of the civic values, and thus: corruption; contempt for individual rights; intolerance of ethnic, religious, sexual, or cultural minorities; disrespect for the harm principle; inequality (including patriarchal or so-called “family” values); and state favoritism in the religious sphere. Historically, these uncivic values, when taken together, have been characteristic of Fascist regimes.

Thus, in terms of liberal values, Belgrade’s several regimes, with a partial exception for the years 1968–87, had an appalling record. Whether the Republic of Kosovo can do better is a challenge for the future.

Values Essential for Sustainability

In addition to the foregoing civic or liberal values, one may also identify three values essential for the sustainability of a social system. By that I mean that, in the absence of these values, a society or social system cannot be sustained. The chief values for sustainability are integration, sociality, and trust. Their opposites, which poison a society and render it unsustainable, are segregation, polarization, and distrust.

Moin Shakir has offered the following distinction between political integration and *national integration*:

Political integration means a shifting of loyalties to the newly created centre in the system. National integration is something more than political integration. Its essence is an agreement among the different nationalities, minorities and other groups constituting the political community which strikes an equilibrium between the “communal” identity and the national identity.²⁹

Integration may be achieved on a pluralist model or on an assimilationist model,³⁰ but either way, integration means that people belonging to different groups—whether ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural—interact with each other peacefully in the public space. It means that there are no benches reserved for whites (as in apartheid-era South Africa) and that blacks are not required to sit at the back of the bus (as in segregation-era USA). But segregation need not be enforced by law. In Milošević-era Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs avoided contact with each other, often walked on different sides of the street, and met at different bars. The fact that most of those Serbs remaining in Kosovo have retreated north of the Ibar River suggests that the challenge of integration is yet to be met.

Sociality, one might say, takes integration to a higher level. A society may be considered integrated when members of different groups—such as Albanians and Serbs—interact in a normal way in the public sphere. There is, however, no presupposition that they form friendships, let alone interact in the private sphere. Sociality entails just such interaction. Fernando Santos-Granero, in a study of kinship and affinity in the Amazon basin, identified sociality with friendships “in which the individuals involved—who may or may not be related by other kinds of ties—seek out each other’s company, exhibit mutually helping behaviour, and are joined by links of mutual generosity and trust that go beyond those expected between kin or affines.”³¹

²⁹ Moin Shakir, “On national integration,” *Social Scientist* 10 (1982), no. 4: 36.

³⁰ Louis Wirth, “The problem of minority groups,” in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. Ralph Linton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), 354.

³¹ Fernando Santos-Granero, “Of fear and friendship: Amazonian sociality beyond kinship and affinity,” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13 (2007), no. 1: 2.

Sociality is the presupposition of a common culture, and likewise of a sense of shared identity. But sociality also builds *trust*, which has been defined as “confident reliance on or belief in the integrity, veracity, justice, friendship, power, protection, etc., of a person or thing.”³² As belief, trust is offered without *proof* of the reliability or trustworthiness of the person or institution, and often also without security. Like integration and sociality, trust is a basic building block of society. As Georg Simmel put it,

Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about another person, and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong as, or stronger than, rational proof or personal observation.³³

Interpersonal trust is important not only insofar as it contributes to a sense of a common political project, but also as a building block for trust in the country’s political institutions. A polarized society is characterized by conflicting interests and agendas and, in such conditions, groups that benefit from government policies tend to trust government more than those that suffer from the same policies.³⁴ Citizens’ trust in government institutions builds institutional strength and contributes to the stability of the political system. As Dyrstad and Listhaug have noted, “the state’s capacity to deliver influences people’s trust in [governmental] institutions.”³⁵ Something else is required for citizens’ satisfaction with their government, however, viz., that they be offered real alternatives.³⁶ Trust, thus, requires the availability of choice—weak in the monochromatic Kosovar political

³² *The Cassell Pocket English Dictionary* (London: Arrow Books, 1991), 885.

³³ Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 178–9, as quoted in Jack Barbalet, “A characterization of trust, and its consequences,” *Theory and Society* 38 (2009), no. 4: 367.

³⁴ Karin Dyrstad and Ola Listhaug, “Citizens’ confidence in European parliaments: Institutions and issues,” in *Party Governance and Party Democracy: Festschrift to Kaare Strøm*, eds. Wolfgang C. Müller and Hanne Marthe Narud (New York and London: Springer, 2013), 161.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 162.

³⁶ Ola Listhaug, Bernt Aardal, and Ingunn Opheim Ellis, “Institutional variation and political support: An analysis of CSES data from 29 countries,” in *The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems*, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 313–4.

landscape—and the ability of the government to deliver on its promises—compromised in the case of Kosovo by the high level of corruption.

The Impact of History

The chapters which make up this volume are divided into four parts. Part One is devoted to history, and tells the story from 1878 to the present. Roberto Morozzo della Rocca starts the story, covering 120 years, beginning with the founding of the League of Prizren in 1878 and ending with the appearance of the KLA and the massacre of Albanians carried out by Serbian forces at Drenica in March 1998. He shows how Serbs tried to change the demographic balance in Kosovo after they annexed the region in 1912 and how local Albanians organized armed resistance when Belgrade moved to restore its control of the region after World War I. Serbian authorities would not allow schooling in the Albanian language. After 1918, the Belgrade government resumed the policy of trying to change the ethnic balance, sending some 60,000 Serb and Montenegrin colonists to settle in Kosovo by the late 1930s, while inducing Albanians and Turks to emigrate. This situation was changed during World War II when Kosovo was united with Italian-occupied Albania; Albanians could welcome the unification of their ethnic homeland, while recognizing that Italian occupation meant that their country was not yet sovereign. After the war, Kosovo was conjoined to a revived Yugoslav state, now under communist rule, and Morozzo della Rocca relates the evolution of the constitutional status and economic situation of the province in the communist era. In 1980, Tito died and, by 1987, Milošević was politically ascendant in Serbia and would ultimately play the central role in taking the country to war and causing it to break up into half a dozen successor states. It was, in the context of Milošević's repressive rule, that the province gravitated toward the uprising of 1998.

What is clear from Morozzo della Rocca's historical survey is that the policies adopted by the Belgrade regime in Kosovo blocked integration, hindered sociality, and sowed interethnic distrust, rendering its own rule unsustainable. Belgrade's rule was also characterized, whether intermittently or consistently, by corruption, contempt for the rights and equality of Albanians with Serbs, and lack of respect for the harm principle.

Oliver Jens Schmitt examines Albanian historical narratives produced after the achievement of independence in 2008. As he shows, historians in

Kosovo could choose between an approach treating the history of Kosovo as such, and, alternatively, one treating Kosovo's past within the larger context of the history of the Albanian people. On balance, as Schmitt argues, Albanian historians in Kosovo have opted for the latter approach. Nonetheless, within this approach, there are two variants: a narrative which reproduces accounts of history developed in Tiranë during Enver Hoxha's years in power (1944–85) and a narrative which gives Kosovo the central place in Albanian history.

Chapter 4, written by James Pettifer, examines the role played by Great Britain as regards the Kosova Liberation Army in the years 1996–2000, looking at both public diplomacy and clandestine operations. With the appearance of the KLA in spring 1996, Whitehall confronted a choice between backing Milošević, as some in the Foreign Office favored, and throwing support to the Albanian insurgents, as others preferred. By 1997, policy-makers in London recognized the possibility that Milošević's tactics might prove self-destructive and that an independent Kosovo might emerge within the proximate future. The shift to a more pro-Albanian policy was connected to the election in March 1997 of a Labour government, which included some figures who viewed the traditional British friendship with Belgrade as a "blind alley." British military advisers came into a collaborative relationship with the KLA now, and the British later encouraged Ramush Haradinaj, an ex-KLA leader, to form his Alliance for the Future of Kosovo in summer 1999.³⁷

Zachary Irwin's chapter, on the uprising and NATO's intervention, covers the two crucial years, 1998–99, beginning with the massacre at Drenica on 6 March 1998, in which 51 Albanians were killed. Irwin's focus is on the international response to the gathering crisis, and he pays attention to NATO deliberations. On the ground, the KLA seemed to have the upper hand during spring 1998, but by June, the tide was turning against the Albanian insurgents and, in July, the KLA sustained heavy losses at Rahovec. In October, UN Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke was dispatched to Belgrade for a meeting with Milošević; the result was an 11-point agreement under which Milošević was supposed to reduce the FRY military presence in Kosovo; instead, he increased Yugoslav troop strength from 18,000 men at the time of his meeting with Holbrooke to 23,500 by 23

³⁷ See also James Pettifer, *Kosova Express: A Journey in Wartime* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005).

December.³⁸ After various warnings and pleas from Western capitals, a final effort at mediation was undertaken at Rambouillet in February 1999. However, as Irwin notes, the Albanians at Rambouillet were not interested in anything short of independence, while the Serbian side refused to consider that option, putting a plan into action to drive the Albanians out of Kosovo. On 18 March, the Albanian side signed the document on offer; the Serbian side refused to sign. Thus, on 24 March 1999, NATO began air strikes against targets in Serbia. After 78 days of punishing air strikes, Milošević conceded defeat on 9 June 1999, and, the following day, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which authorized the dispatch of KFOR to Kosovo, placing it under NATO command. With that, Kosovo ceased to be under Belgrade's operational control. That the Belgrade regime's use of military force against civilians in the months leading up to 24 March violated the harm principle and made a mockery of human rights is more than obvious.

Johanna Deimel picks up where Irwin leaves off and, discussing the decade-long international protectorate in Kosovo, notes the challenges confronting the inhabitants of Kosovo, as they returned from temporary refuge in Macedonia and Albania. As she points out, as of June 1999, 40% of all domiciles in Kosovo had been destroyed, and thousands of Albanians had been killed. The international mission in Kosovo was organized into four "pillars," with UNMIK responsible for civil administration, the UN Refugee Agency handling humanitarian assistance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in charge of setting up democratic institutions, and the European Union assisting in the economy. The initial KFOR contingent involved 50,000 peacekeeping troops from 39 different states, both NATO members and states not in NATO. Yet, as Deimel notes, UN Resolution 1244 left Kosovo in a state of "limbo." Specifically, the resolution called for Kosovo to "enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."³⁹ Once the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formally dissolved in 2003, this assurance to Belgrade became a dead letter—but the resolution had not made any provision for Kosovo to attain independence. In the interim, as Deimel notes, the internationals encouraged the establishment of NGOs, which, accordingly, increased in number from

³⁸ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 514–5.

³⁹ Resolution 1244 (1999), at <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm> (accessed on 11 May 2013).

61 in 1998 to roughly 2,300 by 2004. As political parties emerged, the two main rivals were Hashim Thaçi, leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), and the aforementioned Haradinaj, leading the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). Even before the passage of the 2006 constitution in Serbia, it was becoming obvious to most observers that Kosovo was moving toward independence. As Deimel notes, the country's declaration of independence "was preceded by lengthy and nerve-wracking negotiations," but even so five EU states—Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Cyprus—have withheld recognition of Kosovo, for well-known historical and domestic reasons.

The Political Sphere

Part Two, devoted to the political system and to issues on the current political agenda, opens with Altuğ Günal's analysis of the evolution of the political system since February 2008. As he notes, the political parties of Kosovo are overwhelmingly conservative in orientation. Indeed, according to a 2008 report, the LDK, PDK, AKR, and LDD all agreed in advocating lower taxes, privatization of state enterprises, creation of a climate favorable to capitalism and a market economy, *laissez faire* policies in the economy, and small government. The LDK's program curiously represented the party as an advocate of "traditional and modern values,"⁴⁰ but the LDK joins the PDK, the AAK, and the LDD in opposing same-sex marriage and abortion; by contrast, the economically conservative AKR extends the principle of *laissez faire* also to the sexual sphere, and opposes any ban on either same-sex marriage or abortion. Finally, among the leading political parties, the Reformist Party—until its dissolution in February 2010—favored state intervention in the economy, the nationalization of large public companies, a lowering of salary differences, and a secular state, and opposed any ban on same-sex marriage or abortion. Yet, in spite of their shared orientation, the conservative political parties began to quarrel soon after independence had been achieved, with, for

⁴⁰ As quoted in Jeton Zulfaj, Brikena Mulliqi, Mentor Shala, and Petrit Tahiri, *Political Parties in Kosova: Profile and Ideology* (Prishtinë: Çelnaja, 2008). Supported by Soros and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, at http://www.fes-prishtina.org/pdf/final_draft_en.pdf (accessed on 16 May 2013), 19.

example, personal animosity developing between Thaçi and Haradinaj. Although the conservative parties share a broadly common program, they have, to some extent, different regional strongholds and compete on the basis of the familiarity of the parties' respective leaders in their regional strongholds, and presumably also on the basis of patronage.⁴¹ The first general elections after independence were held in December 2010; Thaçi's PDK was the strongest winner, capturing 34 seats in the Assembly; the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), of which Ibrahim Rugova had been a co-founder, placed second, with 27 seats. The remaining 59 seats were split among the Self-Determination Movement (14), the AAK (12), the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR, with 8), and minority parties (the remaining 25 seats). As Günel points out, the Serb domination of Northern Kosovo continues to present the government in Prishtina with a serious challenge, and Serbs in the north largely boycotted the December 2010 elections. He concludes by suggesting that there is some "hope that, if the economy and mutual trust improve after some time, popularly-elected Serbs in Kosovo's government and institutions may help to induce Northern Serbs to participate as well" in the politics of the country.

Chapter 8, by Florian Bieber, focuses on the Serbs of Kosovo. Taking the nineteenth century as his point of departure, Bieber traces the evolution of Serb-Albanian tensions over the decades and notes that, in the early 1970s, the local "balance of power began to shift away from Serbs in Kosovo" to local Albanians. The mobilization of Serbs began in 1981, in the wake of anti-Serb riots across Kosovo in spring of that year. The Serbian Orthodox Church played a role in this regard, with a public appeal signed by 21 Orthodox clergy, circulating it in 1982. But Serb-Albanian tensions escalated dangerously during the 1980s, leading eventually to a segregation of the two communities. Slobodan Milošević used the Serbs of Kosovo to mobilize the Serb nation for war, but, as Bieber notes, "displayed little interest or commitment toward this group." With Milošević's capitulation to NATO in June 1999 and his fall from power in October 2000, and further the declaration of independence by Montenegro in 2006, the entire context of Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo changed. As of 2005, an estimated 139,417 Serbs still lived in Kosovo, representing about 6% of the population. An estimated 60,000 of these lived in four municipalities in

⁴¹ Bekim Baliqi, "Innenpolitik und Parteiensystem im Kosovo," in Leißle et al., eds., 50, 51, 54.

the north, while those in Southern Kosovo are scattered across various villages and municipalities. As of 2011, roughly 40,000 persons, mainly Serbs, were dependent upon the Serbian government for salary or social welfare payments; most Serbs do not speak Albanian. These factors contribute to reinforcing Serb-Albanian separation, obstructing integration.

Gender relations are a pivotal domain in which a society defines itself as modern or traditional, liberal or illiberal/preliberal/nonliberal, democratic and open, or restrictive and closed. Nita Luci and Linda Gusia take up this theme in Chapter 15, exploring the role played by gender relations in civic participation in Kosovo. They relate how tens of thousands of women were mobilized into civil resistance in the 1990s, many of them being middle-class women. Of particular importance was the Independent Women's Association created at this time as an independent forum. The authors rebut accounts which treat women as marginal to Kosovo's recent history and note, *inter alia*, that 30% of the seats of parliament are reserved for women, and that a woman (Atifete Jahjaga) was elected president of Kosovo in 2011.

Part Two comes to a close with Dušan Janjić's chapter, which examines issues related to Northern Kosovo, where Serbs constitute a local majority. The Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo have had very different views concerning this small parcel of land north of the Ibar River. Janjić describes the competing plans which have been offered over the years, including one which involved an exchange of territory, in which Kosovo was to have ceded the land north of the Ibar to Serbia and to have received, in exchange, the Serbian municipalities of Preševo and Bujanovac, in which Albanians constitute a local majority. The author argues that, to have any prospect of success, any plan being put forward must offer a solution for the north of Kosovo, provide for the administration of Serb monasteries, extend guarantees to Serbs living in enclaves south of the Ibar, and regulate and protect the property of the Serbian state and of Serb citizens living in Kosovo.

In April 2013, Serbia and Kosovo negotiated an agreement under which, in return for recognizing and applying the laws passed in Prishtina, municipal bodies in the north were to enjoy autonomy. In addition, the Kosovar government was to agree not to send security forces north of the Ibar, for the interim, except in the event of emergencies. However, while the draft agreement includes a clause that "neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side's progress in their respec-

tive EU paths,"⁴² it stops short of full normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Partly for that reason and partly also because several EU member states continue to block Kosovo's admission into the Union, the country's prospects in the immediate future look uncertain. Robert A. Churcher, former director of the Office of the International Crisis Group in Prishtina, testified before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 24 April 2013 and advised the committee that there were, in his view, two fundamental problems with the EU-brokered agreement. The first was that it recognized the principle of self-determination for the Serbs living in Northern Kosovo, but not for the Albanians living in Southern Serbia, where they constitute a local majority in the region known as the Preševo Triangle; the second is that, in the absence of Serbian recognition of Kosovo's independence, the accommodation of Serb interests in Northern Kosovo would fail of its purpose in that, in his view, the agreement appeared to "have been designed to appease Serbia rather than to create stability and lasting solutions in the Balkans."⁴³ Churcher urged the US to promote a fresh agreement which would include Serbian recognition of Kosovo, together with a territorial exchange involving the aforementioned areas; in any event, Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić himself had proposed, already in October 2012, to swap the Preševo Triangle for Northern Kosovo, and he repeated this proposal the following May.⁴⁴ At the end of May, the prospects for a Kosovar–Serbian agreement seemed to be threatened by the opposition of some Serbs.⁴⁵ Whatever the eventual prospects for an accommodation between the two countries, Kosovo faces economic challenges including an unemployment rate of 45.3%

⁴² From a photocopy of the draft agreement sent to me by a German journalist. See the report in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 27 May 2013, at <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/kosovo-serbien-stimmt-fuer-normalisierungsabkommen-1.1681762> (accessed on 30 May 2013).

⁴³ Statement of Robert A. Churcher, "Kosovo and Serbia: A pathway to peace," House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats (24 April 2013), at <http://www.acl.us/churcher-april2013-testimony.htm> (accessed on 11 June 2013).

⁴⁴ *Glas javnosti* (Belgrade), 6 October 2012, at <http://www.glas-javnosti.rs/clanak/politika/glas-javnosti-06-10-2012/ivica-dacic-podela-kosova-jedino-pravo-resenje> (accessed on 30 May 2013); and *Die Presse* (Vienna), 6 May 2013, at <http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/1399002/Gebietstausch-waere-beste-Loesung-fuer-KosovoProblem> (accessed on 14 May 2013).

⁴⁵ *Die Welt* (Berlin), 30 May 2013, at <http://www.welt.de/116640008> (accessed on 30 May 2013).

(73% among those aged 15–24), and a poverty rate of 30%.⁴⁶ The Trepça (Trepča in Serbian) lead and zinc mines are Kosovo's most important economic resource; indeed, Chirijeev Kathuria, president of the Chicago-based New General Power LLC, has called the mining complex "one of the most important" sources for lead, zinc, and rare earth metals in Europe.⁴⁷ At this writing, Serbia, which has been sharing jurisdiction over the mines with the Albanians, is trying to establish exclusive control. If Kosovo were to lose any share in the mines, its economic prospects would likely be bleaker than they are today.

Values and Value Transformation

Part Three, devoted to values and value transformation, leads off with Shkëlzen Gashi's study of history textbooks, focusing on the way in which history is represented in schoolbooks. Comparing the Albanian textbooks published by the Libri Shkollor publishing house with the Serbian textbooks published by the Zavod za udžbenike (Belgrade), he finds systematic differences between the two sets of schoolbooks in the way in which the past is remembered. Of particular interest is the fact that the Kaçak movement, an Albanian resistance movement which resisted incorporation of Kosovo into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, is simply ignored in Serbian textbooks, while the Kosovar Albanian textbooks discuss the Kaçaks, and argue that, in spite of their violent suppression by Serbian forces, they "reinforc[ed] the national morale and pride of the Albanian people." Again, discussing the confiscation of land from Albanians and its transfer to Serb ownership, the Serbian textbooks write that "about 500,000 village families gained land," while the Albanian textbooks point out that the land in question was expropriated from local Albanians. Differences in narrative continue where the socialist era (1945–90/91) and the Milošević

⁴⁶ The unemployment rate overall comes from 2011, the unemployment rate among those in ages 15–24 from 2009, and the poverty rate from 2010. All these figures were taken from the Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html> (accessed on 15 May 2013).

⁴⁷ "Serbia seeks investment in Trepca mines ahead of Kosovo talks," *Bloomberg* (17 May 2013), at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-17/serbia-seeks-investment-in-trepca-mines-ahead-of-kosovo-talks.html> (accessed on 18 May 2013).

era (1987–2000) are concerned. Concerning the uprising of 1998–99, Albanian schoolbooks report that some 15,000 Albanians were killed by Serbian forces during NATO's bombing campaign (24 March–10 June 1999) but do not provide figures for the number of Serbs and other non-Albanians displaced after KFOR took control of the region. By contrast, Serbian textbooks report that more than 220,000 non-Albanians, mostly Serbs, were displaced at that time. Gashi shows that, through their schoolbooks, Albanian and Serbian schoolchildren and adolescents acquire entirely different notions of which people should be sovereign in Kosovo, different perceptions about crimes committed, different versions of collaboration with the Axis during World War II, and different accounts of the treatment of their respective peoples during the socialist era and after.

Part Three continues with Kristen Ringdal's chapter, based primarily on responses from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS), conducted in 2008, and places responses among the residents of Kosovo within the larger context of responses and values among the residents of 46 other European countries and regions. As he notes, the EVS covers such topics as life satisfaction, and attitudes/values relating to politics, religion, work, and family. He focuses especially on interpersonal trust, national pride, confidence in the justice system and the police, life satisfaction, political participation, tolerance, and attitudes to democracy. Supplementing the EVS/2008 with the findings of the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP), conducted during 2003–04, he finds that respondents in Kosovo were the least tolerant (among EVS respondents) of homosexuals, but also the least ready to allow extreme political parties to function openly. Respondents in Kosovo also ranked as the least secular (i.e., most religious) people in Europe. The fact that the people of Kosovo are the least tolerant people of Europe suggests that it may be difficult to build a liberal democracy in the country. Although one might expect a strong correlation between trust in other people and trust in the parliament, the civil service, courts, and the police, in Kosovo, as in Turkey, these seem to be negatively correlated. Specifically, in 2008, respondents in Kosovo expressed the highest confidence in parliament and the civil service, and also very high confidence in the courts and police. This suggests that, at least at the dawn of independence, people in Kosovo were ready to accept the laws and legal institutions of the country as legitimate or, to use another expression, fair. On the other hand, the extremely low levels of trust in other people, expressed by Kosovar

respondents, together with the strong disinclination to believe that most people want to be fair, suggest that the medium-term prospect for confidence in national and local institutions may not be good.

In Chapter 13, Albert Simkus and Shemsi Krasniqi look at differences in values *within* Kosovo, contrasting the responses of local Albanians with those of local Serbs as found in the aforementioned South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) in 2003–04, supplemented with analyses of the 2008 WVS survey, and a Gallup International survey conducted in 2012. The SEESSP surveys included questions related to ethnic exclusion, gender roles, and gender equality, and attitudes towards mores related to sexuality and reproduction. In multivariate analyses including the effects of age, level of education, and urban vs. rural residence, they find that level of education makes a much more decisive difference for attitudes about gender than age in itself. Indeed most of the age and cohort differences are explained by the increases in education. Unsurprisingly, older and less educated people were more traditional in this regard than younger and better educated people; less obviously, if those younger did not have higher education, they were not much less traditional.

In Chapter 14, Karin Dyrstad takes into account survey data from 2011, and looks at differences between Albanians and Serbs in support for democracy and trust in the country's political institutions. Comparing the 2011 data with data from 2003 and 2008, she finds that differences between local Serbs and Albanians have remained strong. She notes too that, while most of the locals support democracy in principle, Serbs give the actual political system the lowest possible rating, while Albanians give it a high rating (in spite of their low turnout at election time). Between 2003 and 2004, local confidence in public and political institutions increased dramatically, at least among Albanians, while less than 20% of Serbs expressed any confidence in local political parties. Indeed, data from 2011 showed that nearly 80% of Serbs abstained from voting in the 2010 elections in Kosovo, although nearly 70% voted in Serbian elections.

Toward a Conclusion

The concluding section embraces three chapters, beginning with Anton Bebler's account of Kosovo as an international problem. Bebler casts his eye as far back as the twelfth century but looks more particularly at the

competing expansionist projects at the dawn of the twentieth century, as they affected Kosovo. He notes that the Serbian conquest of Kosovo in 1912 and reconquest in 1918 “left a bitter collective memory among the Albanians of Kosovo,” and discusses the partition of Kosovo during World War II. Following the inclusion of that war, Kosovo was once more reabsorbed by Belgrade, albeit now within a socialist federation; during the years of socialist Yugoslavia, the international community regarded Kosovo as an internal matter for Yugoslavia. Even in 1991, when the European Community convened a conference to discuss the disintegration of the SFRY, Kosovo’s fate was—at Serbia’s insistence—left off the agenda. It was only in 1998, with the start of the Albanian insurgency, that the international community began to take note of the discontent in Kosovo. The international protectorate, which was put in place in June 1999, ended in September 2012, with the closure of the Office of the International Civilian Representative. Yet, Bebler concludes, the status of Kosovo “remains a controversial regional and wider international problem.” And, as he notes, the polarization and the gulf of distrust between Albanians and Serbs only grew after Milošević came to power.

With memories of the conflict of 1998–99 still fresh in people’s minds, not to mention memories of earlier periods, and with local Serbs and Albanians typically nurturing *different* memories of the recent and more distant past alike, reconciliation has been difficult. It is precisely here that the Nansen Dialogue Network, founded by Steinar Bryn in 1994–95, has made its contribution. In his chapter for this volume, Bryn, who has been the driving force in the Network since its launch two decades ago, explains the thinking behind it and recounts its work. The Network initially established three-month-long dialogue seminars in the Norwegian university town of Lillehammer, bringing Serbs and Albanians together to talk to each other. Between 1995 and 2000, more than 200 persons from the post-Yugoslav region came to Lillehammer to take part in these seminars. Later, the seminars were shortened and the scope of the seminars was expanded, bringing Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, and others together. Eventually, ten Nansen Dialogue Centers were set up, operating in Osijek (Croatia); Banja Luka, Sarajevo, and Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina); Podgorica (Montenegro); Prishtina and Mitrovica (Kosovo); Belgrade and Bujanovac (Serbia); and Skopje (Macedonia). The seminars have proven to be useful in overcoming distrust, establishing some common understanding of the past among participants, and even forging interethnic

friendships. In this way, the Nansen Dialogue Network has made and continues to make a contribution to reconciliation although, as Bryn emphasizes, reconciliation is a slow process, which proceeds by small increments.

But quite apart from the economic challenges—noted in the final chapter in this volume—it is also apparent from the survey data reported in this volume that Kosovar society remains distant from achieving a truly civic culture, even though one may identify individuals and groups who have imbibed liberal and civic values. The low scores for tolerance and respect for gender equality, like the low levels of trust in other people and low confidence that others will behave in a fair way, suggest that Kosovo has a difficult road ahead. Nonetheless, with continued EU engagement in the region⁴⁸—which does not presume enlargement—and with the continued work of such agencies as the Nansen Dialogue Network, gradual change in the direction of a liberal society with a civic culture may be possible.

As Montesquieu noted more than 250 years ago, a political system is relatively more stable insofar as it operates according to the rule of law and the principle of the separation of powers, with gradualism as its *modus operandi*.⁴⁹ In terms of the separation of powers, as the 2013 report issued by *Nations in Transit* observes, “[d]espite legislative reforms and a solid performance of the Constitutional Court, Kosovo’s judiciary is only nominally independent from the executive branch.”⁵⁰ Although government officials have stated that establishing the independence of the judiciary is a high priority, “Kosovo’s judiciary continues to operate under intense political pressure,” and there have been deficiencies in terms of assuring equality before the law.⁵¹ For that matter, of all the post-socialist countries in Central and Southeastern Europe (which is to say, those countries which were not part of the Soviet Union before that country’s

⁴⁸ For a discussion, see Adam Fagan, “EU assistance for civil society in Kosovo: A step too far for democracy promotion?” *Democratization* 18 (2011), no. 3: 707–30.

⁴⁹ Paul A. Rahe, *Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty: War, Religion, Commerce, Terrain, Technology, Uneasiness of Mind, the Spirit of Political Vigilance, and the Foundations of the Modern Republic* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2009), 167–8, 210–1, 216, 219; see also Andrea Radasanu, “Montesquieu on moderation, monarchy and reform,” *History of Political Thought* 31 (2010), no. 2: 292.

⁵⁰ Krenar Gashi, “Kosovo,” in *Nations in Transit 2013: Authoritarian Aggression and the Pressures of Austerity* (New York: Freedom House, 2013), at <http://www.freedom-house.org/report/nations-transit/2013/kosovo> (accessed on 20 June 2013), 286.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 295.

breakup at the end of 1991), Kosovo has been rated poorest in terms of judicial framework and independence.⁵²

Kosovo also faces formidable challenges in the area of the rule of law where, once again, *Nations in Transit* assigned Kosovo the lowest score in the region.⁵³ Indeed, a UN report prepared by Kai Eide noted that “[o]rganized crime and corruption have been characterized as the biggest threats to the stability of Kosovo and the sustainability of its institutions.”⁵⁴ Moreover, citizens of Kosovo largely share a “perception that officeholders can engage in corruption and be immune to prosecution.”⁵⁵

Added to these factors is the fact that the existence of independent media is essential to the development and sustainability of a stable, democratic system. Yet, in April 2012, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo adopted a new Criminal Code which included three articles which undermined journalists’ right to withhold the names of their sources. Moreover, neither the Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo nor the Kosovo Press Council has been consulted by government offices in connection with the preparation of legislation or regulations affecting the operations of the media.⁵⁶ Again, *Nations in Transit* listed Kosovo as performing worst within the designated region in terms of independent media, as it did also for electoral process, civil society, and national democratic governance.⁵⁷

These sundry challenges are not unique to Kosovo. All of the post-socialist states of Central and Southeastern Europe have had to build new constitutional and legal frameworks, establish the rule of law, deal with organized crime, fight corruption, and work to put the economy on sound footing. Leaving aside Czechoslovakia’s “velvet divorce,” only Bosnia-Herzegovina and Moldova have had to endure the *de facto* division of their countries—a fate which the government in Prishtina still hopes

⁵² By *Nations in Transit*. See “Tables,” at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2013_Tables_FINAL.pdf (accessed on 20 June 2013).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ As quoted in Rastislav Báchora and Felix Reiterer, “Korruption im Kosovo—normative, historische und realpolitische Aspekte,” in Leißle et al., eds., 122.

⁵⁵ Report of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2012), as quoted in Báchora and Reiterer, “Korruption im Kosovo,” 127.

⁵⁶ Closely paraphrased from Gashi, “Kosovo,” 293.

⁵⁷ “Tables,” at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2013_Tables_FINAL.pdf (accessed on 20 June 2013).

to avoid. What is striking about the case of Kosovo, however, is that it has been ranked lowest (by *Nations in Transit*) across most measures of democratization, and, for that matter, among the lowest in terms of media independence by *Reporters Without Borders*.⁵⁸ Time will tell how the people of Kosovo will handle these sundry and interrelated challenges.

⁵⁸ *Reporters Without Borders*: 2013 World Press Freedom Index, at <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html> (accessed on 20 June 2013).

CHAPTER 2

A Short History of the Kosovar Albanians' Struggle for Independence, 1878–1998

ROBERTO MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA

There is ample literature on the ethnic and demographic strife between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo¹ and it swings between the two extremes of Serb and Albanian viewpoints.² Almost every claim made by one side is disputed by the other, with both sometimes using exactly the same arguments but *reversed*. There are always two truths about Kosovo. Non-

¹ Kosovo or Kosova? On the choice of names, see Paul Garde, *Le discours balkanique. Des mots et des hommes* (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 278–81.

² In contemporary times, the main studies on the history of Kosovo (not always free from political passion in favor of the Albanian side or the Serbs) are: Michel Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie. Minorité nationale territoire et développement* (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 1992); Marco Dogo, *Kosovo. Albanesi e Serbi: le radici del conflitto* (Lungro di Cosenza: Marco Costantino Editore, 1992); Ger Duijzings, Dusan Janjić, and Shkëlzen Maliqi, eds., *Kosovo—Kosova: Confrontation or Coexistence* (Nijmegen: Peace Research Centre, 1997); Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 1998); Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, *Kosovo la guerra in Europa: Origini e realtà di un conflitto etnico* (Milano: Guerini e Associati, 1999); and Ger Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 2000).

Regarding the conflict for Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians, there are numerous publications by both sides, mostly nationalistic in tone. A few examples: for the Serb side, *Kosovo–Metohija dans l'histoire serbe* (Lausanne: L'Âge d'Homme, 1990) and Dusan Bataković, *Kosovo. La spirale de la haine: Les faits. Les acteurs. L'histoire* (Lausanne: L'Âge d'Homme, 1993); for the Albanian side, The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History, *The Truth on Kosova* (Tirana: Encyclopaedia Publishing House, 1993); and Rexhep Qosja, *La question albanaise* (Paris: Fayard, 1995).

Balkan historiography can provide some help in understanding Kosovo's history but it too often falls prey to the ethnic passions that are the object of its studies. Suffice it to consider the recent production of Western historiography on the one side and Eastern Russian or Slav historiography on the other: the former prevailingly pro-Albanian, the latter resolutely pro-Serb. Western literature on Serbs and Albanians, indeed, has swung in one direction or the other depending on the fortunes of war. In 1999, NATO waged war against Serbia, which was held responsible for the recent Balkan tragedies. But during World War I, the Serbs had been viewed as champions of the free and civilized world and, as such, were acclaimed above all in Paris and New York. Human affairs often present such paradoxes proving, on the whole, that history is always complicated and opinions that claim to be conclusive should always be taken with a grain of salt, in 1918 as in 1999.

Ethnography developed earlier for the Serbs than it did for the Albanians, thanks to the more favorable political and cultural circumstances. The Serbs' early liberation from Ottoman rule was accompanied by a swift cultural development of a nationalism that adopted the customary tools, including the patriotic narrative that makes for effective propaganda. Albanian nationalism, instead, was among the last to emerge from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and it is only in recent decades that it has become deeply rooted in the cultural fabric. The fact that Albanians achieved a national state so late doesn't mean that their nationalism is weak; on the contrary, the procrastination has made it especially strong. But without a properly organized state it hasn't been easy for Albanians to make their identity and their citizenship rights known to the outside world.

The Emergence of Albanian National Consciousness

Generally, the dawning of Albanian nationalism is dated to 1878, when Albanian patriots and prominent citizens established the League of Prizren in this historic city of southern Kosovo, at the time threatened by Serbian forces allied with the Russians in a war against the Turks. The Berlin Conference subsequently left Kosovo's status of Ottoman *vilayet* unchanged, according to the wishes of the Albanians themselves. Over the following decades, a practically permanent dispute devel-

oped between Kosovo's Albanians and the Ottoman power in which the Albanians claimed the right to enjoy some form of political, judicial, and fiscal autonomy based on their ancestral traditional customs and the possession of weapons. Fearing Albanian secession from the empire, the Sublime Porte opposed these demands, at times resorting to large-scale military repression. With the exception of a few isolated patriots, however, Kosovar Albanians had no wish to break away from the Ottoman Empire, which had provided some protection against the aggressive neighboring Serbian state. Moreover, they shared the same religion (Kosovar Albanians are nearly 100% Muslims). This lasting turbulence and the intermittent conflict with the Porte led to a state of anarchy and insecurity in the region, for which the Slav Christian minorities that, depending on the year and complex events associated with migrations, made up roughly 30% of the population, paid the highest price. Demographics, which play a fundamental political role in contemporary Kosovo, in those days—between the Berlin Conference and the Balkan wars of 1912–13—varied a great deal. There were Albanians who moved away from the territories that had become Southern Serbia, Albanians who moved into Kosovo from Albania, Serbs who moved to Kosovo from Northern Albania, and Serbs who left Kosovo for Serbia. There were even fairly frequent cases of Christians who paid Albanian Muslims to protect them from other Albanian Muslims.³ Meanwhile, because of the Sublime Porte's refusal to heed their pleas for autonomy, Kosovar Albanians became more and more disaffected from the empire, though not deeply enough for them to opt for full political emancipation.

Kosovar Albanians, at any rate, were not the first to achieve independence, as instead did the Albanians living along the coast between Shkodër and Gjirokastër in 1912. The explanation for this is to be found in the decision taken by the great powers that arbitrated the dissolution of the "great sick man of the East" to hand Kosovo over to Serbia, while an independent Albanian state was to be made up by the two Turkish *vilayets* of Scutari and Janina. At the time, the idea of an independent homeland was circulating in Albanian circles but was supported by only a few élites. Many Albanians, mostly Muslims, contrary to the story told by historiography of Enver Hoxha's days, had no wish to have an independent national

³ See Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 55; and Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 235.

state. Rather, they were keen to preserve the comfortable niche they had carved out for themselves within the Sultans' empire, within which they enjoyed the status of a privileged population. Vaso Pasha, the nineteenth-century bard of Albanian-ness, was an Albanian nationalist but also a contented Ottoman governor. The Albanianism of many of the Sultan's Muslim Shqiptar subjects was viewed in connection with a privileged status within the empire, not as a centripetal force. To quote Peter Bartl: "Although they felt they were Albanians, it wasn't easy for them to distance themselves from Turkey, toward which they felt loyal as Muslims [...] As long as Turkey was still in a position to exercise power over the Balkans, they could not abandon her [...] Turkey's survival was considered essential for their own preservation."⁴ The decision to opt for Albanian independence, proclaimed in Valona in 1912, inclusive of Kosovo, though unsuccessful, was made after the dissolution of Ottoman power in Europe, at a time when Greeks and Serbs were working to portion out the territories inhabited by the Albanians.

In 1912, the Ottoman Empire surrendered Kosovo to Belgrade's state following a Balkan war in which Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians joined forces against the Porte and succeeded in reducing its European domains to Thrace alone. The great European powers ratified this surrender without hesitation. This came as a grim surprise to Albanian leaders and worthies in the region, given that for generations they had considered Kosovo their own territory, i.e., Albanian land. There came also a bitter awareness of the significance of the fact that there had been no cultural patriotic and nationalist evolution, there were no propaganda tools, no contacts with circles beyond the only corner in the world they knew, the Ottoman territory.

After 1912, the Serbs attempted to alter the ethnic balance that had developed in Kosovo under the crescent. There had already been a case of ethnic cleansing against the Albanians in the region of Niš, which lies along Kosovo's northeastern border and had been acquired by the Belgrade government in 1878 thanks to decisions made at the Congress of Berlin. The Albanians, who were the majority in the rural areas, were hounded out of the region. Many of them sought refuge in Ottoman

⁴ Peter Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung 1878–1912* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1968). See also Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening 1878–1912* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1967).

Kosovo and in 1912 found themselves once again under Serbian rule. The Serbs' efforts to alter the ethnic balance in Kosovo were to progress amid ups and downs.

From 1914 to 1945

During World War I, which was a tragedy for the Serbs from the military standpoint, Kosovo was occupied by the Austrians and the Bulgarians. When peace came, the Serbs secured a dominant position in the nascent Yugoslav state. When the Serbs regained power in Kosovo, the Albanians began to organize armed resistance. Guerrilla fighters were active in a number of areas up till 1924 with the aid of supporters in Northern Albania. While countering the insurgency, the Belgrade Government did its utmost to resolve the ethnic struggle in Kosovo to its own advantage. The Albanians were a foreign body in the Yugoslav state led by the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty, in which Kosovo was considered simply Southern Serbia, while the Kosovo myth (the battle of Kosovo Polje of 1389) was adopted as the pillar of Serbness.⁵ Access to culture and education was strictly limited for Albanians, as typically happens in the case of an unwanted minority. As justification for denying the Albanians education, the Serbs referred to the primitive traditionalism of Albanian clans and families, for whom schooling was a secondary aspect within the framework of an existence regulated, for centuries, by customs and armed conflict. There were no schools using the Albanian language and Albanian families refused to send their children to Serbian schools. In addition to cultural deprivation, action was also taken in relation to the region's ethnic composition. Several thousand Serbs and Montenegrins settled in Kosovo, reaching 60,000 by the late 1930s. These settlers were given state-owned land in the hills and a few lots in the plain, which had been expropriated from the Albanians. Groups of Kosovar Albanians and Turks were induced to migrate to Anatolia. Rulers in Belgrade claimed that the Albanians were Serbs who were to be led back to their Slav roots by eradicating the Albanian–Islamic culture. This statement did not in fact produce any results: the Albanians were not going to become Serbs just because the

⁵ See Christos Mylonas, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003).

Serbs had asked them to. The overall demographic balance changed very little. In the early 1930s, the Belgrade government devised a scheme to turn the Albanians into a minority in Kosovo—mass transfer/deportation to Anatolia.

For a long time the speech made by Vaso Čubrilović has been repeatedly presented as irrefutable evidence of the Serb passion for ethnic cleansing. Albanian nationalist propaganda has used it as its strongest argument. The address on the “Solution to the issue of Kosovo” of 1937 by this representative of the Serb nationalist intelligentsia (Čubrilović had also been involved in the planning of the Sarajevo assassination of 1914) presented a clearly defined plan for ethnic cleansing aimed at eradicating, by all possible means, the Albanians from Kosovo.⁶ But, more than Čubrilović’s words, it was the 1938 agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey on an “assisted” exodus of the Albanians from Kosovo that prepared the ground for radical ethnic cleansing.

From 1930 onwards, the Belgrade government tried to persuade the Ankara government (Angora, at the time) to agree to the transfer of 300–400,000 Albanians from Yugoslavia to Anatolia. In the early 1930s, there were almost 550,000 Albanians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and two-thirds of them were in Kosovo. Turkish rulers allowed a few years to go by before taking into consideration the Yugoslav proposals, which became more attractive when Belgrade offered to provide substantial financial resources for re-settling the emigrants in Anatolia. Ankara considered the possibility of placing the mass of Albanians in Turkish Kurdistan, so as to weaken and better control the local and compact Kurdish element. In 1935, the dealings between Belgrade and Ankara became common knowledge: officially, 200,000 Albanians were to be accepted by the Turks, in the name of their long-standing Ottoman bond with the Albanians. The Yugoslav funds for the operation, amassed using assets abandoned in Kosovo by emigrant Albanians, were not to be handed over to them but rather to the Turkish government to cover re-settlement expenses. The final agreement was signed in 1938 but never implemented; the Belgrade government did not succeed in raising the resources it had promised the Turks.⁷ The start of World War II sank the ethnic deportation plan once and for all.

⁶ For the Vasa Čubrilović conference, see Mirko Grmek et al., *Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe* (Paris: Fayard, 1993).

⁷ See Dogo, *Kosovo*, 278–80.

There were no significant variations in Kosovo's ethnic-demographic percentages between 1912 and 1941, in spite of the Serbs' determination to harmonize the region with the rest of Yugoslavia, where they were dominant at the time. The birth rate of non-Slav Kosovars was very high. Montenegrin Serbs comprised, during that period, less than one third of the overall population, a percentage only slightly higher than it had been before 1912.

During World War II, the Albanians won a momentary revenge within the framework of the "Greater Albania" promoted by the Italians, which comprised much of Kosovo. This larger ethnic Albania, however, did not include Kosovo's northern enclave, the Mitrovica territory, with its many mines that were protected by German forces who were even more supportive of the Albanians than the Italians in view of the anti-Slav aims of Hitler's war. The ethnic cleansing initiatives of the previous twenty years, whether actual or planned, were reversed by the Albanians who expelled as many Slavs as possible from Kosovo, as documented, moreover, by accounts provided by Italian military personnel who had occupied the region and which described columns of fleeing Montenegrin Serb peasants, chased by Albanians. Reports of what happened between April and October 1941 present striking analogies, except that the victims were from the opposite side, with the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbs in 1999 against the Albanians; they describe columns of Slavs fleeing Kosovo with their few belongings carried in carts or on their shoulders, and the "ethnic cleansers" randomly shooting at the fugitives, in addition to courtyard massacres and houses burnt down in the hope of keeping their inhabitants from returning, once and for all.⁸

Čubrilović had demanded action against the Albanians; Mustafa Kruja, appointed head of Greater Albania, then promoted the same actions to the detriment of the Serbs. Indeed, Kruja suggested eliminating Slavs who had migrated into Kosovo during previous years and the deportation to concentration camps outside of Kosovo of Slavs who had inhabited the area for many generations. But Kruja had to yield to the govern-

⁸ See Carlo Umiltà, *Jugoslavia e Albania. Memorie di un diplomatico* (Milano: Garzanti, 1947); and Giovanni Lorenzoni, *Rapporto sulla Riforma Agraria Jugoslava con speciale riguardo ai territori interessanti l'Albania, la Dalmazia e la Croazia* (Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1942).

ment in Rome, and his plans, therefore, were not implemented any more than those of Čubrilović, in the opposite direction, four years earlier.

Between 1941 and 1945, Kosovar Albanians were grateful to both Italians and Germans for their release from Serbian power. Albanians of the former state of Tirana greeted the establishment of Greater Albania with a mixture of elation and resentment over the 1939 invasion, but Kosovar Albanians gave the Axis powers unconditional support. It is not surprising that the Italians and the Germans, even at the most difficult times in their Balkan wars, had succeeded in recruiting collaborators and soldiers in Kosovo. After 8 September 1943, to ingratiate themselves with the Germans, the Albanians of Kosovo and Northern Albania went as far as declaring themselves to be the "Aryans of the Balkans," as opposed to the Slavs whom Nazi doctrine viewed as pariahs.⁹ In 1943, the SS established the "Skanderbeg" division made up of 6,500 Muslim Albanians, but it showed inadequate internal cohesion and little propensity to fight.¹⁰ Furthermore, Greater Albania's leaders protested in Berlin against the division soldiers' red Turkish fez: Vehbi Frasheri declared that the Greater Albanian State was non-confessional and all religions enjoyed equal standing within its borders. The Albanians' religion was Albanianism, i.e., love of their homeland, not Christianity or Islam.

Kosovar Albanians supported Greater Albania up till 1945, and, unlike many Serbs, did not join the ranks of Tito's partisans.¹¹ Albanian

⁹ Mehdi Frashëri publicly stated that Albanians were "an Aryan race of Illyrian root" (see the telegram of the German Consul in Tirana, Schliep, 4 January 1944, Akten des Auswärtigen Amt, Politisches Archiv, Berlin). The Chairman of the High Council of Regency did not believe in the Aryan myth, but he accepted it for political convenience.

¹⁰ See George H. Stein, *The Waffen S.S.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966); Christoph Stamm, "Zur deutschen Besetzung Albaniens 1943–1944," in *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, vol. 2 (1981), 99–120; and Yves-Marc Ajchenbaum, "Une division SS islamiste en Bosnie," *Le Monde* (Paris), 14–15 November 1993.

¹¹ "Attempts by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) to recruit Kosovo Albanians were largely frustrated. The Kosovars shunned the CPY as an alien 'Pan-Slavic' organization, which ignored their national aspirations [...] As a result, the Partisan struggle in Kosovo was essentially a Serbian and Montenegrin effort, attracting only a handful of Albanians." (Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 123)

Fadil Hoxha was born in Kosovo. In 1941 he came back from Albania, where he had moved as a boy and where he had become a loyal communist leader. He wanted to organize a partisan guerrilla but he was scarcely successful. Between 1942 and 1944 the Albanian members of the Communist Party of Kosovo (between 400 and 463 depending on the year) never exceeded 12 per cent of the total, while the other

Communist partisan groups existed only in Southern Albania and did not subscribe to the views held in Northern Albania and Kosovo. Incidentally, the Southern Albanian Communists, led by Enver Hoxha, who were aligned with Tito's Partisans and deferential to the internationalist ideology of Socialism, did not call for any changes to be made to the Albano-Yugoslav pre-war borders, leaving Kosovo to be administered by Belgrade. When, in the fall of 1944, German troops pulled out of Kosovo, the Partisan movement did not take over militarily, being too weak in the region. It was, instead, the Balli Kombëtar, the Albanian nationalist party rooted in Northern Albania and Kosovo that took control of the region. Subsequently Enver Hoxha's partisans defeated the Balli Kombëtar, initially in Upper Albania and later, jointly with Tito's partisans, in Kosovo. The nationalist mountain-based guerrilla warfare continued even after the area was declared "pacified" in June 1945.

In the immediate post-war period, because they had supported Nazi-Fascist occupation, Albanians suffered ostracism and repression under the new Yugoslav communist regime. The lasting guerrilla warfare attracted reprisals against the civilian population and they were carried out by the federal army. The Albanians were not included amongst the peoples constituting Yugoslavia, although Tito did not encourage any return to Kosovo by the Montenegrin Serb settlers who had moved into the area in the 1920s and 1930s and been expelled during the war.

The Socialist State, 1945–86

The Marshal had no desire to revive the notion of "strong Serbia strong Yugoslavia" on which the first Yugoslavia had been based. On the contrary, he worked for a "weak Serbia strong Yugoslavia," or, more accurately, for the creation of a multinational state reflecting the imperial model of his

members were Serbs and Montenegrins. In winter 1944–45, as soon as the Germans withdrew, Kosovo experienced a large Albanian rebellion because of the failed reunification between Kosovo and Albania that the partisan communist leaders had promised to gain consensus and support among the Albanians against the Germans. Miranda Vickers concludes: "Kosovo, therefore, emerged from the war into the new Federal Yugoslavia under siege, and with its alienated Albanian population regarded, as in 1918, as a threat to the new state" (p. 142). See also Dogo, *Kosovo*, 325–31.

Habsburg youth. Within this multinational Yugoslavia, the position of a few minor populations (Bosnians, Montenegrins, the inhabitants of Vojvodina, Macedonians, peoples who to some extent still miss Tito) was strengthened so that they might act as counterweights to the greater populations (Croats and Serbs, who by tradition still today take a negative view of Tito). The Albanians were one of the minor peoples of Yugoslavia; if nothing else in view of their limited demographic number in 1945 (less than 400,000 in Kosovo). But the precedents of war and the dispute that arose between Belgrade and Tirana in 1948 (formally, the rivalry between Tito and Stalin emerged precisely over the issue of the Albanians in the Balkans) weighed upon the treatment handed out to the Albanians of Yugoslavia in the early days of the Tito era.

In the mid-1950s, while Belgrade and Tirana viewed each other with hostility, Kosovar Albanians were subjected to repression based on the practice of suspicion. The police searched Albanian homes one by one for weapons. Given that the customary practice involved ill-treatment when weapons were not found, some Albanians bought rifles just so that they could turn them over to the police and be spared the violence. The arms' collection campaign was characterized by heavy intimidation against the Albanians.¹² But, Yugoslavia being a mosaic of peoples and cultures, there were also some positive developments for Albanians, such as the establishment of hundreds of schools where children could study in their own mother tongue. Tito's regime, indeed, made basic education compulsory also for Albanians, an initiative that was the opposite of those promoted in the first Serbian Yugoslavia.

Aside from the political circumstances, within Tito's federation, cultural differences engendered serious problems in relations between the Albanians and other peoples that held a more or less disparaging view of Albanians, considered a primitive, lazy, degraded, undisciplined, Ottoman, Turkish population.¹³ Following a visit to the Balkans, an Australian scholar

¹² See Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 157; and Dogo, *Kosovo*, 331.

¹³ See Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie*. Roux underlines the cultural differences of the Albanians with respect to the Serbo-Croatian speaking Southern Slavs, who, differently from the Albanians, were considered as constituent peoples of Yugoslav. Having been incorporated into Yugoslav against their will, Albanians were irredentist, they abode by their customary rules, spoke their own non-Slavic language, followed their clan costumes. They also practiced an ethnic-spatial separation from the Slavs, they were endogamous, and contrasted their ethnic nation with the Yugoslav one.

noted: "The Albanians, here, are viewed by other populations as we view Aborigines in Australia."¹⁴ The Bosnian Muslims themselves, with their flawlessly clean streets and bazaars and pride in their academic Islamic culture, despised the Albanian Muslims who paid no attention to cleanliness in public places and were not as cultivated from the religious standpoint.¹⁵ The high fertility rate amongst the Kosovar Albanians had always, for obvious reasons, worried the Serbs, but it served to disseminate throughout old Yugoslavia—which as a whole was affected by the Western demographic transition—the idea that Albanians were a people far-removed from an ordered and measured civilization.

The other Yugoslav peoples applied to Albanians all the prejudice habitually applied to southern peoples. In actual fact, they looked with aversion upon the Albanians' unwillingness to accept integration within Yugoslavia, upon the non-permeability of the Albanian social structure, upon the peculiarity of the Albanian culture characterized by clans, and by their common law that was far-removed from the European culture. The compact Albanian world was difficult to penetrate, with its non-Slav language and based as it was on patriarchal families and blood relationships.

The Albanian population was, in Yugoslavia, the least Yugoslavist. And, indeed, their presence in a state characterized by Slavism could be explained only by the two-fold nature of Yugoslavia, a Slav state but also a small multi-ethnic empire, where several minorities co-existed, protected, especially from the 1960s onwards, by a framework of legal guarantees and administrative autonomy, and of development thanks to peace and relative wellbeing. Proud of their Illyric origins, Yugoslav Albanians did not readily recognize themselves in a state whose name meant Southern Slavia. Why should they, the Albanians, be considered Slavs? Of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Albanians were the ones with the highest rate of endogamy; specifically, in 1981 99.2% of Albanian women and 96.9% of Albanian men were apparently married to persons from their own ethnic group, contrary to what was happening amongst the other populations in

¹⁴ See Morozzo della Rocca, *Kosovo la guerra in Europa*, 45. The Albanian historian Kris-to Frashëri complained: "Beograd always speaks ill of us. The Serbs despise us, as if we were gypsies..." (Angela Messina, *Albania* [Milano: CLUP guide, 1992], 71–2.)

¹⁵ See Alexander Popovic, *L'Islam balkanique. Les musulmans du Sud-Est européen dans la période post-ottomane* (Berlin: Osteuropa Institut, 1986); Alexander Popovic, *Les musulmans yougoslaves (1945–1989). Médiateurs et métaphores* (Lausanne: L'Âge d'Homme, 1990).

the federation, where there were millions of mixed marriages.¹⁶ Nor had the Albanians ever been enamored with the founding myths of Tito's federation, such as the one involving the struggle for liberation.

Moreover, despite themselves, the Albanians of Kosovo were influenced by the fact that they lived within Yugoslavia and were therefore learning what it meant to have a modern state organization. They needed to reconcile their deep-rooted social traditionalism with a need to evolve in order to survive in a Slav world that initially was by far superior to theirs in terms of modernity, levels of education, and material techniques. Seventy years of Yugoslavia generated a difference between the Albanians in Kosovo and those living in Albania.¹⁷

The turning point for Yugoslav Albanians came in 1966 when Aleksandar Ranković was ousted from the position of Minister of the Interior and head of security services.¹⁸ Ranković is viewed, in Albanian tradition, as an arch-enemy because of his Serbian origin, although the ideological side of his character is perhaps underestimated: he was a communist from the very beginning, was persecuted by the Serbian monarchy, and, above all, was a more than faithful executor of the directives issued by the Marshal, whose closest advisor he was for over twenty years. Ranković subjected the Albanians to ill treatment, but his suspicion of and ruthlessness toward any kind of nationalism, not just Albanian, was notorious. It was a matter of role-playing; Tito played the father of all Yugoslav peoples, leaving it to Ranković to take on the repressive role of police minister.¹⁹ Ranković's centralism matched Tito's autocratic orientation during the first twenty years of his rule over Yugoslavia, but his attitude changed over the following 15 years, which were characterized by his tentative vac-

¹⁶ See Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie*, 140.

¹⁷ See Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, *Albania. Le radici della crisi* (Milano: Guerini e Associati, 1997).

¹⁸ See Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005* (Washington, D.C. and Bloomington, IN: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Indiana University Press, 2006), 218–9. Ranković was ousted when the Fourth Plenum of the Party's Central Committee on Brioni Island in July adopted a strategy of decentralization and of parity between republics and provinces as Kosovo and Vojvodina.

¹⁹ See Milovan Gilas, *Jahre der Macht* (München: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1983); and Dino Frescobaldi, *Jugoslavia perché: il suicidio di uno Stato* (Firenze: Ponte alle Grazie, 1991), 37–8.

illations between liberal overtures, repression of all forms of nationalism, and federalization.

When Ranković fell from power, the assumption that every single Yugoslav citizen belonging to the Albanian ethnic group posed a threat simply evaporated. Tito decided to adopt a new approach in relation to the Albanians' traditional aversion to Yugoslavia, possibly because of their vigorous demographic growth within his state, or maybe he felt that the days of repression were gone and needed to be replaced by policies based on compromise.

Tito, consequently, granted Kosovo the status of a quasi-republic, only just tempered by the fact that, formally, it was to continue to be an "autonomous province" within Serbia. Having become masters of Kosovo thanks to their overwhelming demographic superiority over the Serbs, by 1968 the Albanians had achieved self-government, with their own executive branches, a parliament, their own police force and the judiciary, both autonomous from Belgrade, their own television network and cultural media. They were able to fly the pan-Albanian Skanderbeg banner, next to the federal flag. They had a school and university system, to a degree connected to the system existing in Enver Hoxha's Albania, which they imitated in 1968 with linguistic unification in the Toska dialect. They enjoyed direct representation in the federal bodies, without depending on the Serbian branch of the League of Communists, and enjoyed a right of veto over the decisions made by central Yugoslav power. They therefore tended to see themselves as the seventh republic of Yugoslavia, boasting the same number of inhabitants as Slovenia and Macedonia, not to mention under-populated Montenegro.

Out of the considerable federal funds set aside for the less-developed areas, i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo, the latter normally received between 30% and 40% of the yearly allocation, the largest share. In Yugoslav federal leadership circles and in the central bodies of the League of Communists, the general feeling was that the Kosovo problem was not ethnic, i.e., associated with the difficult relations between Serbs and Albanians, but rather that it depended on the region's economic and cultural backwardness. During the 1970s, Kosovo's infrastructure improved. Anyone coming to Kosovo from Albania would have noticed the difference between Albania's evident poverty and Kosovo's material civilization. This gap, once the material conditions in Enver Hoxha's Albania had become more widely known during the 1990s, was

possibly the most important factor to cause any notion of seeking union with Albania to fade among Kosovar Albanians.

Despite substantial investments, Kosovo continued to be a backward region. The ineffective management of federal funds on the part of the Kosovar political class has been the object of widespread criticism,²⁰ although the general Yugoslav tendency towards "bureaucratic polycratism"²¹ should also have been taken into account. The overall improvement in the standard of living was not accompanied, in Kosovo, by a balanced modernization of society. The unemployment rate was three times the Yugoslav average. The high coefficient of demographic growth did not aid gradual development. In a society that was becoming used to receiving help from the federal government, discontent was not expressed through any self-criticism of self-management or of local administrative practices but was directed rather externally, i.e., towards the central bodies of the Yugoslav federation.

The prominent patron of a balance between the peoples of Yugoslavia, Tito, died in 1980. The system of political weights and counter-weights he had conceived to hold together the Yugoslav state, after his death, foreshadowed inextricable Kafkaesque scenarios. Indeed, Tito himself exorcised his own death; "After Tito, there will always be Tito!" was the slogan repeated throughout the country according to his wishes. As if to underscore the difficulty of living in a world without Tito, in March and April 1981, Kosovar Albanians took to the streets in the belief that they were victims of an unfair federal system. They appeared to have no recollection of the abject political and economic conditions in which they had been living just 15 years earlier or of the advantageous terms they had been granted, albeit with some delay, by the recently deceased dictator. The troubles of 1981, in the course of which demands were made, at Prishtina, for recognition of Kosovo as the seventh republic, were viewed instinctively by Yugoslav leaders as a step towards a further extension of sovereignty, i.e., towards independence or union with Albania, and led to a situation where it was felt that the Yugoslav federation should keep Kosovo under strict surveillance. A few shouts of "Long Live Hoxha"

²⁰ See Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), which was followed by a broad debate inside Yugoslavia, by then nearing dissolution.

²¹ See Joseph Krulic, "L'explosion yougoslave," *Les Temps Modernes* (February 1993), 16–23, 22.

unleashed the repression of the federal authorities, who feared the nightmare of separatism. The protesters were fired upon. This led to a reawakening of the deep and never appeased antagonism the Albanians felt in respect of Southern Slavia, where they had never felt they were citizens out of their own choice.

In the 1980s, police and military personnel from all of the Yugoslav Republics occupied Kosovo to “normalize” its relationship with the central state. Kosovo’s League of Communists was repeatedly purged (creating political personnel “on leave” who would later save nationalist Parties in the 1990s the trouble of finding new recruits). But even during repression, the federal government further increased federal aid to development, in the belief that Kosovo’s problems stemmed from its unfinished transition into socialist modernity. Meanwhile, Serb discontent was on the rise. While the Albanians held demonstrations in 1981, protesting that their cultural and political specificity was not being acknowledged, shortly thereafter the Serbs began to portray themselves as the martyr people of a Kosovo which had been “Albanianized” according to Tito’s evil wishes. Confidential reports from the League of Communists and the federation’s central government started to become accessible. They provided the figures for the changes in ethnic composition in Kosovo: the Serb-Montenegrin Slavs had dropped from 27% in 1945 to under 15% in 1981. There were also lists of the abuses to which non-Kosovar Albanians had allegedly been subjected in previous years: damaged crops and agricultural installations; threats and harassment of individuals; vandalized graves, monuments and places of cult; minor everyday boycotts; civil rights limitations; the absence of legal protection; administrative discriminations; unfriendly pressure to sell their land.²²

Undoubtedly, the Serbs felt ill at ease in the autonomous Kosovo devised by Tito in the late 1960s and as such guaranteed by the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, and decided to emigrate. They chose to escape the ethnic Albanian tide that was encircling them, against a backdrop of toxic inter-ethnic relations. And, at the same time, they sought better working and living conditions in the federation’s more highly developed areas. But their statistical decline in Kosovo’s overall population hadn’t been brought about by their exodus alone; their demographic growth rate was much lower than the Albanians’.

²² See for this list Dogo, *Kosovo*, 342.

By the mid-1980s, Serb nationalism had fully re-emerged. The Serbs felt that Tito had marginalized them. In actual fact, Serbian presence within the public administration and the army was such that the grievance was not justified. The administrative partitioning of Tito's republic had undoubtedly damaged Serbian prospects. The role of the minority populations had been strengthened by Tito to water down the Serb–Croat dispute that had caused the paralysis of the interwar kingdom. But the Serbs, in their pan-Slavic messianism, had always aspired to identify themselves with the federation as a whole and not just with one of its components.²³

Once the little-loved marshal's dictatorship was over, the Serbs re-discovered their national myths—the first among them the one involving Kosovo, their Jerusalem, where the nation's heroic calling to martyrdom and redemption had allegedly been revealed in 1389. Part of the Serb intelligentsia, in the Belgrade Academy of Science, identified Kosovo with the exemplification of Serb tragedies, also in the twentieth century. The gradual decline in the Serbian presence in Kosovo, explicitly described as a result of ethnic cleansing, was viewed—in the memorandum published by the Academy in 1986 which became the manifesto of re-discovered Serbian patriotism—as proof of the Serbs' subordination within Tito's system. Widespread Serbian popular victimization developed around the Kosovo case.

The Milošević Era

In 1987, the Socialist Republic of Serbia witnessed the rise to power of a new ruling class led by Slobodan Milošević, who at the time was 46. He mobilized the Serbian masses on the issue of national redemption, especially in Kosovo, where—as he stated in his rallies—the Serbian component in the population was allegedly at risk of “genocide.” Although he was not a nationalist by political culture, Milošević behaved liked one, gaining widespread consensus among his people. The different stages of the Serbian re-conquest of Kosovo, under Milošević's direction, are well-

²³ See George Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans XIVe-XXe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 411; P. Garde, *Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 52–5; Mylonas, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity*; *Histoire du peuple serbe*, ed. Dusan Bataković (Lausanne: L'Âge d'Homme, 2005), 270–6.

known: popular mobilization supporting Serbian re-settlement in the region; the gathering at the Field of Blackbirds of a million Serbs on 28 June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the battle of 1389; the presentation of a Serbian constitutional reform project to do away with the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina and bring them back into the fold of the Republic of Serbia; the repression against the Albanians' strikes and protests in March 1989; the proclamation of the state emergency in Kosovo, controlled by the federal army and Serbian police; and, lastly, the change to the 1990 constitution that cancelled Kosovo's autonomy within the Republic of Serbia.²⁴ In the nationalist euphoria of the time, there were few Serbian voices of dissent against Milošević. Koča Popović, former foreign minister, thought that the Yugoslav state might succeed in turning Kosovar Albanians "into loyal Yugoslav citizens . . . but not into Serbs."²⁵

Albanian countermoves involved, during that same period, the establishment of parties that could be an alternative to the League of Communists, with the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, far ahead of all others; the declaration of Kosovo's independence according to the Albanian definition of "Republic of Kosova" by the local parliament, though divested of all authority by Belgrade, in September 1990 (Tirana's Albania alone was to recognize this republic); the referendum held between 26 and 30 September 1991 in which 87% of Kosovo's inhabitants voted, practically the entire Albanian population, and which produced an outcome of 99.87% of votes in favor of independence.

Between 1989 and 1992, the Serbs believed they could once again take over Kosovo. Albanians were removed from public positions, which were taken over by Serbs who were either local or had come from Northern or Eastern Serbia thanks to attractive economic incentives. The police and the judiciary became overwhelmingly Serbian. The only option left to the Albanian majority appeared to be integration in a subordinate role in the Serbian system, or emigration.

²⁴ For a chronicle of the events in Kosovo of 1989–92, see Stefan Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992–1998* (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 1998); Matthias Rüb, *Kosovo: Ursachen und Folgen eines Krieges in Europa* (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999); Morozzo della Rocca, *Kosovo la guerra in Europa*; Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CN and London: Yale University Press 2000); and Jože Pirjevec, *La guerre jugoslave 1991–1999* (Torino: Einaudi, 2001).

²⁵ Frescobaldi, *Jugoslavia perché*, 95.

There were no illusions left in Belgrade as to the chances of reversing the demographic balance in Kosovo. According to the 1991 census, Montenegrin Serbs had dropped to less than 9% of Kosovo's population,²⁶ while the percentage of Albanians had risen to over 85%, and the regional minorities (Turks, Roma, Croatians, Gorani people²⁷) chose not to take an open stand in favor of either side, although they showed towards the authority *en place* the loyalty typical of people who cannot afford not to. Albanian demographic growth was unstoppable, with a 2.7% yearly rate, the highest in Europe, and with 52% of the population under the age of 19.²⁸

But the re-annexation of Kosovo to Serbia gave the Serbs an opportunity to claim that the Albanians were, within the Serbian nation, a minority that, as such, was required to adapt to the laws, customs and language of the state in which they lived. According to Belgrade's vision, the Serbs in Prishtina, Prizren, or Peć, who until 1989 had felt they were a minority threatened with extinction in a territory overpopulated by Albanians, as if by magic, were now able to consider themselves the majority in their own homeland given that Kosovo was no longer Kosovo but Serbia. But this is not how things really stood. Throughout the 1980s, the political repression against the Albanian leadership and the federal police's adoption of harsh methods against Albanians had not, in fact, in any way slowed down the limited but continuous exodus of Serbs. On the contrary, it had speeded it up because of the social turbulence. The fact that, after 1989, the Serb minority in Kosovo described itself as a majority did not alter the fact that it was a minority on the ground.

During 1991–92 the Serbs completed their "re-conquest" of Kosovo, while Yugoslavia was falling apart. First Slovenia and Croatia, and then

²⁶ Data from the 1991 census in the appendix of Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, *passim*. These data should be read with caution, if only in view of the Albanians' refusal to cooperate in the collection of statistical data.

²⁷ The Gorani are Slavic Muslims inhabiting the Gora region which stretches across southern Kosovo and portions of Albania and Macedonia. They number about 60,000 in all and speak the Goranski dialect of Macedonian. For relevant information see Fred Cocozzelli, "Small Minorities in a Divided Polity: Turks, Bosniaks, Muslim Slavs and Roms, Ashkalis and Egyptians in Post-conflict Kosovo," *Ethnopolitics* 7 (2008), nos. 2–3: 287–306; and Nando Sigona, "Between Competing Imaginaries of Statehood: Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) Leadership in Newly Independent Kosovo," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (2012), no. 8: 1213–1232.

²⁸ See Hivzi Islami, "Realtà demografica del Kossovo," *Religioni e Società* (September–December 1997), 39–57.

Bosnia and Macedonia declared their independence and were recognized internationally as sovereign states. The Kosovo scenario became marginal in the global crisis of what had by then become former Yugoslavia.²⁹ The decomposition of Tito's state led to a situation where some populations benefited and others were penalized. The Albanians were the least fortunate in the partitioning associated with the new demarcation lines. Indeed, the Albanians failed to obtain a successor state and found themselves in separate states, between the southern regions of newly-formed Serb-Montenegrin Yugoslavia and Macedonia. The Serbs complained that Yugoslav dissolution had imposed upon part of their population an unwarranted diaspora in Croatia and Bosnia (this engendered the wars of 1991–95), but also claimed to be satisfied with the creation of a new Yugoslavia, in which considerable minorities of Albanians, Hungarians, and Muslims (of Sandžak) had come under their sovereignty (in the new Yugoslavia, the Serb-Montenegrin component reached just over 70% of total population). During the events associated with the troubled Yugoslav succession, Kosovo was marginal in terms of international attention. The world media's spotlights were turned on the wars taking place further north.

In 1992, an odd balance was established in Kosovo and it was to last until early 1998. Albanians and Serbs lived apart. This was nothing new. Already in Tito's day, when the Albanians ruled over the capital city Prishtina, Serbs and Albanians held each other at arm's length. At the time, the Serbs had abandoned the region in large numbers, accusing Albanians of carrying out an ethnic cleansing that involved no bloodshed but was numerically significant. Now it was the Albanians who protested that their men were forced to emigrate to escape the oppression decreed by the Belgrade government.

The Serbs held power, managed public employment, controlled all economic resources (mines and industries that were barely functioning having been almost totally deprived of Albanian manpower). The Albanians were allowed to organize their own parallel society and as a result paid no taxes, had limited relations with the state administration, took no part in

²⁹ See Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books, 1995); Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Stefano Bianchini, *La questione jugoslava* (Firenze: Giunti, 1996); and Pirjevec, *Le guerre jugoslave*.

censuses, boycotted elections, refused to report for military service in the Yugoslav army, rejected everything that was Serbian in Kosovo. This was tolerated because it was impossible to enforce any repression through which to make the Albanians behave as citizens of the Serbian state. Furthermore, it was motivated by the need for Serbia, which was involved in the conflicts associated with Yugoslav disintegration, to avoid opening up other fronts in the struggle. The Serbs, in any case, did not refrain from striking out at groups of Albanians considered extremists, or from taking punitive action, often extra-judicial measures, against individual Albanians, with the aim of discouraging any possible initiatives involving rebellion. There were many human rights violations but not to the extent that they made the autonomous organization of Albanian society impossible. If thousands of young Albanians emigrated, the reason is to be found also in their desire to escape military service and seek work abroad.

Serbs and Albanians accepted mutual apartheid in Kosovo, even though neither side's propaganda acknowledged it. Albanians travelled by bus, Serbs by train; there were restaurants and bars patronized by Serbs, others by Albanians; even settlements in the territory were rarely mixed, given that many villages were exclusively Albanian, and others, very few, had a strong Serb majority; each tended to use medical doctors belonging to their own group. In Prishtina, on pleasant evenings, the "stroll" for decades was taken along different routes by the young of the two ethnic groups (in the 1980s, along Prishtina's main street, young Albanians often dressed in red and black, the colors of the Skanderbeg flag, so that even taking a stroll was a patriotic demonstration; young Serbs dressed in blue, red, and white but held themselves at a distance, walking alongside federal police patrols, their weapons clearly visible).

The Albanians showed great determination in organizing an alternative state and a society that they themselves described as "parallel" and that attempted to reproduce the structures the Albanians enjoyed in previous years as legitimate institutions, with the addition of a network of thousands of commercial enterprises established initially to provide work for Albanians who had lost their state jobs. All patriotic manifestations were forbidden and repressed by the Serbian police, but the Albanians still found a way to express their feelings on the occasion of weddings and funerals, when the national flag led cortèges along the streets or marked funeral rites.

An election was held on 24 May 1992—illegally according to Belgrade that did not, however, interfere significantly in the process—in which a

Parliament of the self-proclaimed “Republic of Kosova” was voted in. The LDK party won 76% of the vote and its leader, the writer Ibrahim Rugova, a leading intellectual who had studied in Paris under Roland Barthès and belonged to an ancient prominent family, was elected President of the Republic with over 90% of the votes. Formerly Chairman of the Association of ethnic Albanian writers, and therefore not a professional politician, Rugova had made himself known both as a critical communist³⁰ and a defender of his Albanian compatriots: for years he had systematically denounced the discriminations and abuse to which Albanians had been subjected. He had also been jailed for these activities. Rugova soon gained international renown: he was called the “Gandhi of the Balkans,” even though his non-violence was dictated more by his faith in a final victory than by unconditional pacifism.³¹

Rugova knew that the Albanians were militarily much weaker than the Serbs and he was determined to save his people from death and destruction. Unlike other Albanian leaders such as Adem Demaqi and Rexhep Qosia, who urged the Albanians to boldly challenge Serbian power, Rugova was more focused on the needs of civil society and he showed a degree of humanitarian sensibility, as far as allowed by the harshness of the ethnic clash. He did not subscribe to the typical Balkan view that eventually all issues need to be settled by the use of force. These non-violent feelings were met by a lack of understanding that subsequently later to become a real aversion to him on the part of the UÇK and guerrilla sympathizers who believed that brute force alone could produce results.

No Albanian leader, not even Rugova, was moderate in his aims or aimed at anything less than independence. On the other hand, Albanian leaders of all sides always viewed the September 1991 referendum as a milestone. But there was a difference in methods. According to Rugova, independence was not worth the death of thousands. He felt it would be wiser to wait for the fast-growing Albanian demographics, the pressure of Western governments, the domestic economic downturn and favorable

³⁰ Rugova, whose father had been killed by the communist partisans, taught Albanian literature at Prishtina University. Although he theorized the esthetic and literary refusal of power, he joined the Communist League “as everybody” (see Adriano Sofri, “Auguri Rugova, Gandhi del Kosovo,” *Panorama*, 29 April 1999) for reasons of opportunity. He was expelled in 1989.

³¹ In Ibrahim Rugova, *La question du Kosovo* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), Rugova’s thought and political program.

historic conditions to persuade the Serbian government to change its policies on Kosovo.

Rugova appointed a shadow government, with representatives abroad, while the LDK organized a parallel Albanian society: jobs, schools, health-care, justice, taxation and other public life sectors were involved in this parallel organization that was not, however, clandestine because the Serbs, out of self-interest, took no action. This engendered a somewhat paradoxical situation. The Albanians, though oppressed by a hostile regime, succeeded in maintaining a standard of living often higher than the Serbs and in providing for the upbringing and education of a number of children three times than that of Serbian families. The many emigrants to Germany, Switzerland, and other North European countries sent money back both to their families and the LDK that ran the "parallel" social institutions. Furthermore, the Albanians were more dynamic than the Serbs in trade and, more generally, economic initiatives. Albanians who had lost their jobs in the public sector soon ceased to regret the average monthly wages of \$100 which they had received up till 1990 or 1991, because private activities gave them an opportunity to earn as much as \$300. The Serbs, whose state wages had been increased to \$400 a month in the years of the "re-conquest" of Kosovo, instead, then saw them drop to as little as \$12 in 1994, in the darkest phase of the Bosnian war and sanctions against Belgrade.³²

The Albanian alternative society was subject to some limitations. According to the power *en place*, the entire structure was unlawful. And it wasn't easy to run a society without the formal levers of power. Undoubtedly, the struggle against the Serbs united the Albanians in spirit, ironing out conflicts and divergences: one example was the reconciliation between over a thousand families divided by the bloody feuds typical of Albanian custom law, due to the fact that in the presence of an enemy, they felt that the blood of the same people was not to be shed.³³ Large crowds—up to half a million people—took part in reconciliation ceremonies organized in a number of towns and villages, people's assemblies which exalted patriotism and the values of Albanian-ness. These mass demonstrations were one of the factors at the roots of Rugova's non-violence.

³² See Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 277.

³³ See Giancarlo and Valentino Salvoldi and Lush Gjergji, *Kosovo. Un popolo che perdona* (Bologna: EMI, 1997); and the September–December 1997 issue of *Religioni e Società* dedicated to *Kosovo. Conflitto e riconciliazione in un crocevia balcanico*.

Meanwhile, this parallel organization presented a number of problems: funding was irregular, means were limited, clinics could not perform complicated surgical operations, sanitary conditions were precarious, the vaccination programs, though drawn up by the World Health Organisation, were shunned because they were carried out under the stamp of the Serb authorities, the child mortality rate was on the rise, school classes were held in basements or apartment rooms crowded with up to fifty students, many new-born babies were stateless because their parents refused to register them with the State Register, there were no courts, and cases were settled through informal mediation.

There was continual political strife amongst Kosovar Albanians. United against the Serbs but internally divided, they heatedly debated the tactics to be adopted against their historical enemy, combining a taste for politics acquired in Tito's Yugoslavia, where everything was politicized, with deep-seated personal rivalry. Rugova was subjected to growing opposition because of his policies; he was viewed as excessively cautious, playing for time and being on the defensive. The Serbs instead considered Rugova, and his top advisor Fehmi Agani, dangerous extremists. Other Albanian politicians, whom the Serbs hoped would be more pliable and easier to manipulate, met with less opposition. In vain, they sought the support of personalities like Azem Vllasi, Mahmut Bakalli, Veton Surroi.

Albanians were able to survive thanks to their parallel society but not to re-establish the self-government they had enjoyed up till 1989 and, even less, to obtain independence. It was a matter of patience and nerve. Rugova seemed to be losing his appeal. The Prime Minister in the shadow-government, Bujar Bukoshi, resident in Germany where he coordinated fund raising among emigrants, took a stand against him in 1996. And Sali Berisha too, from Tirana, after having supported Rugova for a long time, decided instead to support Demaqi, although he was soon overrun by the crisis of the pyramid finance companies.³⁴ Occasionally the acronyms of groups supporting the armed struggle came to the forefront. The latest one was Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK), which was to come to the forefront in 1996 and, unlike others, did not disappear.

³⁴ On the Albanian crisis of 1996–97, see Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, *Albania. From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997); and Morozzo della Rocca, *Albania. Le radici della crisi*.

And it was precisely the UÇK that undermined the balance of fear that had frozen the situation of Kosovo. With a strategy similar to the one adopted by the Kurdish PKK, the UÇK's initial rise to fame was based on its elimination of Albanians who had collaborated with the Serbs, above all members of the Socialist Party which held power. Furthermore, they carried out attacks against Serb policemen. Over two years, they eliminated about thirty collaborationists and policemen, until in March 1998, in the wake of the outrage cause by the Drenica massacre, the UÇK members grew into thousands of fighters. This was the turning point in the Kosovo crisis that was to lead to the war between Yugoslavia and NATO and to the changeover between Serbs and Albanians in ruling Kosovo. This was to be the eighth changeover of power in Kosovo during the twentieth century, without derogation from the practice whereby the momentarily winning ethnic groups always causes the losers to suffer. And it is worth considering that before the rise of nationalisms, up to the mid-nineteenth century, Albanians and Serbs had always maintained good neighborly relations and nothing had foreshadowed the furious ethnic hatred of the twentieth century.³⁵

Conclusion

What is striking about the record of 1878–1998 is that, with few exceptions, the events on the ground and the policies adopted worked precisely *against* the sustainability of the incorporation of Kosovo into any of the incarnations of Serbia/Yugoslavia. Whether one thinks of the interwar agreement with Turkey to expel Albanians from Kosovo or the fact that the Albanians joined rival forces during World War II (the Ballists where the Albanians were concerned, variously either the Partisans or the Chetniks or forces loyal to the Serbian quisling Milan Nedić where the Serbs were concerned) or the *de facto* apartheid which developed after 1987, what is clear is that these processes worked *against* integration, *against* inter-ethnic sociality, and *against* the development of trust between local Serbs and local Albanians. As for civic values such as respect for equality and for the harm principle, there never was any systematic effort in this direction.

³⁵ See Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics*, *passim*.

CHAPTER 3

Historiography in Post-Independence Kosovo

OLIVER JENS SCHMITT

The present chapter starts with the assumption that history is an essential element in any state-building process; it is probably even more important for nation-building processes. Whether we observe in Kosovo both processes—the building of a Kosovar state and a Kosovar nation—or just the construction of a second Albanian state, is an open question, and Kosovar historians have not yet given a clear and definitive answer.

Similarly, the framing of the question of the nature of Kosovo in post-World War II Yugoslavia can also be assumed to be characterized as a complex negotiation process between historians as political actors on both the Serbian and on the Albanian sides. The official interpretation of history mirrored the well-known stages of Kosovo's post-war history. Thus, historical research was highly imbued with political implications: institution building, the recruitment of historians, and the choice of topic all constituted eminently political acts.¹

¹ On this subject, see Sorin Antohi, Balázs Trencsényi, and Péter Apor, eds., *Narratives Unbound: Historical Studies in Post-Communist Eastern Europe* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007); Ulf Brunnbauer, ed., *(Re)Writing History: Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism* (Münster: LIT, 2004); Rumen Daskalov, *The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the Bulgarian Revival* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2004); Hans-Christian Maner and Markus Krzoska, eds., *Beruf und Berufung. Geschichtswissenschaft und Nationsbildung in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Münster: LIT 2005).

In this chapter, I will focus on Albanian actors and Albanian narratives produced after Kosovo's independence in 2008. In adopting this approach, I do not, of course, intend to exclude Serbian actors and the interpretations they produced.² But, since the main lines of the historical controversy on the history of Kosovo are well-known, I think that an assessment of recent historiography will add more new evidence to our discussion than a repetition of already known facts.³ I shall, thus, focus on Albanians, reflecting their overwhelming majority in present-day Kosovo and their dominant position in defining the main lines of Kosovo's history in Kosovo itself. The chapter will include discussion of that phenomenon which scholars such as Andreas Ernst have labelled as the "Albanosphere" in Southeastern Europe, i.e., an emerging Albanian cultural and communication space in the region, the driving force of which is the internet.⁴ I am well aware of the shortcomings of this approach, but I hope that the new evidence I analyze will provide it with more balance. In this chapter I opted for approaches which place Kosovo within a wider regional context, putting forward the thesis that Kosovo's history should be written as a Balkan history.⁵

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² E.g., Kosta Mihailović, ed., *Kosovo i Metohija: prošlost, sadašnjost, budućnost / Kosovo i Metohija: Past, Present, Future* (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 2007); Stevan Karamata and Časlav Ocić, eds., *Srbi na Kosovo i u Metohiji / Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija* (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti 2006); Dušan Bataković, *Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko—arbanaskim odnosima*, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: Čigoja Štampa, 2006); Radovan Samardžić, ed., *Kosovo und Metochien in der serbischen Geschichte* (Lausanne: L'Âge de l'homme, 1989); Milutin Garašanin, ed., *Iliri i Albanci / Les Illyriens et les Albanaïs* (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1988); for a thorough analysis of the Serbian Academy of Sciences as a key element of Serbian nationalism, see Nenad Stefanov, *Wissenschaft als nationaler Beruf. Die Serbische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1944–1992. Tradierung und Modifizierung nationaler Ideologie* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011).

³ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998) is the best history of the area. See also Wolfgang Petritsch and Robert Pichler, *Kosovo—Kosova. Der lange Weg zum Frieden* (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2004); Bernhard Chiri and Agilolf Kesselring, eds., *Kosovo* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006); Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008); Oliver Schmitt and Eva Anne Frantz, eds., *Albanische Geschichte—Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009).

⁴ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich; 16 October 2009), at <http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/mazedonien-albaner-1.3874733> (accessed on 10 January 2013).

⁵ Oliver Jens Schmitt, "Albanische Geschichte als Balkangeschichte," in *Studime për nder të Rehxej Ismajlit me rastin e 65-vjetorit të lindjes*, ed. Bardh Rugova (Prishtina: Koha, 2012), 685–704.

The integration of Albanians into historical research was a highly symbolic part of their general political emancipation in Socialist Yugoslavia. The establishment of the University of Prishtina as an independent academic body with a strong emphasis on Albanian studies, the creation of an Albanological Institute (1953), and the foundation of the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Prishtina (1975), all served the aim of improving the cultural visibility of Albanians in Yugoslavia and of satisfying their demand for cultural self-affirmation as an essential part of their political emancipation.⁶ Changes at the institutional level, mainly the creation of an academy, underlined the republic-like status Kosovo had achieved in 1974. The new institutions were filled by a new elite which can be divided into several generational groups: the first generation was trained mainly at Belgrade University, although some obtained grants for studies abroad (mainly in France and Western Germany). They usually combined a high level of scholarship with strong national and secular ambitions—their national identity was framed in Socialist Yugoslavia even if they had a critical stance toward this state. Since this group was not numerous enough to fill the available positions in the emerging Kosovar institutions, and also for symbolic reasons, the authorities in Belgrade also allowed the invitation of professors and scholars from Enverist⁷ Albania who trained Albanian academic staff in Kosovo. This strategy of openness coincided with the apogee of Enverist ultra-nationalism and the implementation of the Chinese model of “cultural revolution” in the People’s Republic of Albania (a process starting with the abolition of religions in 1967). In other words, Kosovo imported models and interpretations of history from Albania exactly at a moment when totalitarian control of history reached an extreme level in its neighboring state and when the theory of an Illyro-Albanian continuity was becoming a kind of secular religion in Albania. Thus, Kosovo did not develop an alternative perspective on Albanian culture. It mainly imitated the Enverist system.

Strong political reasons prevented the emerging Albanian elite from adopting alternative models: during the 1950s and early 1960s Yugoslavia aimed at implementing a Kosovar version of the Albanian language (similar

⁶ Rexhep Ismajli and Mehmet Kraja, eds., *Kosova. Vështrim monografik* (Prishtina: Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosovës, 2011).

⁷ The reference is to Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Party of Labor of Albania, who led Albania from 1944 until his death in 1985.

to language strategies in Macedonia), but this policy was rejected by Kosovar-Albanian academic elites as a means of separating them from Albanians in Albania; the alternative, the adaptation of models developed among the non- or anti-communist diaspora in Italy, Germany, and the US, was excluded for political and ideological reasons.⁸ Kosovar Albanians also embraced the Tirana version of national history, because they had lived since 1945 in an environment where a Serbian discourse on Kosovo left only limited space for Albanian visibility in history and culture.⁹ However, it should not be forgotten that there was a part of the Albanian intellectual elite that accepted the Yugoslav state ideology of “brotherhood and unity” and tried to integrate into a socialist system of historiography; that meant that they introduced Albanian topics into Yugoslav historiography, e.g., by publishing articles in Serbo-Croatian in leading journals and by inviting Slavic scholars from outside Kosovo to publish in Kosovo journals as the *Gjurmime albanologjike* (Albanological research). They also tried to highlight positive aspects of Albano-Serbian relations, e.g., the protests of Serbian social-democrats against atrocities committed by the Serbian army in Kosovo in 1912–13. However, it soon became evident that the new scholarly space was increasingly used for an Albano-Serbian historiographical debate which cast more and more shadows on socialist “brotherhood.” Thus, Kosovar reviews simultaneously mirrored attempts at socialist integration and nationalist disintegration, the two competing ideological currents of the 1970s and early 1980s.¹⁰

⁸ I refer to scholars such as Arshi Pipa (1920–97 in the United States) or Martin Camaj (1925–92, professor at the University of Munich). For a descriptive assessment of Kosovar historiography see Nuridin Ahmeti, “Kontributi i historianëve nga Kosova për afirmimin e historiografisë kombëtare shqiptare në Ballkan dhe më gjerë gjatë viteve 50–80 të shek. XX,” *Gjurmime albanologjike* 39 (2009): 65–75.

⁹ Authors and topics in the journal *Glasnik muzeja Kosova i Metohije* illustrate this observation: the journal began with no Albanian parallel title, only a bilingual subtitle. All contributions were published in Serbian. There were Albanian summaries which were placed only after English or French summaries. Most authors of the volumes published in the 1950s were South Slavs. Only in volume 3 (1958) were Albanian summaries “upgraded” and published before the French or English abstracts.

¹⁰ In volume 7 (1977) of *Gjurmime albanologjike* there are contributions by Tone Knez and Sreten Martinović; in volume 9 (1979) there are contributions by Đorđe Mikić (on the “invasion” of the Sandžak by Austro-Hungarian troops in 1879), and by Živko Avramovski on the exploitation of the chromium mines of Gjakova and Kukës (in Albania) after the capitulation of Italy in 1943—both subjects fit, of course, into the Yugoslav state ideology. It is important to note that in the same issue of Skënder Rizaj published a harsh critique of Bogumil Hrabak’s articles on the League of Prizren (“Vështrim mbi dy artikujt e Bogumil Hrabakut mbi Lidhjen shqiptare të Prizrenit,” 267–85).

Nevertheless, it is remarkable that, within a few years, Kosovar Albanian historians produced an impressive number of monographs and articles in regional journals—the 1970s (until the riots in 1981) were not only the “Golden Age” of Yugoslav Kosovo, but also of professional historical research. Interpretations were certainly not free of political accents reflecting either the official state ideology or secular Albanian nationalism, but they offered important source material and thorough analysis mainly on the Ottoman period. Post-Ottoman traditions and traditions of Catholic schools within the Albanian elites at that time guaranteed a good scholarly level. A good example is Zekeria Cana (1934–2009), a specialist for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with a focus on Serbian-Albanian relations.¹¹ The best known Orientalist, Hasan Kaleshi (1922–76), the only Kosovar Albanian historian with an international reputation, was, however, criticized because of his close relations with the Yugoslav central state (and is today almost forgotten).¹² The main topics Kosovar Albanian historians dealt with in that period reflected essentially the four pillar system of Enverist historiography, namely 1) the Illyro-Albanian continuity; 2) Skanderbeg’s state-building; 3) national rebirth (*Rilindja*); and 4) the partisan guerrilla movement in World War II—only here the interpretation had to follow Yugoslav narratives.¹³

The *Rilindja* attracted particular attention because one of its main institutionalized elements, the so called League of Prizren (1878–81), was viewed by all Albanians as a highly symbolic step towards Albanian statehood. It served Kosovar Albanians within Yugoslavia as proof of their state-building capacity, and, within an Albanian context, as a crucial contribution of Kosovar Albanians (and Albanians in the Sandžak and Macedonia) to the Albanian National Movement. The new strategy of the Yugoslav state in Kosovo and the attempt to integrate Albanians into a common socialist society was symbolically expressed by a series of conferences dedicated to central elements of Albanian national identity: in 1968, Albanian (the presence of a delegation from Enverist Albania is particularly noteworthy) and Serbian historians celebrated together the highly sym-

¹¹ See among his rich production his monograph *Politika e Serbisë kundrejt çështjës shqiptare 1903–1913* (Prishtina: Instituti albanologjik, 2006).

¹² Riza Sadiku, *Hasan Kaleshi, jeta dhe vepra* (Prishtina: Grafoprint, 1996).

¹³ Cf. the topics treated in the important review *Gjurmime albanologjike. Seria e shken-cave historike* 8 (1978).

bolic five hundredth anniversary of Skanderbeg's death,¹⁴ glorifying him as an Albanian, but also as a Balkan hero, thus demonstrating the state ideology of "brotherhood and unity." The 1970s saw, for example, a conference dedicated to the Albanian National Movement in 1974, a discussion on onomastics (a highly controversial topic because of its importance for the demographic history of Kosovo) in 1976, and the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the League of Prizren, which was portrayed as essential step in the Albanian national movement, an interpretation which did not leave much space for non-Albanians in Kosovo's history.¹⁵

The growing inter-ethnic tensions in the 1980s were mirrored, once again, in historiographical debate: demographic history, whose importance was rather downplayed in the 1970s (although scholars as Skënder Gashi opened the debate on medieval settlement patterns),¹⁶ gained importance and momentum, with Serbian intellectuals, and mainly the Serbian Academy of Sciences, being the key actors shaping a discourse which quickly spilt over to larger social strata. Serbian and Albanian historians used the same narrative strategy and demonstrated inadvertently that they belonged to the same culture of historiography and conflict: the "other" was depicted as Barbarian, as invader, as latecomer without any historical right in Kosovo. While Albanian historians concentrated on Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages in order to construct the dichotomy between Romanized, civilized Christian Albanians vs. pagan, violent, and destructive Slavs, Serbian historians refined the narrative of a late Albanian invasion after the *velika seoba* (the Great Migration, a Christian, mainly Orthodox refugee movement in 1690 after a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire had failed).¹⁷ More extreme interpretations portrayed the Albanians as "false Illyrians" who had penetrated into Kosovo only after 1945.¹⁸

¹⁴ *Simpoziumi për Skënderbeun-Simpozium o Skenderbegu 9–12 maj 1969* (Prishtina/Priština, 1969).

¹⁵ A list of major events is given by Rexhep Qosja, "Dhjetë vjet të Institutit albanologjik. Fjala e mbajtur në solemnitetin me rastin e 10vjetorit dhe të kalimit në ndërtesën e re," *Gjurmime albanologjike. Seria e shkencave historike* 8 (1978): 7–17, especially 11.

¹⁶ Cf. fn. 12.

¹⁷ For a balanced analysis of this event and its place in the Serbian national myth, see Noel Malcolm, "The 'Great Migration' of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690): History, myth and ideology," in *Albanische Geschichte*, eds. Oliver Jens Schmitt and Eva Frantz, 225–51.

¹⁸ This interpretation still exists, e.g., Vesna Pešić, *Albanci—lažni Iliri* (Belgrade: Pešić, 2007).

A second narrative strategy, besides denigrating the other, was to simply omit it from history. It was primarily Serbian historians who developed this strategy, producing an exclusively Serbian history of Kosovo.¹⁹ Albanian historians responded by minimizing or ignoring the Serbian element. A third major narrative strategy was the integration of regional history into a national one: there was no major difference between the history of Serbia in general and of Kosovo in particular. The Albanian side intensified the propagation of Enverist models of a unified Albanian history.²⁰ Attempts to concentrate on shared regional history, which could, although timidly, be observed in the early 1970s, disappeared almost completely. Kosovo became on both sides almost a synonym for national—either Serbian or Albanian—history. The outbreak of the open ethnic conflict in 1989 destroyed the last bridges between the two academic elites in Kosovo: the purges of academic institutions and the exclusion of Albanians from official cultural life were part of the Serbian government's strategy to erase the autonomous constitutional status of the province.

* * *

The members of the second generation of Kosovar Albanian historians were hit by these events at the beginning of their careers. Historiography quickly changed its character. While in the 1970s historians acted as scholars and as a national avant-garde,²¹ in the late 1980s and in the 1990s scholarly standards suffered considerably from the onslaught of Serbian authorities against the presence of Albanians in the state apparatus. While the University of Prishtina was forcefully Serbianized, writing or speaking about history was transformed into an act of Albanian national affirmation. The act of writing, not the content, was important. Thus, old narratives were virtually frozen in the ice age of Kosovo's history.

¹⁹ Recent examples in Očić, ed., *Kosovo and Metohija*; see the contribution by Ema Miljković, "The population of Kosovo and Metohija under Ottoman rule," 5–15.

²⁰ The latest example of this perspective is the semi-official history of the Albanian people edited by the Albanian Academy of Sciences, *Historia e popullit shqiptar*, 4 vols. (Tirana: Toena, 2002–08).

²¹ A good example is Ali Hadri, who is now venerated as a leading historian–politician, see the volume edited by the Institute of History in Prishtina: Jusuf Bajraktari, ed., *Ali Hadri. Jeta dhe vepra* (Prishtina: Instituti i historisë, 2009). A typical statement of Hadri is quoted on the cover page: "I will never feel uncomfortable if I will become a victim of political sadism, because also in this way, I will share the tragic fate of my people."

The third generation of historians—those who are now in their late thirties and early forties—were thus trained by highly politicized teachers, and they were acquainted with history not so much as a scholarly discipline, but as a kind of political activity. At the same time, after Kosovo had obtained its independence, this generation and their teachers were confronted with an enormous challenge: the end of repression and the need to put the new state on the map of international historiography. As outlined at the beginning, there were mainly two possible paths which could be chosen: a history of Kosovo as the history of a specific territory within its actual frontiers, which would have meant also a narrative which included all inhabitants of Kosovo without regard to their ethnic or religious affiliation. Or, a history of Kosovo as part of an Albanian history. This second option itself allowed two main paths of interpretation: historians could continue to reproduce a narrative developed in Enverist Albania, which was still the dominant interpretation of history in Albania. Or they could challenge this perspective and write a new Albanian history which would do more justice to those Albanians who had been left outside the Albanian national state founded in 1912. The first option was certainly preferred by international actors in Kosovo: it was adopted by neither Albanian nor Serbian historians, but constitutes the dominant narrative of extra-regional historians who avoid, however, a counter-narrative of eternal ethnic harmony. This approach, that of understanding the history of Kosovo as a regional history in the context of historical developments in the Central Balkans, did not find much sympathy either with Albanian or with Serbian historians, both of whom often distrusted (and still distrust) the ideology of multi-ethnicity and post-modernist deconstruction of ethnic identities which are perceived as tools aiming at weakening their national identities. The second option with its two subvarieties, however, is much more part of ongoing discussions within an emerging Albanian cultural and communication sphere in Southeastern Europe. I will present representative publications—monographs and journals—which illustrate current attempts to conceive new interpretations of Kosovo's past by its Albanian elites.

A speech given by the historian Muhamet Pirraku²² on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Albanological Institute in Prishtina

²² Professor of history, born in 1944 in the Drenica area; in the late 1970s and in the 1980s he was forbidden to publish in Yugoslavia; he was in jail in 1981–82, and is an ardent supporter of the UÇK (Ushtria çlirimtare e Kosovës, Liberation Army of Kosova).

(December 2003) illustrates the atmosphere which prevailed four years after the withdrawal of Serbian authorities and paramilitary groups. Pirraku discussed "Problems and challenges of Albanian historiography."²³ He recalls the late institutionalization of Albanian historiography, which was put under pressure by the heritage of Socialist historiography, the "dis-memberment of the Albanian area into five states" and the "experimental International administration of Kosovo."²⁴ He goes on identifying other "current problems" as "material errors," interpretations influenced "by one-sided ideological religious" reasons conveyed by "global historiography" and "Albanian clerical historiography," the "chaos" in transition "in the name of freedom," the lack of a scientific center, and of a unified Albanian state. He criticizes the miserable economic conditions of historians, "frenzied" party and religious ideologies, dilettantism and "charlatanism," the lack of "professional scientific auto-censorship and of censorship," the lack of critique of historiography. His comments on the two "schools of history," i.e., in Tirana and in Prishtina, are equally interesting. The Tirana school was forced, according to Pirraku, to develop a history of the Albanian state within the frontiers which had been imposed by the London Treaty in 1913. Historiography had to serve the interests "of the projects of the socialist-Cominformist bloc." Historians had to construct "anti-Turkish" (which meant "anti-Islamic") and "anti-Nazi/Fascist" (which meant "anti-Western") alliances with Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgaro-Macedonians. Greek culture was held in esteem in order to boost Orthodoxy. He celebrates the Tirana conference dedicated to the hundredth anniversary of the League of Prizren (actually at the apogee of isolationism and terror in Albania) as "the most complete scientific and political step towards the affirmation of the school of national history in the Albanian area, whose founding stones were cemented by the dissent and the guerrilla character of Albanian historiography in Kosovo."²⁵ Pirraku thus claims that the scientific and political center of Albanian culture and society lies in Prishtina, and not in Tirana with its "cominformist" traditions. Kosovar Albanians prepared the ground for "Ethnic Albania"; the fundamentals had been laid "with the

²³ Muhamet Pirraku, "Problemët dhe sfidat në historiografinë shqiptare," in *50 vjet studime albanologjike. Simpozium shkencor mbajtur më 18 e 19 dhjetor 2003* (Prishtina: Instituti albanologjik i Prishtinës, 2007), 519–23.

²⁴ Pirraku, "Problemët," 520.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 521.

spirit of the post-Brioni rights and liberties of the Albanian nationality in AVNOJ-Yugoslavia, which was affirmed by the struggle of the Communist League of Yugoslavia against the Greater Serbian anti-Titoist Aleksandar Ranković.”²⁶ Pirraku’s language is heavily marked by contemporary Yugoslav history, which was familiar to his audience: he refers to the Brioni plenum in 1966 and the subsequent downfall of the Yugoslav minister of Interior Aleksandar Ranković, which symbolized the beginning of a more lenient position of Yugoslavia towards the Albanian population. Pirraku depicts a nation threatened by its Orthodox neighbors in the Balkans, by Communists and Catholics from within; he emphasizes a non-Catholic Westernness of the Albanians, but indirectly defends their ties with Turkey and Islam, the most important message being his call for “Greater Albania” in the tradition of the 1941–44 unification of Kosovo with Albania. His hatred of the Cominform is explained by his negative view on all kinds of Balkan federalism which had been also propagated by the Comintern and by his own biography: he had been sacked from his position in research by state-loyal groups in the Kosovar elite. In Albania, Pirraku deplored a revival of interwar and wartime traditions by Catholic and Bektashi historians, “a spirit of revenge of Ballists and Legalists” (followers of the nationalist “National Front” and the monarchist Legaliteti, both partisan movements in World War II) and a powerful influence of the anti-communist diaspora group. Official historians “with the bunker concepts” (an allusion to several 100,000s of bunkers built by dictator Enver Hoxha) would not dare to counter these tendencies, they are rather tempted by the ideas of “open society.” The use of the latter expression is an allusion to the fact that in Kosovo, George Soros is sometimes identified as a threat to the Albanian nation, along with the plethora of previously mentioned threats. Pirraku identified as main currents: on one side, historians close to the “Open Society concept” and “farkist” historians (Forcat armatosura të Kosovës, Armed Forces of Kosova, a LDK financed parallel army to the UÇK whose leaders were eliminated by the UÇK), and on the other side, UÇK historians, who see Kosovo’s statehood as a first step for the solution of the “Albanian question.” By categorizing historians into a Soros and Fark group and a UÇK group, Pirraku indirectly formulates a dangerous threat, since it was and it is an open secret in Kosovo that, during and after the withdrawal, leading

²⁶ Ibid.

LDK politicians were killed by the UÇK. Pirraku's message to the audience, which gathered in a bulwark of the LDK, is thus an indirect death threat addressed to all those historians who formulate different ideas and whom he considers personal enemies who had interrupted his academic career. One has to take into account this atmosphere when analyzing the following examples of texts which were published after 2008.

In 2011, the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo, whose most eminent members belong to the secular and pacifist elite close to the late President Ibrahim Rugova, edited an authoritative monograph entitled *Kosovo: A Monographic Overview*. This book encompasses fields such as geography, society, religion, the constitution, and also history. The structure of the latter field follows in its first part the classical system of Albanian historiography; special emphasis is given to the League of Prizren (two chapters) and the national movement between 1908 and 1912, with a special focus on anti-Ottoman uprisings in Kosovo (which constitute, after the League of Prizren, the main contribution of Kosovar Albanians to the national movement). The historical development of Kosovo in the two Yugoslav states differs from Albanian master narratives and follows the periodization of Yugoslav history. The chapter on the post-World War II period bears the title "The national movement and the struggle for independence." It is highly significant that chapters on the Middle Ages, the Ottoman period, and the second chapter on the national movement were authored by leading historians from the Republic of Albania; this reflects not only the partial scholarly dependency on support from Kosovo's neighbor on its western border, but also the distance between the Academy and most historians in Prishtina. Jusuf Bajraktari, chief historian at the Albanological Institute in Prishtina, contributed two texts, Fehmi Rexhepi (Prishtina) equally two, while Lush Çulaj (Prishtina) wrote the history of the inter-war period; the parts dealing with pre-history and antiquity, key issues for the continuity thesis, are signed by Edi Shukriu (Prishtina). In general, the narrative reflects traditional perspectives on Albanian history. Edi Shukriu sets out constructing a continuity of Albanian presence in Kosovo from the Paleolithic period. Artefacts discovered by archaeologists constitute according to her "one of the most valuable treasures of the country."²⁷ The early Illyrians created a socio-cultural founda-

²⁷ Ismajli and Kraja, *Kosova*, 479.

tion for all following stages of cultural development, a foundation which also influenced other Ancient cultures in the Balkans, such as the Greek, Roman, and later the "Slavo-Serbian" cultures, as well as the "Ottoman stratum."²⁸ She also emphasizes a new symbol of Kosovar culture, a small statuette of a Mother-God. This "magna mater" is used in recent times by secular elite circles which tend to stress the national continuity of Albanians in Kosovo combined with their cultural superiority over late-comers such as Serbs and Ottomans. Shukriu also develops the theory of continuous Albanian statehood in Kosovo beginning in the fourth century BC: "the Ancient history of Kosovo starts with the creation of the Dardanian state,"²⁹ and this state fulfils all requirements of a modern national state: it had a compact territory, a titular nation (the Dardanians, an Illyrian tribe), an organized army, a royal dynasty, and its own foreign policy. The Dardanians played a crucial role in the Roman Empire (especially between the third and sixth century AD), which reached its apogee under the Dardanian-born Emperor Justinian I (527–65), but they were never Romanized. There always remained a "pre-Roman Dardanian subjectivity,"³⁰ constituting the first element of what can be called a national triad: Ancient Dardanians, Medieval Arbër, and Modern Shqiptar presented as the main stages of the development of the Albanian nation, which has always lived as a unique and independent nation on the soil of Kosovo.

Pëllumb Xhufi (Tirana), himself an active politician who has served as deputy minister of foreign affairs of Albania and who is known for his virulent anti-Greek positions,³¹ emphasizes the difference between the highly civilized Dardanians and Barbarian Slavic invaders. He underlines the Dardanian origin of several Late Roman emperors, all well-known elements of the Albanian master narrative. He then sets out constructing a space of medieval national history which includes also the distinctiveness of Kosovo; the "Slavic colonists" did not replace the Albanian population, so there was no radical ethnic change in the Early Middle Ages. Albanians supported Byzantine campaigns against Serbian Raška (the nucleus of Medieval Serbian statehood in the inner Balkans); the Byzantine province

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 172.

³⁰ Ibid., 173.

³¹ See, for instance, his book publications: *Shekulli i Voskopojës* (Tirana: Toena, 2010) and *Dilemat e Arbërit* (Tirana: Pegi, 2006) with a chapter entitled "Grecia mendax in historia."

of Shkupi (Skopje) is portrayed as bulwark against the "Slavic danger."³² Xhufi, although in other contexts a convinced secularist in Enverist tradition, puts forward the thesis that Albanians belonged to the Catholic Church—a symbol of Westernness—while the Orthodox Church, a symbol of Serbian culture, constitutes the Oriental other. He reproduces, thus, a discourse which was quite popular with Kosovar Albanians in the 1990s—emphasizing the Catholic roots of a Muslim population should transform that population in the eyes of a Western audience into a group which is clearly more Occidental than the Serbs. Xhufi also insists on a permanent Serbo-Albanian ethnic and cultural antagonism—which does not correspond to historical realities, but fits well into the worldview of an Enverist historian ("Serbian rule was characterized by its particular harshness against Albanians").³³ Particularly interesting is his narrative on urban culture which he considers to be an essential attribute of civilization: he deliberately mingles examples from Northern Albania (Shkodra, Drisht) and Kosovo, creating thus the impression of a common urban culture in that area; the deep structural differences between Adriatic towns with their written constitutions and urban settlements in the Inner Balkans are left aside.

Ferid Duka (Tirana), Albania's leading Ottomanist, is less ideological when giving an overview of the Ottoman past. His chapter, which covers almost half a millennium, is extremely short in comparison with other parts of the book:³⁴ administration, urban society, and Islamization (the term is avoided and replaced by "religious and cultural changes").³⁵ This alone shows how complex the discussion about the secular character of the Albanian National identity in general, and Kosovo in particular, is. Duka emphasizes crypto-Christianity and the importance of the Catholic Church in Kosovo for Albanian cultural history, reproducing well-known elements of the official Albanian historiography which downplays the importance of Islam and underlines elements of Westernness. In the chapter's final paragraph, Duka rejects the Serbian theory of *velika seoba*, i.e., the theory that

³² Ismajli and Kraja, *Kosova*, 181.

³³ Ibid., 184. Xhufi had published extensively on the relations of Medieval Albanians with their neighbors always presenting them as conflict-ridden, the Albanians always being victims of Byzantino-Greeks and Serbs; see his article "Probleme të marrëdhënieve të shiptarëve me shtetin serb të Nemanjidëve në gjysmën e parë të shek. XIV," *Studime historike* 37 (2000), nos. 3–4: 7–35.

³⁴ Ismajli and Kraja, *Kosova*, 191–9.

³⁵ Ibid., 195.

Albanians invaded Kosovo after the Serbian population had fled because of Ottoman repression in the war of 1689–90. His chapter does not reflect at all the intensive cultural debate about the impact of Ottoman rule and Ottoman culture on Albanian history. Xhufi's and Duka's imported narratives differ only slightly from the Enverist master narrative of the 1970s.

Kosovo's most prominent historian, Jusuf Bajraktari, does not provide a new interpretation of the national movement, but simply reproduces old schemata: Serbs and Greeks pursue a "chauvinist" strategy,³⁶ the four *vilayets* of Kosovo, Shkodër, Monastir, and Janina have, of course, an Albanian majority, and so forth. Bajraktari continues the discourse of victimization which Xhufi had initiated in his chapter. The other appears only as an enemy, while Albanians are classified into categories such as "patriots." But above all, they always constitute a unity of actors. This discourse prevails in the following chapter: it does not even attempt to integrate international scholarship, nor does it formulate any questions. It simply presents a historical "truth" in a black-and-white-image. The second Yugoslavia is reduced to violence in the immediate post-war period, the Brioni Plenum in 1966, the demonstrations of 1968, the uprising of 1981 (all this in one page, p. 243) and the abolition of autonomy after 1989. The author omits discussion of social and economic changes in Socialist Yugoslavia, forms of integration of Albanians into Yugoslav society, and the perception of Tito as a pro-Albanian leader. He merely presents a history of continuous Serbian violence against Albanian victims. His narrative becomes more interesting when he tries to balance two competing interpretations of recent history: it is highly emblematic that Rugova's portrait is embedded between a photograph of the Jashari *kulla* (traditional family tower—in fact the Jashari used this loaded term for their farm house in order to enhance their prestige as freedom fighters) in Prekaz and a photograph of Adem Jashari, one of the founders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) himself.³⁷ While the author constructs a homogeneous narrative of Albanians confronting Serbian oppressors until 1989, he has to find a compromise between Rugova's followers and the new UÇK elite. A second series of pictures shows NATO troops hailed by Kosovar civilians and the declaration of independence, with Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, the President of Parliament Jakup Krasniqi, and State President

³⁶ Ibid., 201.

³⁷ Ibid., 246–7.

Fatmir Sejdiu, once again a combination of politicians from the PDK (Partia demokratike e Kosovës, Democratic Party of Kosovo) and the LDK (Lidhja demokratike e Kosovës, Democratic League of Kosovo).³⁸

If we summarize the analysis, we can conclude that there is only one really new element which has emerged since 1990: the search for a national Albanian narrative of recent history which satisfies the competing political parties of the country. Apart from that, Kosovo is portrayed as an Albanian society; Serbs are mostly written out of history.

The second case attracted far more public interest in Kosovo. Jusuf Buxhovi (born in 1946 in Peja), a former journalist of the *Rilindja* newspaper and founding figure of the LDK, whom Ibrahim Rugova however did not really trust because of the unclear circumstances in which he was sent to Western Germany, recently published a *History of Kosovo* in three volumes.³⁹ After this, he was acclaimed as the leading historian of the country; Buxhovi's political ambitions are well-known, and his book serves to boost his political career. However, the main tendencies of his book are far more interesting: he depicts Kosovo as the cradle of European civilization by reviving the old theory of the Pelasgian origin of the Albanians. His logic is quite striking: he pretends that Troy was founded by "Pelasgian Dardanians" (the Illyrian tribe settling roughly in the territory of present-day Kosovo) and that the Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations derive from the Pelasgian culture. Since all other major European cultures are based on the heritage of Antiquity; the Albanians, descendants of the Pelasgians, are the source of world civilization. Therefore, Albanian history is part of the Occidental world,⁴⁰ indeed, a key to its origin. A second line of interpretation emphasizes Kosovo's central position in Albanian history, thus shifting the spatial perspective on Albanian culture. A third line of interpretation can be characterized as the vision of history by LDK members who had been removed by party leader Ibrahim Rugova. The author does not dare to directly challenge the PDK interpretation of recent history.

It might seem odd that this Kosovo-centric national history of the Albanians relies mainly on the most important manual of Enverist historiography, the *Historia e popullit shqiptar*. But on second glance, it is evident

³⁸ Ibid., 250–1.

³⁹ Jusuf Buxhovi, *Kosova*, 3 vols. (Prishtina: Faik Konica and Houston: Jalifat Publishing, 2012).

⁴⁰ Ibid., vol. 1, 8–10.

that this fits perfectly into Buxhovi's worldview; as a secular nationalist, he is a product of socialist Yugoslavia. He uses evidence produced by Enverists for a narrative which never clearly defines its subject. Buxhovi does not write a history of Kosovo, but an Albanian history from a Kosovar perspective, which, however, is not made explicit. He states with impressive self-confidence that Kosovo, not Albania, was the "epicenter" of Albanian history since antiquity and especially since the League of Prizren, which he labels the first Albanian state after Skanderbeg. Kosovar Albanians were, according to Buxhovi, the driving force of the Albanian national movement and the creation of a national state is due to their struggle.

His book is thus a remarkable mixture of a new version of the continuity thesis which puts Kosovo in the center of world history, and Enverist narratives (e.g., his negative interpretation of Ottoman rule which is as neglected as in the Academy monograph).⁴¹ Interestingly, Buxhovi's book provoked a reaction of intellectuals and historians, among them the then vice-rector of Prishtina University, Nuri Bexheti, who earned his PhD in Vienna. Their "antithesis" constitutes, in fact, the first coherent articulation of criticism of nationalist narratives; the authors of this antithesis refute myth-building, emphasize the lack of basic scholarship in Buxhovi's book, and point to factual errors and long paragraphs which are copied from outdated academic literature. They deconstruct Buxhovi's narrative and analyze his political intentions; they deplore Buxhovi's ignorance or negative stance towards non-Albanian scholarship. They plead for a stronger integration of Kosovar scholars into the international community of his-

⁴¹ Buxhovi uses rather harsh language when addressing persons with other ideas; see, e.g., Abdullah Prapashtica, "Kush janë 'rrugaçët' Buxhovit," *Kosova Press* (22 September 2011), at <http://www.kosovapress.com/?cid=1,71,135614> (accessed on 8 February 2013). Buxhovi toured the Albanian diaspora and proclaimed his message of "5,000 years of Kosovo civilization," e.g., "Jusuf Buxhovi: 'Kosova, 5000 vjet qytetërim,'" *albinfo.ch* (20 May 2012), at <http://www.albinfo.ch/sq/content/jusuf-buxhovi-kosova-5000-vjet-qytet-rim> (accessed on 8 February 2013; book presentation in Dulliken, canton of Solothurn, which was supported by the LDK branch in Switzerland and LDK MPs from Kosovo). On this occasion, Buxhovi declared that "some segments of the actual government in Prishtina. . . say that Albanians are not capable of running a state and that they are a bastard nation which does not deserve their own state or that their state will be used against European and civilized [sic] interests." Recently, he pretended in an interview to the website *Kombëtare*, that in 1878 the majority of Serbia's population in 1878 was composed by Vlachs and Albanians and that in Greece as well, Arvanites, and not Greeks were the majority. At <http://www.kombetare.al/serbia-eshte-krijuar-nga-shqiptare/> (accessed on 8 February 2013).

torians. The authors propose a more sober approach to history, including works of Serbian historians. Their text was published by the newspaper *Koha ditore* and provoked emotional reactions.⁴² Unfortunately, the debate was not continued by the academic community in Kosovo. The antithesis did not receive a competent echo. The authors described the dilemma of historians in Southeastern Europe between public expectations and basic rules of correct scholarship, and they conclude that most historians prefer to please the public rather than revise widespread nationalist myths. Nevertheless, the “antithesis” was an encouraging proof that things can change. But it demonstrates also how complicated fault lines are: one of the authors recently apologized for his position in an open letter to Buxhovi.⁴³

The debate on Buxhovi’s book also shows patterns of intellectual debate in Kosovo: history is seen as an object of party politics, and the community of historians, most of them rather close to LDK circles, is highly politicized. Most historians at state institutions face strong pressure to conform. Society expects them to give a coherent national narrative; but most historians lack methodological and theoretical tools to satisfy this societal demand: they remain isolated from the outside world, do not participate at international conferences, and seek to legitimize themselves through conferences held in the Albanosphere and labelled as international. The culture of scholarly debate is not very developed, and there remains a deep distrust of foreign historians. As a result, historians of the third generation often reproduce well-established narratives; the state research institutions have thus far been unable to develop a coherent scholarly program and mostly cultivate sterile nationalist rhetoric.⁴⁴ It is

⁴² Albert Ramaj, Nuri Bexheti, and Xhemal Ahmeti, *Südosteuropäische Historiografie. Kosovo als Wiege okzidentaler Zivilisation*, at <http://albanisches-institut.ch/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Antithesis-Buxhovi.pdf> (accessed on 28 January 2013).

⁴³ Jusuf Buxhovi, *Sharlatanizmi i një sharlatani*, at <http://www.voal-online.ch/index.php?mod=article&cat=OPINONEEDITORIALE&article=32921> (accessed on 16 May 2013).

⁴⁴ E.g., Frang Bardhi, a Catholic priest and author of an Albanian–Latin dictionary published in 1635: Shefkije Islamaj et al., eds., *Frang Bardhi. 400-vjetori i lindjës* (Prishtina: Institut Albanologjik, 2007); the League of Prizren was acclaimed as a key point of reference for independent Kosovar statehood in the Balkans; see Jusuf Bajraktari, ed., *Lidhja shqiptare e Prizrenit dhe vendi i saj në histori* (Prishtina: Instituti i historisë, 2008).

not a coincidence that an outsider—Buxhovi—was able to hijack the discourse on national history.⁴⁵

A short glance at the content of scholarly reviews shall illustrate these remarks: the leading journal *Gjurmime albanologjike. Seria e shken-cave historike* published in 2007 an issue dedicated to the memory of the first President of Kosova, Ibrahim Rugova. Topics are arranged according to their importance: they start with the trial of the Albanian underground organization in Skopje by Titoist authorities after World War II⁴⁶ and end with a study on “Casual inventions of stone monuments from the Roman times in the territory of Kosova” (original title of the English summary).⁴⁷

Three articles focus on World War II and its immediate aftermath, highlighting “The struggle of Gjilan and massacres of the Albanian population at the end of 1933 and at the beginning of 1944” (sic)⁴⁸ and “The massacre at Bllaca—an act of genocide by the Macedonian XVI Brigade.”⁴⁹ The latter article conveys typical elements of the current historiographical discourse on Socialist Yugoslavia (the quotation is from the English summary, the explanation in brackets is from the original text, p. 73):

...the Macedonian XVI Brigade, known as Bloodthirsty (sanguinary) Macedonian Brigade, under the command of the Serbian Albano-phobic Glisha Sharanoviq, who organised a raid (ragging) of genocide against the village. Serbian-Vlachos and Bulgaria-Macedonian partisans shot and massacred 109 Albanians from Bllaca, expelled (displaced) all the inhabitants, plundered all personal estates and set on fire (burned) whole village, except the house of one of their confident (spy). . . The martyrs, whose names are not known, belonged to the villages of Illirida (Western Macedonia).

⁴⁵ Buxhovi is not the only amateur historian. Low quality standards in history and rather fluid differences between scholarly publications and articles in the mass media explain a steady stream of nationalist publications.

⁴⁶ Daut Bislimi, “Veprimtaria kombëtare e KQ të ONDSH-së në Shkup dhe gjykimi i krerëve të këtij komiteti,” *Gjurmime albanologjike. Seria e shken-cave historike* 36 (2006): 13–28.

⁴⁷ By Exhlale Dobruna-Saliu, *ibid.*, 319–54.

⁴⁸ By Aliriza Selmani, *ibid.*, 41–56.

⁴⁹ By Muhamet Pirraku, *ibid.*, 57–73.

The Albanian text utilizes an even more inflammatory vocabulary, characterizing, for example, the actions of the socialist Macedonians partisans as “Serbo-Macedonian cannibal terror” (p. 61): “The names of the martyrs, graved in granite, are the proof of their immortality. They are the certificate of title [sic] for the Albanianness of the land” (p. 72). The term “genocide” is used by Albanian and Serbian historians alike for describing any kind of interethnic violence, and there is almost no attempt to analyze violence from any other than an ethno-national perspective.⁵⁰ The lack of basic rules of scholarship, not to speak of contextualization, characterizes this kind of nationalist rhetoric disguised as history—a phenomenon which is far from being specific to Kosovo. Such hate speech also devaluates the analysis of the complex history of violence in Kosovo even when Albanians actually were victims of repression by Yugoslav partisan units or later the Yugoslav state. Albanians described as responsible for violence almost never appear in this kind of study. The highly emotional vocabulary reflects the heritage of Titoist partisan propaganda and expresses the deep trauma of the War in 1998–99. It would be an oversimplification to represent the whole of historiographical production on the basis of such texts. In the same volume, a study of Albanian students at Yugoslav universities reveals a less aggressive discourse.⁵¹ But, unfortunately, it is too easy to find these kinds of texts prominently published in this review. In volume 29 (2009), two essays analyze Serbo-Albanian relations in Kosovo. Hysen Matoshi’s “Albanian ethnical cultural space and the Serbian Orthodox Church” (original title of the English summary, pp. 25–47) and Sabri Rexha’s “A short historical view of Albanian-Serb reports in Balkan” (pp. 49–64).

⁵⁰ E.g., by Miloš Jagodić, *Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu (1878–1912)* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2009), 209. Cf. the book review by Eva Anne Frantz, at <http://www.recensio.net/rezensionen/zeitschriften/sudost-forschungen.-internationale-zeitschrift-fur-geschichte-kultur-und-landeskunde-sudosteuropas/--/68-2009/ReviewMonograph764076988> (accessed on 8 February 2013). For an alternative approach, see Eva Anne Frantz, “Violence and its impact on loyalty and identity formation in Late Ottoman Kosovo: Muslims and Christians in a period of reform and transformation,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29 (2009), no. 4: 455–68.

⁵¹ Sulltane Kojçini-Ukaj, “Studentët shqiptarë në universitetet e ish-Jugosllavisë në vitet 1930–1940,” *Gjurmime albanologjike. Seria e shkencave historike* 36 (2006): 75–88; Sabri Rexha, “Represioni mbi popullatën shqiptare të Vushtrisë me rrethinë dhe rezistenca e saj (1918–1941),” *Gjurmime albanologjike. Seria e shkencave historike* 36 (2006): 165–78.

For Matoshi, professor at the University of Prishtina, the Serbian Orthodox Church has always been a main pillar of "Big-Serbian projects," he adds (quoted from the English summary): "Divine love, which actually the church should spread, is surrounded on the lowest hatred of human being, forward political ambitious to conquer and to reclaim the part of the world, even through genocide price. . . No doubt, sowing in further misfortune, hate, the horrors of the war" (pp. 46–7). Once again, there is no doubt about the prominent role the Serbian Orthodox Church has played for Serb nationalism, but the text resembles that of a political pamphlet rather than a scholarly study.

Sabri Rexha, assistant professor at the University of Prishtina, has presented the classical Albanian discourse on Kosovo in a condensed form. The following extract, written in abominable English, illustrates both the content and style of the scholarly or pseudo-scholarly production that unfortunately still prevails in parts of Kosovar historiography. For that reason his English summary is quoted here in full:

Albanian-Serb reports since the middle age up to now days are developed as reports between new-incomers and native population. Native Ilir population were harmed enough during big invasion of population and in a big mass were withdraw in coast-hills where they hardly survived. Settlement of Slav population, especially of Serbs made a new ethnical relation in Balkans after the VI–VII century of our era. Anyway there is no report of large-size conflicts among countries and native population. The beginning of raising of Raška state (Serb) and its pretence to broadened towards the Adriatic and Aegeah Sea made to confront with native population-Arbëresh (Albania). Even though in the beginning Albanians supported Serbs against Feudal pressure especially Catholics, made to start their open confrontation. After Ottoman and Islam invasion of large size of Albanians, will start and division in due to religion, but without serials of contradictions during the ottoman invasion. Whereas Albanians were enough tolerant on building and rebuilding of Orthodox Churches even though they were the overwhelming majority. Harshness of Albanian-Serb relations will start from the beginning of the XIX century (since the first Serb revolt start in 1804—when in a large size killings and persecutions of Muslim population). It became roughly in the middle of the XIX century (when it starts in large-size of Muslim persecu-

tion mainly Albanians) from hegemony politics of Serb autonomy country. Rough Albanian-Serb relation started widely after Congress of Berlin (1878) when Albanian lands were parted and after ethnic cleansing and in a large size persecution of Albanians from their places was annexed by Serbia. From now on Albanian-Serb relation is developed as an Albanian effort to protect its lands with Albanians in mass and for autonomy and independence and Serbian aim was to enter Kosovo and from there to Albanian Adriatic. Hard talks will start after Balkan wars (1912–13) when half of Albanian population (out of London on Albania) remained on violence and genocide of neighbors of Serbia. From now on Albanian-Serb relations are developed as a result of violence and Serbian territory on banishment, assimilation, transform and Albanian submission (about one million) and Albanians stay for surviving. Serbian politics and of Kingdom SHS (later as Yugoslavia) was supported by Serbian Church and many studios who planted hate Anti-Albanian in Serbia population. Even nowadays after the Declaration of Kosovo's Independence (2008) stays as a priority the politics of instigation of under ethnic disorder to realize hegemony aims. Manipulation with Serbs and not recognition Republic of Kosovo as a state and for remained Serbs it serves under-ethnic confrontation politics and slowing down of integration in Europe for both nationalities. (pp. 63–4)

This quotation may explain in many ways why Kosovo's historiography is almost completely absent on an international level. While it is not too difficult to add other examples of this kind of historiographical production, the number of studies which respect international standards is modest. Ylber Hysa, currently serving as Kosovo's ambassador to Skopje, published in 2010 a book whose title already announces an alternative program: "The Albanian and the others."⁵² He opens new fields of study (e.g., the Albanophone population of African origin in Ulcinj/Ulqini, Montenegro; the history of spices, and the veneration of the Black Madonna), making full use of an international bibliography and also relevant works in Serbian. Historians such as Hysa or the authors of the "antithesis" are still a tiny minority, but they exist and they have important positions in political and cultural life; there are also

⁵² *Shiptarët dhe të tjerët* (Prishtina: Instituti Albanologjik, 2010). The reaction to this unorthodox book was simply silence.

a handful of critical journalists who disseminate alternative narratives of history. Although the picture of institutionalized historiography is currently rather bleak, there are exceptions to the dire rule of nationalist discourse.

* * *

To sum up: Kosovar Albanian historians see the history of Kosovo as part of a national Albanian history. At the moment, one can observe two tendencies, one reproducing the Enverist narrative with minor adaptations to new political circumstances, the other shifting the core of Albanian history from Albania to Kosovo. Neither narrative relies on new, original research and both reproduce stereotypes of self-victimization; history is an uninterrupted series of episodes of violence against Albanians who defend their native lands. The enemy has always been the Serbs, their state and Church. Historians and amateurs use traditional evidence for political purposes; they participate in a complex renegotiation of political and cultural power in the Albanosphere. In this process, there is no role for scholars of other ethnic or religious groups or for an internationalization of historiography. Kosovo does certainly not constitute an absolute exception in present-day Southeastern Europe. What distinguishes Kosovo and Albania is the scarcity of scholars with international reputations in the field of history. Writing history thus often remains a self-referential process, and worse, a repetitive process: since independence, with a few exceptions such as Ylber Hysa's monograph, Kosovar historiography has not produced a single piece of fresh and original scholarship. This intellectual weakness makes Kosovar historiography an easy prey of outside pressure as the case of Turkey demonstrates: the Turkish government actively pursues a strategy of changing the negative image of the Ottoman Empire in the textbooks of former Ottoman provinces. Under diplomatic pressure, Kosovo installed a commission which should revise the texts.⁵³ The Turkish intervention provoked a heated debate in Kosovar society, which, however, did not focus on the crucial fact that there are almost no competent Orientalists in Kosovo.⁵⁴ History matters in politics and society, research does certainly not.

⁵³ "Turqia interesohet për trajtimin e Perandorisë Osmane në Kosovë," at <http://www.koha.net/?page=1,13,138186> (accessed on 16 May 2013).

⁵⁴ There are of course exceptions, see for instance Nehat Krasniqi, *Kontribute albanologjike. Studime dhe dokumente historike e letrare të periudhës osmane* (Prishtina: Institut albanologjik, 2011).

CHAPTER 4

British Policy towards the Kosova Liberation Army, 1996–2000

JAMES PETTIFER

This chapter considers a number of issues related to the development of British policy towards the future of Kosovo in the 1990–99 period, and how after various forms of diplomatic engagement with the government of Yugoslavia during the period 1990–96, the onset of the Kosovo conflict gradually forced a reorientation of policy. This included the involvement of security advisors and examination of military options, and subsequent engagement with the Kosova Liberation Army.

The concept of a secret war is central to my new book, *The Kosova Liberation Army: From Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948–2001*, and this chapter is in essence a more detailed study of an aspect of the history explored in that work.¹ I have suggested elsewhere, mainly in my earlier books *Kosova Express: A Journey in Wartime* (2005) and in my account of the Albanian dimension of the wartime period, *The Albanian Question—Reshaping the Balkans* (with Miranda Vickers, 2007), what I believe were the broad outlines of background to the conflict in the Albanian world that culminated in NATO's first war in 1999 against Milošević's Serbia.² In this

¹ James Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army: From Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948–2001* (London and New York: C. Hurst and Columbia University Press, 2012). See also the works of Tim Judah, particularly *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2009) for a reliable introduction to these issues.

² James Pettifer, *Kosova Express: A Journey in Wartime* (London and Madison, WI: C. Hurst and University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); and James Pettifer and Miranda Vickers, *The New Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007).

chapter I put forward some further views on how a key outside power, Great Britain, both a NATO member and a country with close, organic, and long-standing links with Yugoslavia, responded to the prospect of war in Kosovo, both in explicit public diplomacy, and also in clandestine and then open military activity.

The society that existed in Kosovo during the Milošević period existed under martial law and the suspension of the limited democratic freedoms that existed, in theory at least, in socialist Yugoslavia. Thus, civic values in the modern sense of the word hardly existed in a coercive and intermittently dictatorial state based on armed force and a paramilitary police terror for the 90% plus ethnic Albanian majority. This majority community had their own civic values, of resistance and passive and active opposition to the Belgrade-ruled state and much of their energy in the 1990–95 period was directed towards the establishment of alternative structures in the political underground in Kosovo that embodied their notions of historic Albanian culture and the values it embodied. When these parallel structures did not deliver what their progenitors hoped, the issue of armed resistance began to develop, whose value structure was naturally military and martial, and excluded most civic value considerations. The war against Serbia would develop through secret structures, many outside Kosovo, in any case.

The concept of a “secret war” has been central to counter-insurgency theory for many years, and formed a main part of the *modus operandi* of many government agencies on both sides of the political divide during the Cold War. The use of covert assistance to one or other side in a civil conflict or civil war is as old as imperialism itself. In the post-Cold War period, secret or semi-secret operations have also developed as a branch of the general privatization and outsourcing of warfare, so that in all recent major conflicts, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in Kosovo before those wars, the use by Western governments of privately owned military and security agencies has become common. At the same time, in the immediate post-1990 period, NATO redefined itself as a mechanism for intervention in international conflicts and latterly against radical Islamic regimes, as the threat of communism disappeared and alliances that were adversarial, like the Warsaw Pact, collapsed.

There are in my view three main periods of British diplomatic and military activity determining policy towards post-Cold War Kosovo. They are of course intertwined with the general pattern of growing difficulty in relationships with Milošević's Yugoslavia after 1989, and British policy towards the region in the light of the outbreak of war after 1991. The first of these policy phases predates the 1989 period in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe and is concerned with strengthening longstanding British links with the Titoist regime, which many UK Ambassadors have referred to as a near "special relationship."³ This had the main aim of increasing the distance between Belgrade and Moscow, and encouraging the break-up of what remained of social ownership and collective life in Yugoslavia in the direction of increased neo-liberal capitalist integration and internationalization of the economy.⁴ The arrival in power of Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade was viewed with concern in Whitehall, and Britain was one of the

³ For the overall picture, see works such as Michael Barratt Brown's *From Tito to Milošević: Yugoslavia the Lost Country* (London: Merlin, 2005).

⁴ See, for instance, works such as Sir Frank Robert's *Dealing with Dictators* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991); and Sir Duncan Wilson's *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Both had served as British ambassadors to Belgrade for long periods. There is useful background on the traditional Yugophile tradition in the FCO and MI6 in Stephen Dorril's stimulating if sometimes unreliable volume, *MI6: Inside the Secret World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 328ff. It is perhaps significant that in Christopher Andrew's semi-official history, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Heinemann, 1985) there is no discussion of the issue of SIS and Yugoslavia in World War II at all, and only two very brief and cursory references to Yugoslavia in the entire book. Dorril sometimes is unclear about the complex organizational relationship at that time between SIS, SOE, and the FCO, and the weakness of SIS in Whitehall after major setbacks in Europe in the early years of World War II, such as the Venlo affair in 1939. See also S. Payne Best, *The Venlo Incident* (London: Hutchinson, 1950). SOE was never under direct FCO control in the way that SIS was, and its field officers were in practice much more able to be independent in their judgments. A sensible account of the dilemmas facing British military intelligence officers in the field is to be found in R. d'Arcy Ryan, "The guerilla campaign in Yugoslavia," Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper No. 6, RMA Sandhurst, Camberley, 1994.

There is a very large scholarly literature on Churchill and the Whitehall diplomatic machine which is outside the scope of this paper, but it is worth bearing in mind that in general the wartime prime minister always preferred to have his own trusted associates, such as Fitzroy Maclean and Bill Deakin, in Yugoslavia, or C. E. M. Woodhouse (in Greek SOE) reporting to him directly rather than through the official diplomatic machinery. For comparison with activity in Italy, see William Fowles, *The Secret War in Italy: Special Forces, Partisans and Covert Operations 1943–1945* (Hersham: Ian Alan, 2010), and the forthcoming history of SOE in World War II Italy by Roderick Bailey.

few countries to send a military observer to Kosovo to report on the violence there in 1988–89 centered on Mitrovica and the Trepča mines. The British government was well-informed about the foundation of the Kosova Democratic League; the ethnic Albanian mass membership organization in Kosovo that evolved under the leadership of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova after 1990, and London had a number of contacts in the leadership of the new organization. There was concern in the UK that Kosovo might attempt a “run towards independence” in 1991–92, and as a result greater resources were put into local intelligence collection and policy development and planning to meet that eventuality. As it did not take place, the view of the traditional pro-Yugoslavist hegemonists in Whitehall regained the initiative and from about autumn 1993 onwards it was assumed that Milošević would always be able to maintain Serbian rule in Kosovo in most imaginable circumstances. The British policy priority was to keep Yugoslavia together, even if that required a tolerance of growing major human rights violations by the central government and of increasingly dictatorial behavior by Milošević himself.

In the second period, from 1993 until late 1995, after the outbreak of the Croatian and Bosnian wars, policy did not change substantially but there was an intensification of intelligence collection activity on Kosovo, often in quite close collaboration with Yugoslavs.⁵ Much evaluation of the regime and local information depended on military intelligence with the Embassy in Belgrade having close links with the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), a longstanding relationship that had involved exchanges of officers in military academies, and using the JNA link as a route to gain information about Russia and Warsaw Pact states. Intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover were in practice subject to various Belgrade government restrictions, or chose a path of caution and self-restriction in their behavior to avoid the risk of expulsion. This was during the period of most intensity in the Bosnian war, and the limited resources available to London

⁵ For the general background, see James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (London and New York: C. Hurst and Columbia University Press, 1997). A picture of the Milošević–British diplomacy of the period can be found in the recently published memoir of the 1994–95 period of British Ambassador to Belgrade Ivor Roberts, *Razgovori s Milosevicam* (Belgrade: Globus, 2012). This presents a personal view of the Yugoslav crisis and does not illuminate the nature of British policy-making very much, or the detail of Robert’s personal dialogue with the Serbian leader.

were often more or less exclusively deployed in connection with that conflict. There is no evidence that British military observers visited Kosovo much in this period, and such information about JNA activity in Kosovo that reached London did so as a result of the more or less mechanical reproduction of public domain material from Belgrade in the form of open and semi-open sources.

But normal military intelligence exchanges were not the whole story. This was also the period of the exceptionally close UK diplomatic relationship with Milošević under the Major government in London that has been explored in the works of Brendan Simms, Carole Hodge, and other scholars, and disturbing Milošević's Kosovo policy was not on the London agenda providing it appeared to be "keeping the lid on the situation," and preventing an outbreak of violence that would attract media attention.⁶ The British government had a very close link with the small New Democracy party that was often in government with Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia, and sought to influence the Serbian leader in more rational directions, towards London-led privatization strategies, in particular.⁷ Milošević was regarded as an essential partner in the search

⁶ See Carole Hodge, *Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the Present* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 31ff. Hodge is particularly perceptive on the post-2000 period following the fall of Milošević, where weakness in United States leadership in the early period of the Bush administration and the understandable desire to encourage the Kostunica government in a democratic direction led to major concessions on Kosovo being made to Belgrade.

As she observes, Britain had a predominant political and military position in this period in Kosova, but the opportunity to stabilize the situation and meet the democratic wishes of the ethnic Albanian majority was largely squandered. For the Bosnian war period, see Brendan Simms, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (London: Penguin, 2003). Many of the same political actors in Britain were involved in both conflicts, in similar dominant international community roles, e.g., Christopher Patten.

⁷ The New Democracy party originated in the split in the Yugoslav League of Communists in Valjevo and other towns nearby, after 1989, and originally had been assisted, it is generally believed, by Israeli diplomats in Yugoslavia who sought modernization of the Titoist system. It also received various practical aid from the UK government in the period after 1992. Its critics have claimed that it was never a normal political party, even by the odd standards of Belgrade politics at the time, but was more a political club for modernizing individuals in the Belgrade elite. In serious Serbian nationalist circles, it was seen as the "Valjevo conspiracy" against Yugoslavia. Evaluating the role of the New Democracy party in Milošević-led governments is likely to be important in the future historiography insofar as it will also open up debate about the exact definition of British and Israeli attempts in this critical period

for peace, and later, a possible source of British commercial contracts and privatization deals in the neo-liberal agenda of the British government. British influence was considerable in the internal security ministry in some periods, also.

Kosovo was unimportant in these calculations, which focused on the Serbian media and telecommunications industry for much of that period. The main marketable Kosovo commercial asset, the base metal mining industry, was not a London priority, despite the central British role in developing it in pre-1939 royalist Yugoslavia.⁸ Geostrategic considerations prevailed in the general political area. Although many British diplomats felt the best solution for Kosovo was to stay within Serbia but with a reinvigoration of the provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution and the majority-community rights granted by Tito in 1981 and withdrawn and suspended by Milošević, their views did not necessarily carry weight. That is not to say British diplomacy was idle; efforts were made to persuade the Rugova leadership of the Kosova Democratic League to moderate the demand for independence and to enter into negotiations with Belgrade to make a deal on a form of Kosovo's autonomy that would bring back the framework of the 1974 Kosovo constitution.

Albanians were encouraged to join the Socialist Party of Serbia, and other dialogues with the regime were initiated which generally involved the same group of favored members of the Belgrade and Prishtina elites formed by Titoism. The fact that non-LDK oppositionists, principally in the Kosova People's League (LPK), were planning, mostly from centers of the

to influence, even control, Milošević's behavior. Some of the issues were—perhaps inadvertently—put in the public domain as early as 1997 in a publication by ND leader and sometime Milošević government minister Dušan Mihajlović, *Answers: A Guide through Political Viewpoints* (Belgrade: Fond Futura, 1997). Mihajlović was a reformist communist who had been mayor of Valjevo in the key 1990–91 period when the civic values of the Yugoslav League of Communists—such as they were—were seen by Milošević as threatening the rule of the party. The most interesting part of the publication for future historians is likely to be the description of the role of the leaders of the Israelis from the town of Rehovota in the founding of the ND party, and associated matters. Milošević himself seems to have been involved in the party formation at this stage and prominent Serbian nationalist intellectuals like Dobrica Ćosić attended the meetings described by Mihajlović. Mihajlović claims that he left the Socialist Party of Serbia in 1990 because of its continuing commitment to the state control of industry and state planning.

⁸ See D. A. Wray, *The Geology and Mineral Resources of the Serb–Croat–Slovene State* (London: HMSO, 1921).

Kosova Albanian Diaspora in Germany and Switzerland, a force to initiate military resistance to the Milošević regime may have been suspected by a few well-informed individuals in the intelligence community, but did not enter into the mainstream of British Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence thinking.⁹ The LPK had no presence at all in the UK at this stage (it was only to achieve this in 1998, later than almost any other major Albanian Diaspora center). The signature of the Dayton Accords, which excluded Kosova from the agreements, was heavily influenced by the Hurd–Patten–Neville Jones group in the FCO, and Ivor Roberts as British Ambassador in Belgrade, and as a result a strong stake in Dayton meant exclusion, *de facto*, of Kosovo independence from major international consideration.

It did not, however, take long for this policy to encounter serious difficulties, with a darkening atmosphere and a worsening of social conflict in Kosovo. By the spring of 1996, the nascent Kosova Liberation Army had announced itself in Kosovo by armed attacks on police stations, and began to attract coverage in the international media. London was faced with a policy dilemma—would Milošević be able to crush this new force, as he claimed? Or would it grow into a significant political and military player? Above all, would it displace the Rugova-led Kosova Democratic League as the main ethnic Albanian political leadership in Prishtina? A split began to appear in London between the Foreign Office, which generally backed deals with Milošević and attempted to drive his policy in a more “liberal” direction, and the military, which, while often of a naturally conservative outlook and generally imbued with the atmosphere of British Yugophilism, also contained in its ranks officers of a more independent outlook who had been through the war in Bosnia and had often formed strong private reservations about UK policy based on their personal first-hand knowledge of the Serbs’ activity in Bosnia and British collaboration with Belgrade.

The British military also had access, via their Yugoslav contacts, to at least somewhat more realistic evaluations of the declining state of the JNA and the wider Yugoslav security apparatus, and some questioned the JNA’s future capacity to easily repress a Kosovar Albanian insurgent movement. There were also many links between the British military and their opposite numbers in the United States, both through NATO and also other bilateral

⁹ See Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army*, 49ff.

links, and the Americans, in the main, had a much more interventionist attitude toward the Milošević regime than most Europeans. A number of American experts on the region were bitterly opposed to the basis of UK policy, and this came to a head during the latter stages of the Bosnian war when it was made clear to the Major government that the whole UK–US intelligence relationship might be threatened if information provided by the US from its technical apparatus continued to leak to the Serb and Yugoslav military in Bosnia via British links. The clear US achievement in ending the Bosnian war through the use of NATO military force was fresh in many minds and it was obvious that if a war broke out in Kosovo, NATO might again be called upon to act. These tendencies coexisted for a period of time in 1996–97.

The third policy period begins, in my view, during and after the Albanian armed uprising in 1997, when the anarchy in Albania was a major shock to the governments in the European Union, although it was much better anticipated and understood in the United States. The arrival of large quantities of small arms on the regional scene was seen as a nightmare by European diplomacy, with its normal and often exclusive focus on Belgrade-elite dealings, and the question soon arose as to whether Kosovo might be affected by the turmoil. It did not take long for the international press to report small arms transfers from northern Albania to Kosova. The public emergence of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) followed in the autumn of that year, and the war became an open political factor immediately afterwards, continuing until NATO entered Kosova in summer 1999. Some voices in the international community concerned with the Balkans, such as the Swedish diplomat Carl Bildt, were in favor of putting NATO forces on the ground to protect the Albania–Kosovo border, but this was seen as impractical in military circles in London and NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Thus, there was a deep ambivalence in British official attitudes to the emergence of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) from the very beginning of its life. On the one hand, it was seen as a predictable, even overdue, development—some analysts in the London intelligence community in and around MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, and the Foreign Office had expected an uprising in Kosovo in the 1991–92 period and were surprised when it did not take place, and when the KLA did emerge after 1996 it had little sense of novelty in their eyes. But many of a more conventional frame of mind knew little more about Kosovo than its tradi-

tional religious and social symbolism for the Serbs, and feared that conflict in Kosovo would ruin their opportunities for productive dealings with the Belgrade regime. The Secret Intelligence Service with its traditional American links was also more open to the possibility of the downfall of the Milošević regime than many in other parts of Whitehall. Thus, there was a continual tension between the intelligence apparatus in these years and the very small group of senior officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who dominated Balkan and Yugoslav policy.

In terms of London inter-agency development, the ex-Yugoslav wars had been a milestone for the British military, the army in particular. British infantry forces had been faced with a major contraction after the end of the Cold War, the “peace dividend,” and as early as 1994 it was clear that, on the assumption that Russia and the other former Warsaw Pact states made a successful transition to liberal democracy, the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) and forces based in Germany generally would have only a short term future. The peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia were an opportunity to reassert the importance of the armed forces, the infantry in particular. Military budgets were under pressure, and the British had, or believed they had, a uniquely successful record of effective counter-insurgency in the Cold War, with victories over insurgents in Korea, Malaya, and to a degree, in Cyprus. Northern Ireland operations could hardly be designated an unqualified success, but whatever their future in the mid-1990s, they certainly provided a hard core of very well trained and experienced peacekeeping soldiers and administrators. Only the French, with their African peacekeeping experience could, within NATO, appear to be rivals for dominant influence. From the point of view of the British generals, the Yugoslav crisis was an attractive opportunity to reassert the importance of infantry forces in an international peacekeeping role, particularly one where most operations had the strong support of the liberal and left wing of British politics, who often in the past had been critics of military activity and military budgets, and saw peacekeeping operations as part of British colonialism.

At the same time, while recognizing the inevitability of the “war for Kosovo,” the London policy-makers had to begin to look toward a post-Milošević Yugoslavia. Recognizing the claims to independence on the part of the Kosovar Albanian majority was central to this, and from about early 1997 onwards, the possibility of an independent Kosovo began to be subject to open discussion in parts of the London policy-making

apparatus. Contact with the Kosovar Albanians was prioritized, and this rapidly accelerated after the election of the Blair-led Labour government in March 1997. At the same time, joint work on the military intelligence side linking the insights of the UK Defence Intelligence Service (DIS) and the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was ongoing, and provided an extra set of insights for Whitehall policy-makers in this period compared to the paucity of contact with the Americans in the earlier stages of the ex-Yugoslav Wars.

There were a number of other background factors. The new Labour government had a number of leading figures who had been influenced toward a change of traditional British policy by the carnage of the Bosnian war, and saw the traditional London–Belgrade relationship as a blind alley, where all the concessions to the Milošević regime's policy in the Major government period had had little or no effect on the dictator's behavior. After 1997, Blair broke the Foreign Office monopoly on policy development, and opened Whitehall to independent policy advice and influences from regional experts on the Balkans which had been firmly resisted by the Conservatives. International Roman Catholic lobbies and Vatican diplomacy who had been involved with the independence struggle of Croatia were influential in the background to many Blair government attitudes. The traditional Serbophilia of the British elite was very much founded on class in the Conservative party, and to a certain extent on religion, whereas British Roman Catholics who had been involved in support for Croatian national campaigns had purchase in the Labour party, while they did not to any significant extent among the Conservatives. Thus, what must be termed the traditionally Serbophile Foreign Office "establishment" was often isolated and by-passed over Kosovo policy after summer 1997, and advocacy of action to support the Albanian national cause against the pressures of the "Greater Serbia" project became "respectable," in policy discourse terms in the FCO, in a way it had not been under the previous government where Serbian nationalist Christian–Muslim dichotomies had often prevailed.

British Balkan policy ever since the declining years of the nineteenth century had been focused on support for the developing Christian nations in the Balkans, basically Greece and Serbia and in the Ottoman period, before the Siege of Plevna (1877), Bulgaria. The shock of the new orientation of the Blair government's Balkan policy to the London diplomatic community should not be exaggerated. Policy towards the Albanian factor

in the Balkans had been neglected in the 1991–96 period, and for some time in the early years the UK did not have an Ambassador in Tirana. The dramatic events of the period of anarchy in Albania in 1997 changed diplomatic priorities and forced Albania and Albanian policy issues to the top of the agenda. It was not easy for some older generation figures steeped in the Yugophile tradition to come to terms with this. In contrast the British military was in a much easier position to readjust, and in a period prior to the difficulties caused by the uncertain outcomes of Bush administration wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the strong re-orientation towards Washington was much easier.

The public emergence of the Kosova Liberation Army in autumn 1997 was anticipated by many in the intelligence community, but its exact timing was uncertain. After the 1995 Dayton Accords were signed, much British secret and foreign intelligence gathering in the Balkans had been wound down, and Albanian matters had been left as the preserve of the Americans. This was partly a matter of resources and priorities, and the Major government reforms within SIS, but also a product of the over-close relationship with the first Berisha government in the 1992–96 period, where prominent ex-SIS, ex-SOE, or FCO figures from the older generation had been active collaborators with the Berisha project and had appeared to be blind to the anti-democratic tendencies and cult of personality that had developed around Berisha himself. The bitter heritage of Anglo-American differences over Bosnian policy remained for many years, and the Blair government was determined to bridge them. In practice, over Balkan policy (and other issues) this meant by-passing many traditional FCO policy mechanisms and centralizing decision-making around the Cabinet Office and No. 10 Downing Street, where US influences and approaches were paramount.

Thus, when the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in the autumn of 1997, it came into a very different British policy climate in London from that of 1993, when it had begun to be formed. Many initiatives had passed to the Ministry of Defence as part of the process of administrative reorientation of Balkan work in London. The Neville Jones–Hurd dealings with Belgrade when they were working for NatWest Markets to make money from Serb privatization had been widely criticized in the British press, and in this atmosphere a priority of the Ministry of Defence was to synchronize policy as closely with the United States as possible. In the first instance, policy-makers tended to see the KLA as a force likely to produce “anarchy”

on the model of events in the previous summer in Albania in 1997, and the prospect of a descent into chaos in Kosovo was placed within planning parameters. This was an ill-informed view. The Milošević security apparatus in Kosovo was strong then, and well-organized, although suffering technical and equipment deficiencies. The KLA was a tiny force, numbering perhaps only 300 armed men and women and was only beginning the process of forming an army of resistance within Kosovo.

Yet for some months this inertia prevailed. The relative success of Milošević's "First Offensive" in February–June 1998 meant that there was always an influential school of thought in Western diplomatic circles arguing that the Serbs would succeed in crushing the nascent Kosova Albanian army. This was also the case in the United States State Department, where the Holbrooke–Hill axis of diplomats was in the ascendant, until after May 1998 when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright took over personal control of policy concerning Kosova, on the basis that no peace settlement would work unless the KLA was involved. The policy positions of a Holbrooke-negotiated Kosova deal along Dayton lines was becoming less and less realistic as time went on, and the KLA seemed able to survive the JNA onslaught.

It was during this period, of summer 1998, that British policy also changed on the ground. It was obvious that while the then-Defence Attaché in Belgrade, the distinguished infantry soldier and hero of the Falklands War, Colonel John Crosland, was a highly skilled and objective observer of the war, he could not be in more than one place at once, and his visits to Kosova were heavily supervised by "minders" from the Yugoslav armed forces. There was the beginning of a build-up of British police and advisory personnel in Albania during 1997, connected with the stabilization assistance program Blair's Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had initiated after the visit of Albanian Prime Minister Fates Naño to London that autumn. With British personnel on the ground in Albania, and the widespread knowledge in Albania of Kosova Liberation Army operations in Northern Albania (and possibly elsewhere), it was a natural step for intelligence priorities connected with peacekeeping and weapons collection from the opened magazines earlier that year to spread to observation-surveillance of the nascent KLA in the violent and chaotic regions of the north. The question quickly arose about how this could best be conducted.

Experienced informal warfare soldiers from the British infantry, often with a background in Special Forces soldiering were placed in Northern

Albania with the agreement of the new Albanian government under Pandeli Majko that had been formed in November 1997. The British military view, perhaps conditioned by many years of counter-insurgency in Northern Ireland was that the development—or lack of it—of the KLA would be heavily influenced by what support it received from over the kinship border in Northern Albania, in Tropoja district in particular. This was undoubtedly a correct analysis, and led to the early deployment of UK advisers to the Kruma camp and other KLA training centers in Northern Albanian towns like Bajram Curri in Tropoja. Although “Operation Horn,” as this was called, was intended to be a top secret operation, with the aim of keeping this involvement on what could be seen as the Albanian side in the conflict a secret, rumors and hard news of what was happening soon leaked into the media, both local and international, and this tendency was accentuated by the deployment of similar “training teams” from other NATO nations such as The Netherlands and Germany in these areas in the same period in 1997–98. At first these soldiers were tasked primarily with an intelligence remit, to ascertain what the KLA was doing in Northern Albania and to report back to capital command centers, but after the American “move towards the KLA” of the May–June 1998 period, the question of training and military assistance was also on the agenda.

As the war developed in the autumn of 1998, further contacts seemed to be desirable within Kosovo itself. Although the Holbrooke–Hill diplomacy with Milošević continued, few in the British military or security orbit believed a negotiated solution to the conflict was possible, and more and more collaboration with the local ethnic Albanian insurgents became a realistic option. A central objective of the KLA, from summer 1998 onwards, was to keep open the Koshare Valley small arms transfer conduit from Tropoja in Northern Albania to Kosovo via Decani in Kosovo. Significant KLA ground forces were operating here, and it was a priority for the Serbs to close this personnel and small arms transfer route. The earliest effective assistance from NATO-nation trainers was in trying to improve the training of the KLA soldiers involved in this territorial defense.

Like their predecessors attached as British Liaison Officers to the different Balkan Partisan armies in World War II, the ex-SAS attached soldiers often soon tended to share the values and political outlook of their insurgent hosts. It was not long before it seemed natural in London to look at more direct military involvement as allies with the KLA. This was in an important and developing international context. Military realities on the

ground were forcing the diplomat's hands. The Clinton administration in the United States was unwilling to contemplate putting in American infantry on the ground in the conflict. The US Department of Defense contained some leading figures who either bore private sympathies to Belgrade, or were reluctant to see US troops involved in another debilitating and domestically controversial campaign, as in Bosnia. "Mission Creep" was feared and US military planners could not see a clear exit strategy that did not involve the overthrow of the Milošević regime, an outcome which most EU governments had not considered at this stage and which would be very unwelcome to most.

Yet if Milošević did not give way to the international community, a ground invasion of Kosovo by NATO would be a real possibility. After the Raçak massacre in January 1999 and the failure of the international negotiations at Rambouillet in March 1999, this became a certainty. The KLA was *in situ* and could perform various useful roles. As well as providing a critical mass of infantry on the ground in the Koshare defense, the KLA was brought into the targeting framework system for NATO bombing during the 78-day air campaign, identifying potential bombing targets. KLA soldiers fought a number of small engagements against the Yugoslav army, with British Special Forces soldiers, mostly near the end of the conflict.¹⁰ Links with the British army were important, and the investment that London had made in KLA training in the 1998–99 period had paid off. The new leader of the KLA, General Agim Çeku, who took over in February 1999, had fought in the Croatian army in the independence war period and had many British as well as American links. He was to preside over the reorganization of the KLA in the final period of the war; he was also involved in the negotiations that led to the Military-Technical Agreement laid down by NATO in summer 1999, and the subsequent demobilization and breakup of the KLA in September 1999.

It is unlikely that these successes in the post-war pacification process could have been as smoothly achieved without the prior close collaboration of the British military advisers with the KLA over a period of time. The encouragement of ex-KLA Dukagjini leader Ramush Haradinaj to form his AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo) political party in summer 1999 was also a process with substantial British input. In following these

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, 218ff.

policies, the British in Kosovo were working in a long established pattern of activity, most of the parameters of which had been laid down in the decolonization process in British colonies since World War II. In them, the formal imperial and colonial links are dissolved, but UK influence is embodied in the installation of friendly new political leaderships. If there was a local insurgent army to demobilize, as, for instance, in Kenya or Zimbabwe, British army trainers would be attached to the new army, and if possible a British-military educated general was imposed at the top. In some instances, as with Idi Amin in Uganda, this process led to highly adverse, disastrous, and chaotic outcomes, which are still being felt today, forty years later, while in others there was a greater degree of success, as in Kenya with ex-Mau Mau insurgents, and the use in Kenya of Jomo Kenyatta as a stabilizing and ultimately highly conservative figure. This tradition provided an important model for dealings with the KLA. Another relevant tradition was that of the British Special Operations Executive attachments to Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia in World War II. Although the British officers were not involved in the choice of Tito as leader, British support and advice reinforced his influence and British gold and weapons were vital in securing his victory for the Left against Draža Mihailović's Royalist Chetniks in 1943–44.¹¹

¹¹ There are many publications on the subject, but the best introduction is still F. W. D. Deakin's *The Embattled Mountain* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971) by Churchill's personal envoy to Tito. Also, by Heather Williams, *Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans: The SOE and Yugoslavia 1941–1945* (London: C. Hurst, 2012); and M. A. McConville, *A Small War in the Balkans: British Military Involvement in Wartime Yugoslavia 1941–1945* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

The distinction between the officers of the Special Operations Executive and those of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, is important, and will have to be considered in depth when the history of these matters is written. The relationship with Tito and the decisions taken were very much determined by SOE people, of whom Deakin and Fitzroy McLean were the most influential. With its traditional strongly Royalist internal ethos, the Foreign Office and SIS in the post-war period still had many officers and ex-officers with either Chetnik links, or general sympathies in that direction. The ex-Yugoslav monarch was partly resident in London throughout the post-war period. The general topic of the role of the monarchy in Britain in Yugoslav policy has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. The close links in London between the victorious Greek Rightist pro-monarchy forces in the Greek Civil War were a major influence in many London minds about what policy ought to be towards Yugoslavia. This had a marked effect on some of the immediate post-1991 controversies about events in Yugoslavia that took place in Britain. The influence of the old generation of ex-SOE officers such as Reginald Hibbert or Michael Lees in setting the terms of public debate was very unwelcome to most of the serving generation of FCO and SIS

In the main demobilization was a success, if evaluated at the formal level.¹² The timetable for demobilization was exactly achieved under the command of British General Michael Jackson the NATO KFOR force commander and a final ceremonial parade was held in Prishtina. The formal existence of the Kosova Liberation Army ended at this point, although many informal links between ex-KLA soldiers have continued in contemporary Kosovo and in the main constitute the organizational backbone of Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) that dominates the current governing coalition.

* * *

How far was the British link with the Kosova Liberation Army justified or successful? In the main the political objectives set by London were achieved, and the realism and professionalism of the British soldiers attached to the KLA in the difficult early days of the war in Kruma camp led to a good dividend in terms of political influence in the post-war period. The many difficulties that Kosovar governance encountered in the post-July 1999 period were not their fault, or that of the ethnic Albanian majority, but were inherent in the deficiencies of the United Nations (UNMIK) administration that followed. Nevertheless, the successor organization to the KLA, the Kosova Protection Force, has played a useful role as a National Guard type force in post-war Kosova, and has performed some civil emergency work successfully, as in the 2002 earthquake, when required to do so. It is not a Kosovar army, and the question of a future Kosovar army will certainly be on the political agenda at some point in the

officers who were grappling with the day to day practical problems of intelligence and policy. The volumes most of these SOE veterans had either published before 1990 or soon after formed a bridge between what Sabrina P. Ramet has explored in terms of scholarly debate in *Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), and the wider public and mass media consciousness. See also Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmett, eds., *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative*, 2nd ed. (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2012). This is a useful book on the narrow issues of media coverage, but largely oblivious to the wider atmosphere in Western governments. For some observations on the media issues, see my volume *Kosova Express*, op. cit.

¹² For basic information on the demobilization, see Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, *The Mobilisation and Demobilisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army* (Bonn and Skopje: IOM, 2001).

future. It is to be hoped that this force will evolve within a NATO framework, and will contribute to NATO in the tradition of the Kosova Liberation Army in assisting NATO forces in the period of alliance in 1998–99. At the time of writing, in March 2014, it appears there is substantial progress being made towards the fulfillment of this objective of the transformation of the Kosova Security Force (KSF) into a Kosovar army.

CHAPTER 5

The Uprising and NATO's Intervention, 1998–99

ZACHARY T. IRWIN

The Milošević regime by its oppressive policies and misrule in Kosovo bears full responsibility for provoking a crisis of decision among concerned governments and within international institutions, especially the United Nations and NATO. It is also accountable for the criminality of Serb official behavior in Kosovo itself.¹

Madeleine Albright's recollection of "lessons" from the period prior to NATO's bombing of Serbia raises questions about the interaction of the involved actors.² The significance of NATO's mission in Kosovo emerges from several interacting levels of analysis (domestic, regional, and international; see Figure 5.1). Considering Kosovo's experience requires relating the "lessons of the past" to distinct actors at different levels. The KLA's emergence is a more challenging task, for it must be explained how a guerrilla force, described as "terrorist" by American officials became a negotiating partner with the same officials. However, explaining the "lessons" of Kosovo may be as self-evident as identifying the analytic "levels" of NATO's policy environment. The levels of analysis required for

¹ Richard Goldstone et al., The Independent International Commission, "The Kosovo Report" (29 August 2000), at <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303E3B-thekosovoreport.htm> (accessed 25 October 2012).

² Madeleine Albright, "Frontline Interviews" (14 September 2012), at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html> (accessed 25 October 2012).

understanding the case of Kosovo are relevant to most issues involving the Balkan conflict. NATO assumed a key role in the rise of the KLA.

What should be emphasized at the outset is that the outbreak of the KLA insurgency in spring 1998 reflected the fact that the *status quo ante* had become unacceptable for Albanians (and, given Belgrade's plans, for the regime as well). In essence, the Belgrade regime had failed to promote and develop the key values for sustainability stressed by Sabrina Ramet in the introduction, viz., integration, sociality, and trust. Indeed, Milošević's policies had provoked Serb–Albanian segregation, ended such sociality as had developed between Serbs and Albanians, and sowed deep inter-ethnic distrust in the province.³ It was, thus, Milošević's scorn for values essential for sustainability which brought Kosovo to the brink and provoked the Albanian uprising of 1998. Nor was that all, in that his rule also showed contempt for the rule of law, the individual rights of Albanians, equality, and the harm principle—civic values likewise stressed in the introduction.

Conference diplomacy, involving actors at all levels, such as those at Chateau Rambouillet, has been specific to the region. NATO's involvement in Kosovo has also been expressed through issues such as the relationship between the UN Security Council and regional organizations (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) or legitimate "self-determination." "Self-determination" has been counterpoised to the idea of "state integrity" in other venues such as the North Caucasus. Claims by the Republika Srpska for "self-determination" from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter, Bosnia) were the subject of a ruling against Serbian secession by the EU-supported Badinter Commission.⁴ The decision's relevance to Kosovo has been controversial. The distinction between NATO and EU involvement was emphasized by a national security advisor in the Clinton White House, who explained that the NATO alliance had been kept out of the crisis in Bosnia "until it became clear that the Bosnian conflict exceeded the capabilities of all other international institutions."⁵ The


³ See Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 316–7; and Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005* (Washington, D.C. and Bloomington, IN: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Indiana University Press, 2006), 510–6.

⁴ Alain Pellet, "The opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A second breath for self-determination of peoples," *European Journal of International Law* 3 (1992), no. 1: 178–85.

⁵ David C. Gompert, "How to defeat Serbia," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (1994), no. 4: 31.

consequence of that attitude confined NATO to the enforcement of sanctions against Serbia or to ensuring compliance with the “no-fly zone” over Bosnia. NATO’s caution may have emboldened the Milošević regime to violate the most significant promises made to the international community after the 1992 London Conference on former Yugoslavia. Bosnian involvement helped to create a precedent for NATO’s role in Kosovo well before adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In this respect, the sequence of outside involvement in the post-Yugoslav area as a whole is relevant to the specific involvement of NATO in Kosovo. After Dayton, demonstrations on behalf of Kosovo’s independence coincided with the insistence of Serbia’s Minister of Interior, Vukašin Jokanović, that political affairs in the province would remain within Serbia’s internal jurisdiction.⁶ Beyond Lord Carrington’s initial conference diplomacy, the diplomatic background included the Contact Group founded initially at the initiative of David Owen.⁷

Figure 5.1. Levels of analysis—Kosovo, 1996.⁸



⁶ BBC Monitoring Europe (22 March 1996), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 23 July 2012).

⁷ Christoph Schwegmann, *The Contact Group and Its Impact on European Institutional Structures* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2000), 6.

⁸ The “level of analysis problem” is well-known. One early discussion is authored by J. David Singer, “The level of analysis problem in international relations,” in *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, eds. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 77–92.

The Road to Rambouillet: NATO's Involvement and the Rise of the KLA

A description of the long and tortured history of relations between Albanians and Serbs lies well beyond the limited intended scope of this chapter and is in any event the subject of Roberto Morozzo della Rocca's contribution to this volume. The origins of NATO's involvement in Kosovo extend back to the time of Yugoslavia's dissolution and well before NATO's campaign. The transformation of NATO's mission, the international response to the Balkan situation, and an independence referendum in Kosovo coincided temporally and interacted over the decade. In July 1990, NATO's heads of state agreed about a transformation of the Alliance in a way that would be consistent with the larger changes in Europe, a change implying cooperation with the OSCE.⁹ In November of the following year, NATO's New Strategic Concept was adopted.¹⁰ The "Strategic Concept" repeatedly demonstrated its relevance to the serial crises in Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In October 1991, the International Conference on Yugoslavia (The Hague Conference) considered the idea of self-government for Kosovo as a part of resolving the overall crisis. Presumably, the prior autonomy of Serbia's "provinces" in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution suggested a restoration of self-government. The Security Council passed its first major resolution about Kosovo expressing "deep concern" about Serbia's refusal to allow the work of the CSCE's "missions of long duration" as a stabilizing example of "preventative diplomacy."¹¹ At Dayton, then-President of Serbia Milošević had made "informal" promises about Kosovar self-governance.¹² Yet soon after, Serbia's foreign minister denied that Dayton had created any obligation towards Kosovo.¹³

⁹ *New York Times* (7 July 1990), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 30 July 2012).

¹⁰ NATO Official Text: "The Alliances New Strategic Concept" (7 July 1991), at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed 30 July 2012).

¹¹ UN Security Council Resolution 855 (1993; 9 August 1993), in *The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: an Analytical Documentation 1974–1999*, ed. Heike Krieger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 120.

¹² Elizabeth Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 102.

¹³ Milan Milutinović declared that Kosovo was Serbia's "internal affair"; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (28 December 1995), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 28 August 2012).

After Dayton, Kosovo's diplomatic activity on behalf of independence increased through Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The situation exposed a contradiction. As Rugova's practice of non-violent resistance increased diplomatic activity, so also increased the domestic appeal of the militant Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Rugova enjoyed a supportive reception in the United States Congress. Not only did he earn the right to open an "information office," but he also brought Secretary of State Warren Christopher to remark that an "outer wall" of sanctions would remain against Serbia until Belgrade had granted autonomy to Kosovo, rather than independence.¹⁴ European institutions and the United Nations became increasingly attentive to Kosovo's plight. For a time, the outcome appeared to advance reconciliation. Milošević and Femi Agani, an official of Kosovo's Justice Party, concluded an agreement in principle on education in the Albanian language, a step described by the EU Council as "a first step in the direction of a comprehensive dialogue in the status of the region."¹⁵ Rugova contradicted such claims, and substantive progress remained specious. By the next year the Contact Group expressed its "deep concern over tensions" in the area, citing the problem of refugee return and the importance of implementing the education agreement.¹⁶ The refugee problem offered an ample source of recruitment for the KLA.

Increasing tensions followed escalating violence on the part of both Serbian police and the KLA. Serbian forces started a broad campaign of repression, public trials, and extra-judicial killing.¹⁷ At its initial meeting on Kosovo, the Contact Group (including Italy) had done little more than to call for a return of refugees, an end to violent conflict, and negotiated autonomy.¹⁸ A statement on 25 February was somewhat more urgent in

¹⁴ *Washington Times* (15 December 1995), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 29 August 2010).

¹⁵ European Council, 1950th Council Meeting, General Affairs, PRES/96/253 (1 October 1996), in Krieger, ed., 12.

¹⁶ Contact Group Foreign Ministers, "Statement on Kosovo" (24 September 1997), in Krieger, ed., 121.

¹⁷ Amnesty International, "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: A human rights crisis in Kosovo," EUR 70/054/1998 (31 July 1998), at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR70/031/1999/en>.

¹⁸ *Financial Times* (25 September 1997), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 11 September 2012).

its demand for a dialogue,¹⁹ but escalating violence brought a new sense of urgency by early March. US Special Envoy to the region Robert Gelbard remarked that the KLA was “without question a terrorist group,” which some considered a pretext for Belgrade’s offensive.²⁰ The comment followed the bombing of a Serbian refugee camp for which the KLA claimed responsibility.²¹ About 6 March, Serbian forces killed 51 Albanians in the village of Donji Prikaze (Drenica), including 25 from one clan, among them Adem Jashari, a KLA supporter and some 25 women and children.²² One indication of Serbian perceptions about the incident emerged from a tour of the village offered to foreign diplomats by Serb officials.²³ Members of the Contact Group declined this chance to witness KLA “fortifications.” Instead, the group issued a new statement marking a turning point in international perceptions. Condemnation of KLA “terrorism” was unambiguous, but perfunctory, in comparison with the “condemnation of the large-scale police actions of the last ten days . . . violent repression of non-violent expression of political views . . . [and demanding investigation] . . . very serious allegations of extrajudicial killings.”²⁴

Measures were suggested or mandated in the document, including return to Kosovo of the OSCE long-term mission, involvement of its Permanent Council, and appointment of a Personal Representative of its Chairman. The Group would meet with regional governments “to discuss the grave consequences of an inter-ethnic conflict and its spill-over [effects].”²⁵ The Contact Group sought to maintain its unity by threatening new sanctions rather than force. Demands included a withdrawal of forces and the inception of negotiations without preconditions. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright persuaded Russian Foreign Minister Evgeni

¹⁹ Contact Group Meeting, “Statement on Kosovo,” Moscow (25 February 1998), in Krieger, ed., 121.

²⁰ *Financial Post* (Toronto, 13 March 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic* (accessed 12 September 2012).

²¹ Deutsche Presse Agentur (17 February 1996), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 16 October 2012).

²² *Financial Times* (10 March 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 12 September 2012).

²³ Serbian Radio (Belgrade), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 12 September 2012).

²⁴ Contact Group, “Statement on Kosovo,” *Le Monde Diplomatique* (9 March 1998) at <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/kosovo/contact-290498-en> (accessed 12 September 2012).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Primakov to accept an arms embargo against FR Yugoslavia, lacking clear progress in negotiations, an apparent concession following the agreement of France and Germany.²⁶ Milošević sought to temporize by accepting the earlier negotiated education agreement; meanwhile, Rugova reshaped his cabinet to prepare for talks. Secretary Albright appeared to make Kosovo the centerpiece of American policy in the area: "I think we have learned the lessons of the last seven years that we cannot equivocate in the face of ethnic cleansing that we have a moral duty to do today what we did not do in 1991."²⁷ Albright's "moral duty" adumbrated a concept of legal "rectitude" as a "theory of problem solving. . . related to community processes," and expressing norms of "responsible conduct."²⁸ More threateningly, she would not "rule out the severest consequences" if the new measures proved to be ineffective. Finally, Albright's urgency expanded the work of the Contact Group in enlisting Spain's premier Felipe Gonzalez as EU envoy, inviting Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the White House, and convening a meeting with European foreign ministers.

Contact Group statements proceeded in tandem with related activity in the Security Council and the European Council. Resolution 1160 (1998) endorsed the work of the OSCE and the Contact Group and created an *ad hoc* committee to gather information about the situation in Kosovo. Significantly, this and subsequent resolutions invoked its recommendations under Article VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression." The resolution clearly implied that the situation demanded an effective response and "enhanced status for Kosovo [and] a substantially greater degree of autonomy and self-administration."²⁹ Wording in the resolution was intended to satisfy Russia and may have understated the potential for the use of force against Serbia. Shortly before the resolution, a coalition government assumed power in Belgrade with power shared between Milošević's Socialists and

²⁶ *Daily Mail* (London, 10 March 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 12 September 2012).

²⁷ *Toronto Star* (13 March 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 12 September 2012).

²⁸ Myres S McDougal and Harold Lasswell, "Jurisprudence in policy-oriented perspective," 1967, Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Perspective, at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3594&context=fss_papers, 496, 506 (accessed 10 March 2014).

²⁹ Resolution 1160 (1998) S/RES/1160/1998 (31 March 1998), in Krieger, ed., 128.

Vojislav Šešelj's Radical Party. One consequence was intensified violence in Kosovo. It was hardly surprising that Vladislav Jovanović, Serbia's representative at the United Nations, would insist that all of Kosovo's "diverse" population enjoyed "the same civil and human rights [as Serbs] . . . based on the highest European standards." If problems existed in the region, they were because of "blackmail" to boycott Serbian authority exerted by "separatist" Albanian elements.³⁰ In April 1998, the Contact Group adopted more detailed prescriptions for negotiations between Priština and Belgrade, including "appropriate international involvement [mediation] as an essential factor to establish confidence between the parties and to facilitate talks."³¹ Presidents Milošević and Rugova met unsuccessfully, and Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke abandoned his efforts at shuttle diplomacy in June. Holbrooke admitted that Milošević had not "changed his attitude" toward Kosovo and that NATO had drawn up contingency plans.³² Holbrooke later quipped, "[w]e felt sending Rugova to meet with Milošević was like sending Bambi to meet Godzilla."³³ In fact, the two had met once before on 22 May to no lasting effect. Along the Kosovo–Albania border an estimated 80,000 refugees had fled Serbian forces, which were seeking to deny sanctuary to the KLA.³⁴

In late April, NATO issued a major statement on Kosovo, demanding "maximum restraint" from Yugoslav authorities. The Council insisted it was of "utmost importance that the security and stability of neighboring countries not be jeopardized."³⁵ A follow-up statement in May emphasized themes from earlier documents and pledged to "enhance and supplement" Partnership for Peace activities in Albania and Macedonia. The statement promised "possible further deterrent measures" and consultation

³⁰ "Extracts from Security Council Debates..." on Res. 1160 (1998), UN Doc S/PV 3868 (31 March 1998), in Krieger, ed., 133.

³¹ Contact Group, "Statement on Kosovo," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (29 April 1998), at <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/kosovo/contact-290498-en>.

³² Beta News (Belgrade, 25 June 1998), in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (27 June 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 13 September 2012).

³³ *Washington Times* (17 July 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 13 September 2012).

³⁴ *New York Times* (19 June 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 14 September 1998).

³⁵ "Council Statement on the Situation in Kosovo" (30 April 1998), at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25985.htm?selectedLocale=en; see also "Council Statement on the Situation in Kosovo" (5 March 1998), at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25989.htm?selectedLocale=en.

through “Permanent Joint Councils” with Russia and Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. A responsible source considered the action expressed NATO’s potential involvement in preventative peacekeeping for Kosovo and “somehow in a resolution there.”³⁶ By June, NATO defense ministers reaffirmed that the “missions” in Albania and Macedonia might have an additional purpose, one including “the halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression and expulsion in Kosovo.”³⁷

Meanwhile, border conditions worsened with “sudden large-scale movements of refugees. . . affecting all segments of the [Kosovar] population.”³⁸ A Yeltsin–Milošević meeting in mid-June promised a halt to attacks on civilians, but entailed neither a withdrawal of Serbian forces, nor any contact with the KLA. The day after the meeting and in response to an incident on the Albanian border, Special Envoy Richard Gelbard spoke about the progress of NATO’s contingency planning against Serbia.³⁹ The 2001 Albanian insurgency would demonstrate the threat of destabilization to Macedonia from a refugee influx. In Skopje, Javier Solana assured his hosts that whatever the outcome in Kosovo, NATO would not support its independence or any version of a “Greater Albania.”⁴⁰

NATO’s linkages with international agencies were strengthened. NATO foreign ministers offered support for OSCE and UN monitoring activity. Their statement followed a change in NATO’s relations with the United Nations. The new Secretary General, Kofi Annan, responsible for UN peacekeeping, had worked smoothly in Bosnia, managing the transition of operations from UN to NATO forces. The relationship also benefitted from the appointment of NATO’s new Secretary General, Javier Solana, in December 1995.⁴¹ Annan’s statements afforded a rationale for NATO’s involvement.

³⁶ *International Herald Tribune* (28 May 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 12 September 2012).

³⁷ “Statement on Kosovo” (11 June 1998), at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25969.htm?selectedLocale=en.

³⁸ European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Statement on the Status of Refugees from Kosovo” (1 June 1998), at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,ECRE,,SR-B,,3ae6a65f14,0.html>.

³⁹ *St. Petersburg Times* (18 June 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 13 September 2012).

⁴⁰ *Tanjug*, BBC Monitoring Europe (24 July 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 12 September 2012).

⁴¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2010), 166.

He condemned "the pattern of terror carried out by Serbian forces."⁴² NATO Foreign Ministers met on 28–29 May 1998, warning about future options. "[W]e have commissioned military advice on support for UN and OSCE monitoring activity as well as preventive deployments in Albania and Macedonia . . . in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis."⁴³ Solana left no doubt about NATO's responsibility. "Kosovo is not a national problem. It's [an] international [one]. Therefore, we would be justified in acting. . ."⁴⁴ He added that such action could require coercive measures. The comment left unresolved whether a Security Council sanction would be necessary. NATO's evolving role was complicated by the coincidence of the Kosovo situation with the question of expanding NATO membership. Russian involvement in Bosnian operations was a prominent outcome of these discussions in the Joint Permanent Council, but unilateral action in Kosovo would threaten cooperation in Bosnia.⁴⁵ Similarly, expanding the alliance demanded caution to avoid jeopardizing Russian cooperation in the Balkans. On 16 June, President Slobodan Milošević of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a joint statement that affirmed the absence of "restrictions" on diplomatic personnel accredited to Belgrade from "familiarizing themselves with the situation [in Kosovo]."⁴⁶ The statement became the basis for Richard Holbrooke's proposal to create "Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions" (KDOM) intended to "provide clear and objective information from the ground."⁴⁷ The activity and reports of the Observer Missions to the Contact Group were important. They helped to "delay the onset of full-scale war," and by October laid the basis for the more robust, monitoring mission of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).⁴⁸

⁴² "Secretary general outraged by reports of atrocities in Kosovo" (30 September 1998), OSSG, SG/SM6725, in *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General 1997–2006*, vol. 1, 1997–99, ed. Jean F. Krasno (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012), 524.

⁴³ "NATO Statement on Kosovo," Press Release M-NAC-1 (98) 61 (28 May 1998), in Krieger, ed., 288.

⁴⁴ *Deutsch Presse Agentur* (July 16 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 21 July 2012).

⁴⁵ NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council, Press Release (30 September 1998), at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980930e.htm>.

⁴⁶ Interfax News Agency (Moscow, 16 June 1998), *News Bank, Access World News* (accessed 10 March 2014).

⁴⁷ Shun Byrnes, "The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions," in *Albania and the Balkans: Essays in Honor of Sir Reginald Herbert* (Cornwall: Elbow Publishing, 2013), 222.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 229, 232.

In July 1998, the KLA sustained its worst defeat at Rahovec, a consequential event. The Serbs pressed their advantage with the appointment of Nebojša Pavković as field commander, an extreme nationalist who advocated the use of heavy armor against the KLA.⁴⁹ This development accelerated the flow of refugees. Concurrently, a decision was made in London and Washington to increase assistance to the KLA, ending the designation of the KLA as a “terrorist” organization, a view Madeleine Albright saw as “obsolete and mistaken.”⁵⁰

By September, the situation was deteriorating, owing to expanding KLA activity, the volume of refugees, and Belgrade’s lack of cooperation. By this time, the KLA had expanded its arsenal to include weapons, explosives, and munitions seized during the violent unrest in Albania in 1997.⁵¹ The Security Council passed a new Resolution, 1199, the tone of which conveyed a greater sense of urgency than the previous Resolution 1160. The document recalled aspects of the crisis, demanding an “unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons under programs agreed with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR), complete freedom of movement of [international] monitors, and [cessation] of all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population.”⁵² As if to indicate a unified Security Council, the Resolution recalled the Milošević–Yeltsin statement that “no repressive action will be taken against the civilian population.” The UN Resolution became the impetus for an extraordinary diplomatic offensive. For the first time, Milošević agreed to serious negotiations. As NATO members “activated” aircraft for possible strikes against Serbian forces, the US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, representing the Contact Group, issued a Draft Settlement for Kosovo on 1 October. The draft avoided defining Kosovo’s status in the Federation, an important consideration for Montenegro, Serbia’s partner in the Federation. Instead authority was divided among local assemblies, national communities and

⁴⁹ James Pettifer, *The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948–2001* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 143.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁵¹ *Deutsch Presse Agentur* (5 August 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 25 October 2012).

⁵² S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), at <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm> (accessed 20 May 2013).

the federal government subject to review in three years.⁵³ The same day the North Atlantic Council issued an "activation request" for a limited air campaign against Serbia.

Neither party fully accepted Hill's Draft Settlement. Instead, a more general accord was initialed on 14 October by UN Special Envoy Holbrooke and then-FRY President Milošević.⁵⁴ The eleven-point document marked a high point in the pre-Rambouillet period on Kosovo's status in referring to "assemblies," including those at the "communal level," with rights to preserve "national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities." A timetable set 9 November as the deadline for agreement on procedures for elections, but the most important feature of the agreement was the provision for a 2000-strong OSCE verification mission. The statement elevated the OSCE "as the best way... to verify the positive trends underway." From October 1998 to March 1999, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was deployed to verify the FRY's compliance with UN Resolutions 1160 and 1199, monitor troop movements, and promote democracy and human rights.⁵⁵ In earlier correspondence, the Chairman of the OSCE, Bronisław Geremek, declined UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's request to monitor a regional arms embargo owing to a lack of resources.⁵⁶ By March 1999, a deteriorating situation led to the withdrawal of the mission.

Somewhat later, a spokesman for the UN Secretary General acknowledged that a separate UN presence in Kosovo had not been recommended since it would have created "parallel reporting channels."⁵⁷ Concurrently, a separate and complementary agreement with NATO provided for a reconnaissance "air verification mission."⁵⁸ The 14 October agreement lacked the detail necessary for Christopher Hill's mission and that of EU Envoy

⁵³ Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," *International Affairs* 73 (1999), no. 2: 219.

⁵⁴ UN Doc. S/1998/953, Annex (14 October 1998), in Krieger, ed., 290.

⁵⁵ OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in the FRY in *OSCE Annual Report*, 25–7, at <http://issuu.com/osce/docs/osce-annual-report-1998-en?mode=window&view-Mode=doublePage>.

⁵⁶ "Letter of the Chairman in Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe...", in Krieger, ed., 207.

⁵⁷ "Daily press briefing for the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary General" (16 November 1998), in Krasno, ed., 565.

⁵⁸ "NATO-FRY Agreement..." (15 October 1998), in Krieger, ed., 291–2.

Wolfgang Petritsch.⁵⁹ Ambassador Hill's mediation produced two further draft agreements, with the final one on 2 December. The entire process represented an integrated level of cooperation between the UN, the Contact Group, the EU, and NATO. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook spoke for NATO in saying that the agreement represented a "big climb down" by Milošević, but that force remained an option since it was "important that we don't let our guard down prematurely."⁶⁰ In fact, the progress of withdrawal went smoothly as did the deployment of the OSCE Verification Mission. Commander and Chairman of the NATO Military Council, Gen. Wesley Clark, and Gen. Klaus Naumann, Chair of the NATO military Committee, were received in Belgrade by their Serbian counterparts and President Milošević. Clark had been an influential voice for the view that substantive negotiations with the FRY required the threat of air strikes—a position which had provoked opposition in the Pentagon. Clark's view would prevail.

Rambouillet and the Heart of the Matter

The agreement was not realized because no cease-fire was sustainable without agreement on Kosovo's political status. The KLA sought independence and Serbia refused withdrawal. One official described a "chicken and egg" situation of mutual retaliation.⁶¹ NATO foreign ministers issued a detailed statement on 8 December recognizing the culpability of "both" the KLA and the Serbian forces, again demanding agreement with Christopher Hill's negotiated agreement. The Serbian side was criticized for its refusal to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and NATO Foreign Ministers implicitly threatened to resume air strikes by authorizing a NATO-led "extraction force" to withdraw members of the OSCE Verification Mission in an "emergency."⁶²

⁵⁹ Point six of the Holbrooke–Milošević accord affirmed that self-governance in Kosovo would be "harmonized in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act." UN Doc. S1998/953, Annex (14 October 1998), in Krieger, ed., 290.

⁶⁰ *Daily Mail* (London, 14 October 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 3 March 1993).

⁶¹ *Washington Post* (21 November 1998), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 18 September 2012).

⁶² North Atlantic Council, "NATO Statement on Kosovo" (8 December 1998), Press Communiqué M-NAC-2(98) 143 8 December 1998, in Krieger, ed., 299.

An exhaustive report submitted to the UN Secretary General on 24 December depicted a disturbing situation in which the level of killing on both sides had "increased dramatically," initiating "a new cycle of major hostilities."⁶³

Following a new Serbian offensive, journalists discovered the bodies of 45 Albanian civilians in the village of Račak on 15 January. American intelligence revealed that the strike against Račak had been ordered by Nikola Šainović, Deputy Prime Minister, and General Sreten Lukić of the Serbian Interior Ministry Special Forces. The incident was critical in shaping NATO's ultimate decision to use force. Solana remarked that NATO "stands ready to act and rules out no option [during] a critical turning point in the Kosovo crisis."⁶⁴ Russian and American officials closed ranks. On 26 January, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Secretary Albright held a joint news conference in Moscow. They expressed their common indignation at the Račak massacre and demanded full Serbian cooperation with the ICTY and the Verification Mission. The Contact Group then met to "summon" representatives of the two sides to negotiations at Rambouillet under the co-chairmanship of Albright and Ivanov. Russian cooperation was evident in demanding that the KLA cease abducting Serbian police, since KLA "provocations had contributed significantly to the deep tensions."⁶⁵ The unmentioned "stick" was left to the North Atlantic Council to threaten air strikes and demand that both sides accept negotiations toward an "interim accord" at Rambouillet. The statement sought balance in condemning Serbia's "excessive and disproportionate use of force," while warning that [NATO's] Secretary General would "take full account of the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership" in reaching his decision on military action. NATO had agreed on the certainty of air strikes, and was prepared to deploy ground forces for peacekeeping.⁶⁶

⁶³ Report of the Secretary General prepared pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1169(1998), 1199(1998), and 1203(1998). UN Doc. S/1998/1221 (24 December 1998), in Krieger, ed., 238.

⁶⁴ *The Independent* (London, 29 January 1999), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 19 September 2012).

⁶⁵ US Secretary of State Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, "Joint Statement" (Moscow, 26 January 1999), in Krieger, ed., 253.

⁶⁶ *New York Times* (1 February 1999), in *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 20 September 2012). On 30 January 1999, the North Atlantic Council authorized the Secretary General to order air strikes: North Atlantic Council, Press Release 99 (30 January 1999), in Krieger, ed., 256.

A suggestive comparison between Dayton and Rambouillet was inevitable, but Milošević would not attend, possibly fearing a suspected secret indictment and arrest as a war criminal.⁶⁷ Instead Milan Milutinović, the President of Serbia, would represent his country. The Albanian delegation included Hashim Thaçi, Adem Demaçi, and Bardhyl Mahmuti, the KLA's representative in Switzerland. The use of force was not mentioned by the Security Council, but had been implied by the Contact Group's statement of 29 January which noted the threat of a "humanitarian catastrophe," and threatened to "hold both sides accountable." Secretary General Annan did not mention force but found UN–SFOR cooperation in Bosnia a "model for future endeavors," praising previous UN–NATO action in Bosnia as a "model of credibility," relevant to the "horror of Kosovo."⁶⁸

The conference's co-chairs, Foreign Ministers Cook of Great Britain and Hubert Vedrine of France, worked from prior diplomacy and an abbreviated list of Contact Group proposals listing general principles of autonomy. Kosovo's institutions would enjoy a "clear definition of competencies" at the communal level and independent, local police of an "ethnic makeup corresponding" to the local area. Rambouillet was intended to create an "interim agreement [and reach] final settlement after three years."⁶⁹ After a week of negotiations mediated by Ambassadors Hill, Petritsch, and Boris Mayorsky, Russia's representative at Rambouillet, the deadline was extended to 23 February. The final document shared features with EU Bosnian diplomacy. The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia corresponded with an OSCE appointed Chief of Implementation Mission (CIM) in Kosovo. To avoid Bosnia's communal division, there "would be no changes in the borders," and "unhindered contacts" with co-nationals in Yugoslavia and abroad. Overall, the document envisioned shared governance with the CIM and other international agencies.

KFOR would coordinate security with CIM, but operate "under the authority of and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command."⁷⁰ Military provisions centralized overall responsibility with the KFOR Commander

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ "Secretary-General speaks of lessons learned in Bosnia," EOSG, SG/SM/6598, in Krasno, ed., 433–4.

⁶⁹ "Contact Group negotiator's proposal" (30 January 1999), in Krieger, ed., 256.

⁷⁰ "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Determination in Kosovo" (Rambouillet, 23 February 1999), Chapter 7, Implementation II, in Krieger, ed., 272.

(COMFOR) who would enjoy “unimpeded” movement through the province; no FRY forces would operate or remain in the province without the permission of COMFOR; KFOR would be immune from civil jurisdiction and empowered to detain individuals prior to turning them over to local authorities. The absence of an exit strategy was deliberate and qualified only by asserting that “an international meeting . . . [would] determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo.”⁷¹

Serbian spokesmen accepted the “painful necessity” of negotiation with the KLA for “substantial autonomy” yet rejected the presence of KFOR as an “invasion by 200,000 men. . . for the sake of 1.5 million people? It is too much!”⁷² The Yugoslav and Serbian joint delegation in fact had very different objections. A final list of “non-negotiable elements” greatly simplified the draft agreement. Typically, the complex annexes concerning implementation were reduced to a single phrase: “[P]articipation of OSCE and other international bodies [would be implemented] as necessary.”⁷³ The delegations were to submit comments on the longer draft. Meanwhile, NATO planned for a 35,000 member force, and despite the initial statement, the Serbian delegation agreed to sit across from the KLA.

Negotiations started on 6 February and have been described elsewhere; each delegation submitted comments on the longer draft, producing asymmetrical results.⁷⁴ Both contravened the “non-negotiable principles.” The presence of an international force in Kosovo was rejected as incompatible with Serbian sovereignty. As a sign of approval of Kosovo’s position, Secretary Albright announced that the United States would open a consular office in Priština. After an extension of negotiations until 23 February, a further “implementation conference” was set for 15 March. A NATO statement commended “substantial progress” in the talks, while noting ominously a resumption of violence in the province. Until the March deadline had passed, NATO kept a positive tone: “Our stance in putting the threat of force at the service of diplomacy has helped to create the conditions for the Rambouillet talks to make progress.”⁷⁵ The Kosovar

⁷¹ Chapter 8, in *ibid.*, 278.

⁷² As quoted in Radio France Internationale (5 February 1999), in BBC Monitoring Europe (6 February 1999), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 22 September 2012).

⁷³ Weller, “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,” 226.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 225–9.

⁷⁵ Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Press Release (99)21 (23 February 1999), in Krieger, ed., 297.

delegation signed the document on 18 March. Meanwhile, a counter-proposal for “multi-ethnic” [and] “self-government in Kosmet” published by the FRY on 18 March was dismissed as irrelevant. Co-chairs Vedrine and Cook considered the proposal an effort to “unravel” the Rambouillet Accords, adding that the Contact Group would “be in contact with the Secretary General of NATO” and “solemnly warned” Belgrade “against any military offensive and any impediment to the freedom of movement and of action of the KVM.” On 19 March, White House Spokesman Joe Lockhart announced that NATO would “act in the event of any further aggression.”⁷⁶ In quick succession, OSCE troops were withdrawn. On 22 March, Ambassador Holbrooke in a final trip to Belgrade communicated the certainty of military consequences, despite Russia’s “categorical opposition” to force. Secretary General Annan distanced the UN from the imminent NATO strikes, observing that he could not comment since the “matter [was] for the Contact Group to decide.”⁷⁷

Air Strikes and After: Establishing Intervention

The following day, NATO’s Secretary General announced that air strikes had started, offering suspension through attaining a “viable political settlement [that] must be guaranteed by an international military presence.” A Security Council Resolution demanding a halt to the bombing was rejected by a 12 to 3 vote. On 27 March, NATO’s Supreme Command (SAUCER) notified Kofi Annan that NATO had initiated broader operations against the FRY following “continued human rights abuses and atrocities [which had] exacerbated the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons.”⁷⁸ Annan referred to “irreconcilable imperatives: the requirements of the Charter and the grave and urgent nature of the situation on the ground,” as well as a “precedent” for unilateral intervention.⁷⁹ Annan wrote that he was “profoundly outraged” by the actions of Serbian military

⁷⁶ *The Age* (Melbourne, 20 March 1999), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 20 September 2012).

⁷⁷ “Letter from the Secretary General of NATO to the Secretary General of the UN” (27 March 1999), in Krieger, ed., 305.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ “Letter to Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO” (25 March 1999), in Krasno, ed.

forces.⁸⁰ A response to the humanitarian catastrophe through support to Macedonia and Albania remained a consistent feature of Annan's statements. Contrary to expectations, the war would last from 24 March until 11 June, with up to 1,000 aircraft involved as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles. The objective was to compel the FRY to cease military operations and to accept international peacekeeping forces. Broadening involvement through tacit UN cooperation had afforded partial legitimacy to the campaign. The air campaign established the overwhelming superiority of NATO's multinational F-16 squadrons over the FRY's MiG 29 aircraft.⁸¹ The legality of NATO air strikes in the absence of Security Council authorization was a challenging and disputed matter. One view considers the UN an "enabler" of NATO involvement. The noted legal scholar Louis Henkin considers Security Council Resolution 1244, endorsing the ultimate settlement of 10 June 1999, to have implicitly justified the war.⁸²

A series of operational and political problems were difficult. They included approving specific targets, minimizing "collateral damage," and cooperating with non-NATO Preventive Forces in Macedonia. The continuing flow of refugees left Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov "wary" of NATO's presence and concerned that the Kosovo campaign must not undermine the Dayton Accords.⁸³ After a week of NATO bombing, the UNHCR reported that about 94,000 persons had fled; about two-thirds of them arrived in Albania.⁸⁴ By the end of the operations, this number had increased to 863,000, who were officially registered.⁸⁵ About 10,000 Albanians had been killed and an astonishing 1.4 million Albanians (60% of the population) had been displaced. An independent assessment of NATO-UNHCR cooperation described NATO's role as a "mixed blessing." Although NATO provided "significant resources" in support of logistics, camp construction, and personnel, it also "inserted competing [military]

⁸⁰ "Secretary General outraged by reports of 'ethnic cleansing' by Serbian forces in Kosovo," EOSP, SG/SM/6942, in Krasno, ed., 663.

⁸¹ General Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2001), 196.

⁸² Louis Henkin, "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention," *American Journal of International Law* 99 (1999), no. 4: 824–8; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the UN: A Particular Relationship* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2010), 182–5.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 197–205.

⁸⁴ UNHCR, *Kosovo News Update* (30 March 1999), at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/textis/vtx/news/open_doc.htm?tbl=NEWS&page=home&id=3ae6b80dc.

⁸⁵ Goldstone et al., "The Kosovo Report."

priorities. . . especially in Albania.”⁸⁶ The ICTY determined that “most” targeted objectives were clearly of “military” significance. The military significance of “dual-use” targets, were less certain. Targeting a Belgrade television tower was “problematic.”⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch has documented that at least 500 non-combatant civilians were killed by NATO bombs and missiles in Serbia and Kosovo. Possibly many died in civilian areas as a result of cluster bombs.⁸⁸ Estimates of final Serbian civilian casualties vary from “some 500 Yugoslav civilians” according to Human Rights Watch to “less than” 1,500 by the Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph Ralston.⁸⁹ The casualties accompanied extensive destruction of bridges and infrastructure.

NATO cooperated with the UNHCR through endorsing a “political settlement” based on the “unconditional return of all refugees and deployment of an international military force in the region.”⁹⁰ Milošević’s strategy has been variously assessed. Apparently he did not expect that NATO would maintain a common front or possibly believed that Russian support would be sufficient to deter NATO. Elizabeth Pond cites a fundamental change in European attitudes. In 1995, the genocide at Srebrenica was somehow “outside” Europe, but in 1999 Kosovo was not.⁹¹ Janine di Giovanni, a correspondent for the *Times*, believes that Serbia’s “collective denial” about crimes against Albanians was a consequence of the regime’s

⁸⁶ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Evaluation and Analysis Unit, *The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness Response*, EPAU/2000/01 (February 2000), at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=3ba0bbeb4&query=kosovo> (accessed 27 September 2012).

⁸⁷ ICTY, “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” at <http://www.icty.org/sid/10052>.

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, “NATO’s use of cluster bombs must stop” (9 May 1999), at <http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/05/10/natos-use-cluster-bombs-must-stop>; “NATO urged to respect humanitarian law” (6 April 1999), at <http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/04/06/nato-urged-respect-humanitarian-law> (accessed 28 September 2012).

⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign* 12 (2000), no. 1: 16, at <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/natbm002.pdf> (accessed 21 May 2013).

⁹⁰ “Talking points of the Secretary-General on Kosovo to the Security Council” (EOSG, 19 April 1999), in Krasno, ed., 682.

⁹¹ Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans*, 104–5.

media monopoly.⁹² For Secretary Albright, the mission realized American objectives and signified that NATO had passed a "critical test." In addition to the \$150 million already allotted for refugees, Albright revealed that a request for \$386 million had been submitted to the State Department and USAID humanitarian assistance along with a similar amount in support of NATO troops engaged in humanitarian relief in Albania. Additional aid would go to Macedonia and "democratic" Montenegro.⁹³ She spoke of the goal of bringing "stability" to Southeastern Europe and its eventual "integration" with the rest of Europe. The German Foreign Ministry offered a more specific vision through the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the OSCE. The German view implied eventual NATO membership for all Yugoslav successor states.⁹⁴ The coincidence of NATO's campaign in Kosovo with the goals of a larger integrated Europe was likely deliberate, but not insincere.

From early May to early June 1999, a sequence of events and documents expanded on a settlement that would remain in force through the following twelve years. Russia's attitude remained conflicted, but Russia continued its involvement. Secretary Albright revealed that Russia "did not agree with the [peace] formulation expressed by the NATO document."⁹⁵ On 4 May, Secretary-General Annan declared that Russia was "playing a very, very active role in the search for a solution," and added that Russia "would like to participate as an international force on the ground."⁹⁶ Clearly its role in Bosnian peacekeeping indicated that Moscow was unlikely to forfeit an opportunity for involvement in peacekeeping despite objecting to NATO's role. NATO statements about Kosovo included reference to Russian "responsibility" or "interest" in a political settlement. Secretary Albright's testimony referred to NATO's core mission in collective self-defense and emphatically insisted that "NATO's relationship to Russia was a key to Europe's future security and would be determined by many

⁹² Janine di Giovanni, *Madness Visible: A Memoir of War* (New York: Knopf, 2003), 144.

⁹³ Secretary of State Albright, "Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee" (20 April 1999), in Krieger, ed., 419.

⁹⁴ "Germany: A stability pact for Southeastern Europe" (12 April 1999), in Krieger, ed., 354–5.

⁹⁵ US Secretary of State Albright and Norwegian Foreign Minister Volleback, "Joint Press Conference" (Oslo, 13 April 1999), in Krieger, ed., 358.

⁹⁶ "Remarks by the Secretary General outside Security Council chambers" (4 May 1999), in Krasno, ed., 688.

factors in addition to Kosovo.⁹⁷ Reference to Russia became relevant after NATO and Belgrade began releasing rival statements for a settlement in early April.⁹⁸ Despite his ministry's vigorous opposition to NATO bombing, Foreign Minister Ivanov shared a press conference with Secretary Albright. He referred to an "acceptable form of international military presence supporting refugee return."⁹⁹ The eventual settlement involved a modified return to the military role envisioned for NATO at the Rambouillet conference. The difference involved G8, a less compromised forum for Russia than the former Contact Group.

Russia's participation was expressed by the G8 meeting in Petersburg on 6 May and the Military-Technical Agreement between KFOR, Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia.¹⁰⁰ The communique included five major points:

[i]mmediate and verifiable end of violence and repression; . . . [w]ithdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces; [e]stablishment of an interim administration . . . to be decided by the Security Council . . . [s]afe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian organizations; a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords . . . and the demilitarization of the UÇK (KLA).

The transition from these "principles" to a "Peace Plan" emerged with the mediation of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, representing the EU, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Special Representative of the Russian Federation. The agreement anticipated a "substantial North Atlantic

⁹⁷ Secretary of State Albright, "Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee" (20 April 1999), in Krieger, ed., 422.

⁹⁸ See FRY Statement carried by the Serbian Television (6 April 1999); NATO Statement by the Secretary General, Press Release (1999) 049 (6 April 1999); NATO Statement issued at extraordinary ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, M-NAC (99) 51 (12 April 1999), in Krieger, ed., 306–7.

⁹⁹ US Secretary Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, "Joint Press Availability..." (Oslo, 13 April 1999), in Krieger, ed., 356.

¹⁰⁰ "Statement by the Chairman on the Conclusion of the G8 Foreign Ministers" (Petersburg, 6 May 1999) and "Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia" (9 June 1999), in Krieger, ed., 359–60 and 362–5 (respectively).

Treaty Organization participation [that] must be deployed under unified command and control.”¹⁰¹ Second, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was added as part of the agreement. The Military Technical Agreement relevant to KFOR included NATO’s broad empowerment drawn from the Rambouillet Agreement. NATO would oversee enforcing FRY troop withdrawals, the “selected return” of certain FRY personnel, and assisting other international entities involved in implementation. KFOR’s commander would have “authority without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, including the use of force...” Yugoslavia’s parliament voted in favor of the peace treaty by 168 to 82, almost coming to blows over the charge of “capitulation.”¹⁰²

Establishing the Peace: NATO in Kosovo, 1999–2000

The final component in the complex establishing NATO’s position in Kosovo was Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted on 10 June 1999. The Resolution authorized the role of KFOR, but KFOR remained under NATO, not UN, command. This arrangement would secure Serbian compliance in Kosovo, as it had previously in Bosnia.¹⁰³ The resolution implicitly authorized NATO’s role. KFOR was unmentioned, but the resolution included the Ahtisaari Plan and the Albright–Ivanov press conference as “annexes to the resolution.” On 18 June, agreement was reached on deployment of approximately 2,850 troops under Russian command in KFOR national sectors. One segment envisioned a situation in which the command would “decline to accept an order from a KFOR commander.” The provision ensured that the commander’s authority would otherwise be preserved.¹⁰⁴ The UN Secretary General would supervise a “relevant civil service in charge of interim administration,” the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was charged with ensuring autonomy conditions for a “final settlement, including demilitarizing armed Albanian

¹⁰¹ “Agreement on the principles (Peace Plan) to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis” (3 June 1999), UN Doc. S/1999/649 Annex 7 June, in Krieger, ed., 361.

¹⁰² *The Independent* (London, 4 June 1999), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 28 September 2012).


¹⁰³ Kaplan, *NATO and the UN*, 182.

¹⁰⁴ US–Russian Federation, “Agreement on Russian Participation in KFOR” (Helsinki, 18 June 1999), in Krieger, ed., 535.

groups.” Finally, UNMIK was charged with responsibility for the “future status” of the province,” taking into account the Rambouillet accords.¹⁰⁵

Actual KFOR deployment proved difficult. Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen negotiated an agreement for 3,600 Russian troops responsible to NATO Commander General Wesley Clark. A Russian military representative would also be assigned to NATO's Southern Europe Command in Naples.¹⁰⁶ On the ground, integrated Russian troops remained under Russian commanders. In the province itself, conditions were chaotic. Before UNMIK had been organized, the KLA and its allied militias had seized Serbian military and police facilities and detained, tortured, or killed Serbs, Roma, and Albanians considered to have collaborated with Belgrade. These instances led to direct confrontations with KFOR, although KFOR forces generally were treated as allies and cooperated in repatriating refugees. An American source commented that there was no reason for the KLA to act as a military force.¹⁰⁷ KFOR was deployed in five sectors: French, British Italian, German, and American.

Figure 5.2. Levels of analysis—Kosovo, 2000.



¹⁰⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1244(1999) of 10 June 1999, in Krieger, ed., 364–5.

¹⁰⁶ *New York Times* (19 June 1999), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 12 October 2012).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, a Canadian officer responsible for UNPROFOR's "Sector Sarajevo," commented on KFOR's three "bad options" of indefinite occupation, outright independence, or eventual partition.¹⁰⁸ Mackenzie's criticism anticipated KFOR's challenge. By late June, a series of documents envisioned a detailed division of labor among KFOR, UNMIK, the EU, the OSCE, and the UNHCR. Central to the mission was the "imperative" that UNMIK and KFOR cooperate "in a mutually supportive manner towards the same goals."¹⁰⁹ The Secretary General's Special Representative would include a Military Liaison Unit to facilitate day-to-day operations. In addition, KFOR was charged with helping guard civilians and gather evidence of atrocities for the ICTY. Initially, KFOR reported some incidents involving Serbian police and British and German forces, attacks by the KLA and Albanian civilians on withdrawing Yugoslav forces, and incidents of "burning and looting."¹¹⁰ By 20 June, the agreement was signed between KFOR and the KLA. Several features are important. Immediately, all hostile acts by the KLA were to cease. KFOR was to maintain a "secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo," and to undertake a "phased surrender" of all small arms within 90 days. Over the next decade, challenges to KFOR and UNMIK would echo these provisions.

Are There "Lessons" from Kosovo?

From the period beginning with NATO's initial campaign, certain insights emerge, if not lessons. At the international level, retrospectively, the Kosovo campaign demonstrates the core role of individuals. The administrations of Boris Yeltsin, Kofi Annan, and Bill Clinton shaped decisively the outcome of international involvement. Their interaction infused the event with a consistent purpose. Secretary of State Albright's frequent comments helped legitimize the alliance's role while winning Russia's "partnership." Albright's recognition of the importance of the KLA was equally important. Finally, the United Nations and the OSCE provided critical

¹⁰⁸ *The Ottawa Citizen* (19 June 1999), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 13 October 2012).

¹⁰⁹ "Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution 1244(1999)," UN Doc. S/1999/672 (12 June 1999), in Krieger, ed., 533.

¹¹⁰ NATO, "Initial Report on the International Security Force (KFOR) Operations (12–15 June 1999)" (17 June 1999), in Krieger, ed., 534.

operational support for NATO's conversion from a cold war alliance to a relevant "regional security organization." The UN Secretary General defined his role. Annan's Bosnia experience and his disgust with Serbian brutality were relevant to UN cooperation. The UNHCR was central in stabilizing the regional context. Individuals established effective operational coordination for a common approach to an envisioned outcome.

At the regional level, the single most astonishing aspect of the situation in Kosovo concerned the rise of the KLA from local insignificance to a regional actor and an international negotiator. Milošević's genocidal campaign in response to the KLA reinforced its appeal to young Albanians over Ibrahim Rugova's party. NATO's role ensured that Kosovo would be governed by Albanians who preferred self-rule to a less certain role in a greater Albania. Macedonian stability was the likely beneficiary of an Albanian governed Kosovo. The Kosovo refugee crisis constituted a regional threat potentially as serious as the later 2001 Macedonian uprising. As in Macedonia, the European Union engagement in Kosovo became critical for regional stability. The emergence and transformation of the KLA into a governing Kosovar Civil Protection Force could be compared with the rise of Ali Ahmeti's Democratic Union of Integration in Macedonia after the 2001 uprising.

Initial prospects for EU influence in the region appeared to diminish after Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008. A Council of Europe report indicated a sharp deterioration in the rule of law, corruption, and organized crime, despite the work of a large European Union Rule of law Mission (EULEX).¹¹¹ In addition, Europe's control was threatened by guerrilla activity in Albanian-inhabited areas of Preševo and Medvedja within Serbia proper. Possible responses include a swap of territory for Serbian Mitrovica or reciprocal guarantees of minority rights.¹¹² Resolution may depend on Belgrade's perception of the EU and the 1999 Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and its allied Stabilisation and Association Process. Regional prospects of EU membership have been an enduring, if inconsistent, destiny. Most recently, Kosovo and Serbia have signed an Integrated

¹¹¹ Council of Europe, *The Situation in Kosovo and the Council of Europe*, Doc. 12281 (7 June 2010), at <http://www.assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/Working-Docs/Doc10/EDOC12281.htm> (accessed 26 October 2012).

¹¹² BBC Monitoring Europe (10 February 2012), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 25 October 2012).

Border Management Agreement.¹¹³ (For an update on relations between Kosovo and Serbia, see the chapter by Dušan Janjić in this volume.)

The NATO intervention serves as a reminder that, when values essential for sustainability are ignored or treated with contempt, the resulting disintegration of social order can draw in the international community. Broader consideration of the intervention fixes the episode in a tradition surrounding the ideal of “self-determination” in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.¹¹⁴ Interpreting the involvement of NATO and the European Union in Kosovo through such values creates a legal framework for the scope of intervention. As already mentioned, the idea of “rectitude” as a rationale for action finds resonance in the statements claiming the right of humanitarian intervention, but it also begs the criticism that the McDougal–Lasswell system provides the “opportunity for the use of law as an instrument for powerful states to dictate their political interests.”¹¹⁵ But, Rasmus Tenbergen reminds us, depending on the circumstances, humanitarian intervention may be not just a right, but also a duty. In his words, “humanitarian interventions are legitimate when they protect more human rights than they damage. Human rights are defined. . . as rights which one cannot dispute without self-contradiction and which, because of their consequent validity, apply to all people.”¹¹⁶

¹¹³ BBC Monitoring Europe (28 September 2012), *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (accessed 25 October 2012).

¹¹⁴ *Wikipedia*, “Fourteen Points,” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points (accessed 10 March 2014).

¹¹⁵ Sean D. Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 25. See also Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-Chu Chen, *Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of International Law and Human Dignity* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1980).

¹¹⁶ Rasmus Tenbergen, *Der Kosovo-Krieg: Eine gerechte Intervention?* (ILD Verlag, 2001), 14.

CHAPTER 6

The International Presence in Kosovo, 1999–2008

JOHANNA DEIMEL

State-building processes in the Balkans were either carried out by the local elites or were—not infrequently—the result of support from an external factor which, in our case, is called the international community. [. . .] This kind of relationship between the local elites and an international factor, or in our case, the international community, was evident not just over the last 10 or 20 years but also over the last 200 years, ever since the formation of the first independent states in the Balkans. (Enver Hoxha)¹

Legality

Humanitarian intervention

The NATO-led “humanitarian intervention” in Kosovo from 24 March until 10 June 1999 triggered a debate between the advocates of the principles of state sovereignty and of non-interference in domestic affairs on the one side, and the use of force for humanitarian purposes, and about new humanitarian politics on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities

¹ BBC, “Politicians react to Slovene envoy’s remarks on Kosovo’s frightful dependence” (27 February 2009). Text of report by Kosovo Albanian privately-owned newspaper *Express* on 25 February 2009.

on the other.² While most would agree that the intervention was morally justified, its legal basis was not clear.³ Since the negotiations in Rambouillet had failed in 1999, the so called “humanitarian intervention” took place without a mandate and without an authorization by the UN Security Council. Russia and China “were both very protective of sovereignty and the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and preserving the territorial integrity of states against changes without agreement or resulting from the use of force,” as James Gow argues.⁴ International advocacy and awareness raising about Kosovo, in particular in Washington, prior to the air strikes, was of enormous importance. Centered on the humanitarian rights issue launched by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in June 1992⁵ and as a consequence of the internationals’ failures in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent atrocities and genocide there, the morality and credibility of the US were at stake.⁶

Especially after the military interventions in Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992 (both endorsed by the UN Security Council), and the NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 public opinion was not in favor of another military involvement in the Balkans. Thus, it appeared to be necessary to influence the public opinion in the creation and implementation of the air campaign.⁷ Alynna J. Lyon and Mary Fran T. Malone demonstrate that the US administration—and President Bill Clinton especially—made strong efforts to convince the public to support intervention, with the argument of a “moral imperative” to protect the people in Kosovo. On 20 March 1999 Clinton declared in public that “in dealing with the aggressors in the

² Marc Weller, *Peace Lost: The Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo* (Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 102–21; Alex J. Bellamy, “Kosovo and the advent of sovereignty as responsibility,” in *Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding*, ed. Aidin Hehir (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 39.

³ See Marc Weller, *Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 150–64.

⁴ James Gow, “Kosovo: The final frontier? From transitional administration to transitional statehood,” in Hehir, ed., 154.

⁵ Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An agenda for peace, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping” (17 June 1992), A/47/277-S/24111.

⁶ David L. Philips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center Studies in International Security and the MIT Press, 2012), 106.

⁷ Alynna J. Lyon and Mary Fran T. Malone, “Responding to Kosovo’s call for humanitarian intervention,” in Hehir, ed., 17–37.

Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill.”⁸ It took until the end of February 2009, when first judgments at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) regarding war crimes committed by high-ranking Serbian politicians and by Serbian military personnel in Kosovo to implicitly confirm the humanitarian catastrophe and thus set an argument for the legality of the intervention.⁹

The Kumanovo Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244

After Belgrade accepted a peace plan on 9 June 1999 and the FRY military withdrew, NATO ceased its air campaign and established the cooperative peacekeeping mission Kosovo Force (KFOR). The Military Technical Agreement—also known as the Kumanovo Agreement—between KFOR and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia made possible the employment of KFOR under the auspices of United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Technically part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Kosovo became a UN protectorate in 1999, with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, which called for a “political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future.” Humanitarian considerations predominated and the rights of the Kosovo-Albanian people had priority over the sovereignty of Yugoslavia.¹⁰ The Resolution reiterated the Yugoslav (now Serbian) sovereignty over Kosovo for an interim period and “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration” and made the determination of the final status open to further “negotiations between the parties for a settlement.” UNSCR 1244 Annex 2 says:

⁸ BBC News, “Clinton makes case for strikes” (20 March 1999).

⁹ International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Judgement Summary for Milutinović et al. (The Hague, 26 February 2009), at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/090226summary.pdf>.

¹⁰ Lene Mosegaard Søbberg, “The Kosovo experiment,” in *Kosovo between War and Peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship*, eds. Tonny Brem Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 61–64.

Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

Russia

All of Russia's worst strategic fears converged in Kosovo. When US Vice President Al Gore informed Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov on the phone that NATO air strikes would start during his visit in Washington, the Russian aircraft made its famous U-turn off the coast of Newfoundland.¹¹ Lacking UN authorization for the bombing campaign, NATO strikes began—and Russia did not have any say against it despite Russia's seat in the UN Security Council. Because both Russia and China opposed rewarding separatists, the UNSCR 1244 left Kosovo's political status unresolved and, as David L. Philips has rightly stated, "placing responsibility for Kosovo's future under the jurisdiction of the UNSC gave Russia *de facto* control."¹² During the discussions on peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, NATO again made it very clear that any deployment of Russian troops would be within the framework of KFOR. The Russian army was upset about being marginalized in the decision-making process. To resolve differences over Russia's role in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, Russia's generals decided to go alone and score a quick propaganda victory against the West. On 12 June 1999, 200 Russian troops rolled from Bosnia into Kosovo on the Slatina airfield. According to John Norris, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was quite convinced that Russia's effort "to seize the Slatina airfield was designed to effectively partition Kosovo as part of a secret agreement with Milošević."¹³ The Russian military operation

¹¹ John Norris, *Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 2005), 31.

¹² Philips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 116.

¹³ Norris, *Collision Course*, 311.

brought Russia and the West close to a confrontation. Though it is still not clear whether the generals acted without the consent of President Yeltsin, the military coup aimed at preventing Russia from serving under NATO's command and followed the objective to resolve Russia's role in KFOR. Russia finally accepted the deployment of its troops in the US, German, and French sectors and serving alongside with the British at the airport.¹⁴ Norris concludes that Russia eventually helped "to effectively isolate Belgrade and pushed Milošević to accept NATO's terms," but on the other hand "managed to look as bad as possible in the process of producing sound results."¹⁵

Russia's fear that NATO might intervene worldwide under the new program of "humanitarian intervention" provoked adoption of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation presented by Vladimir Putin in 2000.¹⁶ The Russian military contingent left Kosovo in July 2003. The Kosovo issue turned out to be *the* tool to get Russia back on the table. The mandate for UNMIK came from the UN Security Council, where Russia holds a veto position.

Responsibilities

Some 850,000 refugees crossed the borders to Macedonia and Albania during spring 1999, 40% of all houses in Kosovo were destroyed, thousands of Kosovo Albanians killed,¹⁷ when the internationals launched the biggest and most extensive UN mission so far. The top priority of peace- and nation-building is to achieve and settle a cease fire, then to sustain this status and to transform conflict societies into peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous societies – or at least to pave the way to meet these goals.

UNMIK was established after the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999. Though Belgrade at that time rejected UNMIK,

¹⁴ NATO, "Agreed points on Russian participation in KFOR" (Helsinki, 18 June 1999), at <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990618a.htm> (accessed on 14 October 2012).


¹⁵ Norris, *Collision Course*, 307.

¹⁶ National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by Presidential Decree No. 1300 (17 December 1999), *Rossijskaja Gazeta* (18 January 2000).

¹⁷ Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft* (Wien and Köln: Böhlau, 2008), 330.

Serbia in fact did not exercise authority over either Kosovo or UNMIK.¹⁸ With that, Kosovo was *de facto* an international protectorate. Kosovo became a unique case insofar as the international community took complete control of the territory, placing all formal and administrative authority in the hands of the transitional administration.¹⁹ The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) as ultimate executive, legislative, and juridical authority was mandated to head UNMIK with extensive power.²⁰ The mission was divided into four pillars each managed by a different organization. Besides UNMIK, which was responsible for the civil administration, the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR dealt with humanitarian assistance. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was the third pillar within UNMIK. It established a number of key democratic institutions and tried to follow a bottom-up approach. The European Union (EU) took Pillar IV, the economy. Compared to the other main international actors—NATO, the UN, and the OSCE—the EU was a newcomer to nation-building. The head of the EU pillar was made the deputy to the UN Special Representative.²¹

Figure 6.1. Kosovo 1999–2008 under UNMIK.



¹⁸ Philips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 115–6.

¹⁹ Gow, "Kosovo: The final frontier?," 150.

²⁰ All SRSGs between 1999 and 2008 were European officials.

²¹ Iain King and Whit Mason, *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed in Kosovo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 87.

On 12 June 1999, NATO implemented the peace plan, allowing KFOR to enter Kosovo. Some 50,000 peacekeeping troops from 39 different NATO member and non-member countries were deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its initial mandate was to ensure and maintain a secure environment, to disarm and demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and to supervise the transformation of KLA into the Kosovo Protection Force (KPC). Since 1999, KFOR troops have been reduced according to the overall improved security environment. In 2008, 14,000 troops from 34 different nations participated in KFOR. KFOR was a separate “military presence” reporting directly to NATO’s North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Throughout the period in focus KFOR remained a constant factor of peace and stability.

Stock Taking

UNMIK: A neo-colonial power

Kosovo started from scratch, from zero, and moved from negative to positive peace. It must be acknowledged that UNMIK and KFOR were confronted with a huge task when they took their mandates in 1999. Building democratic institutions, infrastructure, and ensuring security in a post-war society were a giant challenge for the international civilian and military presence. However, it was a mistake that Kosovo was left in a limbo with UNSCR 1244 and that it was not clearly defined who would rule Kosovo. While Kosovar Albanians wanted nothing else than independence, they were living in a colonial regime. The enormous power of the SRSG and the mandate of UNMIK created a “quasi state” governed by almost everyone or none. As Veton Surroi has noted,

There was an internal paradox in the UN mission. It was here to build a democratic society and the basic precondition of that is the rule of law. But if the UN is the supreme law it does not allow a society of the rule of law because it is the final authority. The SRSG can pass any law, because he is the final authority. So, you have a kind of postmodern neo-colonial power.²²

²² Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 97.

UNMIK retained core reserved powers under the Kosovo Constitutional Framework issued in 2001. Despite enormous efforts to develop provisional democratic self-governing institutions (Provisional Institutions of Self-government—PISG), the civilian mission was not able to transfer real power without a political settlement.²³ SRS Michael Steiner in April 2002 presented a report to the UN Secretary General aiming at a gradual transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to the PISG. In his “standards before status” strategy, Steiner formulated eight benchmarks which Kosovo Albanians were required to meet before starting negotiations on status. Barry J. Ryan argues that with the standards before status strategy, the SRSG gained even more power, “in that he established a right to decide not only the nature of Kosovo’s future, but also who would be next in line for the throne.”²⁴ Although “standards before status” brought a new political momentum in tackling the status question, Kosovars were not consulted in preparation of the benchmarks, and thus “UNMIK’s ‘core political project’ [. . .] was a patronizing process.”²⁵ Steiner’s successor as SRSG, Hari Holkeri, later on tried to move the standard implementation forward. Jointly with Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi and President Ibrahim Rugova, he developed a revised version of Steiner’s strategy in December 2003—the Standards for Kosovo. Together with the PISG—but without any participation of the Serbs—a Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan was eventually prepared and presented in the aftermath of the violent riots of 31 March 2004.²⁶ On 7 October 2005, the Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide in his report to the UN Secretary General had to admit that “the standards implementation process is an important part of this dynamic. The record of implementation so far is uneven.”²⁷ He in consequence argued in favor of focusing on the future status of Kosovo, with “still international presence—military and civilian [. . .] to manage the implementation of the settlement in a stable and orderly way.” With the indication that it was imperative to resolve the status question, former Finnish President Martti

²³ International Crisis Group, “Kosovo countdown: A blueprint for transition,” Crisis Group Europe Report No. 188 (6 December 2007), 14.

²⁴ Barry J. Ryan, “Policing the state of exception in Kosovo,” in Hehir, ed., 117–118.

²⁵ Philips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 140.

²⁶ Helmut Kramer and Vedran Džihic, *Die Kosovo-Bilanz: Scheitert die Internationale Gemeinschaft?* (Wien: Lit-Verlag, 2005), 167–169.

²⁷ Kai Eide, “Report to the UN Security Council” (7 October 2005), 2; UN Security Council, S/2005/635, at <http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf>.

Ahtisaari was entrusted with the task of working out a compromise with Serbian and Kosovar representatives. In March 2007, Ahtisaari presented a plan which contained fundamental guarantees for the Serbian minority in Kosovo and envisaged conditional independence for Kosovo—again under international supervision.²⁸

Some critical assessments of the international administration

Kosovo has been supported by transnational governance missions of both the UN and the EU, and accountability of the governing elite was almost impossible to be achieved. To quote Montanaro: "Its state consolidation has been undermined by numerous factors, ranging from the disunity of the international community, to Belgrade's persistent interference and the lack of a solution concerning the North, to the lack of effective accountability mechanisms both for the local leaders of Kosovo as well as for international actors providing guidance and serving models."²⁹ Disunity over recognition resulted in competing dynamics and has opened loopholes for the local actors on the ground to avoid responsibilities and implement effective governance mechanisms so far.

Different management structures and varying policy priorities within the organizations' headquarters have created complications in the implementation. To ensure that the tasks were performed by the different organizations in an integrated manner with a clear chain of command was a major concern to the UN.³⁰ In addition, people deployed in the civilian and military missions came from different countries, with various professional and cultural backgrounds, which made interpersonal and inter-organizational cooperation very complicated.

Around the middle of every day of the week, a unique collection of people queue up at Terminal C of Vienna airport. A more diverse group of commuters the world has never seen. On a

²⁸ Johanna Deimel and Armando Garcia Schmidt, "Kosovo 2009: Uncertain future," *Spotlight Europe* 1 (2009), Bertelsmann Foundation Gütersloh, January 2009.

²⁹ Lucia Montanaro, "The Kosovo statebuilding conundrum: Addressing fragility in a contested state," FRIDE Working Paper No. 91 (October 2009), 7–8.

³⁰ Mosegaard Søjberg, "The Kosovo experiment," 66.

given day it may include a contingent of policemen from Fiji or the Philippines, Scandinavian engineers, administrators from Peru and Ethiopia, riot control experts from Pakistan, German soldiers, American lawyers, Australian specialists in such niche industries as mine clearance and border security, and well-heeled fifty-something civil servants and diplomats from the four corners of the world. Alongside this cosmopolitan crowd are Kosovo Albanians, the young often sporting outlandish fashions, middle-aged men wearing dark suits and even darker expressions, and elderly men and women in skullcaps and kerchiefs nervously waiting to board a plane the second time in their lives. This is the daily Austrian flight to Pristina.³¹

UNMIK's reputation was damaged with corruption cases within its own ranks. The UNMIK mission, which should have helped to establish the rule of law in Kosovo, was accused of being unable or not willing to deal with serious corruption cases within its own ranks.³² High level corruption was a serious problem and breaking the knot of organized crime, misconduct which is rooted in clan and KLA solidarity was indispensable. A study by Nika Stražišar Teran on "Peacebuilding and organized crime"³³ underlines the importance of smuggling channels for the KLA—in particular heroin trade to Western Europe, weapons in 1998–99 and in 1999 in human trafficking. "Organized criminal groups, which consolidated in the course of the conflict, took advantage of this situation before the new law enforcement and justice systems were established to further strengthen themselves and extend their control in the territory," the study states. Trafficking in human beings and money laundering remained wide spread in post-conflict Kosovo the latter mostly through the privatization of state owned enterprises and illegal construction industries.³⁴ The above mentioned study

³¹ King and Mason, *Peace at Any Price*, 1.

³² See Marciej Zaremba: "Report from Unmikistan: Land of the future," at <http://www.dn.de/kultur-noje/debatt-essa/1.732443> (accessed 29 March 2009).

³³ Nika Stražišar Teran, "Peacebuilding and organized crime: The cases of Kosovo and Liberia," Swiss Peace Foundation, Working Paper No. 1 (2007).

³⁴ Nikolaus Graf Lambsdorff, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Head of Pillar IV (EU), UNMIK (2003), in Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF), "Organized crime as an obstacle to successful peacebuilding," Conference report (2004), 70–72.

even speaks about a “close interrelationship between criminal and political elements, which in some cases have overlapped substantially,” with severe consequences for institution building ambitions for the internationals.

But, as an International Crisis Group Report indicates, UNMIK has also failed to train Kosovar officers in the skills needed for serious criminal investigations.³⁵ By 2007 large scale corruption was seen present especially in healthcare, central administration, the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK), and the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA). Furthermore, the envisaged establishment of rule of law and of an independent judiciary as a key component of democracy and human security was very difficult to achieve. Eight years after the war and one year prior to the declaration of independence in 2008 only 24% of Kosovo-Albanians, 6% of Serbs, and 22% of respondents from other minorities believed that Kosovo’s judicial system was unbiased and fair.³⁶ Still witnesses and officials were intimidated by criminals who not only tried to control the justice system but the economy as well—be it as business actors or by creating an insecure environment.³⁷ For too long the international community not only condoned, but even coddled parts of the political elite suspected of involvement in corruption and organized crime, and thus has created a sort of unsaintly alliance between them and the ruling elite. Criminal prosecution—key tasks of UNMIK and OSCE in the frame of building institutions, democratization and the rule of law—was stuck in procedures. A 2008 background report of the OSCE admits: “At the end of 2007, there were almost 50,000 unsolved civil cases pending before the municipal courts of Kosovo, compared to approximately 47,000 cases at the beginning of the year.”³⁸

The minorities in particular were affected by the lack of rule of law. Widespread corruption in Kosovo and within the missions, organized crime, as well as the dragging establishment of rule of law were characterized by Kai Eide in his report to the UN Security Council in 2005 as “... the biggest threat to stability of Kosovo and the sustainability of its institutions.”³⁹

³⁵ International Crisis Group, “The rule of law in independent Kosovo,” Crisis Group Report No. 204 (19 May 2010), 8.

³⁶ USAID/UNDP, “Early Warning Report Kosovo No. 17” (April–June 2007), 30.

³⁷ Stražišar Teran, “Peacebuilding and organized crime,” 18.

³⁸ OSCE Background Report, “Human rights, ethnic relations and democracy in Kosovo” (Summer 2007–Summer 2008), 4.

³⁹ Eide, “Report to the UN Security Council.”

The EU, responsible for economic reconstruction in Pillar IV, managed to achieve a macro-economic stability, enabled the integration of Kosovo in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), and established a functioning banking system. After the successful initial phase of reconstruction and growth involving a construction boom, UNMIK and PISG were not able to establish a functioning policy environment and conditions for stable and lasting economic growth. Privatization turned to be very difficult to achieve. A main reason for that was that UNMIK adopted Yugoslav law as the interim legal system for Kosovo. Andreas Wittkowsky who worked as deputy head in Pillar IV summarized the problem as follows: "A domestic economic policy area where the 'traditional' approach soon reached its limits was the problem of governance over some 400 socially and publicly owned enterprises (SOE and POE)."⁴⁰ The biggest donor, the EU, provided €2.4 billion in technical and financial assistance between 1999 and 2007. Mostly earmarked for public administration and energy supplies, a large amount of the money, however, trickled away due to slapdash and missing political and economic control mechanisms.⁴¹ In an interview in September 2010 with David L. Phillips, the Kosovar politician and director of the Kosovo privatization agency (PAK), Dino Asanaj, who died in 2012 under strange circumstances, even noticed that "UNMIK was a multinational monarchy. UNMIK had zero transparency and accountability. The money was mishandled."⁴² Economic development—an integral part of human security, peacebuilding, and peace consolidation—has been widely ignored by the international community and donors. Generally, legal ambiguities, including overlaps between EU, UN, and Kosovar institutions, have let foreign investors hesitate to become actively engaged. And, each donor had its own rules and procedures. Donors did not provide clear mechanisms for project evaluation, implementation, for a fair and transparent process.

Lack of coordination between the different representations of the international community in Kosovo was a core problem in the years

⁴⁰ Andreas Wittkowsky, "EU innovations to UN-led nation building in Kosovo," in *The Balkan Prism: A Retrospective by Policy-Makers and Analysts*, eds. Johanna Deimel and Wim van Meurs (München: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2007), 332.

⁴¹ Vladimir Gligorov, "Die wirtschaftliche Zukunft des Kosovo," *Europäische Rundschau* (2008): 53, at http://www.europaeische-rundschau.at/2008/Inhalt_2008_1_files/Gligorov.pdf (accessed 28 March 2009).

⁴² Philips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 122.

1999–2008. The UNSC gave UNMIK a strong mandate, but daily disagreements over UNMIK's mandate occurred between UNMIK in Pristina and UN headquarters in New York. David L. Philips quotes the British diplomat working for UNMIK, Carne Ross, stating that "UNMIK's work was carried out in a completely arbitrary and unaccountable fashion. The supervisors were three desk officers at the DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations]."⁴³

"Parallel structures"

Local *civil society* found itself in a difficult position to define its role. While internationals intensively supported the development of NGOs (1998 just 61 local NGOs existed—by 2004 they numbered 2,300), civil society faced the complication which Mentor Agani has described as follows: "UNMIK was administering Kosovo while supporting the creation of new Kosovan governmental structures. So, who was the state to be counter-balanced in this situation: UNMIK or the new Kosovan governmental structures?"⁴⁴ Furthermore, the formation and attitudes of local societies were influenced by the experience of living in parallel societal systems in the 1990s, and "the construction of a para-state to counter ethnic segregation entailed a blurring of the distinction between public and private spheres."⁴⁵ The challenges, to build a democratic society in Kosovo after years of suppression in the 1990s and of war in 1999 were enormous. The international community has taken the lead in this process, hoping that the Kosovo society would follow its guidance and assistance and would gradually take its own responsibility for the future. A survey conducted by IDEA and published in May 2001 shows a deep gratitude *vis-à-vis* the international community as peacemaker and a factor for political stability.⁴⁶ However, this positive image of the internationals on the ground deteriorated and the level of dissatisfaction of all ethnicities with the political situ-

⁴³ Philips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 123.

⁴⁴ Mentor Agani, "Civil society in a protectorate," in *Civil Society in Kosovo since 1999*, ed. Mentor Agani (Prishtina: Centre for Political Courage and Department of Political Science, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Prishtina, 2012), 17.

⁴⁵ Luisa Chiodi, Francesco Martino, and Francesca Vanoni, "From one parallel society to another," *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*, Occasional Paper (January 2008), 8.

⁴⁶ IDEA, SEE Public Agenda Survey, Focus Groups in Kosova (May 2001), 12.

ation increased rapidly. The UNDP Early Warning Report (September 2003–December 2003) showed that the dissatisfaction with the performance of UNMIK declined from November 2002 from 63.8% positive responses to only 28.4% in November 2003.⁴⁷ But the question whether Kosovan society from 1999 until 2008 has gained trust in its own local institutions, political parties, and civil society as an alternative to the internationals' efforts leads to negative answers. Balkan Monitor 2008 illustrates that the government (22%), courts (21%), civil society (14%), and political parties (8%) were the least trusted institutions in Kosovo.⁴⁸ Citizens' participation and representation in Kosovan governance would have needed a broad range of non-governmental actors, to serve as "the strongest check of abuse of power and the generation of creative proposals to deepen democracy,"⁴⁹ the UNDP in 2004 stipulated. Again, the international community and their agencies understood themselves as care-takers in this respect. Michael Weichert observed that it was a common approach of international actors to search for "like minded groups and (influential) personalities or opinion-makers in this agenda-setting business."⁵⁰ This selected elite was nurtured by the internationals and played in conformity with the rules and objectives set by them. Thus, "real" civil society engagement found it very difficult to influence the agenda. UNMIK's executive power was to a great extent preventing a real empowerment of the society and the state. Luisa Chiodi, Francesco Martino, and Francesca Vanoni argue that "the peculiarity of Kosovo in this realm is that the counterpart of local civil society has not been local institutions but rather foreign administrators: instead of state-society relations, in Kosovo, one finds UNMIK-society relations."⁵¹ In such an environment civic engagement and public participation happened in public street protests and not through policy oriented initiatives, public discussions and interest groups.

Discontent and distrust *vis-à-vis* UNMIK and the still pending status grew especially among the younger generation and paved the way for Albin Kurti, who in 2004 founded the political movement Vetëvendosje

⁴⁷ "Early Warning Report Kosovo No. 5" (September–December 2003), 29.

⁴⁸ Gallup Balkan Monitor 2008, "Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans. 2008 Analytical Report," 26.

⁴⁹ "UNDP Human Development Report" (Kosovo 2004), 91.

⁵⁰ Michael Weichert "How to make them do what you want them to do?," in Deimel and van Meurs, eds., 365.

⁵¹ Chiodi, Martino, and Vanoni, "From one parallel society to another," 8.

("self-determination"). The movement, which in 2010 transformed into a political party, opposes international involvement in Kosovo, and campaigns for the right of the people to self-determination for the future status of Kosovo. With fresh ideas the movement started to advertise on walls with graffiti, organized protests against status negotiations, and sprayed UNMIK vehicles with *fund* (Albanian for "end") or *tung* (Albanian for "goodbye"). During a rally organized by Vetëvendosje in Pristina on 10 February 2007 to protest UNMIK's overpowering presence and attended by more than 60,000 people, Romanian UNMIK police started firing tear gas and rubber bullets at the crowd. Two Albanian protesters died.

Two thirds of the *Kosovar Serbs* live in enclaves. Belgrade's policy *vis-à-vis* Kosovo since 2000 is undermining the efforts made by the internationals and aiming at partition of Kosovo. From 1999 till 2004, Kosovar Serbs hoped that the Serbian military presence would be restored in Kosovo.⁵² While Mitrovica has always been in Belgrade's focus and enjoyed a "no man's land status," Serbs living in the south of Kosovo were left in a limbo. Kosovar Serbs in general were left without an elite, only a few have been working in parallel institutions, doing administrative jobs. Furthermore, Belgrade was very clear in preventing Kosovar Serbs from cooperating with UNMIK or the PISG either by declaring those who showed some willingness for cooperation to be national traitors or by paying double salaries from the Serbian budget to the employees in parallel structures. Belgrade made Kosovar Serbs politically and financially reliant on Serbia. Dismantling the parallel structures for Kosovar Serbs is a top priority for the international community. Serbia is financing a parallel health system and organized the local educational system. In 2006 Serbia in the preamble of its new constitution—approved by a referendum—defined Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.

KLA/criminal networks/secret services: International peacebuilding missions are confronted with the problem, whether they should rely on even only rudimentary existing structures or whether they should better completely destroy them and then restart the state and institution building from scratch. Yet "UNMIK and KFOR and the hundreds of NGOs simply could not do the job by ignoring and excluding the locals. Only Kosovar Albanians had the expertise on what needed to be done and how to do it,"

⁵² Sonja Biserko during a conference on "International peace-keeping and stabilization in Kosovo," Brdo, Slovenia (12 June 2010).

Henry H. Perritt, Jr., states.⁵³ As a consequence, the KLA without any doubt determined post-war politics in Kosovo. The first post-war municipal elections in October 2000 put the KLA in the driver's seat and enabled former KLA fighters Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj to enter into politics.⁵⁴ Considering the possibly damaging consequences in terms of stability the co-optation of former KLA figures, like Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj, into the political reconstruction effort might be understandable. "Prominent KLA leaders were those in the best position to provide real political leadership because they were proven risk takers, and because they had more political capital because of their hero status with the domestic publics," according to Perritt.⁵⁵ The question, however, remains, to what extent the political calculation might become a hindrance for democratization and the consolidation of rule of law and thus discredit international actors or even the entire reform process. UNMIK preferred to deal with Thaci and Haradinaj rather than with Ibrahim Rugova,⁵⁶ who died in 2006. Two of the main political parties in Kosovo, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) with Hashim Thaci and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) with Ramush Haradinaj, still present in the political scene of Kosovo, reflect the split or division between rival KLA and clan networks. In addition, parallel intelligence service networks affiliated either to the PDK or to the AAK were intimidating political opponents—also within their own party ranks—or protecting party officials. Their members were involved in cross border organized crime activities and the services further counted on personal and family relations and war time alliances.

It was a leaked report of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in 2005 to bring the intensive interaction between politics and organized crime in Kosovo to the public. Both Thaci and Haradinaj were named as key figures in the report. Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor at ICTY until the end of January 2007, openly criticized the lack of international and local political support in prosecuting war crimes committed

⁵³ Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61.

⁵⁴ Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 154.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁵⁶ The leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and elected President of Kosovo 2002–06 represented the peaceful resistance against Serb suppression under Milošević.

by KLA members against Serbs. Investigations were hindered, witnesses intimidated, and documents suppressed.⁵⁷ When in March 2005 the then acting SRSJ Sören Jessen-Petersen openly sided with Ramush Haradinaj, UNMIK was further severely discredited in the eyes of the Serbs. Indicted by the ICTY, Haradinaj was able to walk around freely and remained politically active.⁵⁸ The first trial against Haradinaj ended in April 2008 when he was released due to lack of evidences.

Wishful thinking: The concept of multi-ethnicity

The aim of ensuring a multi-ethnic Kosovo has been largely unrealized, despite the fast deployment of KFOR. Immediately after the NATO intervention and the withdrawal of the Serbian security forces, ethnic and politically motivated violence against Serbs and all those who supposedly had sided with the Serbs forced approximately 65,000 Kosovo Serbs to flee out of Kosovo.⁵⁹ Refugee returns remained far below the expectations—between 2000 and 2007 only 17,821 returned.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the KFOR protection of Serb enclaves paved the way for deepening and manifesting the segregation of the ethnic communities. By establishing relationships with the “potential spoilers, mainly former KLA leaders,” UNMIK and KFOR were blamed for having been more concerned with “placating those who opposed inter-ethnic tolerance than [with] defending those few who supported it.”⁶¹ Despite the introduction of minority rights and laws to protect religious and cultural sites of minorities, it was wishful thinking to suppose that the Kosovar Albanians would be willing to treat the Kosovo Serbs and other minorities as equals.

Frustrated by the lack of improvement in terms of defining Kosovo’s final status, by the desperate economic situation and UNMIK’s colonial veto power,

⁵⁷ *Spiegel online International* (18 October 2007), “Interview with War Crimes Prosecutor Carla del Ponte (accessed 19 April 2009).

⁵⁸ Carla Del Ponte (with Chuck Sudetic), *Im Namen der Anklage. Meine Jagd auf Kriegsverbrecher und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Verlag, 2009).

⁵⁹ Wolfgang Petritsch and Robert Pichler, *Kosovo–Kosova. Der lange Weg zum Frieden* (Wien and Klagenfurt: Wieser 2005), 310–311.

⁶⁰ UNMIK Fact Sheet (July 2008), 6, at http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2008/Fact_Sheet_July_2008.pdf.

⁶¹ King and Mason, *Peace at Any Price*, 79.

riots broke out all over Kosovo on 17–18 March 2004, targeting Serb enclaves and religious sites. Thirty-five churches and monasteries and 800 houses were burned and destroyed, 5,000 Serbs and non-Albanians fled Kosovo.⁶² The violent riots in March 2004 were a disaster. UNMIK and KFOR were heavily criticized for not having reacted adequately. The riots have also put the principle “standards before status” of SRSG Michael Steiner in question. Russia criticized NATO for what it considered KFOR’s failure to prevent violence against ethnic Kosovo Serbs. Russia insisted in “disarming illegal armed groups in Kosovo,” and the Russian Duma called for the return of Serbian-Montenegro’s troops to Kosovo.⁶³ Kosovar Albanians regarded the standards before status strategy increasingly as an appeasement for Serbian obstructionism. The riots in March 2004 have sent a clear message to the international community that violence was needed to get the politicians moving.

Mitrovica and the north of Kosovo

French KFOR troops were based in the northern sector of Kosovo and in fact helped to foster the situation in Mitrovica by “refusing to enforce property rights, allow Albanians to return to their properties, or control the border with Serbia. They also refused to confront the ‘bridge watchers’—Serbian thugs, including ex-members of Serbia’s Interior Ministry (MUP), who kept Albanians from heading north,” according to Phillips.⁶⁴ The city in the North of Kosovo is divided by the Ibar river which marks not only the boundary where UNMIK was faced with strong Serbian resistance and Belgrade’s influence, but also the *de facto* partition of Kosovo.⁶⁵ In August 2001, a Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija (CCK) was set up by Belgrade, and (though officially denied by Belgrade) Serbian security forces are present in the North since 1999 in violation of not only UNSCR 1244 but also the Kumanovo Agreement.⁶⁶ The Pristina-

⁶² International Crisis Group, “Collapse in Kosovo,” Crisis Group Europe Report No. 155 (22 April 2004).

⁶³ Johanna Deimel, “Russia’s Balkan policy,” in Deimel and van Meurs, eds., 487–497.

⁶⁴ Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 143.

⁶⁵ International Crisis Group Report, “Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica divide,” Crisis Group Europe Report No. 165 (13 September 2005), 1.

⁶⁶ International Crisis Group Report, “Serb integration in Kosovo: Taking the plunge,” Crisis Group Europe Report No. 200 (12 May 2009), 5.

based think tank KIPRED reports that the government of Kosovo and the international community have spent almost a decade focusing on the bridge of Mitrovica and conflict management rather than offering solutions in developmental incentives for Kosovo and especially for Serb populated areas. The North became a haven for organized crime—"Kosovo's 'El Dorado.' This is a consequence of the decade-long disastrous failure of UNMIK, Kosovo Force (KFOR), and Pristina to implement basic rule of law and [assure] safety for people in the area."⁶⁷

Pragmatic Chaos: The Internationals in Kosovo 2008

The Kosovo Declaration of Independence of 17 February 2008 was preceded by lengthy and nerve-racking negotiations. In March 2007 Ahtisaari presented the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (CSP), or Ahtisaari Plan, which envisages fundamental rights and guarantees for the Kosovo-Serbs. In contrast to what the proponents of independence had planned, the international community has not managed to come up with a new legal framework for the missions on the ground. Russia, which until the middle of 2006 still supported the views of the Balkans Contact Group (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, U.S., and Russia) on the negotiations under Ahtisaari, used Kosovo to further its global political ambitions, and forced the international actors with its UNSC veto power to be bound to UNSCR 1244 from the year 1999.⁶⁸

From reconfiguration to reconfusion

When Kosovo declared its independence, the EU member states invented the formula: "Diverse in recognition, united in action." Five EU states—Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Cyprus—still refuse to recognize Kosovo for reasons associated with domestic policy issues and inter-

⁶⁷ Ilir Deda and Lulzim Peci, "Looking beyond Mitrovica Bridge: An Ahtisaari Plus package proposal," Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Prishtina (October 2008), 5.

⁶⁸ On 15 June 2008 the first constitution of the new state entered into force. Both the declaration of independence and the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo refer to the Ahtisaari Plan and its implementation.

national legal reservations. However, the lack of clarity and consensus among the EU member states, the OSCE, and the UN is apparent and causes problems even in terms of action. In fact, the international community and the EU representatives on the ground in Kosovo appeared to be far from being coherent.

As a centerpiece of the Ahtisaari package, the EU offered to take responsibility for the security area and to deploy a sizeable international rule of law mission (EULEX) which would have executive powers in areas such as organized and inter-ethnic crime.⁶⁹ Prior to the declaration of independence, the EU had given the impression of being united on the issue. As late as 4 February 2008, the 27 EU member states emphasized that they were willing to assume a leading role if Kosovo agreed to implement the Ahtisaari Plan. It was unanimously agreed to dispatch the EULEX rule of law mission and an EU Special Representative for Kosovo. EULEX is the most ambitious and largest mission the EU has ever launched. The EU leaders accepted EU-led supervision for an open-ended period mainly to guarantee minority rights.⁷⁰

Literally no one expected that the UNSC 1244 would be retained. In consequence, there again was a very difficult situation as regards the international presence in Kosovo. Reconfiguration of UNMIK and the transfer of competences could not be achieved as intended and thus resulted in a mix of policies, competences and presences on the ground. Instead of "reconfiguration", Veton Surroi characterized the situation as "reconfusion" of the international presence and that of UNMIK and EULEX in particular.⁷¹

UNMIK found itself in a difficult position after the declaration of independence, and especially after the entry into force of the constitution. The dilemma was due to the fact that UNSCR 1244, on which the mandate of UNMIK is based, continued to be in existence, whereas there is no mention of UNMIK in the Kosovar Constitution. The intention had been that UNMIK would operate in Kosovo only until EULEX had become fully operative. Initially it was planned that UNMIK would leave Kosovo

⁶⁹ Stefan Lehne, "Resolving Kosovo's status," OIIP Policy Paper (June 2009), at http://www.oaip.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Arbeitspapiere/Policy_Paper_Status_of_Kosovo.pdf.

⁷⁰ *Financial Times* (5 June 2009), Special Report.

⁷¹ UNMIK Media Monitoring (13 June 2008).

Figure 6.2. Reporting Line under UNSC 1244.





Figure 6.3. International Presence in 2008: Pragmatic chaos—between supervised independence and Kosovo / UNMIK 1244.



and that the International Civilian Office (ICO) with the International Civilian Representative (ICR)/EU Special Representative (EUSR) would take over responsibility in the oversight of the implementation of the CSP. Yet things were about to turn out differently. Since June 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has been trying to find a way out of this impasse. He attempted to obtain Belgrade's support for the reconfiguration of UNMIK and the deployment of EULEX, and put forward six points on which Belgrade should in future continue to have a say. The proposals, agreed on 26 November 2008 between Belgrade, Brussels, and Ban Ki-Moon and approved by the UNSC, suggested that, in the Serbian enclaves and in the north of Kosovo, matters relating to customs, police, justice, transport, telecommunications, and religious and cultural heritage would continue to be handled under the aegis of UNSCR 1244, whereas EULEX would operate under the umbrella of the United Nations, that is, of UNMIK.

Since February 2008, Kosovo is called either the Republic of Kosovo (of those recognizing countries) or Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/1999. The declaration of independence referred to the Ahtisaari Plan. It welcomed the international civilian presence to supervise independence and at the same time confirmed that "[w]e shall act consistent with the principles of international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, including Resolution 1244." All of that was confusing, Tim Judah rightly stated. It was unclear as to who was actually going to be in control.⁷² UNMIK is seen as a hurdle for state sovereignty and the role and function of the SRSB has changed. Albin Kurti, leader of Vetëvendosje in Kosovo, got to the heart of the problem by stating that EULEX "is nothing but the new First Pillar of UNMIK."⁷³ The establishment of EULEX was far from being optimal. Resistance from citizens of Kosovo against EULEX deployment, which in their view seemed to be just a newly labeled UNMIK/EUMIK protectorate, was widespread.

The ICO, which was endorsed by all EU member-states before the declaration of independence since 2008, acted as the ultimate authority regarding the interpretation and oversight of the implementation of the CSP—which is in favor of independence and status. The ICR found it rather difficult to move to Kosovo in order to perform the consultative and inter-

⁷² Judah, *Kosovo*, 145.

⁷³ Albin Kurti, "Causing damage in Kosovo," at <http://euobserver.com/opinion/28602> (accessed 2 September 2009).

ventionist functions stipulated in the Ahtisaari Plan. Matters became even more complicated when it comes to the double hat function of the ICR namely as EUSR. The European Council has decided to dispatch an EUSR in conjunction with EULEX. The ICR, Pieter Feith, as stipulated in the Ahtisaari Plan, was also the EUSR. This dual function increasingly caused difficulties. Whereas the ICR was supposed to supervise the government of the Republic of Kosovo, opinions differed with regard to the function of the EUSR in the 22 pro-recognition and five non-recognizing EU member states.

The OSCE was assigned a key role by Ban Ki-Moon's report to the Security Council. Its members—and in this they resemble the EU—do not agree with regard to the status question. Yet the OSCE has only a political and consultative mandate, and not an internationally binding one. Furthermore, the organization has to defer to its member states Russia and Serbia—and is thus status-neutral. Cooperation with the ICO has been officially impossible.

Conclusion

Kosovo is not in dry towels yet; it is independent, but still in limbo. The most convincing argument would be a sound and responsible performance of the Kosovar institutions. Little progress has been made in the integration of minority communities; corruption is endemic and the economic situation is still very critical. One of the most important lessons of international engagement in Kosovo 1999–2008 learned is: streamline and coordinate actions. Endless diversification of responsibilities and the proliferation of new personalities rather than results were absolutely not favorable for ensuring coherence and efficiency—for both sides: for the international community and for the local government. The largest CSP mission the EU has launched may have used Kosovo as a testing ground for enabling the Union to resolve conflicts and act as a civilian component for peace and democracy building in the future. It is more than obvious that UNMIK did too little to build up Kosovo's own capacity. Progress on the rule of law and good governance are still crucially needed in Kosovo. In a joint effort, the European Union and the US were assisting Kosovo authorities in state-building, with the latter almost ready to leave Balkan affairs to the European Union.

CHAPTER 7

The Development of the Political System since February 2008

ALTUĞ GÜNAL

The countries of the Western Balkans have been passing through a fundamental transformation process. New states have come into existence after very long, complex and sometimes painful courses. The Republic of Kosovo, as the newest, has also encountered challenges in its aspirations for democracy, peace, prosperity and stability. This chapter deals with the political developments and challenges that Kosovo has been facing after declaring its independence on 17 February 2008. I shall start by explaining the changing status of the international presence in Kosovo after the declaration of independence and subsequently define the most influential actors on the Kosovar political landscape. I shall then outline the ideologies of the Kosovar political parties together with the competition, conflicts, and coalitions among them and their leaders, throughout the general, local, and presidential elections. Information on how and in which circumstances the declaration was issued will also be provided here. The next issue with which I will deal is the process of the long-awaited “end of supervision” of Kosovo in 2012. Finally, I will focus on corruption, evaluating it as one of the most important political issues that Kosovo has faced since the declaration of independence.¹

¹ Since this volume includes a chapter on the Serbs in North Kosovo, I shall not discuss this subject herein.

The Changing Status of the International Presence in Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established on 10 June 1999 by Security Council Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Initially, it was planned that the UN-mandated final status process was going to end in a way that Kosovo would become independent with the approval of the UN Security Council and the presence of a transitional European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which would strengthen and monitor the new state's institutions. However, since it had become obvious that Russia and China were going to exercise their veto rights in the Security Council, on 17 February 2008, after coordinating with friendly powers, the Assembly of Kosovo declared independence, invited the EU mission to monitor/supervise it, and transferred some of its sovereignty to it. This sacrifice of sovereignty was seen by Kosovar Albanians as an exchange for an independent state. The declaration was made in consultation with the USA and some EU member states, drafted partly by the US State Department,² and read out by Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi in both Albanian and Serbian. Mostly to please the international community, the Kosovar government made concessions and displayed some sensitivity to the Serbian minority on the style of the flag, symbols, and the national anthem of the new state.

The Most Influential Political Actors in Kosovo and Their Political Orientations

In Kosovo today, the most influential actors in the political arena are: the leaders of the political parties, other top party members, top officials of the international organizations residing in Kosovo, top Kosovar bureaucrats, and the US Ambassador to Kosovo. However, it is generally accepted that the leaders of organized crime networks and strong clans have some influence over Kosovar politics as well. It is also known that politics in Kosovo is strongly connected to US politics and vulnerable to influence from the leading EU members, neighboring countries, Serbia, Russia, and

² Faton Tony Bislimi, "International state-building in Kosovo: The shifting trend in the level of US–EU involvement," *The Western Balkans Policy Review* 2 (2012), no. 2: 59.

important international organizations. However, even though civil society and the media in Kosovo are still weak and often under political pressure, their capacity to affect the public opinion and the decision-making process has been significant and growing.

Since independence; considering their capacity for impact, level of institutionalization, number of acquired votes, ministry positions, and seats in the Assembly, the most influential political parties in Kosovo are: the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK—Partia Demokratike e Kosovës), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK—Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës), Self-Determination (VV—Vetëvendosje), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK—Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës), the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR—Aleanca Kosova e Re), and the Justice Party (PD—Partia e Drejtësisë e Kosovës). Comparatively minor Kosovar parties—such as the Democratic League of Dardania, the Albanian Demo-Christian Party of Kosovo, the Green Party of Kosovo, the Liberal Party of Kosovo, and the New Democracy Party—can also play important roles in politics. The Independent Liberal Party (SLS) and the Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija are influential in Northern Kosovo. Finally, ethnic minority parties such as the Ashkali Party for Integration, the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo, and the Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo are able to influence the composition of the governing coalitions and also some important political decisions concerning both all Kosovars and their respective communities.

Parties and political attitudes are frequently described by the terms, “left and right.” For more than 200 years, these terms have offered a simple scale on which political parties and opinions can be placed. This left–right, socialist–capitalist, or a liberal–conservative continuum is well-known and the public has learned to attach them to parties and to a lesser degree to issues.³ However, this is not universal and as Ronald Inglehart has noted, “the left right ideological dimension, means different things to different

³ However, the usage of the left–right concept is far too simple to be entirely valid. In fact most people have a set of ideologies rather than a single ideology and many people hold a collection of political views that cannot be fitted neatly into any point of scale and often they have contradictory views. It is exceptional for anyone to be exactly clear about those issues. Leonard Tivey, “Introduction: Left, right and center,” in *Party Ideology in Britain*, eds. Leonard Tivey and Anthony Wright (London: Routledge, 1989), 2; Asher Arian and Michael Shamir, “The primarily political functions of the left–right continuum,” *Comparative Politics* 15 (1983), no. 2: 139–41; Kenneth R. Hoover, *Ideology and Political Life*, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993), 12.

people; moreover its meaning and social basis can change over time.”⁴ Schapiro puts it more overtly, asserting that “there are probably no two terms in the language of politics which are more imprecise and subjective.”⁵

Favoring religion–state separation, secular schools, government-funded medical care and education, and high taxes to support extensive government services are generally described as policy preferences of parties on the “left,” while favoring religious reflections in the constitution and education, low taxes, and privatization of the main sectors and services are considered to be the preferences of the parties on the “right” of the political spectrum. However, difficulties and ambiguity in explaining left–right ideologies, have led to revised classifications, suggesting that there is both a political and economic left and right. Political orientation concerns change, values, religion, tradition, hierarchy, and authority, while economic orientation concerns state intervention, welfare, taxes, free market, and like matters.⁶

The majority of the Kosovar political parties lack clear ideologies and programs.⁷ According to Zulfaj, Mulliqi and others, they intentionally do this and are labeled by the authors as “catch-all parties,”⁸ where the main

⁴ Ronald Inglehart, “New perspectives on value change,” *Comparative Political Studies* 17 (1985): 487, quoted in Tom Langford, “Left/right orientation and political attitudes: A reappraisal and class comparison,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 24 (1991): 475. Another major problem is that, when it is asked in an interview, respondents who do not understand the terms place themselves in the center, feeling it is the safest answer. Survey studies have found that only industrial societies exhibit clear and meaningful relations between citizens’ political attitudes and left–right self-placements. Herbert Kitschelt and Staf Hellemans, “The left–right semantics and the new politics cleavage,” *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (1990), no. 2: 212.

⁵ Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 84, quoted in Roger Eatwell, “The rise of left–right terminology: The confusions of social science,” in *The Nature of the Right*, eds. Roger Eatwell and Noel O’Sullivan (London: Pinter Publishers), 33.

⁶ A double classification implies the possibility of a set of four categories. A horizontal axis would show the capitalist–socialist gradation, while a vertical axis would reflect authoritarian–libertarian values. Tivey, “Introduction,” 3.

⁷ This is a general view on Kosovar political parties. Albert Krasniqi and Krenar Shala, “Strengthening the statehood of Kosovo through the democratization of political parties,” *KIPRED*, Policy Paper Series No. 2012/0, 5. Based on the interviews authors made, even the party officials have accepted that their parties were not profiled and had defined ideologies. Jeton Zulfaj, Brikena Mulliqi, et al., *Political Parties in Kosova: Profile and Ideology* (Prishtina: Çelnaja, 2008), 17.

⁸ The usage of “catch-all party” is of Otto Kirchheimer, “The transformation of the Western European party systems,” in *Political Parties and Political Development*, eds. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

goal is maximizing support. The lack of ideology, affiliation, and identity can also be noticed in the frequent transfers of members (including senior members) from one party to another. Since ideologies are not clear and promises made are similar, the competition among the politicians is not mainly around the implementation of ideologies, ideas, or policies; instead, personal quest for power, statute, position, privileges, and prestige come to the forefront.⁹ Thus, rather than policies, Kosovar electors' preferences are influenced more by leaders' personalities, charisma, or regional affinity.¹⁰

Despite the aforementioned problems, there are some signs reflecting Kosovar parties' ideological positions. Examining their attitudes and discourses toward the economy and society, it may be seen that all of the main parties except the Reformist Party, which had leftist tendencies before it dissolved and joined the LDK, have defended economic liberalism and social conservatism, positioning them closer to the right of the European political spectrum. Concerning the economy, it is clear that; the signs for economic liberalism such as defending free and open market economy, laissez-faire, smaller government, low taxes, privatization, and equality of opportunity (instead of equality of outcome) are common among all. However, the Reformist Party was an exception in that it defended the state's stronger intervention in the economy and equality of outcome.

In terms of the place of religion in society, state secularism is common to all of the main Kosovar political parties. Preservation of social/religious values and tradition, together with standing against abortion and same-sex marriages, which are accepted as the signs of social conservatism, are predominant; this time excluding the AKR, which does not have a negative rhetoric on abortion or same sex marriages.

Parties with a conservative ideology are usually nationalist parties. In general these parties do not believe in idealism and tend to doubt that international institutions such as the UN can bring justice.¹¹ Moreover, right-wing parties are sensitive on sovereignty and thus euro-skeptical, claiming that membership in the EU would weaken state sovereignty. At

⁹ Krasniqi and Shala, "Strengthening the statehood," 10–1.

¹⁰ David Bokhorst, "Kosovo," *European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity*, at <http://www.europeanforum.net/country/kosovo> (accessed on 9 May 2013).

¹¹ Zulfaj and Mulliqi, *Political Parties*, 19.

the same time, since Europeanization stands for a change in culture and values, it is not praised by the conservatives. However, the situation in Kosovo is quite different on this matter. Becoming a part of Euro-Atlantic structures is seen as a means to being accepted into the European family, international recognition, and the consolidation of the independence. Since international recognition is of highest priority for all in Kosovo, political parties support EU integration and Europeanization regardless of their ideological stance.

The International Socialists and the Party of European Socialists have no partner parties in Kosovo. Due to the disreputable communist past of the country, the independence struggle, and post-war conditions, left-wing parties would not have much popular support and had to merge with stronger parties that concentrate more on territorial integrity and solving the independence issue.

The Democratic League of Kosovo

The Democratic League of Kosovo, as the oldest party in Kosovo, had its origins in the 1990s non-violent resistance movement. A group of Albanian intellectuals gathered in 1989 to form the LDK to oppose Serbia's repressive policies and the Kosovar parliament's approval of the constitutional amendments that degraded Kosovo's autonomy to the pre-1974 level. Since it was deemed nationalist and separatist, the party was banned by the Yugoslav authorities. It was also one of the chief organizers of the referendum for self-determination in 1992.

The LDK is generally accepted as liberal in economic terms and conservative in social terms. It is the main right-wing party in Kosovo. Initially, it was led by moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova, who excluded the use of violence or armed struggle against the Serbian authorities. After the end of the war, it adopted several pro-European policies and has become more moderate. However, from the very beginning, the LDK was a leader-dominated party and its charismatic leader with whom the party was identified, was a brand by himself, directing the party alone. Nevertheless, as it is experienced in most of the leader-dominated parties, its formal decision structures were weak and this created problems at the time of leadership succession. Accordingly, when Rugova started to lose power because he had cancer, the then-chairman of the Kosovar Parliament, Nexhat Daci,

started to express his opposition more strongly. However, after Rugova's death, this opposition ended when Daci was dismissed from his position by the efforts of Eqrem Kryeziu, the first vice chairman of the party. Since this beloved politician felt that he had been betrayed by the leadership of the party, he decided to form his own party where he could be the chairman. Daci's departure, together with many important figures of the party, negatively affected the LDK's performance in the November 2007 elections.¹²

The first victor in the fight for the party's leadership after Rugova's death was Fatmir Sejdiu. Nevertheless, when the party started to lose power in the elections under his leadership, unrest grew and Isa Mustafa emerged as the new leader. Mustafa brought a more hard-line conservative stance to the party.

The LDK is a step ahead compared to the other Kosovar parties in terms of ideological clarity.¹³ In its latest party program, the LDK defines itself as a "center-right party."¹⁴ Accordingly, Eqrem Kryeziu from the LDK, has claimed that no one could occupy the "right" wing in the political spectrum better than the LDK, because it had all the preconditions. In the interview, he said, "even [if] the LDK program seemed [as if it was at the] center, it was going to be oriented to right center [i.e., center-right] in the future."¹⁵ Its previous and latest party programs also reflect the conservative and right-wing stance of the party. Conservatives usually connect the past with the present and are inspired by the past. The LDK's program reminds the voters that the LDK was born and grown in Kosovo and also resisted the repressors. Since the values of the society and family institution are important for the conservatives, they are also attached to the LDK's party programs. While the program of 2007 asserted that the "LDK wishes to preserve the values that this society has and not to sell them on the market,"¹⁶ the latest program remarks that, insofar as it is a

¹² Ibid., 7–18.

¹³ Krasniqi and Shala, "Strengthening the statehood," 23.

¹⁴ The program of the Democratic League of Kosovo, at <http://www.ldk-ks.eu/public/uploads/pdf/tresh-1352244646.pdf> (accessed on 5 May 2013).

¹⁵ Sentences in brackets are the author's corrections for the bad English translation of the document. Interview with Eqrem Kryeziu (4 February 2008), in Zulfaj and Mulliqi, *Political Parties*, 19.

¹⁶ "The LDK was born and grown in this land, from this people"; "The LDK is originally of Kosova, [. . .] beating violence with democracy"; LDK, Program for national elections (2007), quoted in Zulfaj and Mulliqi, *Political Parties*, 18.

center-right party, "the LDK gives the family a key role and commits to strengthen it."¹⁷

The LDK's program on the economy also reflects its right-wing attitude. The LDK believes in private initiative, competition, small government, low government spending, low taxes, foreign investment, privatization, and open markets as the main forces for economic development. The strengthening of the market economy and economic development are chosen as the main tools for reducing poverty and unemployment in Kosovo. Membership in international organizations is also considered important for the improvement of the economy.¹⁸

In 2012, the political assembly of the European People's Party (EPP) evaluated the LDK's political program and concluded that it was harmonious with those of other center-right parties and approved the proposal for the accession of the party into the family of the EPP as an observer.

The Democratic Party of Kosovo

The PDK is Kosovo's largest and leading political party. It was founded on 14 May 1999 from the political wing of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Ex-KLA member Bajram Rexhepi was Kosovo's first post-war prime minister and today's Prime Minister Thaçi was also the political leader of the KLA. Although the PDK originally had socialist tendencies, its political tendencies have shifted to the center-right over the years.¹⁹ However, Sabri Kiçmari, one of the party's leaders, claims that it is a left-wing party aiming to be a member of Socialist International, while Memli Krasniqi²⁰ says that, considering its political program during elections of 17 November 2007, there is no doubt that it is center-right.²¹

The PDK draws its support mainly from poor, rural, Albanian-dominated areas that suffered a lot during the war. In the Drenica region, where Thaçi and many KLA fighters were raised, the PDK has

¹⁷ The program of the Democratic League of Kosovo.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Bokhorst, "Kosovo election 2010: The political parties," *Balkan Insight* (9 December 2010), at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/profile-kosovo-s-political-parties> (accessed on 22 November 2012).

²⁰ Minister of the Culture, Youth, and Sport of the Republic of Kosovo.

²¹ Zulfaj and Mulliqi, *Political Parties*, 25–6.

been garnering the largest number of votes.²² In its party program, the PDK strongly reminds voters that it is the successor of the KLA and that it identifies with the values and goals of patriotic organizations of World War II. Many of its leaders' and members' past, as KLA fighters—and here the same may be said for the AAK—brings comparatively a more nationalist and patriotic stance to the party. In this respect, Ramush Tahiri from the PDK claimed, in an interview, that the party was a rather right-wing party.²³ Even though Thaçi has gone through a gradual process of moderation, it is his historic heroism as a KLA commander rather than his policies that still attracts Kosovar electors. That is why the PDK chooses to remind voters of its KLA past on many occasions. However, the image of the party was temporarily called into question by war crimes charges brought against its top members as well as by now-dismissed accusations in the 2010 Dick Marty report, that Thaçi and the KLA had been involved in organ trafficking at the time of war. Furthermore, the PDK is also challenged in its patriotic credentials by the "Self Determination Movement", which accuses the PDK of treachery, claiming that Thaçi is too soft on relations with Serbia and international organizations.

Self-Determination

The "Self-Determination Movement" was formed on 12 June 2005. However, since it originated from the Kosova Action Network (KAN), many of its members were well-known by the public even before, especially for their nationalist graffiti slogans against the presence of UNMIK and the negotiations for independence.²⁴ Its members strongly supported self-

²² Bokhorst, "Kosovo election 2010."

²³ Ramush Tahiri, interviewed by Qelnaja (15 January 2008), quoted in Zulfaj and Mulliqi, *Political Parties*, 125.

²⁴ *Vetëvendosje!* originated from the Kosova Action Network (KAN), formed in 1997, which consisted of activists working for social change and active citizenry, with activities focused on human rights and social justice, education, culture, and art. On June 12 2005, activists sprayed "No negotiations, self-determination!" on the walls of UNMIK's Headquarters in Prishtina, marking the transformation from KAN into the Movement for Self-Determination. Interview with Albin Kurti in *IRST Anatolia Daily* (23 November 2010), at <http://www.anatoliadaily.com/irst/index.php/main-subjects/interviews-and-reportages/4-interview-with-albin-kurti> (accessed on 24 June 2013).

determination as the only solution. The party enjoys wide appeal amongst the youth, mainly due to its nationalist stance, courage and anti-corruption messages. Its leader, Albin Kurti, attributes the cohesive strength of the movement to three components: 1) mutual awareness; 2) a coherent attitude about the international community whether in protests and in media appearances; and 3) loyalty to the method: where its MP does not sit in Parliament, but goes out in the protest and gets arrested.²⁵ The movement also opposes the decentralization process claiming that it creates a *de facto* division of Kosovo along ethnic lines, separating Kosovo into ethnic Albanian and Serbian parts. Although the Movement has its political program, its ideological profile is still unclear. The greatest challenge on this issue will be the reconciliation of its incompatible figures from Marxist to radical nationalist.

The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo

The AAK was formed in 2001 by another former KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj. In December 2004, he was elected Prime Minister of Kosovo, but after having served for only 100 days, having learned that he had been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes, he chose to resign. His international *prestige* was rather high at the time. Even a recent BBC report found considerable support for Haradinaj among the Serb population.²⁶ Haradinaj received a full acquittal from the Tribunal on 3 April 2008 thanks to lack of evidence. His willingness to surrender and be tried was appreciated internally and internationally and increased the respect he had already enjoyed. By behaving this way, he prevented civil unrest in the country as well. After the trial, he returned to Kosovo and immediately resumed his duties as the president of the party until the ICTY ordered a partial retrial in 2010. On 29 November 2012, Haradinaj was acquitted for the second time on

²⁵ Albin Kurti interview in Prishtina (1 June 2012), in Krasniqi and Shala, "Strengthening the statehood," 25.

²⁶ Serbs in Northern Mitrovica told the BBC by telephone that only two Kosovo government members, Bajram Rexhepi and in particular Ramush Haradinaj, have managed to do something for the Serb minority. "Qëndrime të ndryshme për qeverisjen," *BBC Albanian.com* (6 September 2006), at http://www.bbc.co.uk/albanian/news/2006/09/060906_arber.shtml (accessed on 8 November 2012).

all charges.²⁷ However, strong criticisms of the intimidation of the witnesses against Haradinaj and the ineffective witness protection programs which could not make them feel secure, weakened the legitimacy of those acquittal decisions.

The AAK is similar to the PDK especially in terms of its economic approach, but it is relatively more moderate in social life. Women and youth are well represented in the party, which fits with the party's priority to promote youth and a stronger role for women in society. It praises Europeanization and is committed to regional/international cooperation. Concerning religion, the party's official web site explicitly states that its members believe in God but respect freedom of religion and support the principle of secularism as a fundamental principle of democratic states.²⁸ However, since it is an alliance, the AAK has representation from both the right and left wing, which complicates its ideological stance. Another challenge for the party relates to its narrow sphere of influence. Traditionally, the party gets strong support from the town of Dukagjini, where Haradinaj was at command during the war times. In fact, businessmen from Dukagjini are among the most important sources of funding for the party.²⁹

The New Kosovo Alliance

The New Kosovo Alliance is the newest influential party in Kosovo, formed in 2006 by millionaire businessman, dual Swiss/Kosovar citizen, and founding owner of Mabetex, Behgjet Pacolli. The Party inherited its name from "the Alliance for New Kosovo," which had also been founded and organized by Pacolli in Washington in 2004.

Like every other parliamentary party in Kosovo, this party is accepted as center-right and parallel to its business roots strongly defends free market economy. Pacolli believes that the objectives of Kosovo can be achieved primarily through economic development.³⁰ Accordingly, low-

²⁷ "Hague tribunal acquits ex-KLA commander," *B92* (29 November 2012), at http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?yyyy=2012&mm=11&dd=29&nav_id=83396 (accessed on 2 June 2013).

²⁸ Political program of the AAK, at <http://aak-ks.net/?id=19> (accessed on 20 May 2013).

²⁹ Krasniqi and Shala, "Strengthening the statehood," 27–8; "Kosovo election 2010."

³⁰ Official web site of AKR (History), at <http://www.akr-ks.eu/pages/43> (accessed on 28 May 2013).

ering tax rates, encouraging foreign investment and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures are among its main arguments.³¹ Up until 17 November 2007, the AKR had not taken part in elections as it was a new political organization. However, due to the successful lobbying background of its founder Pacolli, the party enjoyed increasingly significant support in Kosovo. The AKR participated for the first time in general elections on 17 November 2007 and became the third largest party and the largest opposition party. Pacolli also managed to become the president of Kosovo but later had to resign due to constitutional problems which will be explained later in this chapter. In the current coalition government of the PDK and the AKR, he became the first deputy prime minister of Kosovo on 8 April 2011 and was given the exclusive task of being in charge of a special task force created to lobby for the recognition of the independence of Kosovo throughout the world. Since he is known as the richest Albanian in the world, he is able to acquire votes from Kosovars who believe Pacolli's enormous wealth is a guarantee that he won't need to abuse his political power or be corrupted.

The General Elections that Paved the Way for the Independence

The last Kosovar parliamentary election before the declaration of independence was held on 10 November 2007. The elections were praised by international observers.³² However, dissatisfaction and disappointment among the Kosovar people, stemming from bad management and the broken promises of previous governments, as well as the Serbian boycott, led to a low turnout. Only 42.80% of the electorate voted in these elections.³³ Another reason for this was related to the role of the international presence

³¹ Official web site of AKR (Program) at <http://www.akr-ks.eu/pages/44> (accessed on 29 May 2013).

³² Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244/99), "2008 Progress Report," Com(2008) 674, 9; Council of Europe Elections Observation Mission in Kosovo, "Elections in line with international standards but alarmingly low turn-out," Press Release No. 801(2007), at <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1213139&Site=COE> (accessed on 5 December 2012).

³³ Council of Europe, Press Release No. 801(2007), at <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/38260> (accessed on 5 December 2012).

in Kosovo. Even though "internationals" organized democratic elections and established institutions of self-government for Kosovars, in reality they kept most of the powers for themselves. For instance, the SRSG for Kosovo had the right to refuse, change, or override whatever the elected officials said or decided. So, to vote for political institutions which actually did not have enough authority to make important changes in the country, did not seem very meaningful.³⁴ Individuals in Kosovo felt they could not influence the decision-making process by voting. Nevertheless, the November 2007 election results were a victory for the PDK, which secured 34.3% of the votes. In addition, the LDK attracted 22.6% of the vote, the AKR 12%, the AAK 10%, the LDD 10%, the ORA 4%, and the Party of Justice (PD) 2%. In addition, 13 minority parties received a total of 5% of the vote.

The Declaration of Independence under the Rule of the PDK-led Government

Following the 2007 elections, the government coalition that organized the move toward independence was formed between the PDK led by Hashim Thaçi and the LDK led by President Fatmir Sejdiu. Thaçi became the prime minister and two deputy prime ministers were appointed, together with 17 ministers. Naturally, the 120-day period designated in the Ahtisaari Plan prior to the declaration passed with the Kosovar Albanians devoting full concentration to attaining independence and preparing a constitution. Since the time limit was very tight, 41 laws for meeting this goal were passed in an accelerated procedure, without sufficient chance to allow serious discussion even in the Assembly. However, even if the process was not as democratic and transparent as it should have been, all of the mentioned laws were monitored by the ICO and were declared to be in line with the Ahtisaari Plan.³⁵

Kosovo's political parties respected their commitment to remain united throughout the independence process. Thus, striving for Kosovo's independence from Serbia had provided powerful cement in the politics of Kosovo. However, after independence was declared and the consti-

³⁴ Bislimi, "International statebuilding," 63.

³⁵ Hilde Katrine Haug, "The political landscape in Kosovo since the declaration of independence," *Südosteuropa* 58 (2010), no. 1: 56.

tution was written, the basis for the unity of the parties disappeared. In fact, this fragmentation was not unexpected,³⁶ and since then, Kosovo's political parties have been striving harder to position themselves in order to amass more power and influence for themselves in the changing environment. Opposition parties have been criticizing the government more heavily and conflicts have also surfaced within the ruling coalitions.

In spite of their rhetorical differences, since there are no serious ideological differences among the major parties, the conflicts between them have not often been directly related to social and economic policies. On the contrary, the intra-party and inter-party struggles for power, position, and influence seemed to throw social and economic concerns into the shade. In fact, the competition between Haradinaj and Thaçi has turned into a personal rivalry, almost becoming hostile.³⁷

Expectations on the part of the first government of independent Kosovo that it would be the beneficiary of a high level of foreign donations and assistance have not been realized. However, despite its weaknesses, the performance of the Kosovar government was generally considered promising by the internationals and better than that of the governments prior to independence.³⁸ Since the government preferred to use the budget primarily in areas related to education and infrastructure—particularly road building—the results for the citizens were comparatively more concrete and visible than anything prior to independence.

In Autumn 2010, the Constitutional Court of Kosovo ruled that the first president of independent Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu, was violating the constitution by remaining simultaneously the leader of the LDK while serving as president of the republic. This decision threw Kosovar politics into a deadlock. He chose to resign from the presidency rather than resign from the party leadership, but lost his party leadership anyway against Isa Mustafa, who had campaigned for leaving the government coalition. The LDK with-

³⁶ To a large extent, the LDK's losing its position for the lead after Rugova's death, had also warmed up the inter-party competition.

³⁷ The AAK on the other hand had been criticizing Thaçi's government harshly, especially on the low level of international recognition of Kosovo, selling off the state telecom, failing to solve social issues, inability to control Northern Kosovo and to integrate Serbs; Haug, "The political landscape," 63; Fatos Bytyci, "Junior partner quits Kosovo coalition as vote looms," at http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/news/international/Junior_partner_quits_Kosovo_coalition_as_vote_looms.html?cid=28561946 (accessed on 10 December 2012).

³⁸ Haug, "The political landscape," 58.

drew from the coalition; the Assembly dissolved on 2 November 2010 following a no confidence vote on an exit strategy for the crisis; and the acting President of Kosovo called early general elections for 12 December 2010.

The December 2010 General Elections and Their Impact on Politics

The December 2010 general elections were the first elections held in Kosovo since the declaration of independence. Haradinaj, the leader of the main opposition party, was in detention at the ICTY and the Self-Determination Movement led by Albin Kurti, perhaps the most popular politician in the country, had not taken a clear shape yet. A coherent opposition or a charismatic leader who might have been strong enough to challenge Thaçi did not exist at the time. Hence, the PDK won the elections again, acquiring 34 seats while the LDK collected 27, the Self-Determination Movement 14, the AAK 12, the AKR 8, and minority parties 25—of which the SLS was the largest with 8 seats. However, this election proved that there was nationalist unrest in the country, which threatened the strength of the governing PDK. Even though it was its first electoral competition, the Self-Determination Movement, which campaigned against corruption and demanded union with Albania,³⁹ gained many more votes than expected.

Part of the December 2010 elections had to be repeated during early 2011. On 9 and 23 January it was decided to hold a repeat of the vote in the municipalities of Mitrovice/Mitrovica, Skenderaj/Srbica, Glogovac/Drenas, and Dečan/Dečani, as well as in three polling stations in Malisheve/Mališevo and Lipjan/Lipljan. This was because the Central Election Commission had annulled some results due to irregularities and electoral manipulations, and the Supreme Court ruled that there were technical failures. More than 40% of the votes cast had to be recounted. However, the repeat elections, recounts, and delayed publication of results damaged the credibility of the process and the legitimacy of the results. The only promising aspect of the elections was the increased participation in these six Serb majority municipalities. But the general turnout was

³⁹ ICG, "Kosovo and Serbia: A little goodwill could go a long way," *Europe Report* (2 February 2012), No. 215, 4.

very low again—just above 45%—and almost all the Serbs in the three northern municipalities boycotted the elections.⁴⁰

The Current PDK-led Government and Politics in Kosovo

As the PDK emerged victorious over the LDK, Thaçi was named to form the government. However, he did not manage to do this until February 2011, three months after the elections. It was not easy to ensure a parliamentary majority; so he brought the AKR and several ethnic-minority parties, including the SLS into the coalition. The Assembly approved Thaçi as the prime minister on 22 February 2011 for a four-year mandate. The Speaker of the Assembly, the President of Kosovo, and the government were also elected. In the process of coalition-forming bargains, Thaçi had promised the leader of the AKR, Behgjet Pacolli, the position of president. However, the election of Pacolli as the president of Kosovo met with challenges from the opposition. Opposition parties boycotted the session and this caused Thaçi's government to be approved by only 65 MPs. Nevertheless, the SLS's leader, Slobodan Petrović, became the deputy prime minister and Minister of Local Government Administration,⁴¹ and his party acquired two more ministries while other minorities also acquired eight ministries; these were good omens for reconciliation.

Even though Thaçi came to power with promises to reduce government expenses, Kosovo's government has been criticized by the opposition as over-sized. In fact, it is the largest government in the entire Southeast European region, with six deputy prime ministers, 19 ministers, and about 30 deputy ministers supported by more than 120 advisers. This creates great pressure on the state budget. According to Shpend Ahmeti from the Self-Determination Movement, government expenses for rented offices in 2010 alone totaled €6.5 million, which was equal to the pensions of 14,444 Kosovo citizens. On the other hand, it is obvious that, not only in Kosovo but also throughout the Balkans, employment in the public sector

⁴⁰ United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011," 17; European Commission, "Kosovo 2011 Progress Report," SEC(2011), 1207 final, 6.

⁴¹ "Thaçi pledges Kosovo government will work for all" (23 February 2011), at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-s-government-cabinet-approved> (accessed on 10 December 2010).

is evaluated as a kind of social security measure, and considering the high unemployment rates, it will be hard to change this in the near future.⁴² The current legislative mandate is due to end in 2014, but there is an agreement between Thaçi, Mustafa, and Pacolli to hold the general elections in 2013 under a new electoral system.⁴³

The Election of the President of Kosovo and the Constitutional Crisis

The Republic of Kosovo is defined under its constitution as a “multi-party parliamentary representative democratic republic.” However, the president has the power to return draft legislation to the Assembly for reconsideration, and has a role in foreign affairs and certain official appointments as well. Being the head of the state, s/he is elected by a two-thirds majority of members of the Assembly for a five-year mandate.

The second presidential election in Kosovo was held on 7 April 2011. As a result of the several rounds of bargaining led by US Ambassador to Kosovo Christopher Dell between the ruling PDK, its coalition partner AKR, and the main opposition party LDK, Atifete Jahjaga was chosen as an interim compromise candidate, until parliament could reach an agreement on direct popular elections for the presidency. In the 120-seat Kosovo Assembly, she gained 80 votes in the first round with no votes opposed, and that was exactly the two-thirds majority required. Another candidate for presidency who took the second highest vote ratio was also a woman.

Jahjaga is the first female, the first non-partisan, and the youngest president ever elected in Kosovo. She served as deputy director of the Kosovo Police before being elected president, holding the rank of major general, which is the highest rank ever held by a woman in Southeastern

⁴² Macedonia has 19 ministers as well, but fewer deputy ministers. Montenegro has 16 ministers and Albania has 15. In comparison, Estonia—with a similarly sized population—has 11 ministers, while Finland has 12. “Critics target size of Kosovo government” (23 June 2012), at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/06/23/feature-01 (accessed on 13 November 2012).

⁴³ “Minority MPs ask for reserved seats in Kosovo assembly” (25 December 2012), at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/10/25/feature-02 (accessed on 20 December 2012).

Europe. She graduated from the University of Prishtina (Faculty of Law) and she also received extensive professional training at the FBI National Academy in the United States. Her photographs with US President George W. Bush during his visit to the FBI National Academy, and with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her subsequent visit to Kosovo, were among the few distributed through the internet before she was placed in the national spotlight as a presidential candidate. However, before her candidacy, both the public and political leaders were unaware of her political leanings. In her first speech to parliament, she said that the ideal of the whole of Kosovo was membership in the European Union and a permanent friendship with the United States. She said she believed and was convinced that their dreams would come true.⁴⁴ Media reports have stressed that neither she nor her husband own real estate, as they have been renting a modest apartment in Prishtina. This strengthens the trust and sympathy toward her among the Kosovars.

The question whether Jahjaga will be able to serve for a full five years is still in dispute. Even though the parties agreed to adopt constitutional and electoral reforms that would allow the president to be elected by a direct vote, enact the reforms within nine months, and hold the presidential elections six months later; in its July 2012 judgment, the Constitutional Court confirmed the full length of the mandate of Jahjaga.⁴⁵ The disagreement between the parties about Jahjaga's mandate caused the LDK to withdraw from the parliamentary committees just before the end of the country's supervised independence was announced. The party's withdrawal from ad hoc parliamentary committees has not sparked a political crisis so far, but it could still do so. Accordingly, in an effort to calm a potentially divisive political situation, Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuci has been urging the LDK to return to the committees. However, Haki Demolli (LDK) replied that the members of his party will not be part of the commission unless the previously negotiated agreement on the presidency was respected.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Website of the Presidency of Kosovo, at <http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=2,6,1686>; <http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=2,92> (accessed on 28 December 2012).

⁴⁵ "Kosovo elects new president" (7 April 2011), at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-elects-new-president> (accessed on 4 January 2013).

⁴⁶ "Government asks Kosovo opposition party to return to committees" (5 September 2012), at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/09/05/feature-01 (accessed on 10 November 2012).

Before Jahjaga's election, Kosovo faced a serious constitutional crisis on 22 February 2012, related to the election of Pacolli as president. On 28 March, following a request by the opposition parties, Kosovo's Constitutional Court ruled that the vote which had led to Pacolli becoming president was unconstitutional because no candidate had stood against him, two-thirds of the MPs had not been present for the vote, and there had been an illegal break held before the third round. If he had not been elected in the third round, then a fresh election would have had to have been called. That was the reason why Thaçi asked for a break even though he was warned about the illegality of this and finally managed to convince more MPs to vote for Pacolli. However, Pacolli had already said he would respect the authority of the Court and resign if the Court decided that he should do so.⁴⁷ Thus, he withdrew his candidacy for the revote during the talks, thereby heading off a new political crisis.

Actually, Pacolli's initial statements after his election were quite promising. However, in spite of his tolerant statements and the support of the US Ambassador, Pacolli's election as president had aroused some concerns. He was a rather ambivalent figure and his extraordinary wealth aroused suspicion among Kosovars. Besides, news about the inquest, which had been opened against him at the end of the 1990s by the Swiss authorities concerning "Russiangate,"⁴⁸ tarnished his image even though he was completely exonerated in 2002. Furthermore, his close business ties with Russia had given his opponents a pretext to present him as "the Trojan Horse of the Serbian ally Russia."⁴⁹ His business past also raised concerns among those who had defended the proposition that Kosovo needed a new political culture which separated politics from business and corruption.

Apart from the Pacolli case, the EU's latest reports have recommended that the presidency actively carry out its constitutional duties and oppose

⁴⁷ For instance, he asked his compatriots to forget the past and the resentment nurtured toward the Serbs and accept multi-ethnicity. "Kosovo president 'will resign' if asked by court" (30 March 2011), at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/uncertainty-over-kosovo-president-s-future> (accessed on 4 January 2013).

⁴⁸ Laundering in Switzerland of money belonging to the family of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

⁴⁹ "Pacolli faces tough time as Kosovan [sic.] president" (22 February 2011), at http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/kosovo/Pacolli_faces_tough_time_as_Kosovan_president.html?cid=29560398 (accessed on 26 October 2012).

legislation not in harmony with European values and standards. The latest examples involved legislation related to the criminalization of defamation and the requirement for journalists to disclose their sources of information. This can be seen as evidence of a comparatively well-working separation of powers in Kosovo today.⁵⁰

The Structure of the Assembly of Kosovo

Kosovo may be considered a parliamentary democracy and the Assembly of Kosovo is the primary legislative institution in the country. Its members are directly elected for a four year mandate on the basis of proportional representation. The Assembly is unicameral and there is a 5% threshold for non-minority parties only. Parliament has the power to remove the government by a vote of no confidence. As envisaged in the Ahtisaari Plan, the Assembly of Kosovo has 120 seats, of which 20 seats are reserved for the political parties of ethnic minorities; 10 of these are reserved for Serbs. Thanks to these guarantees, Serb representatives were able to enter the Assembly, even though the majority of the Serbs boycotted the elections. In the aforementioned elections, the SLS of Slobodan Petrović and the Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija, led by Slaviša Petković, had led five Serb parties which entered the parliament. They also formed two caucuses, including Bosniak and Gorani representation.⁵¹ Guarantees ensured that the formation of governments or coalitions by the Albanian parties would be seriously affected by minority MPs' preferences. Accordingly, governments also have to appoint ministers from ethnic minorities or obtain the assent of minority caucuses, giving the latter a veto-like power.⁵² Ethnic minority consent is needed for the amendments to the constitution and changes on some critical laws as well.⁵³ In addition, critical institutions including the constitutional and supreme courts have quotas guaranteeing minority participation. However, most scholars fail to

⁵⁰ European Commission, "Commission Communication on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo," SWD(2012) 339 final/2, 6.

⁵¹ ICG, "Serb integration..." 7.

⁵² See: Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 96, Paragraphs 3 and 4.

⁵³ See: Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 81.

notice that some of the Ahtisaari Plan's measures are temporary. It guarantees these 20 seats for minorities only for two elections after independence. Since two elections have already been held, the minorities' seats will not be guaranteed any longer in future elections. This is a big issue and ethnic minority parties are working hard to convince the Albanian MPs to assent to a permanent renewal of these guarantees. However, reflecting the general view, Lirije Kajtazi, a representative of the LDK, opposed this idea, stating that the phase of democratic transition was successfully accomplished and in normal democratic circumstances there was no need for reserved seats.⁵⁴

At the time of writing this chapter, the Kosovar Assembly included 13 Serb deputies, representing three different political parties. This number is the largest since the Povtarak⁵⁵ (Return) coalition was built in 2001. The eight MPs from the SLS are part of the governing coalition, which could collapse without that party's support. However, taking into consideration this sensitive situation, Serb deputies rarely take part in sensitive debates and keep a low profile, trying not to arouse negative feelings on the part of their Albanian counterparts. The other 12 minority deputies represent local Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians.⁵⁶ Moreover, two of the five deputies of the Assembly's Speaker are also from non-Albanian minorities.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ "Minority MPs ask for reserved seats in Kosovo assembly" (25 December 2012), at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/10/25/feature-02 (accessed on 10 January 2013).

⁵⁵ Twenty seats then reserved for the Serbs were filled. ICG, "Setting Kosovo...", 4.

⁵⁶ There are between 35,000 and 40,000 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians living in Kosovo, and an estimated 100,000 living abroad. Most of them live in five municipalities in southwestern Kosovo: Pejë/Peć, Deçan/Dečani, Gjakovë/Djakovica, Prizren, and Dragash/Dragaš. They are considered by some observers to be members of one and the same ethnic group. They tend to speak Romany and Albanian, as well as one or other languages of the region. In the 1990s, the Egyptians—apparently not related to the Egyptians of Egypt—set up NGOs in Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, and Serbia. For relevant information see Fred Cocozzelli, "Small Minorities in a Divided Polity: Turks, Bosniaks, Muslim Slavs and Roms, Ashkalis and Egyptians in Post-conflict Kosovo," *Ethnopolitics* 7 (2008), nos. 2–3: 287–306; and Nando Sigona, "Between Competing Imaginaries of Statehood: Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) Leadership in Newly Independent Kosovo," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (2012), no. 8: 1213–1232.

⁵⁷ ICG, "Setting Kosovo...", 5; European Commission, "Feasibility Study," 14; "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011," 18.

The latest EU reports conclude that Kosovo's Assembly has been strengthening its capacities and has become more able to supervise the executive branch of government than was the case earlier.⁵⁸ The Constitutional Court declared in September 2011 that MPs have only functional immunity, meaning that, excluding their responsibilities and duties related to being members of parliament, they have no more rights or protection than any other ordinary citizens before the law. This prevents MPs from hiding behind the shield of immunity in their private affairs. Considering this, the Kosovar Assembly is ahead of the parliaments of many other countries where MPs can abuse their powers relying on their almost unlimited immunity.

The End of the International Supervision of Kosovo

Beginning in 1999, the supervising institutions' right to intervene substantially narrowed the authority and autonomy of Kosovar political actors. However, during the planned process of the gradual devolution of powers, domestic and international politics have been shaped by different party coalitions with different views which have nonetheless exchanged their views peacefully. This suggests that Kosovo may be on the road to democratic stability.⁵⁹

As the time for the end of supervision drew near, the Assembly of Kosovo formed a Commission for Constitutional Amendments in order to execute the transfer of power from the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo (ICR) to the Kosovar institutions. After the amendments which provided the framework for the official end of supervision were finalized, the government asked the Constitutional Court if these amendments would undermine any of the fundamental rights or freedoms formerly guaranteed within the constitution. The Court ruled that only one of the 22 laws in question, which dealt with the return of the refugees,⁶⁰ could not be reconciled with the spirit of the constitution.

⁵⁸ European Commission, "Feasibility Study," 5.

⁵⁹ Jens Narten, "Assessing Kosovo's postwar democratization: Between external imposition and local self-government," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5 (2009), no.1: 130.

⁶⁰ Article 156 (Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons).

Some of the important articles referring to the Ahtisaari plan were removed through the constitutional amendments. Even the article which asserted that the plan was superior to Kosovo's Constitution and laws had been in dispute.⁶¹ Another important article requiring that Kosovo "promote and facilitate the safe and dignified return of refugees and displaced persons and assist them in recovering their property" was to be removed by the government, but the Constitutional Court blocked the attempt.⁶² However, the government's intention to dump this article sent a dangerous and disappointing signal to the international community and the Serbs. The Court accepted the remaining amendments on 15 May 2012. On 31 August 2012, the Assembly adopted the resolution calling for an end to internationally supervised independence by the end of 2012. Nonetheless, the same body voted 97 to 11 on 7 September 2012 to amend the constitution and extend the mandate of EULEX through June 2014. Kosovar Serb, Turkish, Bosniak, and Roma deputies all voted in favor of these amendments but they were not supported by the MPs of the Self-Determination Movement, which claimed that, instead of ending, international supervision was expanding. The Kosovar government also adopted an exchange of letters between Jahjaga and EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Catherine Ashton in the form of the first bilateral agreement between the EU and Kosovo.⁶³

After the International Steering Group (ISG) determined on 2 July 2012 that Kosovo had substantially implemented the terms of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal and adopted the necessary constitutional and legal framework, Pieter Feith, the highest international representative in Kosovo, stated that the ISG had decided to end the period of Kosovo's supervised independence. Officially, the supervision period and mandate of the ICR ended on 10 September 2012.⁶⁴ As Prime Minister

⁶¹ Chapter XIII, Final Provisions, Article 143. For the discussion on the question, "whether the possibility exists for a constitution to stand as the highest legal act and also subordinate itself to another act with legal significance?" see: Dren Doli and Fisnik Korenica, "What about Kosovo's constitution? Is there anything special?" *Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law* 5 (2011): 49–70.

⁶² Constitutional Court case KO38/12 (15 May 2012).


⁶³ "Kosovo to extend EU Law Mission's mandate" (4 September 2012), at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-parliament-to-extend-eulex-s-mandate> (accessed on 28 December 2012).

⁶⁴ Website of ICO, at <http://www.ico-kos.org/?id=61>.

Thaçi hailed it as “a very special and historic day,”⁶⁵ US President Barack Obama called it a “historic milestone” for Kosovo.⁶⁶

The government of Kosovo hopes that the new amendments to the constitution will pave the way for membership in NATO and the EU. However, as Thaçi recognizes, “full independence also means full responsibility.”⁶⁷ There will no longer be a UNMIK or SRSG to blame for failures, and the government will be judged on the basis of its own performance. Indeed, polls conducted by the United Nations Development Programme in 2010 showed that the overwhelming majority of respondents (93%) believed that the government was most responsible for the economic situation, while the number of respondents holding UNMIK most responsible had decreased to just 7%.⁶⁸ It is the same for the political situation (see Figure 7.1). According to the January 2010 poll results, only 9% of respon-

Figure 7.1. Trend of respondents holding the government of Kosovo or UNMIK responsible for Kosovo’s political situation. UNDP, Early Warning Report, no. 28, (April–June 2010, p.13)



⁶⁵ “Kosovo to extend EU Law Mission’s Mandate” (4 September 2012), at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-parliament-to-extend-eulex-s-mandate>. (accessed on 28 December 2012).

⁶⁶ Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić stressed Belgrade would never recognize Kosovo’s independence “supervised or unsupervised,” and dismissed the decision as meaningless. “Kosovo declared ‘fully independent’” (10 September 2012), at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19550809> (accessed on 29 October 2012).

⁶⁷ “Kosovo finalizes amendments for supervision end” (2 September 2012), at <http://www.eurasiareview.com/02092012-kosovo-finalises-amendments-for-supervision-end/> (accessed on 8 November 2012).

⁶⁸ UNDP, “Early Warning Report No. 28” (April–June 2010), 19.

dents held UNMIK responsible for the political situation at that time, while around 69% assigned this responsibility to the government and the political parties.⁶⁹ However, even though the responsibilities of the Kosovar government have increased, the EU Office in Kosovo, with the US Embassy's support, is expected to continue to monitor or aid implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. It should also be noted that this international presence is seen as a guarantee by local Serbs who still do not want to be left alone to deal with the Kosovar Albanian institutions. Hence, the eventual future of this international presence can only be changed with a new United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution nullifying no. 1244.

The Main Challenges to Kosovar Political Life

Kosovo's leading politicians had expected that the achievement of independence, even with a limited sovereignty, would have "magical" effects that would result in great improvements, especially in the economic sphere; in other words, they nurtured unrealistic and exaggerated expectations. However, since the major problems in Kosovo are structural and could only be fixed in the mid- and long-term, expectations were not met and people have become deeply disappointed. As of 2012, Kosovo continued to be dependent on foreign aid (as the biggest recipient of EU aid in the world) and faced serious budget and trade deficits and unemployment.

Independence is, obviously, no longer the biggest issue for Kosovar Albanians. However, the vast majority in Kosovo sees it as an irreversible fact. In fact, the paramount problem is the lack of economic development.⁷⁰ However, putting the economy aside, the most important political issues in Kosovo today are corruption, democratization, the weak civil society, the rule of law, the status of Northern Kosovo, the integration of Serbs, international recognition, and the reform of the security sector. Success in fighting these tough problems is important not only for creating stability in the country but also for ensuring the continuation of the international community's vital economic and political support.

⁶⁹ UNDP, "Early Warning Report No. 27" (October–December 2009), 13.

⁷⁰ For the Albanians and other ethnicities, the main reasons for their anxiety are economic, while for Serbs it is both safety and the economic situation. UNDP, No. 28, 14, 17, 20.

Corruption as an Acute Disease of the Kosovar Political System

Pervasive corruption and the close relations between politicians and the leading figures of organized crime are two of the major obstacles impeding Kosovo's improvement of the political, economic and social situation. Two former UNMIK officials have published a book in which they have characterized the situation in Kosovo as "Al Capone-like."⁷¹

Corruption undermines the proper functioning of Kosovar institutions and has economic consequences as well. The auditor general's 2008 report states there are inexplicable annual monetary losses in the state's budget of from €0.5 to €5 million *per ministry*.⁷² Moreover, the Directorate of Organized Crime's (DOC's) estimate is that, the "daily" turn-over of organized crime in Kosovo amounts to around €1.5 million, which represents around one-quarter of Kosovo's Gross Social Product, when calculated on a yearly base.⁷³ Organized crime continues to be the most profitable branch of the economy, with the Albanian mafia maintaining control of drug smuggling routes through the Balkans leading to Europe.⁷⁴

Since effective control mechanisms could not be formed, the degree of vertical and horizontal accountability for elected or appointed officials is still low in Kosovo. On the contrary, ties along affiliations of party, family and clan⁷⁵ prove stronger than, and have largely replaced, the Weberian ideal type of a rational-legal bureaucracy, free of patrimony and corruption. Effective local accountability was upheld only when UN-led oversight bodies threatened local institutions with sanctions or the withdrawal of

⁷¹ In fact, these problems threaten not only Kosovo but also the entire Balkan Peninsula. Ian King and Whit Mason, *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 23.

⁷² European Commission, "Progress Report 2008," 15.

⁷³ "Operationalisierung von Security Sector Reform (SSR) auf dem Westlichen Balkan—intelligente/kreative Ansätze für eine langfristig positive Gestaltung dieser Region," 53, at <http://balkanforum.org/IEP-BND/iep0001.PDF> (accessed on 19 November 2012).

⁷⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "2008 World Drug Report"; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "2012 World Drug Report."

⁷⁵ In Montanaro's words, "[t]hese clans promote the material, social and political interests of their members. But their concern for public goods, national development and welfare is very limited." Lucia Montanaro, "The Kosovo state building conundrum: Addressing fragility in a contested state," FRIDE International Alert Working Paper No. 91 (October 2009), 8.

competences and licenses. Another problem was that UNMIK and EU staff members were not very good examples themselves. Cases of UN internal investigations of professional misconduct, up to such high positions as the SRSG, were conducted.⁷⁶

The pursuit of a zero tolerance policy against corruption is a key priority in the European Partnership for Kosovo. Accordingly, Prime Minister Thaçi declared that the members of government had committed themselves to the motto, "zero tolerance on corruption and organized crime."⁷⁷ However, the PDK continues to be accused of corruption. To give a recent example, Deputy Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi and ten other officials were charged with corruption by the EULEX prosecutor on 6 July 2012. Bukoshi was accused of having abused his authority, dereliction in the performance of his duties, tax evasion, and the concealment of evidence against him while serving as health minister in 2010. Ironically, accusations even reached to the head of the Anti-Corruption task force, Nazmi Mustafa,⁷⁸ and he was arrested in 2012 on corruption charges. In addition, Dino Asanaj, as the head of Kosovo's Agency of Privatization, was fatally stabbed in 2012 while he was under criminal investigation for seeking bribes. Since autopsy reports showed that he had 11 knife wounds, the government's ruling that the death was a suicide has been dismissed as ridiculous.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ One of the most politically sensitive and high-profile investigations was done by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) against SRSG Joachim Rucker, his deputy, and the head of the legal department in 2007 (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2008/kosovo>; accessed on 25 November 2012). UN reports showed that: peacekeeping forces brought with them a demand for commercial sexual services, which was satisfied by organized crime using victims of human trafficking. As the number of peacekeepers increased in the 1990s, so the number of females trafficked to the region jumped. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Crime and its impact on the Balkans" (March 2008), 52.

⁷⁷ "Kosovo government beset by corruption" (17 July 2012), at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/07/17/feature-01 (accessed on 9 December 2012).

⁷⁸ Mustafa was appointed by Thaci in 2010 to direct Kosovo's anti-corruption efforts. "Kosovo judges, lawyers accused of corruption" (2 July 2012), at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/08/02/feature-01 (accessed on 20 December 2012).

⁷⁹ The public's skepticism in spite of the official autopsy report is a sign of distrust in the Kosovar community towards the politics and officials. "Around the bloc: Kosovo privatization chief killed, Georgian tycoon rejects court fine," *Transitions Online* (18 June 2012), 1.

The latest amendments to the constitution affect the appointment of senior officials in Kosovo and the transfer of authority from the international civilian representatives to Kosovar Institutions. This may mean that civil and public servants will be more vulnerable to local political interference, corruption and nepotism. As a matter of fact, the PDK has been accused of heavily influencing and intervening in the appointments of important public sector officials, and favoring its own supporters. Particularly in 2008, during the PDK-led government, interference in high level appointments was a great issue of concern.⁸⁰ The cycle of Taçi handpicking loyal figures to take up key positions, and the internationals refusing his choices, repeated itself throughout 2008, causing delays in appointments to a number of important deputy minister posts.⁸¹ However, in the most recent case, leading figures in the LDK accused PDK leaders of exerting pressure even on the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo in its hiring practices.⁸²

At one point, Prime Minister Taçi was suspected of involvement in organ trafficking. However, after investigating the matter, the European Union concluded that there was no evidence against Taçi and cleared him of all charges.⁸³ In an unrelated matter, seven persons were put on trial for involvement in illegal organ transplants. The trial ended in April 2013, with the conviction of five of the accused and the acquittal of two of the defendants.⁸⁴ None of these were government personnel.

Since the legal system in Kosovo is strongly linked to politics, judicial corruption arose as another important problem. The political elites have shown a tendency to use their authority and position to promote nepo-

⁸⁰ European Commission, "2009 Progress Report," 8.

⁸¹ Haug, "The political landscape," 59–60.

⁸² In May 2009, the president of the LDK's Women's Forum, Melihate Termkolli, declared that "the then government not only failed to fight crime but also in certain cases encouraged it," at <http://www.unmikonline.org/Headlines/Headlines%20-04.05.2009.doc> (accessed on 2 January 2013); "LDK: The request of the PDK is absurd" (29 October 2012), at <http://kosovapress.com/?cid=2,86,154924> (accessed on 20 December 2012).

⁸³ *EuReporter* (29 July 2014), at <http://www.eureporter.co/magazine/2014/07/29/opinion-council-of-europe-should-apologise-for-smearing-kosovo-prime-minister-hashim-thaci-after-eu-report-clears-him-of-organ-trafficking/> [accessed on 4 November 2014].

⁸⁴ *New York Times* (29 April 2013), at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/world/europe/in-kosovo-5-are-convicted-in-organ-trafficking.html?_r=0 [accessed on 4 November 2014].

tism and clientelism by filling public slots, including the judiciary, with relatives, members of the ruling party, and family members of KLA war veterans.⁸⁵ Even though allegations of political interference in the selection, appointment and dismissals of persons in key positions negatively affect the credibility of the government, they sometimes prevail. Accordingly, prosecutors are forced to poke their political “noses” into the selection of cases and have motivations to choose to ignore a case if it has strong political connections. Moreover, the very low salaries paid to judges and prosecutors cause them to have a low status in society and to be more open to pressures from the strong or wealthy. On 31 July 2012, EULEX indicted eight judges and a lawyer on corruption charges.⁸⁶

In addition to high-ranking government officials, corruption charges have been filed against low-ranking municipality staff as well. However, if evaluated in a positive way, even though the high number of corruption charges and cases show that corruption continues, it also shows that there is a struggle against it. Even though legal charges brought against high-ranking politicians reveal corruption starting from the highest levels, they also show that there is a certain level of rule of law that upholds the prospect of bringing even the highest authorities to justice.

Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, it is also true that Kosovo has taken important measures to fight against corruption by extending and strengthening its legal framework to include issues concerning the financing of political parties. At least theoretically, the current legal framework seems strong enough to bring tangible results.⁸⁷ The Independent Anti-Corruption Agency works well and it has the authority and duty to deal with cases of individual complaints and has the obligation to notify the relevant authorities. Furthermore, the president of Kosovo created the National Anti-Corruption Council in February 2012 with the aim of improving coordination and awareness among institutions responsible for the fight against corruption. An increase in the salaries of judges and the

⁸⁵ Narten, “Assessing Kosovo’s postwar democratization,” 134.

⁸⁶ “Kosovo judges, lawyers accused of corruption” (2 August 2012), at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/08/02/feature-01 (accessed on 10 November 2012).

⁸⁷ EU says, in general, that Kosovo has sufficient elements of the legal framework in place as well as the relevant institutions. However, the EU has asked the government of Kosovo to develop a new anti-corruption strategy. European Commission, “Feasibility...,” 10.

completion of the regulated reappointment process are some other positive steps encouraging the prevention of corruption in the judiciary. The campaign on the declaration of assets, beginning in 2011, has increased the rate of official declarations by up to 96%, and the results have been posted online.⁸⁸ However, high-level political support is vital in the fight against corruption, and, in reality, the level of this support will determine the success.

Conclusion

Since the declaration of independence in February 2008, political leaders of Kosovo have been acting as rational actors, calculating the costs and benefits of their political decisions and doing their best to balance their self-interests with the demands of the international community and Kosovar public. However, mounting pressures from the international community on reconciliation with Serbia and decentralization, together with the rise of the Self-Determination Movement, which reflects the increasing nationalist unrest in Kosovo, make it harder for Kosovar governments to balance the demands from outside and inside.

Kosovo's problems in its political system that stem from much older times have still not been solved. However, it is also true that Kosovo is quite different from what it was before 1998. For now, ideologies of the Kosovar political parties are not clear. Nevertheless, since independence has already been declared, and as of today, 101⁸⁹ UN member states have recognized Kosovo; the recognition issue by itself is not at the top of the Kosovar public's agenda any more. As the international issues of Kosovo are solved one by one, the trauma of war is recovered and normalization of the country is realized; so the public's attention will shift more to ideological arguments and electors' preference will be influenced more by political parties' ideological distinctions. Therefore, in the short- and medium-term, it is likely that Kosovo's political parties will increasingly differentiate themselves ideologically and in terms of the policies they advocate.

⁸⁸ European Commission, "Commission communication on a Feasibility Study," 10; European Commission, "Kosovo 2011 Progress Report," 13.

⁸⁹ <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com> (accessed on 28 June 2013)

CHAPTER 8

The Serbs of Kosovo

FLORIAN BIEBER

No single community has had such significance in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and yet found itself as marginalized and instrumentalized as the Serbs of Kosovo. Today Serbs in Kosovo live in isolated communities and with uneasiness over Kosovo's independence. Kosovo Serbs are deeply divided between those living in settlements in central and south-eastern Kosovo that are increasingly integrating into Kosovo institutions—but less so into society—and around a third of Serbs in four northern municipalities geographically contiguous to Serbia with few ties to the rest of Kosovo.

The nationalist grievances that Serbs in Kosovo articulated were the ground on which Serbian nationalism in the 1980s grew and culminated in the mass mobilization at the end of the decade that Slobodan Milošević utilized for his rise to power. Later, the community became increasingly marginalized in an authoritarian and centralized Serbia. The repression of Albanians by the Serbian state was in part supported by Serbs in Kosovo and also benefited the community, even though only temporarily. The exclusion of Albanians from the state reversed the balance of power in Kosovo, but also aggravated the division between the much larger Albanian and the Serb community and consolidated the Albanian demand for an independent Kosovo. While Serbs were also victims of the escalating violence between the attacks of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the heavy handed response of the Serbian and Yugoslav security forces in 1998–99, the brunt of the violence was experienced by Albanians at the

hands of the Serbian and Yugoslav state. Once the state withdrew at the end of NATO intervention in June 1999, Serbs became the victims of mass violence and retribution. While most Serbs remained in Kosovo, the community became rural and fragmented in small enclaves, living on subsistence farming and supported by Serbian state institutions. Limited movement in the first post-war years enhanced the sense of isolation of the community that also lost much of its intellectual elite and struggled to formulate its own concerns as both Serbian and Kosovar institutions sought to utilize the community for their own position in the dispute over status. Serbs in Kosovo are marked as a politically marginal community both in Kosovo and in Serbia that experienced the shock of double status reversal: moving from a dominant group during the 1990s through the support of the apartheid-style policies of Milošević in Kosovo to becoming excluded from public life in Kosovo and from being a pillar of the Milošević system to being supported yet also increasingly peripheral to concerns in Serbia. The isolation of this now largely rural group meant that the importance of the concept of community increased, while abstract values such as rule of law, equality, and civic virtues rang hollow, especially in the first years after 1999 when the international administration promoted a discourse of multiculturalism and liberalism, while being unable to provide for adequate protection and security for the Serbs of Kosovo.

Historical Trends

The historical significance of Kosovo for Serb national identity has been a source of myth-making and supposed historical facts have been used extensively by Serbian and Albanian nationalist intellectuals to justify claims to the land. Historical facts have been subjected to contemporary claims. In particular the myth of the Kosovo Battle in 1389 became a salient *leitmotiv* of Serbian nationalism since the nineteenth century (and especially in the course of World War II) and gave Kosovo a greater significance than the territory had in terms of Serb population.¹ Kosovo in its current shape emerged only after 1945 and some smaller territorial changes took

¹ Florian Bieber, "Nationalist mobilization and stories of serb suffering: The Kosovo myth from 600th anniversary to the present," *Rethinking History* 6 (2002), no. 1: 95–110.

place along the border with Kosovo and Serbia in the late 1940s and 1950s. The region of Kosovo has been Serb and Albanian populated in recent centuries whereas the size and distribution of the two communities has been a major source of controversy. Especially with the advent of nationalism first among Serbs and later among Albanians, relations have not been easy. The fact that differences were marked by religious, linguistic and ethnic differences hardened the divide. British journalist Tim Judah sarcastically remarked once that "[i]t would be a joy to write about Kosovo's golden age: the years of mutual tolerance and respect, the long years of peace and happiness. The problem is, they have not happened yet."²

Tensions between Albanians and Serbs emerged in the late nineteenth century as the Serbian state began extending into territories inhabited by Albanians. In 1878 Serbia gained control of the regions Toplica and Komanica adjacent to Kosovo, and expelled the significant Albanian population which mostly re-settled in Kosovo and fueled tensions between Serbs and Albanians. As Đorđe Stefanović notes "[f]rom that point onward, both ethnic groups had recent experiences of massive victimization that could be used to justify 'revenge' attacks. Furthermore, Muslim Albanians had every reason to resist the incorporation into the Serbian state."³ During the subsequent decades, Serbs in Kosovo came under threat from the Ottoman state and the Albanian community that in turn felt threatened by Serbian claims to Kosovo. These developments can be described as the beginning of a century of difficult Serb-Albanian relations where different periods were characterized mostly by the domination of one community, perceived by the other as a clear threat and repression. When Kosovo came briefly under Serbian control during the first Balkan war and then under Yugoslav authority in 1918, the Serb population dominated the region. This was briefly interrupted during World War II when most of Kosovo (except for the North) became part of an Italian administered greater Albanian state. After the war, Kosovo was established as an autonomous region and in 1963 it became a province with greater competences. In the first post-war decades Kosovo was dominated by Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs were disproportion-

² Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CN and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 11.

³ Đorđe Stefanović, "Seeing the Albanians through Serbian eyes: The inventors of the tradition of intolerance and their critics, 1804–1939," *European History Quarterly* 35 (2005), no. 3: 465–92, here 470.

ally represented in Kosovo's institutions.⁴ There is no space to discuss Serb–Albanian relations in this chapter, but it is important to note that inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo have been considerably worse than elsewhere in Yugoslavia, shaped by experiences of domination.⁵ This logic is well exemplified by the following description of the status of Serbs in Kosovo from a Serbian perspective: “A continual struggle for survival under long centuries of decaying Ottoman rule, Fascist Italian and Nazi German occupation, and the preservation of both life and identity, is encoded in the individual and collective unconscious [of Kosovo Serbs] as an archaic legacy.”⁶ This perception of victimhood and external threats has become a defining feature of Serb nationalist discourse (and Albanian) and strongly shaped Serb–Albanian relations.⁷ With this in mind, one needs to be careful not to essentialize Serb–Albanian relations as a being only conflictual, as there are examples of cooperation and hybrid identities. For example, Serbs and Albanians have gone on pilgrimages to each other's religious shrines and in Prizren, Turkish was widely used by Albanians and Serbs as a language of communication. However, such practices declined as interethnic relations became further polarized in the 1980s.⁸

Changing Balance of Power

The balance of power began to shift away from Serbs in Kosovo in the early 1970s. Until then, Serbs had a dominant position in the province and Serbia exercised considerable influence over Kosovo. This dominance had begun tilting towards the Albanian majority as Kosovo's autonomy was broadened within the framework of the constitutional reforms of the late 1960s and 1970s and the repressive and anti-Albanian policies of the first post war decades came to an end with the removal of Aleksandar Ranković

⁴ See Srdja Popović, Dejan Janča, and Tanja Petovar, *Kosovski čvor. Drešiti ili seći?* (Belgrade: Hronos, 1990), 18–9.

⁵ The best overview of Kosovo's history is Oliver Schmitt, *Kosovo: Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008).

⁶ Valentina Pitulić, “Folklore in the Serb enclave,” in *Kosovo and Metohija: Living in an Enclave*, ed. Dušan Bataković (Belgrade: SANU, 2007), 131.

⁷ Helena Zdravković, *Politika žrtve na Kosovo* (Belgrade: Čigoja, 2005), 149–232.

⁸ Petrit Imami, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove* (Belgrade: B92, 1998), 208–12; Ger Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 2000), 71–6.

from power in 1966. At the same time, more Albanians had joined the League of Communists and achieved high office in the province and party. Ethnic quotas favored Albanians who had been underrepresented in the public administration and the police in particular. In addition, policies that required employees to be bi-lingual favored Albanians over Serbs who often did not learn Albanian.⁹ Despite this shift, Serbs remained on average in a better position than Albanians. For example, in 1984 Serbs constituted 26% of the employed inhabitants, but only 13% of the population.¹⁰

In parallel to the changing power-relations, the Serb population's share had declined significantly during the socialist period—a source of major controversies in the 1980s. In 1948, Serbs accounted for nearly a quarter of the population, a share that only began to drop in 1971 and once more declined to 13.2% in 1981. The drop was larger in percentages rather than in absolute numbers as the Serb population grew until 1971 and declined by only 20,000 between 1971 and 1981 and another 15,000 in the following decade. In part this drop can be explained by the emigration of around 100,000 Serbs between 1946 and 1981, mostly to central Serbia.¹¹ While Albanians also emigrated, often to the northern republics and the West, the proportion among Serbs was greater. Nevertheless, the population dynamic suggests that the decline in the Serb population was not primarily due to the highly publicized emigration of Serbs, but rather due to the increasing discrepancy of the average birth-rate among Serbs and Albanians. With modernization and changing social structures, the birth rate in Serbia and among Kosovo Serbs declined significantly in the post-war period, while it declined later and less among Albanians. Still in 1981 there was a significant discrepancy between the average birth rate in Serbia (1.9) and among Serbs in Kosovo (3.4), suggesting that there was a social-economic rather than ethnic basis for differences in birthrates.¹²

⁹ Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 179–80; and Imami, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove*, 176.

¹⁰ Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko Pitanje* (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 137.

¹¹ Srdjan Bogosavljević, "A statistical picture of Serbian-Albanian relations," in *Conflict or Dialogue: Serbian-Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkan Countries*, eds. Dušan Janjić and Shkelzen Maliqi (Subotica: Open University, 1994), 23. According to Imami, between 1946 and 1990 some 151,736 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo. Imami, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove*, 174–5.

¹² Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, and Robert Pichler, *Kosovo–Kosova. Mythen, Daten Fakten* (Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 1999), 151. See also Imami, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove*, 171–2.

Table 8.1. Serb population in Kosovo, 1948–2011.¹³

	In numbers	In %
1948	171,911	23.62
1953	189,869	23.49
1961	227,016	23.55
1971	228,261	18.35
1981	209,497	13.20
1991 ¹⁴	195,301	10.00
2004 (est.)	139,417	6.00
2011 ¹⁵	25,532	1.47

Both the birth rate and the emigration of Serbs have been sources of controversy in the 1980s as both were interpreted in Serbia as evidence of Albanian plans to dominate Kosovo.¹⁶ There is no evidence that birth-rates have anything to do with nationalist policies of one community and thus the debate about birth rates came to be a reflection of Serbian nationalist fears rather than real demographic dynamics.¹⁷ The controversies over demographics also betrayed the deep distrust between the two communities. The high level of ethnic distance, greater than elsewhere in socialist Yugoslavia, has been confirmed by sociological research in Yugoslavia and Serbia since the 1980s.¹⁸

¹³ All results from 1948–91 are taken from Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Popis 1991* (Belgrade, 1998, CD-Rom).

¹⁴ In 1991 no full census was carried out, as most Albanians boycotted the census.

¹⁵ This number is lower than the real number, as the census was not held in the four northern Serb-populated municipalities and many Serbs in the south also did not participate.

¹⁶ See also Momčilo Pavlović, "Kosovo under autonomy, 1974–1990," in *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies*, eds. Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009), 62–5.

¹⁷ See for example Branislav Krstić, *Kosovo između istorijskog i etničkog prava* (Belgrade: Kuća Vid, 1994), who argues for a partition of Kosovo to avoid Albanian domination of Serbia (he provided projections that Albanians would number over 4 million by 2051, p. 193).

¹⁸ Lela Milošević and Dragan Todorović, "Ethnic autostereotypes and heterostereotypes and ethnic distance in the Balkans," in *Globalization, Acculturation and Identities at the Balkans* (Niš: Punta, 2002), 79–90; Lazar Nikolić, "Ethnic prejudices and

The Political Mobilization of Kosovo Serbs

Kosovo Serbs began mobilizing as a political actor in the early 1980s. The petitions, protests and demonstrations of Kosovo Serbs that would culminate in the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" by 1988 were caused by the aforementioned shift in the power structure and the controversies over the declining population share of Serbs.

The cause of Serbs in Kosovo was championed by the Serb Orthodox Church from the early 1980s onwards. Already in 1981 Patriarch German met with the Yugoslav Prime Minister to draw his attention to the expulsion of Serbs and desecration of cemeteries.¹⁹ In a public appeal 21 priests also demanded better protection of Serbs in Kosovo. In the appeal the priests argued that "the Serbian people are in struggle since the Kosovo Battle of 1389 until today over the memory and to protect their own identity, to defend the meaning of one's existence against one's enemies. It is contradictory today, when one might believe the battle won, that Kosovo stops being ours and we stop being where we were. And all this without war, in times of peace and freedom!"²⁰ In subsequent years the Church press began regularly publishing reports about alleged threat against the Serbs of Kosovo. A fire in the seat of the patriarchate in Peć/Peja shortly before the student demonstrations in Prishtina in 1981 was interpreted by the Church as evidence of anti-Serb violence even though an official inquiry suggested a short circuit as a cause of the fire.²¹ The attention paid by the Church was soon matched by Serbian media and in particular sensationalist and tabloid publications reported regularly about threats against Serbs in Kosovo. The articles in the Belgrade press emphasized the threat emanating from Albanians against Serbs and that Albanians were seeking to pressure Serbs to leave the province. In retrospect and amidst

discrimination: The case of Kosovo," in *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, eds. Florian Bieber and Zhidas Daskalosvki (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 53–76; and Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Stated a War* (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 317–29.

¹⁹ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (31 July 1981).

²⁰ Quoted from Anne Yelen, *Kosovo 1389–1989* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1989), 133–4.

²¹ On this and other aspects of the churches role during this period, see Florian Bieber, *Nationalismus in Serbien vom Tode Titos bis zum Ende der Ära Milošević* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), 94–5.

the virulent media campaign at the time, it is difficult to ascertain the real scale of attacks against Serbs in Kosovo at the time. Without doubt violence and threats against Serbs were the work of radical nationalist Albanians. These real incidents²² became conflated with the argument that the higher birthrate among Albanians was part of a deliberate plan to dominate Kosovo and largely fictional stories of mass rapes of Serbian women by Albanian men.²³

In this context, organizations among Kosovo Serbs emerged that addressed Serbian and Yugoslav institutions with petitions. These petitions described Serbs in Kosovo as victims of “genocide” and urged Serbia and Yugoslavia to intervene. Soon, these petitions also elicited the support of Belgrade intellectuals who would increasingly take up the cause of Kosovo Serbs.²⁴ With support from intellectuals, the Church, and favorable media reporting, Serbs of Kosovo began mobilizing and organizing public protests that would eventually grow to become the so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution”—a series of mass protests in 1988 across most of Serbia and Montenegro. At the core of these protests were often Serbs from Kosovo, supported by local citizens who joined to protest the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo and their own more local grievances, especially over economic and social conditions. Although these protests came to be instrumentalized by Slobodan Milošević in his rise to power, the Kosovo Serbs’ movement emerged autonomously, organized mostly by party members from Kosovo Polje.²⁵

The cause was taken up famously by Slobodan Milošević during his visit to Kosovo in April 1987 when the Serb group from Kosovo Polje that had been driving many of the earlier protests managed to secure his visit

²² These as well as the atmosphere of fear among Kosovo Serbs are documented in surveys conducted by two sociologists at the time, although without sufficient critical distance to the claims made. Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević, *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985–1996* (Belgrade: SANU, 1992). See also similar stories collected in Mertus, *Kosovo*, 317–29.

²³ Wendy Bracewell, “Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian nationalism,” *Nations and Nationalism* 6 (2000), no. 4: 563–90.

²⁴ See Bieber, *Nationalismus in Serbien*, 99–102; and Jasna Dragović-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation? Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Rise of Nationalism* (London: Hurst, 2002).

²⁵ Nebojša Vladislavljević, *Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilisation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 104–8.

and confronted him and the head of the League of Communists of Kosovo, Azim Vllasi, with their grievances.²⁶ As Milošević adopted the agenda of the protestors and their intellectual backers, the cause of Kosovo Serbs appeared to dominate the political agenda in Serbia and Yugoslavia. The dynamics that led to the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and the rise to power of Milošević have been written about extensively. The protest movement of Kosovo Serbs supported Milošević during this critical phase, even if they at time remained skeptical about his commitment to their cause. The League of Communists of Serbia and Milošević in turn sought to co-opt this social movement for his own rise to power. The reassertion of Serb influence over Kosovo was symbolically marked with the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle on 28 June 1989 at Gazimestan, just outside Prishtina.

Success and Marginalization

With the end of Kosovo's autonomy in the constitutional amendments of 1989, consolidated in the new Serbian constitution of 1990, one of the core demands of Kosovo's Serbs was met. As Albanians were expelled from the public administration or were unwilling to work for the institutions now dominated by Milošević's Serbia, the balance of power had shifted again towards Serbs in Kosovo. The segregation of Kosovo society and the exclusion of Albanians had on the surface benefited local Serbs who could now dominate the public administration. All institutions, from the media to theatre, health care, university and schools were purged of Albanians and replaced by Serbs.²⁷ Yet at the same time, it would prove a Pyrrhic victory as Serbs in Kosovo had become associated by the Albanian majority with the repressive Serbian state and closely associated with the authoritarian and opportunistic rule of Slobodan Milošević: "...[T]he Serbs (and Montenegrins) play the role of agents of the Centre and dependents of the Leader. That makes them additionally confronted with their neighbors..."²⁸

²⁶ Pavlović, *Kosovo under Autonomy*, 71.

²⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 247.

²⁸ Dušan Janjić, "National identity, movement and nationalism of Serbs and Albanians," in Janjić and Maliqi, eds., 118.

The tensions of the previous decade had led to a complete segregation of the two communities and efforts to communicate across the divided became not just difficult but were effectively policed by nationalist leaders in both communities. In effect, it became easier for Albanians from Kosovo to communicate with Serbs from Belgrade²⁹ than with their Serb neighbors: "In the summer of 1992, the Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo lived in apartheid and open hostility and without true communication."³⁰

Already from the early 1990s, a number of the Kosovo Serb leaders that had organized protests a few years earlier and aligned themselves with Milošević became disillusioned. Mostly, they had hoped for radical policy directed against the parallel Albanian institutions that emerged in 1990–1991 after the abolition of the autonomy. The group also realized that Milošević had instrumentalized the cause of Kosovo Serbs, but displayed little interest or commitment towards this group.³¹ Nevertheless, Kosovo's Serbs remained largely loyal to Milošević's politics for most of the 1990s. Most continued to vote for the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and other nationalist parties, such as the Serb Radical Party and briefly also for the list of the paramilitary leader and (war) criminal Željko Ražnatović "Arkan." With Kosovo Albanians boycotting Serbian and Yugoslav elections, the regime could count on the seats in the Serbian and Yugoslav parliaments elected in Kosovo,³² not least due to the ability to manipulate electoral results more easily in Kosovo than elsewhere.³³

The segregation and repressive policies of the Serbian state in Kosovo became increasingly unsustainable in the second half of the 1990s. Even according to the 1991 census that was boycotted by Albanians, Serbs con-

²⁹ It is striking that in the multiple Albanian–Serb dialogues of the 1990s few if any Serbs from Kosovo participated.

³⁰ Dušan Janjić with Anna Lalaj and Besnik Pula, "Kosovo under the Milošević regime," in Ingrao and Emmert, eds., 286.

³¹ See Florian Bieber, "The other civil society in Serbia: Non-governmental nationalism," in *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe*, eds. Petr Kopecny and Cas Mudde (London: Routledge, 2003), 19–36.

³² See Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 280.

³³ In the presidential elections in 1997 Milan Milutinović won elections over Vojislav Šešelj only thanks to an improbably high turnout in Kosovo, which would have meant that Albanians voted for him in large numbers. Vladimir Goati, *Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998: Will of the People of Electoral Manipulation?* 2nd, extended ed. (Belgrade: CeSID, 2000), 136–7; Zoran Lučić, *Analiza izborni rezultata 1990–1997 u Srbiji* (Belgrade: CeSID, 2002), 42–5.

stituted only 10% of the population (195,301), but dominated all institutions and public life was harshly segregated.³⁴ The regime sought to alter the demographic balance, but without success. Plans to resettle Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia, especially after 1995 were tried but failed as only a few thousand went to Kosovo and most left soon thereafter.³⁵ Serbs in Kosovo saw the ease with which Serbia had abandoned Serbs in Croatia and the status quo seemed increasingly untenable. Many Serbs continued selling their properties to Albanians, despite restrictions.³⁶ Legislation was put in place in 1989 to prevent the sale of properties from Serbs to Albanians, but was circumvented through the use of proxies.³⁷

Although Serbs found jobs in the public administration and publicly owned enterprises after Albanians lost their jobs, their position became precarious as sanctions, economic mismanagement, and the economic isolation of Serbia meant a worsening of the economic situation.³⁸

With the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK), the situation for Kosovo's Serbs became increasingly difficult. The UÇK did not differentiate between military and civilian targets and Serbs in Kosovo became a prime target for the group. In 1997, a car bomb injured the rector of the Prishtina University and attacks against Serbs and Albanians accused of collaborating with the Serbian authorities increased. In 1998, as the conflict escalated, most victims were Albanians and most Serbs who died in the conflict were members of the security forces.³⁹ As the war escalated Serb civilians were also killed by the UÇK, but with the Serbian security forces in control and engaging in large-scale ethnic cleansing in 1998 and 1999, the tide began to turn against Serbs only after the war itself had ended.

Expulsion and Enclaves

On the 9 June 1999, the Yugoslav Army and Serbian police signed the Kumanovo Agreement with NATO which regulated the withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. KFOR entered Kosovo

³⁴ In addition the census reports 3,070 Yugoslavs and 20,045 Montenegrins.

³⁵ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 263, 284–5.

³⁶ Janjić with Lalaj and Pula, "Kosovo under the Milošević regime," 292–3.

³⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 298–9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 299.

³⁹ 129 Serb civilians and 151 members of the police and army died in 1998.

three days later and by 20 June 1999 all Serbian security forces had withdrawn.⁴⁰ With the forces, the state left as well. As all the institutions were dominated by Serbs, not only from Kosovo, during the withdrawal, they took with them official documents and records, all institutions disappeared and a void emerged which left Serbs in a vulnerable position. The international peace mission could not take the place of the repressive state and competed with the UÇK which undertook a rapid takeover of the towns. As a result, the first months were marked by anarchy, looting, and large scale violence against Serbs and other minorities (especially Roma and Gorani). Much of the violence appears to have been carried out by local UÇK members and others using it to justify violence and plunder. While the UÇK leadership probably did not order the violence, it failed to limit it, and statements by Veton Surroi and others against the attacks and murder of Serbs, Roma, and others were met with hostility by UÇK leaders. Between June and August, Serbs were forced out of all major towns, many Serb inhabited villages and religious sites were burnt and destroyed.⁴¹

While many Serbs left or were expelled from Kosovo in 1999, according to a study by the European Stability Initiative around two-thirds of the Serbs remained in Kosovo.⁴² In addition to the displacement from Kosovo, Serbs moved within Kosovo. A significant share of Serbs (and Montenegrins)⁴³ before 1999 had lived in the cities of Kosovo (i.e., 31,181

⁴⁰ According to the Humanitarian Law Centre, some 932 non-Albanians (mostly Serbs) were abducted or disappeared in the period between June 1999 when KFOR entered Kosovo and the end of 2000. *Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosovo* (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Centre, 2001).

⁴¹ See Judah, *Kosovo*, 286–302; and Dušan Bataković, “Surviving in ghetto-like enclaves: The Serbs of Kosovo and Metohija,” in Bataković, ed., 242–9.

⁴² According to ESI’s estimates that approximately 65,000 Serbs sought refuge in Serbia. International organizations and Serbian authorities have made considerably higher claims. For example, the UNHCR claims that as of 2012 228,215 IDPs from Kosovo live in Serbia. Academic studies make similar claims. A study on expulsions and returns of Serbs, for example, claims that 250,761 people were displaced from Kosovo in 1999, more than 200,000 of which are Serbs. Considering that between 120,000 and 150,000 Serbs remained in Kosovo and the population estimate of 1991 lists 195,301 Serbs, it would implausibly suggest that between 1991 and 1999 over a 150,000 Serbs migrated to Kosovo. Milan Bursać and Nenad Ilić, “Dinamički progona i povratka Srba i drugih nealbanskih stanovnika Kosova i Metohije posle 1999. Godine,” in *Srbi na Kosovo i Metohiji* (Belgrade: SANU, 2006=Naučni skupovi 112), 463.

⁴³ European Stability Initiative, *The Lausanne Principle, Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo’s Serbs* (Berlin and Prishtina, 2004). Until 1991 Serbs and Montene-

or 15.2% of the population of Prishtina; 15,007 or 11.33% in Peć/Peja) of which most either left Kosovo altogether, moved to more rural regions with a Serb majority (such as Gračanica/Gračanicë just outside of Prishtina or Štrpce/Shtërpçë close to Prizren) or to the northern municipalities. Most rural Serbs remained in Kosovo, except in the western Metohija/Dukajini region where violence against rural Serbs was greater than in places such as Gjilan/Gnjilane in Eastern Kosovo. As a result, the urban and multiethnic environment in which many Serbs had lived rapidly disappeared and most found themselves in scattered, often isolated and vulnerable rural enclaves. These enclaves were mostly Serb villages that were quickly surrounded and protected by KFOR troops. For fear of attacks, especially in the first post-war years, Serbs could not move freely and often had to rely on KFOR protection to move between enclaves or to and from Serbia.⁴⁴ In the north, French KFOR troops did not move beyond the Ibar that runs through the city of Mitrovica. Thus, international military control did not extend to the Serb populated areas in Northern Kosovo. While the international civilian mission began operating there and later also KFOR, the division of Kosovo remained in place and has plagued it ever since as informal security structures controlled by Serbia continued to operate. In the first years after the war, the “bridge-watchers” who ensured that Albanians would not cross the bridge helped to secure the divide.⁴⁵

Decimated in size and now living increasingly in rural enclaves, the dependence on Serbia increased after 1999. Being fragmented into multiple small enclaves with limited mobility between them meant that there was little room for the emergence of a Kosovar Serb elite after 1999. Many of the best educated Serbs left in 1999 and the competing centers of power Prishtina and Belgrade further led to the fragmentation of the community with some Serbs cooperating with the international administration and later Kosovo institutions and others only recognizing the Serbian insti-

grins were listed as distinct identities in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia. However, in the context of the Serb–Albanian antagonism Montenegrins were often subsumed into the category of Serbs. There is a clear regional pattern with most Montenegrins living in Northwestern Kosovo bordering Montenegro (i.e., around Peć).

⁴⁴ These enclaves are discussed in detail, albeit with a very one sided bias in Bataković, ed., *Kosovo and Metohija*.

⁴⁵ Erich Rathfelder, *Kosovo. Geschichte eines Konflikts* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2010), 288–90.

tutions. Many also sought to navigate the competing centers of power by extracting resources and security from both.

The number of Serbs in Kosovo today remains contested and unclear. The 2011 census was the first conducted by Kosovo authorities and the first since 1981, but was boycotted by most Serbs. In the census only 25,532 respondents (or 1.47%) identified as Serbs.⁴⁶ In 2005, UNMIK provided a more meaningful estimate of the number of Serbs in Kosovo. According to the estimate provided by UNMIK, some 139,417 lived in Kosovo at the time, or around 6% of the population. According to the estimate just over 60,000 or 45% lived in four municipalities in the North adjacent to Serbia (Zvečan/Zveçan, Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok and the northern half of the municipality of Mitrovica). A study by the European Stability Initiative from 2004 sought to establish the share of Serbs living in the different regions of Kosovo based on school enrollment and came to the conclusion that around two thirds of Serbs lived in the south of Kosovo and only one third in the aforementioned northern municipalities.⁴⁷ In the south most were living in scattered villages in the municipality of Gjilan/Gnjilane, in the Southern municipality of Štrpce/Shtërpçë, in Gračanica/Graçanicë which became its own municipality in 2008 and as minorities in municipalities adjunct to Prishtina (such as Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Obiliq/Obilić, and Lipjan/Lipljan).⁴⁸

After 1999 two separate political spheres developed among Kosovo's Serbs. On one hand, Serb parties and organizations emerged that formed part of the Kosovo institutions, represented in parliament and government in Prishtina. At the same time, Serbian parties organized in Kosovo and Serbia organized both national and local elections in Serb populated regions of Kosovo. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Serbs in Kosovo lacked any credible political or intellectual elite. The old elite closely associated with the government in Belgrade had fled with Serbian and Yugoslav forces in 1999 and was in any case not an acceptable interlocutor for the international mission in Kosovo and the Albanian political parties. Before the emergence of Serb political parties and institutions, this role was

⁴⁶ Kosovo Agency of Statistics, *Kosovo Population and Housing Census 2011: Final Results. Main Data* (Prishtina, 2012).

⁴⁷ European Stability Initiative, *The Lausanne Principle*.

⁴⁸ UNMIK, "Report Submitted by the UNMIK Pursuant to Article 2.2 of the Agreement between UNMIK and the Council of Europe Related to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities," ACFC(2005)003, 2.6.2005.

played by individuals selected by the international administration for their ability to work with UNMIK and KFOR and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Bishop Artemije of the Eparchy of Raška and Prizren (from 1991 until 2010), covering all of Kosovo and parts of Sandžak, had been critical of Milošević and denounced violence against Albanians and could thus become a significant representative of Kosovo Serb interests in the first post-war years.⁴⁹

Serbia channeled its support and influence for Serbs in Kosovo first through a coordination center responsible for Kosovo and later through a special ministry. Only between 2008 and 2012 was the minister a Kosovar Serb, Goran Bogdanović, while otherwise the office was held by politicians with few connections to Kosovo.⁵⁰ The main task of the office for Kosovo was to channel funds to Kosovo Serbs since 1999, as Serbia continues to fund schools, health care, as well as other state and para-state institutions. The institutions were not just significant as service providers, but also the major employers of Serbs.⁵¹ In addition, the Serbian state was able to exercise its influence in Kosovo and support political structures loyal to Belgrade.⁵² Finally, the funding to Serbs in Kosovo also provided for ample opportunities for abuse and corruption and led to the growth of organized crime structures, especially in Northern Kosovo which has been neither under full international or Kosovo jurisdiction nor under full influence by Serbia since 1999.⁵³

A major marker in the post-war period was the mass violence in March 2004. A number of small incidents escalated to mass violence against Serb settlements and internationals. After a Serb in the settlement of Čaglavica, just outside of Prishtina was killed, local Serbs blocked nearby main roads to Skopje and to Gjilan/Gniljane, leading to protests

⁴⁹ He belonged to a group of influential bishops (with Amfilohije and Atansije) who had strongly supported the cause of Kosovo Serbs in 1980s.

⁵⁰ This office was first lead by Nebojša Čović during the government of Zoran Đinđić and later by Sanda Rašković-Ivić during the first Koštunica government. In 2007 the center was upgraded to a ministry headed first by Slobodan Samardžić. Since 2012 the ministry was transformed into an office headed Aleksandar Vulin, a former official of the Yugoslav Left (JUL).

⁵¹ Salaries paid by Serbia in Kosovo were higher than either Kosovo salaries or those in Serbia itself.

⁵² Helmut Kramer and Vedran Džihčić, *Die Kosovo Bilanz* (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2005), 82–7.

⁵³ The abuse of Serbian government support for Kosovo Serbs was documented in a series of investigative reports by the TV show *Insajder* of B92, at http://www.b92.net/video/video.php?nav_category=906&nav_id=645824.

by KLA veterans. When, the next day, three Albanian boys drowned in Ibar, rumors quickly spread that Serbs were responsible for their deaths. Some 51,000 people participated in 33 riots across Kosovo on 17 and 18 March, and some 800 Serb houses were demolished or seriously damaged. Furthermore, 36 Orthodox religious objects were destroyed and completely demolished or torched and over 4,000 people displaced. Although they appeared to be spontaneous protests at first, driven by the lack of a clear perspective for the status of Kosovo, the riots were clearly orchestrated and directed to destroy Serb property. The scale and degree of organization suggest that the violence was not spontaneous, but rather planned.⁵⁴ The violence put an effective end to the already sluggish refugee return process. The refugee return of Serbs and other minorities has remained far below comparable levels in other post-war regions of former Yugoslavia. Between 1999 and 2011, only 22,906 refugees and IDPs returned to Kosovo.⁵⁵

At the same time, the violence triggered the process that would lead to Kosovo's independence. A report written for the UN by the senior Norwegian Diplomat Kai Eide in 2005 notes the problems confronting Kosovo, including the "grim" situation of multiethnicity and the difficult situation for minorities. His report recommends settling the status of Kosovo and outlining some of the features that would be part of the Ahtisaari proposal that would outline the settlement, including decentralization and special protection for Serbian Orthodox Church properties.⁵⁶

In the immediate aftermath of the mass violence, Serbs in Kosovo withdrew from Kosovo's institutions. In the first Kosovo wide elections in 2001, Serbs had voted in large numbers, in large part due to encouragement by the Serbian government. The Kosovo Serb list *Povratnik* ("return") thus gained 89,388 votes and with 11.34% of the vote became the third largest group in parliament. With an additional ten seats reserved in par-

⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Failure to protect: Anti-minority violence in Kosovo" (March–July 2004), at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/07/25/failure-protect>.

⁵⁵ Ministry for Communities and Returns, *Strategija za Zajednice i Povratnik*, 2009–2013, at http://www.mkk-ks.org/repository/docs/313R_KOMUNITETE_DHE_KTHIM_2009_-_2013_SERB_.pdf; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo," S/2012/72 (31 January 2012), at <http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2012-72.pdf>.

⁵⁶ For a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo, see <http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf>.

liament for Serbs, they were an important political player in the newly established Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. In 2004, this changed. Under the impression of the March violence and with mixed signals from Belgrade—newly elected president Boris Tadić called on Serbs to participate while Vojislav Koštunica who had just become Prime Minister called for a boycott—only few Serbs participated. Serbs could count on the ten reserved seats, but the MPs elected to these seats gained between 94 and 1,414 votes, making them hardly representative of the community.⁵⁷

Serbs in an Independent Kosovo

The division among Serbs in Kosovo was compounded by Kosovo independence. The north of Kosovo remained firmly under Serbian government authority and there are few signs of authority of Kosovo institutions in these municipalities. The regions where Serbs lived in the south were in a different position: While still strongly reliant on Serbia, especially for the provision of services including mail, education, and health care, these could not ignore the existence of the Kosovo state after 2008. Serbs in the South began working with Kosovo's institutions, voting in elections, and otherwise engaging with the new state after 2008, while Serbs in the North rejected the state and maintained ties to Serbia.

Serbs in Kosovo still experience restrictions in freedom of movement. Many Serbs fear attacks and discrimination in majority Albanian environments. In the first post-war years, this was indeed the case with regular incidents of violence. While the seriousness of incidents has declined considerably since 1999, ethnically motivated violence remains an issue and Serbs are the target of sporadic attacks.⁵⁸ The overall decrease of attacks against Serbs has improved the freedom of movement, but fear remains potent among some Kosovo Serbs and political conflicts, such as in 2011

⁵⁷ All election results from Central Election Committee and OSCE.

⁵⁸ UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo," UN Doc. S/2012/603 (12 August 2012), paras. 17, 29, and 30; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo," UN Doc. S/2012/275 (27 April 2012), para. 21–2.

over the border crossings to Serbia can quickly lead to deterioration of relations.⁵⁹

Following the declaration of independence in February 2008, new state institutions were established based on the "Comprehensive proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement" drafted by UN mediator and former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari ("Ahtisaari Plan").⁶⁰ The plan was sought to persuade Serbia to accept an independent Kosovo in exchange for far reaching group rights for the Serb community. Although Serbia and most Serbs in Kosovo rejected the plan, because of the offer of independence, the Ahtisaari Plan was still implemented without backing by the UN Security Council. The constitution and laws provide for significant protection of the Serb minority. Some of the institutional mechanisms had been in place since the 2001 constitutional framework, such as 10 reserved seats for Serbs (and 10 for all other groups) of 120 in addition to any seats gained in elections through proportional representation in the parliamentary assembly and guaranteed representation in government. Furthermore, a number of consultative bodies for minority communities were set up, proportional representation in the public administration introduced,⁶¹ and full bilingualism including in municipalities were not only a few Serbs remained.⁶² Key laws can only be passed with a so-called double majority, i.e., with the consent of both the minority MPs and an overall majority. Finally, the plan also provided for the decentralization of Kosovo and the creation of new Serb municipalities. Thus, new municipalities were established to de-facto recognize Serb enclaves that emerged in 1999. These include Gračanica/Graçanicë, Klokot-Vrbovac/Klllokot, Ranilug, and Parteš/Partesh; all except for Gračanica/Graçanicë, are among the

⁵⁹ Norwegian Helsinki Committee, "Authorities in Kosovo must ensure access to justice and show practical support to minorities" (25 November 2011), at <http://nhc.no/no/nyheter/Authorities+in+Kosovo+must+ensure+access+to+justice+and+show+practical+support+to+minorities.9UFRDQZL.ips>.

⁶⁰ <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html>.

⁶¹ Despite quotas, Serbs remain underrepresented with 0.75% Serbs in public companies and 3.06% in municipal institutions. Only in state institutions Serbs hold 5.08% of jobs. Office for Community Affairs (Office of the Prime Minister), *Employment of Members of Non-majority Communities within Kosovo Civil Service and Publicly Owned Enterprise* (Prishtina, 2010), 35–77, at http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/zck/repository/docs/1-Policy_study_no1_FINAL.pdf.

⁶² Office of Community Affairs (Office of the Prime Minister), *Policy Study II, Language Policies in Kosovo: Implementation in Relations to Public Bodies* (Prishtina, September 2011).

smallest municipalities of Kosovo with only 2,000–4,000 inhabitants. The Ahtisaari Plan also foresaw the establishment of special protected zones around key Serbian Orthodox religious sites to protect them from illegal construction and other threats. This special status has been particularly controversial in Kosovo, as its critics saw it as a form of extra-territoriality giving Belgrade direct control.⁶³ As a result, the government and parliament have been reluctant to pass the necessary legislation and there have been frequent tensions between local authorities and Serb-Orthodox churches and monasteries over municipal plans that appeared to contravene the protected status.⁶⁴

Serbs remained divided whether to participate in the new institutions or to reject not just independence, but also the institutions. In 2010 turnout among Serbs in Southern Kosovo was significant (around 20,000), while in the North the elections were nearly entirely boycotted.⁶⁵ The gap between Serbs in the North and the South thus became apparent: Turn-out in three northern municipalities was just 2.3%, whereas turnout in six southern municipalities with a Serb majority of a large Serb population share were higher (46.2%) than the general turnout in Kosovo (45.29%).⁶⁶ At the same time, many Serbs continue to participate in Serbian elections. In 2012, some 32.2% of eligible voters in Kosovo participated in Serbian parliamentary elections and first round of presidential elections.⁶⁷

In response to the declaration of independence, Serb municipalities organized elections to an Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of Kosovo and Metohija in 2008. It was dominated by parties that particularly strongly rejected Kosovo's independence and took an uncompromising line, such as the Serb Radical Party (SRS) and the Democratic Party of

⁶³ Vetevendosje, "Letter to Quint Ambassadors" (8 September 2012), at <http://www.vetevendosje.org/?cid=2,24973>; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General" (27 April 2012), para. 46.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 45.

⁶⁵ Igor Jovanovic, "Kosovo election causes new rift among Serbs," *SEE Times* (15 December 2010), at <http://www.setimes.com/>.

⁶⁶ The northern municipalities do not include Mitrovica, as it is a single municipality including the south with a largely Albanian population. The southern municipalities include Klokot/Klllokot, Parteš/Partesh, Ranilug, and Gračanica/Gračanicë. Štrpce/Shtërpçë and Novo Brdo/Novobërdë have a large Serb community and are also included. All data from the Central Election Commission, at <http://www.kqz-ks.org/SKQZ-WEB/sr/zgjedhjetekosoves/rezultatetzp.html>.

⁶⁷ "OSCE says turnout in Kosovo was 32.17%," *B92* (Belgrade, 6 May 2012), at <http://www.b92.net/>.

Serbia (DSS). The Democratic Party that won Serbian parliamentary elections in 2008 gained only three of 45 seats.⁶⁸ With the increasing north-south divide, this body was never able to gain more than symbolic significance. Another Serb institution in Kosovo has been the Serb National Council that sought to represent all Serbs in Kosovo and created in 1999 after the withdrawal of the Serbian state. However, it has been dominated by hardline Serb leaders from Northern Kosovo, in particular Marko Jakšić and Milan Ivanović.

This dynamic changed through the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo that resulted in a number of agreements, in particular in April 2013 regarding the status of the North. The 15-point agreement on the normalization of relations foresaw a formal reintegration of the Northern Kosovo municipalities into Kosovo, while maintaining a high level of self-government. In addition, the agreement creates an association of Serb municipalities—not just in the North—that would be able to pool competences of the municipalities and form a loose type of intermediate layer of government.⁶⁹ Through local elections throughout Kosovo in November 2013, for the first time since independence all Serb populated municipalities participated in a Kosovo-wide election and de facto ratified the agreement. However, turnout was low in the North and violence in the first round and the later refusal by the elected mayor of North Mitrovica to take the oath of office resulted in several repetitions of elections in Mitrovica. The opposition of many Serbs in Northern Kosovo was reflected not just in the electoral process, but also in the refusal of the local committees of the ruling parties in Serbia to participate in the elections.⁷⁰

Kosovo remains a poor country and the historical pattern of underdevelopment has been compounded by the war and the subsequent uncertainty over the status. The weak socio-economic situation also affects Serbs, especially those living in the South, where most Serbs have

⁶⁸ Igor Jovanovic and Blerta Foniqi-Kabashi, "Kosovo Serbs convene parliament; Pristina, international authorities object," *SEE Times* (30 June 2008), at <http://www.seetimes.com/>.

⁶⁹ First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations (19 April 2013), at <http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/04/20/3224318/Originalni%20tekst%20Predloga%20sporazuma.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Gezim Krasniqi, "North Kosovo: New reality, old problems," CITSEE Blog (27 January 2014), at <http://www.citsee.eu/blog/north-kosovo-new-reality-old-problems>; Balkan Policy Research Group, "Something completely different in Northern Kosovo" (23 October 2013).

limited access to the more developed urban centers. Most rural Serbs live off subsistence agriculture and/or employment in either (or both) Kosovo and Serbian state institutions. While an increasing number have begun working for Kosovo institutions, in 2011, around 40,000, mostly Serbs, received Serbian government support (either through social welfare benefits or employment). Thus, a significant number of Serbs are directly dependent on income from Serbia. Most Serbs in Kosovo continue not to speak Albanian, as it is not taught in Serbian schools following the curriculum of Serbia—the only schools available in Serbian—and have little everyday contact with Albanians. As a result, not only is the segregation of the communities preserved, but Serbs have few opportunities in mainstream Kosovo society, reinforcing the divide.⁷¹ While Serbs work in Prishtina and cities are no longer off limits as they were immediately after 1999, many remain oriented toward Serbia and rarely venture into Albanian majority regions. Ties to Serbia remain close among Serbs in Kosovo with two-thirds travelling to Serbia at least monthly, mostly for family reasons, shopping, or health reasons. Furthermore, many administrative services (related to Serbian institutions) are available only in Serbia, and thus cities like Vranje have become centers for the Serb community, especially in the absence of Serb-dominated urban centers in Kosovo itself (both Gračanica/Graçanicë and Mitrovica North have no more than 20,000 inhabitants).⁷²

Conclusion

Serbs in Kosovo have struggled since 1999 to find a place in the new Kosovo. From a temporary position of dominance, yet fearful of the large Albanian majority, the community became marginalized, vulnerable and fragmented. With predominance in rural communities, Serbs in Kosovo after the war lacked a political and intellectual elite. Even in 2012, Kosovo Serb politicians themselves frequently noted to the author the lack of an elite as a major problem. The surrogate center of Mitrovica has a univer-

⁷¹ Project on Ethnic Relations Kosovo, *Boosting Prospects for Young Kosovo Serbs* (Prishtina, 2012), 23.

⁷² Project on Ethnic Relations Kosovo, *Urban Life in Kosovo Serb Communities* (Prishtina, 2012), 45–6.

sity (the remnants of the Serb university in Prishtina) and a hospital, but lacks the environment, size, and socio-economic basis to develop such an elite, especially as the community continues to shrink due to migration to Serbia, few returns, and a fairly old population structure among Serbs. Thus, while most Serbs stayed in Kosovo even during the violence of 1999 and after independence in 2008, the overall community is likely to decrease in size and importance.

Relations between Serbia ("Belgrade") and Kosovo Serbs have been ambiguous. Serbia has devoted considerable financial and symbolic resources after 2000 to support Serbs in Kosovo and to claim its continued sovereignty over Kosovo. The claims to territory and at the same time to support Serbs have been often conflicting, especially as it became apparent that Serbia would not be able to prevent Kosovo's independence.⁷³ Serbs from Kosovo have often been excluded or only had a marginal role in the different negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo and many Serbs in Serbia look down on Kosovo Serbs—often with similar stereotypes as many hold of Albanians (backward, primitive). These patterns are not unique of course and intra-ethnic stereotypes are strong elsewhere. The safeguard of the Serb community in Kosovo is today still dominated by nationalist and territorial considerations in Serbia and political elites interested in EU integration and reforms generally pay little attention to the status of Kosovo Serbs. The criminal networks in the north that have benefited from the status quo further worsened the image of Kosovo Serbs among many in Serbia. In Kosovo, violence against Serbs has declined dramatically, yet there is little appreciation of the position of the community among Albanians. The extensive rights granted under the Ahtisaari Plan and the continued support from Serbia shape the perception of an unfairly privileged group that serves as a "fifth column" for Serbia. Whether this community will be able to overcome the double marginalization and help link Serbia and Kosovo, Serbs and Albanians or be treated as an awkward obstacle in relations between the two countries remains to be seen.

The challenge for the Serb community is to be able to identify as citizens of Kosovo rather than (or at least in addition to) citizens of Serbia. Although Kosovo formally is not defined in ethnic terms, leaving space for

⁷³ I have made this argument in an op-ed for the Serbian daily *Politika* in 2004. Florian Bieber, "Vreme za nove prioritete," *Politika* (8 December 2004).

a joint Kosovo and Serb identity, the Albanian dominance in Kosovo leaves little space for a civic Kosovar identity. Similarly, due to the small size of the Serb community today and the status reversal experience in 1999 (and in the 1970s to a lesser degree), the community itself has sought refuge in relatively homogenous communities and national identity. The loss of urban Serb populations in Kosovo has impacted both Albanian and Serb identity, as cross-ethnic communication is rare in rural settings and urban identity in Kosovo is now largely devoid of Serb-Albanian contacts.

CHAPTER 9

“Our men will not have amnesia”:¹ Civic Engagement, Emancipation, and Transformations of the Gendered Public in Kosovo

NITA LUCI and LINDA GUSIA

This chapter looks at changing gender relations in Kosovo as part of shifting public articulations of the emancipation of Albanian women and their civic and political engagement. Women’s emancipation, as discourse and practice, has continued to be engaged in the politics of national identity and state-building in Kosovo, producing spaces for action through a tenuous relationship between the constitution of narratives of modernity and those of re-traditionalization. Post-war peacebuilding mechanisms promise empowerment, but simultaneously create new gendered economic, political, and social spaces as well as practices that help reinstate patriarchy. We ask: how have gender relations figured in and shaped notions of civic participation in Kosovo as part of civic engagement in national, state and post-war projects? How does women’s public participation affect paradigm shifts in reformulating citizenship and governance? What disagreements arise between projects promoting gender equality versus those encouraging a new patriarchy in post-war state building?

By seeing the state and nation as formations always in the making, we first concentrate our attention on the ways in which gender difference is asserted and regulated. Étienne Balibar, has argued that states become nation-states by appropriating “the sacred,” not only in terms of “secularized ‘sovereignty,’ but also at the day-to day level of legitimation, implying

¹ Julie Mertus, “Gender in service of nation: Female citizenship in Kosovar society,” *Social Politics* 3 (1996), nos. 2–3: 261.

the control of births and deaths, marriages or their substitutes, inheritance and the like.”² Accordingly, as a structure, “the nation-form produces and perpetuates a differentiation that it must defend.”³ Central to nationalism’s differentiation is of course the sex/gender nexus, and feminist scholars have long shown that “all nationalisms are gendered,” to borrow the notion coined by Ann McClintock.⁴ Nevertheless, as far as most post-conflict countries are concerned, gender as a critical category of analysis, referring to both masculinities and femininities, is still missing from most mainstream discussions on nationalism. On the other hand, scholarship on the intersections of gender, race, class, ability, sexual orientation and other axes of identity point to how structured inequality based on *difference* is obscured when we do not account for the multiple levels of women’s experiences, as well as multiple patriarchies.⁵

Here we aim to attend to the formation of women’s political identities, the creation of a political public and political private space as evidence of intersections between gender and nation, including the racialization of citizens as members of national communities. Specifically, we ground this analysis in a discussion of women’s activism during the 1990s civic resistance in Kosovo, as a project of a modern return of the nation, and a discussion of post-war politics where post-national varieties of sociological imagination appear as emancipatory solutions, but in effect produce judgments about culture and “normalize difference” through what Chatterjee has defined as modern empire.⁶

² Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 20.

³ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁴ Anne McClintock, “No longer in a future heaven’: Women and nationalism in South Africa,” *Transition* 51 (1991): 104.

⁵ Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics,” *University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989): 138–67. See also Nira Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality and feminist politics,” *The European Journal of Women’s Studies* 13 (2006), no. 3: 193–209.

⁶ Partha Chatterjee, *Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 235–52.

Women's Civic Activism and Nationalism

In February 1989 martial law was declared in Kosovo, ending fifteen years of Kosovar autonomy within the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia. The abolition of autonomy removed most Albanians from all forms of civil life. The mass dismissals of Albanian workers from their jobs would ultimately reach 90% of those formerly employed.⁷ Schools were closed, leaving Albanian pupils, teachers, and administrators jobless. More than half of the state medical staff throughout Kosovo were dismissed and clinics shut down.⁸ Abolition of autonomy and the lack of any control in state institutions pushed Albanians back to the private domain. Family, already a strong institution in the Albanian community, regained strength and became restructured as a new source of identity and resistance. Parallel institutional structures were established, mainly in the fields of education and medicine. Former state employees and state services were relocated in the private domain (private houses, basements, shops) and this parallel structure became a center of civic and national resistance. The struggle for education became a central symbol, and the rescue of education became one of the proudest achievements of the parallel system.⁹

Women's involvement in civil resistance was, however, rife with paradox; during the 1990s tens of thousands of women became active in their community.¹⁰ The beginning of civil resistance was marked by the new phenomenon of large-scale demonstrations, where women from all social strata took an active part in nonviolent protests, both engaging in nonviolent forms of protest and demonstrating against the violence being committed by the Serbian authorities and affiliated groups. It seemed that participation in the Kosovar nationalist movement offered new channels through which women could enter the public space. The general perception of Albanian women as confined to the domestic sphere and consequently alienated from everything public or political both provoked new activism and was at the same time a challenge to elite women's' social

⁷ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London and Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2000), 74.

⁸ Crenshaw, *Demarginalizing the Intersection*, 107.

⁹ Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 96.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 73.

agency. Elite women had, however, been active in public life, and to some extent had exercised political influence during the communist era in Yugoslavia and would not easily go back to being housewives.

Sevdije Ahmeti, one of the founders of the Independent Women's Association (IWA) in Kosovo remembers the anger she felt for the ways that Yugoslav and international media represented Kosovar women: "they created new stereotypes about Albanian women as Muslims, birthing machines who did not know anything except how to be submissive to the family, [they were] basically uneducated slaves."¹¹ Countering the negative stereotypes produced in the Yugoslav media and, additionally, *showing the world* that Albanian women had social agency, was one of the main objectives of the Independent Women's Association. The declaration issued upon its establishment was formulated in the spirit of internationalism and stated: "We women, regardless of our race, religion or nationality, come together, for the movement of independent women of Kosovo, outside the Communist Party of Kosovo."¹² The association was intended to function as a forum that would be independent of any political party, but the disintegration of the Communist Party and the creation of new political parties, left the IWA outside the political decision-making process. A law on citizens' associations passed in 1989 required 650 or more signatures of members in order to register legally.¹³ The IWA collected the signatures needed and transformed itself from a small organization of urban intelligentsia into a mass social organization. The issue of women's emancipation and political agency had become merged with the new political agenda, which subsequently was assimilated within the biggest political party in the 1990s, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).

Contradicting the first basic principle of the IWA, to operate as an independent association of women, 40 women participating in a meeting with the LDK voted almost unanimously to join the party (with only four votes in opposition). The IWA (later, just WA) had grown in less than seven months to 80,000 members throughout Kosovo; this mobilization was largely seen as a result of women's desire to contribute to the

¹¹ Nicole Farnsworth, *History is Herstory Too* (Pristina: Kosovar Gender Studies Center, 2011), 59.

¹² *Ibid.*, 61.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 63.

national cause.¹⁴ It may seem that, as soon as women entered the arena of political activism, their claims for women's rights became patriotic (if not patrilocal), a trend that was to be continued throughout the further development of the civil resistance movement.

Women's emancipation has been a component of many nationalist discourses throughout many nationalist movements. The new Albanian identity was created as a European identity, based on claims for basic universal human rights, and this universalism encouraged silence with regards to some within—nation markers and their related issues, particularly the role of women. As Denis Kandiyoti described this process, "[n]ationalism presents itself both as a modern project that melts and transforms traditional attachments in a favor of a new identity."¹⁵ The emerging Albanian identity and nationalist discourse suggested the emergence of a new era for women politically, as well as space for a different cultural agency. Modernization, as one of the elements introduced by the nationalist discourse of the LDK, which was more a political movement than a party, seemed promising at the time in terms of its implications for women's emancipation. As Vjosa Dobruna, a women's rights activist recalled, "[t]he mentality has become that gender or individual freedom can be perceived only through the overriding philosophy of national freedom."¹⁶ Politics came to be understood as the safeguarding of the rights of one's own national community.

However, LDK records show that the party later maintained that the IWA had been founded within the LDK. In this account, the organization was referred to by the name of the Women's Association (WA). The organization was apparently losing its name as well as its influence. Luljeta Pula-Beqiri was elected president of the WA. She was energetic, outspoken and eloquent, and became an active public face, pushing publicly for a seat within the LDK presidency. Nevertheless, the "LDK leadership decided that the WA did not need to be involved directly in all issues, but should focus instead on issues related to women and children."¹⁷ Marginalized at the outset from the decision-making process within the party, a number

¹⁴ Ibid., 68.

¹⁵ Deniz Kandiyoti, "Identity and its discontents: Women and the nation," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 20 (1991), no. 4: 429–43.

¹⁶ Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 146.

¹⁷ Farnsworth, *History is Herstory*, 69.

of women who had played a leading role in the initial founding of the women's association had left the party by 1992. Many would soon get involved in starting their own independent non-governmental organizations¹⁸ or new political parties. Luljeta Pula-Beqiri went on to lead the newly formed Social Democratic Party and was the only opponent to Ibrahim Rugova in the following presidential elections.¹⁹

The WA would continue operating as a forum; by 1995, renamed the LDK Women's Forum, it had become more stable, and to some extent more politically important. Edita Tahiri, as new president of the forum would become President Ibrahim Rugova's envoy for foreign relations, a position similar to that of a Minister of Foreign Affairs, although the women's forum in general continued to deal with more "feminine" social issues such as education, humanitarian aid, and healthcare.²⁰ Women's inclusion in the LDK had become a structural necessity for creating an image of a European nation. Molded through the already existing patriarchal construct of an essentialized identity of women, the roles of women that re-emerged in the context of peaceful resistance came to be framed within the domestic sphere, and women's political identity was reduced to being supportive and supplementary to the interest of nation.²¹

Nevertheless, women's relation to nationalism was structured around contradictions. Their exclusion from full political decision-making contrasted with their increasing grassroots activism. This was possible because the LDK was not the only point of entry to civil resistance. Volunteer work was put to service in the parallel system and the creation of women's NGOs. By 1997, twelve organizations comprised of and led by women operated throughout Kosovo. These NGOs claimed to have a gender component integrated within their work, but for the most part, they were working within the framework of defending human rights, with a few leading urban women activists playing roles as public advocates and documenting human right abuses.²²

¹⁸ Ibid., 72.

¹⁹ Ibid., 111.

²⁰ Ibid., 74.

²¹ For a discussion of socialist, post-socialist, and nationalist gender essentializations in former-Yugoslavia, see Svetlana Slapšak, "The use of women and the role of women in the Yugoslav War," in *Gender, Peace and Conflict*, eds. Inger Skjelsbæk and Dane Smith (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2001).

²² Ibid., 79.

As previously mentioned, parallel education was a hallmark of civil resistance. But among the rural population, as Reineck's research shows, faith in education was evidently declining, especially among young girls in secondary education. These declines were accompanied by strikingly high levels of illiteracy among Albanian women in general.²³ One of the first non-governmental organizations founded in Kosovo, Motrat Qiriaz, focused its activity in the more traditionally conservative villages of the Has region. Its members focused primarily on the issue of the education of Albanian girls, claiming that the education of future mothers was crucial to the nation's struggles and women's emancipation. This ideological stress on the role of women as mothers, as in other nationalist projects, became a dominant form of symbolic imagery through which the position of women became visible in the national project. It is precisely the emphasis on the role of motherhood that led Julie Mertus to view women's organizations in Kosovo as non-feminist, insofar as they had failed to challenge the patriarchal status quo.²⁴ A founder of Motrat Qiriaz, Igbale Rugova, claims that it was the only option they had, the only strategy available then.²⁵ According to her, they had worked strategically within traditional ideology to de-traditionalize women's roles through education. As such, Motrat Qiriaz, and other women activists, were working with a definition of women's roles assumed in all modernist national projects.

According to Pnina Werbner, "the strength of political motherhood as an evolving social movement has been to introduce new human qualities into the public sphere, and to define them as equally foundational in the legitimation of the political community."²⁶ "Political motherhood," however problematic, gave women active political agency. In April 1996, 10,000 women demonstrated against the murder of a young Albanian man in Prishtina shot by a Serbian sniper, ending "a more than five-year period

²³ Janet S. Reineck, "The past as refuge: Gender, migration, and ideology among the Kosovo Albanians," unpublished PhD dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1991).

²⁴ Mertus, "Gender in service of nation," 261–77.

²⁵ Conversation with Igbale Rogova.

²⁶ Pnina Werbner, "Political motherhood and the feminisation of citizenship: Women's activism and the transformation of the public sphere," in *Women, Citizenship and Difference*, eds. Nira Yuval-Davis and Pnina Werbner (London: Zed Books, 1999), 227.

of patience and was the first to challenge President Rugova's passive resistance."²⁷

Women activists were also the first to react to the unfolding of police violence against civilians in the Drenica region, organizing a massive protest of more than 2,000 women.²⁸ One of the more notable demonstrations was "Bread for Drenica," where women tried to walk to the region and break the police cordon preventing humanitarian aid from reaching those in need. Public manifestations called for a "peaceful divorce from Serbia" in which all women silently removed their rings at the same time as a symbolic act of Kosovo divorcing Serbia.²⁹ Many more peaceful and symbolic acts and demonstrations organized by women enabled activists to gain credibility and visibility as women, as well as reclaim the public space in times of martial law, curfews, and restrictions on movement enforced on Albanians. Being visible was not just about claiming public space but also demonstrated to the international community a new emancipated nation where women can take to the streets and be active citizens. Most participants aimed to communicate that these women "showed they were not backward villagers locked inside their homes by dictatorial Albanian men,"³⁰ but they were modern and deserving of rights. The image they created for and of themselves was one of patient and self-sacrificing mothers partaking in peaceful resistance, while still creating a context in which women could participate as active citizens.

The struggle to define and conceptualize women's relationship to nationalist movements remains a very complex and uneven process. During the 1990s women's movement in Kosovo, this relationship at large seemed less problematic because of a strong emphasis on human rights; in this context, woman's rights were seen as human rights, and that in itself both challenged existing patriarchal norms and deemphasized redefining social roles. The "Woman Question" did get postponed, and existing women's NGO's failed to challenge patriarchal structures, pushing aside the emergence of feminist consciousness. Nevertheless, the involvement of women as strong actors and strong agents participating in these social movements during the 1990s helped to reformulate the way in which

²⁷ Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 129.

²⁸ Farnsworth, *History is Herstory*, 109.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 116.

³⁰ Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 118.

women imagined their community and their strategies for claiming rights as women.

Mainstreaming Gender: Between the Political Public and Private Public

Here we turn to asking how gender relations have figured in and shaped notions of civic participation at the end of the war in Kosovo, and what disagreements arise between projects for gender equality and new patriarchy in post-war state building.³¹ As we suggested earlier, and as other scholars have argued, nation- and state-building processes contribute to the constitution of identities based on differentiation and the normalization of essentialized difference; where intersecting and complex categories of gender, sex, class, and ethnicity often become reduced to understandings of identity that follow patriarchal political and social dictates. Or shortly, as McClintock has claimed “no nation in the world gives women and men the same access to the rights and resources of the nation-state.”³²

While most scholars have looked at the naturalization of gender stemming from kinship and family structures, and the differentiation of the public and private domains (e.g., practices of motherhood, distribution of economic and political resources and participation, hetero-normativity, etc.), only recently have we begun to understand similar dynamics in post-conflict, post-war protectorates, and the structural dependencies of capitalism in post-socialist contexts.³³ Dubravka Zhanokov has shown, specifi-

³¹ We recognize the relevance and need to look into those groups, efforts, and networks that have aimed to bridge ethno-national divides and/or challenge nationalist hetero-normativity. Also, analyses of post-war processes merit a larger discussion of competing paradigms of nation. While we are unable to tend to these in depth, this chapter is underscored by a concern with related questions.

³² Anne McClintock, “Family feuds: Gender, nationalism and the family,” *Feminist Review* 44 (1993): 61.

³³ Carol Delaney, “Father state, motherland, and the birth of modern Turkey,” in *Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis*, eds. Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 177–99; Rhoda Ann Knaaneh, *Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel* (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002); and Nancy Fraser, *Justice Interruptus* (New York: Routledge, 1997). See also Suad Joseph, “The public/private: The imagined boundary in the imagined nation/state/community: The Lebanese case,” *Feminist Review* 57 (1997): 73–92.

cally in the context of socialist Yugoslavia's disintegration, that "states and their national and ethnic groups became personified or symbolically represented as female or male bodies; in which the notions usually associated with norms of sexuality or assumptions of "proper" manhood and womanhood were suddenly associated with matters that concern state territory, daily politics, and—last but not least—ethnicity."³⁴ While we cannot attend to all of these formations, there are a number of discourses and practices that we turn to in order to trace women's social and political representation. In focusing on assertions that "gender equality" has gained through post-intervention bylaws, we argue that citizenship becomes constituted through civic participation in the spaces and practices between a political public—of assumed male citizenry—and a private public—of women in their roles in nationalist reproduction.

In Kosovo, women activists and politicians in the years following the war imagined that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 would be a precursor of, and a necessary legal basis for, the Ahtisaari Plan; a settlement that would have to seriously consider the much needed and key role of women in status talks and post-war state-building.³⁵ The Ahtisaari Plan failed in offering any such provisions. Both, the Resolution and the Plan, have been implemented through arrogantly superior and disdainful stances of the "international community." They have treated gender as a women's issue, and interact with local patriarchies through oscillating *friend-foe relations* that do little to disrupt masculine privilege.³⁶ Serious lines of consent and dissent have emerged around the meanings and practices of gender mainstreaming and gender equality mechanisms. At the same time, it becomes necessary to consider the ways in which Kosovo has become a site of projects that aim to mainstream gender, as outlined in UNSCR 1325, other international agreements, and the statements of various agencies, but where the same agencies do not practice what they

³⁴ Dubravka Žarkov, *Body of War: Media, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 13.

³⁵ Formally, "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement."

³⁶ See Ramya Subrahmanian, "Making sense of gender in shifting institutional contexts: Some reflections on gender mainstreaming," in *Feminism in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges*, eds. A Cornwall, E. Harrison, and A. Whitehead (London and New York: Zed Books, 2007), 112–22.

require of "local counterparts."³⁷ Introduced by many international agencies and aid organizations, and most prominently by the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, Resolution 1325 has been promoted as a means of gender inclusivity in peacebuilding, although activists in Kosovo often note that they were implementing 1325 before there was a 1325.³⁸

The international administration in Kosovo, as has international administration in other similar instances, has become a means of solidifying what are often assumptions of previous power and gendered structural arrangements. An example in point is the issue of the participation of women in the status talks for Kosovo. In 2006, women's organizations and women political leaders had come together to rally for their participation in the talks being led by Martti Ahtisaari, Finnish Ambassador and Special Envoy to the Kosovo Status Negotiations. Many saw it as an opportunity to at least begin remedying the post-war exclusion of women from local decision-making positions and political structures.³⁹ On 8 March 2006 women's non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors protested this exclusion under the banner of "No more flowers! We want power." Following the protest, much pressure was exerted through willing diplomats in Kosovo; and, in the end, through the Regional Women's Lobby and Women's Peace Coalition, an audience was secured with a fact-finding mission of the UN Security Council.⁴⁰ Ljiljeta Vuniqi, director of the

³⁷ Valur Ingimundarson, "The last colony in Europe: The new empire, democratization, and nation-building in Kosovo," in *Topographies of Globalization*, eds. Valur Ingimundarson, Kristin Loftsdottir, and Irma Erlendsdottir (Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 2004), 67–91; and Linda Gudmundsdottir, "Gender, power and peacebuilding: The struggle for gender equality in post-war Kosovo," unpublished MA Thesis (University of Iceland, 2012), at <http://skemman.is/en/item/view/1946/13017>.

³⁸ UN Security Council, Res. 1325 (31 October 2000), at http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2013).

³⁹ International organizations have also continually failed to create gender proportionality within their own structures, although it is called for in Resolution 1325. For figures on the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX—faring much better), etc. See Nicole Farnsworth, *1325 Facts & Fables* (Kosovo Women's Network: Pristina, 2011).

⁴⁰ "Një fjalë nga Kryesuesja," *Regional Women's Lobby for Peace, Security and Justice*, at <http://www.rwlsee.org> (accessed on 30 May 2013). See also the statement issued by the Women's Peace Coalition on 23 May 2006, at <http://www.womensnetwork.org/documents/20130124004353118.pdf> and the report published by the Global Fund for Women, at <http://www.globalfundforwomen.org/impact/news/43/394> (both last accessed on 30 May 2013).

Kosovar Center for Gender Studies, explains the disappointment of one of the ambassadors; the ambassador had protested that they had not come to Kosovo to discuss women's rights. According to Vuniqi, the ambassador was upset that the women "did not take the stance of the victim."⁴¹ Vepore Shehu, executive director of Medica Kosova, an organization that has mainly offered support to women raped during the war, noted her frustration when another ambassador remarked on women's exclusion from the negotiation process by stating Albanian traditionalism as an obstacle. He claimed: "We did not want to break tradition."⁴²

It would certainly be accurate to recognize the hope women activists and politicians placed on the international community and the laws that would protect against gender based discrimination. For example, former women combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army believed that its transformation to the Kosovo Protection Corps, and later to the Kosovo Security Force, would guarantee their place in new military structures being assembled.⁴³ Further analysis would be required to understand the gendered dynamics at play in the oversight of the military environment in Kosovo, as well as the various understandings surrounding women's participation in the war; but, similar to some of the members of the political elites of the 1990s, many former combatants were also able to translate their previous social capital to political capital after the war. Most nonetheless remained unrecognized.

The "political motherhood" mobilized during the 1990s has now become replaced by national narratives and international administrative bureaucracies that assume that women have identities primarily as victims either of men of their own ethnic group or of men of the adversary ethnic group. There is certainly little room for women fighters in the public imagination.⁴⁴ Discussion of women's sexuality has also proved controversial and dangerous, and discussions about survivors of rape have remained marginal, although a recent initiative has emerged after much pressure

⁴¹ Farnsworth, *1325 Facts & Fables*, 50.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴³ Interviews with members of the KPC. See Isabel Ströhle, "The politics of reintegration and war commemoration: The case of the Kosovo Liberation Army," *Südosteuropa* 58 (2011), no. 4: 478–519.

⁴⁴ Xhevë Lladrovci, who fought together with her husband Fehmi Lladrovci, is the only recognized woman martyr of the war and her memory has been kept alive much due to the insistence of her husband's family.

from the Kosovo Women's Network, the political party Vetvendosje!, and a number of feminist scholars.⁴⁵

Sanam N. Anderlini, in a review of challenges and achievements of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, has concluded by noting that "[w]hatever the reasons for the exclusion or oversight of information regarding women, the net result is a perpetuation of the cycle of invisibility."⁴⁶ Lynne Alice has also shown that the inability or unpreparedness of international agencies and makers of peace after war, or intervention, to implement gender equality provisions is most often passed to the "local counterparts," who are then evaluated for their ability to achieve "international standards of democracy and human rights."⁴⁷

The failures of the latter are most often reported and analyzed as reflections of local patriarchy. For example, in 2006, the UNMIK office for Gender Affairs supported the making of a film on the topic of human security from a gender perspective. In an interview for the film, then Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sören Jessen-Petersen claimed: "Resolution 1325 calls for women's participation in all political and social processes... In Kosovo's case it is the responsibility of those in authority. We can request, push, and insist but we cannot guarantee if leaders do

⁴⁵ The amendment of the Law on The Status and The Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of Kosovo Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War and Their Families, was accepted in the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo on 14 March 2013, and includes reference to survivors of sexual violence, who are placed in the category of "civilian victim." The law is still being read and has not been promulgated. A number of Assembly members voted against the amendment, arguing that inclusion of survivors of sexual violence would burden Kosovo's budget, debating the accuracy of possible claims, and went as far as debating administration of medical exams (rape tests) twelve years after the war. Initial parliamentary discussions used the phrase "victims of sexual violence"; however, civil society organizations have pressured to standardize the use of "survivors of sexual violence." See "The Law on the Status and Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of Kosova Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War and Their Families," Law No. 04/L-054, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, at <http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/Law%20on%20the%20status%20of%20the%20martyrs.pdf> (last accessed on 30 May 2013). The overall sexist language of the debate was protested by a group of feminist artists and scholars. For the artists' intervention and protest, see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UCcNjZ026yg&feature=youtu.be> (last accessed on 30 May 2013). One activist was assaulted and received a death threat.

⁴⁶ Sanan Naraghi Anderlini, "1325: A small step for the Security Council: A giant step for humanity," in *Roadmap to 1325: Resolution for the Gender-Sensitive Peace and Security Policies*, ed. Gunda Werner Institute of the Heinrich Boll Foundation (Leverkusen Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishing House, 2010), 28.

⁴⁷ Lynne Christine Alice, "Roadmap to 1325: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo," in *ibid.*, 173.

not decide to invite women to participate.”⁴⁸ While Petersen was considered by many women’s organizations and activists as one among the few international decision-makers prepared to help and listen, his statement is indicative of the general perception that women must be invited by men in order to take part in political processes.

At the same time, the post-war political and social landscape has become dominated by narratives of sacrifice, martyrdom and victory, leaving no room for the painful stories and experiences of war.⁴⁹ The Kosovar leadership legitimates its position through this new symbolic order, and the marginalization of these experiences is often claimed as a necessity in building reconciliatory relations and promoting a strategy of forgive and forget. In tandem these processes have produced a general ignorance of history, erasing the memory and history of the internationalist paradigm—of women’s civic engagement that characterized civil resistance in the 1990s, as was the IWA—and thereby erasing the existence of a history of activism. As Einhorn argues, once gender-based demands are subordinated to the goal of national independence, their mobilization does not result in feminist post-war agendas, and women become cast “as symbolic markers and policy objects, not as active political subjects.”⁵⁰

Gudmundson’s research on gender and peacebuilding in Kosovo has also shown that “the gender essentialist notions that had grown strong during the conflict were equally enforced by international action in the peacebuilding process. Local women were kept in the margins. Their grassroots’ work on ethnic reconciliation idolized as a natural feminine and pacifist phenomenon, while the same men that fought the war were given the reigns to the state under the supervision of international actors.”⁵¹ Therefore the ambassador’s reply, noted earlier, that they *did not wish to break tradition* refers to the general tendency to see Kosovo as a place of

⁴⁸ In *Whose Security?* UNMIK Office for Gender Affairs documentary film. Directors: Antoneta Kastrati and Casey Cooper Johnson, 2006.

⁴⁹ Anna di Lellio and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, “The legendary commander: The construction of an Albanian master-narrative in post-war Kosovo,” *Nations & Nationalism* 12 (2006), no. 3: 513–29.

⁵⁰ Barbara Einhorn, “Insiders and outsiders: Within and beyond the gendered nation,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Gender and Women’s Studies*, eds. Kathy Davis, Mary Evans, and Judith Lorber (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2008), 206.

⁵¹ Gudmundson, *Gender, Power and Peacebuilding*, 83; See also Elisa Helms, “Women as agents of ethnic reconciliation?: Women’s NGOs and international intervention in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina,” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 26 (2003), no. 1: 15–33.

backwardness and patriarchy, much harsher than the societies one finds in Western Europe. Nonetheless, the experiences of women activists and civil society organizations has led most to be uncertain whether it is local or foreign traditions that international actors fear to break.

Again, we may turn to the Ahtisaari Plan as an example of principles structuring power relations in Kosovo, both those ethnic and gendered, within the contested frame of human rights and freedoms. The document, which provides the details of Kosovo's status resolution and the machinery of state-building, makes reference to gender equality in the area of reconciliation, participation in the Constitutional Commission, Assembly of Kosovo, and civil service. An addendum to each article regulating these areas contains a copy-pasted text referring back to Article 2, without recognition of the particularities that make gender a very different category in any of these institutions: "having due regard for internationally recognized principles of gender equality, as reflected in the human rights instruments referred to in Article 2 of this Annex." Paragraph 5 of the document is the only instance where gender appears as a relevant category in its own: "Kosovo shall promote and fully respect a process of reconciliation among all its Communities and their members. Kosovo shall establish a comprehensive and gender-sensitive approach for dealing with its past, which shall include a broad range of transitional justice initiatives."⁵²

While the Ahtisaari Plan had been based on a framework of human rights in order to secure some participation on the basis of gender equality, it has also reinforced ethnic/community/national identifications, as well as rights and claims to participation, including those in political office. A number of scholars have already remarked on how the plan creates a "state of exception" and preserves the legitimacy of international organizations and governments to define the limits of Kosovo's sovereignty.⁵³ But, if we turn to the area of transitional justice, and more specifically, initiatives for

⁵² "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement," Addendum to a letter from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the President of the UN Security Council, at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf (last accessed on 30 May 2013).

⁵³ Besnik Pula, "Kush e Konstituon Shtetin e Kosovës? Qytetaria dhe Komuniteti në Kosovën Ahtisaariane/Who Constitutes the Kosovo state? Citizenship and community in Ahtisaarian Kosovo," in *Identiteti Evropian i Kosovës* (European identity of Kosovo) (Pristina: FORUM 2015, 2007), 109–12, at http://www.syri3.com/pdf_fajllat/identiteti2.pdf (last accessed on 30 May 2013).

dealing with the past, we find aestheticized representations and practices of national political culture that exist in a public space—where sovereignty is constituted and dominated by male political subjects and female bodies—and a new gendered division of labor in the making of history, with remembrance taking place in the political-private-sphere.

The memory work of Ferdane Qerkezi, a woman from Gjakova, is notable but also exemplary of how transitional justice remains confined to patriarchal economic and political arrangements, and masculine national-memory. On the night of 27 March 1999, Serbian paramilitary and police took Ferdane Qerkizi's husband and four sons, including her nephew, and she has not seen them since. She has now turned her home into a museum. Not having moved anything since the night they were taken, she and the home now preserve the moment of capture, loss, and pain. More recently, her husband's family members have begun asserting pressure on her to leave the house, claiming she has no right to its inheritance. By forcing her to do so, they would not only rid her of her economic resources, but also of the knowledge and experience of war and its memorialization. Such a memorial, and the struggle for its maintenance, does not easily fit into the dominant images of martyrs and fighters' sacrifices for the fatherland.

At the same time, new categorizations of gender differences create new class-based vulnerabilities that push women to new limits. The work conventionally done by women (childcare, care for the elderly, the sick, etc.) has been privatized twofold. Privatization has moved all of this work to the sphere of the home and added additional burdens to women's unpaid work, or to the private market, enabling new structural and cultural class distinctions to emerge. The low participation of women in the official labor market (ranging between 26% and 33%) and their lack of property ownership (estimated at 2%), among other indicators, are most often construed as examples of local patriarchy and not due to a lack of economic development policy, insufficient protection under the labor law, and general corruption. Nonetheless, human security and mainstreaming paradigms, as well as civil society strengthening initiatives where women retain some power, are part of "transitions"⁵⁴ and "globalization," where

⁵⁴ There is a large body of work in anthropology, and some in sociology, that provides analysis and critique of "transition" discourses and policies in post-socialist Eastern Europe. See Katherine Verdery, *What was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Prince-

“the distribution of political power in society [changes] in favor of corporate capital against the institutions that have responsibility for the general welfare of the citizenry.”⁵⁵ Although we do not have space to discuss this topic in the detail it deserves, it is possible to at least consider how the political and economic domains interact to create new dependencies and the particular precarious position of women in such arrangements.

The general failure to implement necessary measures, whether Resolution 1325 or the National Gender Equality Law, or a series of other laws and mechanisms that could help economic and political participation, has not prevented attention being given to the topics of sexual exploitation, such as trafficking in human beings, and domestic violence. Within these spheres women can be placed within their conventional and traditional contexts of vulnerabilities, at least the markedly visible ones: in chains, in awareness raising posters, or with bruises on their faces in public service announcements. Consistently addressing the symptoms and not the causes has enabled the disappearance of women’s work. Young women working at cash registers in Kosovo’s mushrooming supermarkets and malls have confided about having to conceal their pregnancies, often tying stomachs with cloth, and thus postponing losing their jobs. With a new labor law in place that requires six months of paid maternity leave most private businesses find a way of dismissing workers. Lack of oversight, a poor judiciary, and politicians with shares in most of these businesses, further aids the impoverishment of the poor. On the other hand men continue to be treated as physical, economic and political aggressors, with dominant conceptions of masculinity reinforced. Although such conceptions are not without a basis, one may also wish to attend to the precarious work of construction workers and day laborers mainly comprised of men. We may consider this situation as one resulting from lack of rule of

ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Michael D. Kennedy, *Cultural Formations of Postcommunism: Emancipation, Transition, Nation, and War* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, *The Politics of Gender After Socialism: A Comparative-Historical Essay* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Daphne Berdahl, Matti Bunzl, Martha Lampland, eds., *Altering States: Ethnographies of Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

⁵⁵ Edith Klein, “The gendered impact of multilateralism in the post-Yugoslav states: Intervention, reconstruction, and globalization,” in *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict*, eds. Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 275.

law and corruption, or a policy-oriented approach that considers only the need of further liberalization strategies, but Kosovo has become a place where work has disappeared from public purview.⁵⁶

In the post-intervention context of Kosovo, as is the case in other post-war, post-colonial and peacebuilding missions, the interaction between gender, nation and state-building has also included the racialization of national culture and re-traditionalization of gendered hierarchies.⁵⁷ Although ethnicity has been used to describe the underlying causes of the wars that took place, and then also to describe the distribution of power in all of the Yugoslav successor states, Bosnia-Herzegovina being the prime example, the discourse of the wars' analysis and peacebuilding mechanisms also set up new relations with judgments about cultural heritage and belonging in Europe.⁵⁸ The racialized underpinnings of segregation in 1990s Kosovo are either unknown or dismissed in critical analyses, while they are quite poorly articulated in nationalist histories.

Analyses provided by feminist scholars from former-Yugoslav republics, attempting to point to the dangers of nationalism, often conclude by equating all experiences of the wars in former republics. They also fail to recognize the complicity of "ordinary people" in the violence that was committed, but also how particular "ethnic identities," similar to those in colonial contexts, become subjugated to perceived universal ones. Here, Kosovo is the prime example. It is quite safe to say that even the most critical scholars have not shown that they know *what to do with Kosovo* and have failed to acknowledge ways in which civilizational missions espoused

⁵⁶ See Ritty Lukose, "Empty citizenship: Protesting politics in the era of globalization," *Cultural Anthropology* 20 (2005), no. 4: 506–33. Lukose has for example shown how the transformation of these domains in the context of market liberalization has affected education in the Indian state of Kerala. While she is interested in the relations between the market and the state, the main focus is on the competing notions of the public and meanings of citizenships. In these instances, new gendered identities, through processes of marketization and privatization, become implicated in emerging class differences and new economic rearrangements and result in both restrictions and civic engagement.

⁵⁷ Sylvia Chant and Matthew C. Gutmann, "'Men-streaming' gender?: Questions for gender and development policy in the 21st century," *Progress in Development Studies* 2 (2002), no. 4: 269–82.

⁵⁸ Nita Luci, "Interventions in Kosova: Un/welcomed guests?," in *Responsibility to Protect: Cultural Perspectives in the Global South*, eds. Rama Mani and Thomas G. Weiss (New York: Routledge, 2011), 167–94.

by first, the Yugoslav, and later, the Serbian state, relied on the construction of the Albanian Other.

In post-1999 Kosovo, often masking underlying assumptions about cultural identities and moral orders in relation to markers of religion, class and sexuality, a legalistic order has been erected that makes Kosovo appear as a site of the clash of civilizations. In this context, Vjollca Krasniqi has for example argued that Kosovar Albanian politicians have aimed at "a Western self-representation through a gendered abnegation of Islam," particularly by banning the scarf in public institutions.⁵⁹ Competing political and economic interests of secular and religious political parties have begun to use the veil in particular, and sexuality in general, to assert limits and possibilities for civil engagement and democracy. Issues of religion and sexuality will provide new challenges to testing those limits in Kosovo. As new religious groups emerge requesting extended presence in public institutions, the taken for granted assumptions underlying Kosovo's secular nationalism are being challenged.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the promotion and meanings of human rights as a modernization discourse have been constituted through a cultural pedagogy that is perceived as Western and thus increasingly attacked by new political entrepreneurs that aim to restore moral order in what is understood as corrupt and Westernized gendered exploitation.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Vjollca Krasniqi, "Imagery, gender and power: The politics of representation in post-war Kosova," *Feminist Review* 86 (2007): 3.

⁶⁰ Islamist influences have grown stronger, particularly from Wahhabi sects, and the Catholic Church remains publicly silent on most issues. Emerging cultural, economic and political rearrangements, dependencies and identifications beg for further analysis, especially those that do not construct the debate along superficial East-West dichotomies, but which do recognize that globalization does not have only a Western point of departure.

⁶¹ The Kosovo Women's Network (KWN) protest of the Pristina-Belgrade negotiations was organized under the slogan of "Justice and Dignity Before Negotiations," held on of 3 November 2012. The key demands in the protest, according to organizers, were a public apology by the Government of Serbia for the war crimes committed, the return of missing persons, justice for crimes and rapes during the war, as well as compensation for moral and economic damages. The KWN received great public and media support for the protest and its director Igballe Rogova was lauded for her commitment to the national cause. Nonetheless when she participated in the launch of the *Kosovo 2.0* magazine issue on sex, addressing issues of sexuality and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual rights, she and the magazine staff were attacked, shunned, and escorted by police to ensure their safety. In a recent blog post a reader thanked Rogova for returning to issues of primary importance for Kosovo,

Although the national-subject is reaffirmed through maleness, and women remain in liminal nature-culture/politics space, this is untrue for all women. Our attempt to generate a critique to power/difference produced through international peacebuilding, and rule of law-building enterprises, is also an attempt to recognize the ways in which women have sought political legitimacy through identification with nation, state and citizenship. On the other hand, gender mainstreaming has further strengthened the power and position of women that emerged as leaders of the women's movement during the 1990s. It has produced a shift from grassroots activism to a top-bottom strategy; with the gender equality law producing 30% participation of women in parliament, and indirectly a woman president and a number of ministers, yet there is no single mayor of a city that is a woman, nor do women hold leadership or decision-making positions in local government. Simultaneously, gender-mainstreaming has not been accompanied by change in the urban-rural divide—rather, self-declared elite, emancipated, and politically aware women continue to dominate the public, governmental, and non-governmental landscape.

Conclusion

Woman's civic engagement and contribution in Kosovo has been continuously silenced by mainstream remembrance and historical accounts. Most feminist scholars in the region are still unable to speak about Kosovo and have created superficial accounts of women's experience there. Western scholars have been interested in the power dynamics of intervention, but they fail in recognizing the longer history and continuity of women's political agency in Kosovo. Women's activism has at best been "added" in the form of special editions of books, written mostly as intervention from the women's movement today as an attempt to re-write women stories and their role as active agents of struggles and political movements. In Kosovo these interventions have focused mostly on highlighting women's involve-

such as the economy and international relations with Kosovo, and not sticking to issues that are marginal for Kosovar society, such as LGBT rights. See Tanya Domi, "Organized thugs attack Kosovo 2.0 magazine launch of sexuality edition," *The New Civil Rights Movement* (15 December 2012), at <http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/organized-thugs-attack-kosovo-2-0-magazine-launch-sexuality-edition/news/2012/12/15/56422> (last accessed on 30 May 2013).

ment rather than seeing it as a cultural or discursive project in which ideals of womanhood and manhood in nationalist movements were also deeply modernist, with a new vision of building a new society.

The relationships women created with the state and nation have been complex, and require historical contextualization and a multidimensional vision of experiences and practices. We have attempted to unearth what is often a buried account of women's participation in nation, state and peacebuilding projects in Kosovo. We did this by looking back to women's involvement in the front-lines of politics as a result of the unraveling of one kind of state, namely socialist Yugoslavia, the peaceful resistance to Milošević's Yugoslavia/Serbia, and state-building under an international protectorate. The gendering of national identities has interacted with and has been challenged by women's activism, although very often within shifting patriarchal ideologies. The space for creating gendered equality was and continues to be sought and negotiated through ideas about modernity, democracy and human rights discourse. Kosovo has often been used as an example of exceptions, with frequent emphases on its particularity, if not backwardness, often disabling recognition of the ways in which such views lead to a provincialized outlook of what are multiply-linked and structured power relations. In Kosovo, nationalism has been seen as that which kept it apart, but the insistence on ethnic identities and politics in building a multi-ethnic state has almost entirely stripped people of citizenship, and made women again markers of moral and traditional codes.

CHAPTER 10

Solving the Issue of Northern Kosovo and Regional Cooperation

DUŠAN JANJIĆ

In this chapter, “Northern Kosovo” refers to three municipalities with an ethnic Serb majority, located to the north of the Ibar River—Zubin Potok, Leposavić, and Zvečan, together with Northern Mitrovica. Population estimates vary between 55,000 and 65,000.¹ Northern Kosovo is an area within the divided states (Kosovo and Serbia)² and the ethnically divided society of Kosovo. In the past and today, the observable characteristic of Kosovo is that Serbs and Albanians have lived in “parallel societies,” next to each other, rather than together (the number of mixed marriages and similar relationships is very low).

With Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power in the late 1980s, the circumstances for the establishment of two “parallel societies” in Kosovo were created.³ First were the Albanians who built their “parallel structures,”⁴

¹ International Crisis Group, “North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in Practice,” Europe Report No. 211 (Brussels, 14 March 2011).

² For the purpose of this chapter, the concept of a “divided state” refers to the states created with the breakup of Yugoslavia. It therefore designates a state which is fragmented along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines.

³ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 49.

⁴ Although the proclaimed independent republic was symbolic (its territory was controlled by the Serbian army and police), the Albanians in Kosovo, in the early 1990s, came to resemble an organized and independent society. Jens Stilhoff Sorensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political Economy, Ethnicity and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 190.

followed by the Serbs who did the same at the end of the war in 1999.⁵ The general term “parallel structures” is used to define bodies and institutions that have been or still are operational in Kosovo after 10 June 1999,

During the war of 1992–95 in the former Yugoslavia, the Albanians did not take unnecessary risky political actions. Instead, they persistently continued to build their society in which the most frequently used foreign currency was the German Mark. They built a parallel system of exchange offices, banks, hospitals, schools, universities, media, etc. A kind of social welfare system of solidarity funds was established to aid the most endangered groups, such as jobless miners in Trepča/Mitrovica. The parallel institutions were generally financed through a parallel tax system. This was based on a 3% income tax of all Albanians in Kosovo and those working abroad. Additional funds were collected in Western Europe. The institutions of the parallel system also required great acts of solidarity, including reduced salaries or unpaid services (Sorensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction*, 191). The overall result was an apartheid-like situation. But, where the Albanians themselves developed a completely independent society from below in protest to, and out of the control (and thereby in conflict with) of the state, it resembled more the Palestinian situation (ibid., 198–9). But the most accurate description is that the infrastructure of the future independent state was established in Kosovo. Generations of young people could not speak the Serbian language, whereas the communication between the Serb and Albanian communities was reduced to a minimum. Dragoljub Mićinović, “*Nomegnuto rešenje za delirijum suvereniteta*”: Kosovo proizvodnja države, “*Limes Plus*” (Belgrade: Hesperia edu, 2007), 20.

- ⁵ The establishment of the Serbian “parallel society” was further influenced by the following: 1) people got used to living in “parallel societies” in the period of building the Albanian “parallel society”; 2) the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started to return to violence immediately after the NATO bombing stopped (in late summer and autumn 1999); and 3) the inability of the international community to adequately respond to KLA violence. All this reinforced the lack of confidence of the Serbian community in the Albanian community and UNMIK. For its part, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) viewed the Serbs in Kosovo and Belgrade as one community, which helped Milošević’s government to establish and support the “parallel institutions” in the Serb enclaves.

The following circumstances additionally contributed to strengthening these institutions: 1) until 2002, access to Kosovo’s institutions was impeded due to lack of freedom of movement; 2) lack of will on the Albanian side to open their institutions for the Serbs; and 3) absence of a well thought-out policy of the UNMIK in that direction. Simona Maneli, *Kritički bilans NMIK-a: Kosovo proizvodnja države*, “*Limes Plus*” (Belgrade: Hesperia edu, 2007), 30, 32.

Violent riots in 2004 increased the distrust of Kosovo Serbs in the Albanians and the international community, and strengthened the “parallel institutions” in the Serb enclaves. In March 2004, violent Albanian riots erupted. The riots were directed against Serbs and Serb religious and cultural monuments in many areas of Kosovo. Northern Kosovo (Mitrovica) remained under the control of a local majority of ethnic Serbs. The UN administration had been unable to establish a unified system of governance throughout Kosovo, leaving it under a form of parallel administration steered from Belgrade. Marc Weller, “Negotiating the Final Status of Kosovo,” Chaillot Paper No. 114, Institute for Security Studies, European Union (Paris, December 2008), 19.

and that are not mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In the majority of the cases, these institutions operate under the *de facto* authority of the Serbian government and assert jurisdiction over Kosovo from Serbia proper or operate in the territory of Kosovo. These parallel structures operate contemporaneously with, or sometimes even under the same roof as, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) recognized bodies.⁶ The Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP), although legally not binding, required that parallel structures be dismantled or integrated into the PISG.⁷

In practice, the parallel systems (Albanian and Serbian) were facilitated by the character of the ethnic structure in Kosovo. While all (at the time) twenty-two municipalities in Kosovo were ethnically mixed, according to the 1981 census (only two had a Serb majority and all others had an Albanian majority) the settlements inside them became increasingly ethnically homogeneous. Increasing physical separation took place in all municipalities, with the exception of some large towns. Thus, the physical and geographical segregation between the ethnic groups facilitated the practical functioning of the system since daily contact to some extent could be avoided.

Today, Kosovo is additionally burdened with inner conflicts between the Serbian ethnic community and the emerging state of Kosovo.⁸ There is a chronic lack of trust between the Serb community and the government in Prishtina. "Kosovo is a cold house for Serbs. They feel as, at best, unwanted guests in the Republic's house. The government, for its part, fears that the room the Serbs want to build in the north will undermine the foundations of the original house, and bring the whole independence project crashing down."⁹ Besides, Kosovo, including the north, suffers from numerous economic, social, political, and security problems. Among these, the problems of key concern to the people in Northern Kosovo are the fol-

⁶ For example, the administrative bodies responsible for property issues, established after 10 June 1999, sometimes recognize the UNMIK's mandate, but also operate under the *de facto* authority of Belgrade.

⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo, *Parallel Structures in Kosovo*, Department of Human Rights, Decentralization and Communities (Prishtina, January 2007), 5.

⁸ Gerard M. Gallucci, "Kosovo—Another attempt to abolish the UN in the north?," *TransConflict Review* 10 (2012).

⁹ International Civilian Office and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *Guests in Our Own House* (Prishtina, 2012), 10.

lowing: economic development and unemployment; the return of refugees; restitution of property or fair compensation; missing persons; and legal protection and the resolution of outstanding court cases.¹⁰

Northern Kosovo: More a “Hot Spot” than a “Frozen Conflict”

Although a relatively small area, with a population that amounts to only a few thousand people, Northern Kosovo has become one of the most complicated issues in the Western Balkans and Southeastern Europe. It threatens to destabilize not only Kosovo and Serbia, but also the neighboring countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia).

The issue of Northern Kosovo is about status and gaining control over territory. The positions of Serbia and Kosovo are different regarding the content of the “proper solution” of this issue. As for the Republic of Serbia, the proper solution for Northern Kosovo means the determination of its borders and territory. For Kosovo, the proper solution means the implementation of Prishtina’s full control over the territory in the north, and placing Serbia in the position to face the inevitable recognition of the Kosovo’s independence.

The territorial issue is of extreme relevance in the state-building of Serbia and, within the context of this issue, there is the question of territorial implications of the solution of Kosovo’s status.¹¹ Valuable mineral deposits and the potential for energy production make this territory important not only for Northern Kosovo, but for the states of Kosovo and Serbia respectively. Because of that, at the beginning, the development of the basis for economic cooperation should be given priority over the resolution of territorial issue. Therefore, the principle of “territorial status quo” is a good starting point for discussion. This excludes both the territorial division of Kosovo and integration by force. In any case, the solution

¹⁰ Council for Inclusive Governance, *Searching for Solutions for Kosovo’s North* (New York, 2012), 54.

¹¹ The formula “military and police control over territory for development” might help in that difficult task. Dušan Janjić, “The status of Kosovo,” paper submitted to the 2nd International SEER Symposium (Knokke-Heist, Belgium, 2–4 November 2012), 1.

to northern Kosovo will have a direct influence on the main foreign policy goal of Serbia and Kosovo: EU integration.¹²

Review of Strategies Developed to Deal with Northern Kosovo

In the recent history of Kosovo's conflict management, several strategies have been applied.¹³ First, the *status quo strategy* is unsustainable in the midterm. Therefore, mutually acceptable ways to resolve the unsustainable status quo in the north in a peaceful way must be found.¹⁴ Second, practice over the last two decades has shown that the practice of *territorial delimitation and division along the ethnic lines* (in the case of Northern Kosovo and Mitrovica, along the Ibar River) has been an inadequate and coerced solution.¹⁵ It has not brought peace and stability but temporarily only froze the conflict.

In the period 2001–12, it appears that Serbia's policy toward Kosovo developed around two plans: Plan A—"frozen conflict"; and Plan B—partition of Kosovo. There has been no public confirmation of this policy, but

¹² Dušan Janjić, "The case of Northern Kosovo and Mitrovica," in *"Frozen Conflicts" in Europe: Searching for Pragmatic Solutions and Promoting Reconciliation* (Bled: Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), 19; Council for Inclusive Governance, *Searching for Solutions*, 48, 49, 70.

¹³ Janjić, "The case of Northern Kosovo and Mitrovica," 18.

¹⁴ Council for Inclusive Governance, *Searching for Solutions*, 49.

¹⁵ An example of a well-developed idea of the Kosovo partition was given by Diter Farwick, global Editor-in-Chief of the World Security Network Foundation and former DepDivCdr in charge of sending the first German troops to Kosovo, in "Is Kosovo partition the best way?" (17 September 2007). Therefore, we present this text in its entirety: "The partition could run through Mitrovica and along the River Ibar—separating the Serbs in the north from the Kosovo-Albanians in the south already de facto in existence in the daily lives of people in the region today. The northern part of Kosovo with its vast Serbian majority would get the status of an autonomous region. This would not mean the end of shifts in the region. It might well happen that in the mid-term perspective this province will be integrated into the 'Republic of Srpska.' More complicated is the situation with the Serbian holy sites and Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. The combination of partition and minority protection might become a face-saving action for Serbia and Russia. This solution would mitigate the present tensions and would improve stability and security. The Kosovo-Albanians have to be convinced that a smaller but more independent Kosovo is better than the present situation with on-going conflicts. They know that more foreign direct investments depend on a stabilized Kosovo."

developments on the ground do indicate it. In 2001, during the negotiation on the Preševo Valley, the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojša Čović put forward a proposal for partition, concerning mainly the creation of a Serb entity in Northern Kosovo.¹⁶ Ten years later, in May 2011, the Serbs organized a protest (road block, political demonstrations and even armed incidents with casualties on the side of the Kosovo Police Service [KPS] and the Kosovo Force [KFOR]) against an attempt by Prishtina and the international community (Quint, KFOR, and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo [EULEX]), within the technical dialogue, to establish control in four municipalities in north. By protesting, the Northern Serbs demonstrated that they believed that territorial delimitation was an option.

During 2011–12, the then-Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of Serbia Ivica Dačić (currently the Prime Minister and head of Belgrade's negotiating team in the ongoing dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina) was promoting the old but still active policy of partition of Kosovo. The policy of partition had become official in December 2011, when Serbia's President Boris Tadić clearly distinguished Kosovo Serbs living in the north of the Ibar River from those living in the south. Tadić called on Kosovo Serbs from Northern Kosovo to boycott the Kosovo parliamentary elections, while saying that those in the south could do as they wished.¹⁷ In fact, Boris Tadić was using his "secret diplomacy" to place the division of Kosovo on the agenda, throughout his whole presidential term, until 2011, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clearly stated that this option was a nonstarter.¹⁸

The current President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić and the ruling coalition led by his SNS announced a change in state policy and intention to reach a political consensus before the upcoming negotiations with Prishtina. As an expression of this consensus, it was announced that the Assembly of the National Republic of Serbia would adopt a "platform."

¹⁶ Jacques Rupnik, "The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo question," Chaillot Paper No. 50, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union (Paris, October 2001), 79, 80.

¹⁷ Krenar Gashi, "Possible implications of the dialogue Prishtina–Belgrade on regional stability: A Kosovo–Albanian view," in *From Bosnia and Herzegovina to Northern Kosovo: Coping with the Remaining Impasses in the Western Balkans*, eds. Ernest M. Felberbauer and Predrag Jureković (Vienna: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, Austrian Ministry of Defense), 143.

¹⁸ Lidija Valtner, *Dačićeve izjave isprovocirale Evropu* (Belgrade: Danas, 2012), 2.

By all accounts, this platform will not go beyond the coalition agreement signed by SNS, SPS, and URS on 10 July 2012. This in turn means that it will not invoke the division of the territory.

- The *exchange of the territories* of Preševo and Bujanovac municipalities in Central Serbia for Zubin Potok, Leposavić, Zvečan, and the northern part of Mitrovica. This option is unlikely to take place in the current security and political circumstances.
- *Ethnic cantonization and regionalization* is an idea which was included in many projects during the 1990s. It was also advocated by the Belgrade negotiation team during the talks in 2006 and 2007, but was never implemented.¹⁹ Some elements of this concept (establishment of the Serb-majority municipalities and protected zones around the Serbian Orthodox monasteries and cultural and historical monuments) are contained in the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement.
- *Implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP)* or the *Ahtisaari Plan* has been the strategy of Kosovo's authorities since the unilateral declaration of its independence. The stumbling blocks for the Serbs and Serbia regarding the acceptance of the CSP are the linkage of the CSP with the independence of Kosovo; and the conferring of a "minority community" status on the Serb community bears a risk of losing "acquired rights." On a practical level, there were two reasons for the rejection of the CSP by the Kosovo Serbs: a strong perception that it would mean lower living standards; and a real fear of the loss of all public sector jobs in the North.²⁰

In 2010, the Government of Kosovo appointed Ylber Hysa to serve as coordinator for implementation of "The Strategy for Northern Kosovo." Although the Government of Kosovo with the assistance of the Interna-

¹⁹ According to Dr. Dusan Bataković, one of the authors of Serbia's plan for the Kosovo status in 2006, the "region" in this plan implied the connection of territorially separated Serbian enclaves and large monastery complexes into one region. Dr. Dušan T. Bataković, *Kosovo i Metohija: Decentralizacijom do Evrope*, LimesPlus No. 4 (Belgrade, 2004), 88.

²⁰ International Civilian Office and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *Guests in Our Own House*, 11.

tional Civilian Office (ICO) adopted an ambitious plan which seemed to suggest that elections would be called on the entire territory including Northern Kosovo in less than a year, this attempt had no practical results. Therefore, the Quint, the ICO, and the Government of Kosovo sought new avenues to implement the strategy.²¹

Within the same effort, a new "office," named the Temporary Administrative Office for North Mitrovica, was opened in summer 2012.²²

²¹ In February 2012, the Prishtina press reported on secret meetings between the Kosovo government, the US ambassador, and chief of the International Civilian Office (ICO), Pieter Feith, on a new plan to push the UN out of the north. According to Koha Ditore, the three have agreed to close the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Administration in Mitrovica (UAM) that administers Northern Mitrovica under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Koha Ditore says this is contained in the document "Kosovo Government carries over the financing of the municipal services in the north from UAM to AONM." It refers to an action plan aiming at the closure of UAM by 31 March and its replacement with a "Temporary Administrative Office for North Mitrovica" (AONM) under the authority of Prishtina and to be placed in the mixed neighborhood of Bosniak Mahalla. The plan is said to contain 10 actions which were due to begin implementation in 2012. Space and equipment for the AONM were to be secured by 10 February, with a meeting with the UNMIK SRSG on the 17th to inform him that the Kosovo government would cease funding the UAM.

KIPRED's paper, "A comprehensive vision for the North: The final countdown," is a professionally done effort to prod the Kosovo government and its international supporters to undertake ten actions to overcome the status quo of "criminals and extremists" in the north. KIPRED calls for imposing its "non-negotiable" plan "supported politically and operationally by EU, USA and NATO." The actions include forming transitional local governments for the four northern Serb-majority municipalities, withdrawal of "parallel security institutions," imposition of Kosovo courts and police in the north supported by EULEX and KFOR, and closing the UAM. KIPRED requires as well that the Ahtisaari Plan be implemented as it is (Gallucci, "Kosovo").

²² The opening of the office, according to newspaper sources, is made by the Government of Kosovo and the ICO, in coordination with the Embassy of the United States of America to Kosovo and other embassies. The UNMIK chief, Farid Zaarifa, and UNMIK transferred all documents, data, and other material to the new Kosovo government office. The Ahtisaari Plan did not mention that an administrative office should have been established for the municipality of Northern Mitrovica, but, searching for the most adequate solution, a "Joint Board" was envisaged for the city of Mitrovica divided into two municipalities. The joint board shall consist of eleven members, five representatives selected by each subject and one international representative to be elected from the International Civilian Representative (ICR). The Joint Board shall be guided by the international representative. The board will be created without establishing a municipality in the northern part of Mitrovica, which is inhabited mostly by Serbs. In this way the Kosovo government is trying to find an alternative route to the implementation of Ahtisaari Package. Plan for the establishment of the Administrative Office of Northern Mitrovica (AONM), a copy of which has ensured "Koha Ditore," provides as follows: "As provided in section 13 of the

According to Kosovo's interior minister, the new office will provide services and will be followed by "local elections" to have "legal partners" in the north, thus "contributing to the ending of monitoring of the supervised independence of Kosovo."²³ In 2011, there was a lot of media speculation in Serbia and Kosovo about a suggested "Ahtisaari Plan Plus." In spite of the fact that the "Ahtisaari Plan Plus" is imaginary, it does have positive traction in leaving space for concerns to be addressed in the future.²⁴

During 2011 and early 2012, a technical dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina was held according to the UN General Assembly Resolution 64/248. The main purpose of the "technical dialogue" was to build trust between Belgrade and Prishtina. Although seven agreements were reached, the main purpose of the technical part of the dialogue was not achieved. However, the implementation of agreed issues and the continuation of dialogue about unfinished issues such as those of telecommunications, energy, and property, is pending.²⁵

Some kind of "transitional solution": transitional administration guided by the principles of minority self-government based on the right to self-organization and self-administration, including regional autonomy.²⁶ Similar solutions were effective in many cases of ethnic conflicts and

Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement and Article 7 of the Law on municipal boundaries, a common functional board of Mitrovica will be established for close cooperation between Mitrovica and AONM in the fields of the relevant municipal authority."

In fact, the Comprehensive Proposal, known as the Ahtisaari Plan, provides that the Joint Board to be of Northern and Southern Mitrovica, and not as it was envisaged in this government document. However, it is anticipated the Board to develop functional cooperation in areas of their competence, under the agreement between two entities that comprise Mitrovica and AONM. *M-Magazine* (28 May 2012), at <http://www.m-magazine.org> (accessed on 26 October 2012).

²³ Gallucci, "Kosovo."

²⁴ International Civilian Office and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *Guests in Our Own House*, 10.

²⁵ Janjić, "The case of Northern Kosovo and Mitrovica," 19.

²⁶ Janjić "Ethnic conflicts and minorities in a multiethnic society," *Themes* 20 (2002): 44, 45. Basic principles supporting this model are 1) *regionalization*, which, to the largest possible extent, respects economic, demographic, cultural, historical, and ethnic features, and which would also make possible full protection of the rights of national communities, including self-government for Serbs. 2) *Institutions of self-organization and self-administration of national communities*, including the Serb one, would be instituted on the basis of democratic elections within each of the communities. This model was elaborated in Forum for Ethnic Relations and YUCOM, *Decentralization of Kosovo* (Belgrade, 2002).

divided states and cities (Eastern Slavonia,²⁷ Mostar). There are different models of transitional solution: 1) regional autonomy (without prejudice to the status of Kosovo, but also without compromising the *status quo*); 2) transitional administration under international supervision (integration by introducing Kosovo's legislation as an objective); and 3) "special status" or interim government (Serbian legislation remains, to be progressively aligned with Kosovo's legislation). Each option assumes reaching an agreement on the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which confirms the agreed interim solution.

Also, it is necessary to harmonize the legislation on minority self-government of Serbia and Kosovo and introduce the level of minority self-government and self-administration which is granted to Albanians and other minority communities in Serbia. One of the solutions within this concept will be further discussed in the next section.

One of Possible Solutions for Northern Kosovo

In line with the UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 in March 2011, the EU began facilitating a process of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo from its first round, which was held on 8 and 9 March 2011 until the thirteenth held on 8 July 2013. A desired outcome of the dialogue is the normalization of relations between the two sides. The normalization process is seen as serving peace, security, and stability in the Western Balkan region, as well as the promotion of cooperation, the advancement of the EU integration progress, and improvement of people's lives.²⁸ In reality, the dialogue represents a large step made by the two sides.²⁹

During the first stage of technical dialogue, a number of sector agreements in the form of conclusions were reached. The first agreement was reached on the free movement of goods, which was one of the out-

²⁷ In developing a desirable model for dialogue and solution for Northern Kosovo, the experience with the Erdut Agreement should be kept in mind, which created conditions for peaceful integration and the mutual recognition of Serbia and Croatia.

²⁸ UN General Assembly, A/RES/64/298 (13 October 2010), at <http://www.un.org>; Kosovo Institute of Peace, "A 'peace treaty' for sustainable peace: A new beginning for Kosovo and Serbia," Policy Study No. 1 (Prishtina and Kosovo, 2012), 3, 5, 6.

²⁹ New Policy Center, "(Is there) a way forward for Serbia and Kosovo?" (Belgrade, March 2013), 32.

standing issues which had obstructed economic development. Parallel to the technical dialogue, a high-level political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (represented by the prime ministers and the presidents) was under way. Its purpose was the normalization and resolution of the disputes in and over Northern Kosovo.³⁰

In December 2012, Serbia and Kosovo reached a landmark agreement on border control and agreed on how to collect customs duty and VAT, and defined a special fund to collect and disburse these revenues in Northern Kosovo. This was an important step toward the integration of Northern Kosovo in Kosovo's institutional and territorial framework. The Northern Kosovo Serbs oppose the agreement.³¹ From this moment forward, it became clear that the authorities in Belgrade failed to motivate the Serbs from Northern Kosovo to directly participate in the implementation of agreements reached so far. However, despite the sporadic public disputes and apparent mutual distrust, Serbs in Northern Kosovo have not completely rejected cooperation with Belgrade. In fact, they did not obstruct in any way the implementation of agreements already in place.

In searching for a solution for Northern Kosovo, one of the biggest challenges is the survival of institutions of the Republic of Serbia, described by Prishtina and part of the international community as "parallel institutions." The Northern Serbs insist on the "parallel structures" funded by Belgrade because they are a visible evidence of Kosovo's division and the collapse of "multi-ethnic" society, proclaimed by the United Nations as the main goal and reason for its presence in Kosovo. Yet the "parallel structures" are in concrete terms of vital importance for the survival of Serbs.³² Even more than that: the Northern Serbs perceive themselves as an integral part of Serbia, not a part of Kosovo. Therefore, they continue to resist integration into the Republic of Kosovo by not recognizing Kosovo's laws and refusing to cooperate with Kosovo's institutions. The Northern Serbs regard that the institutions and laws of the Republic of Serbia as the only legitimate ones in Northern Kosovo. For most of them, the institutions of the Republic of Serbia are not "parallel" as seen by Prishtina and the

³⁰ Kosovo Institute of Peace, "A 'peace treaty' for sustainable peace," 6, 8, 10.

³¹ International Crisis Group, "Serbia and Kosovo: The path to normalisation," New Report (Pristina, Belgrade, and Brussels, 19 February 2013), 1.

³² Žan-Arno Derand, *Kosovska zamka* (Belgrade: Hisperia edu, 2009).

international community, since they are the only institutions which grant independence to local self-government and independent social services, health, and educational and cultural institutions.³³ After all, the Northern Serbs today perceive that Serbia offers more on both practical and emotional levels. From their point of view, the Albanians fear that the Serbs want to divide Kosovo and detach its northern part to Serbia. On the other hand, many Albanians publically express the desire to expel the Serbs from Northern Kosovo by force.³⁴

To reach the right solution, each side must be willing to compromise and recognize the fundamental interests of the other side, as well as their own. For the northern Serbs it is to be allowed to live in their own communities without political interference in local matters from Kosovo's central institutions and to retain strong linkages to Serbia. For the Kosovo Albanians it is that the north remains part of Kosovo and functions in significant ways as part of Kosovo's legal system. This can be achieved by granting "substantial autonomy" to Northern Kosovo, which goes beyond the current form of the Ahtisaari Plan. This solution will allow the Serbs to administer Northern Kosovo as part of the legal system of Kosovo state.³⁵

The agreement, signed on 19 April 2013, established a framework for the resolution of Northern Kosovo's status. According to the agreement, Serbia—which does not recognize Kosovo's independence, declared in 2008—has a continued role in protecting the interests of Serbs in Northern Kosovo.³⁶ For officials from Kosovo, Serbia, and the EU, the agreement is a milestone that will enhance stability in the region and clear a path for both countries to join the EU. In reality, the 15-point agreement on Northern Kosovo remains an outline with many important details to be determined. This is the agreement on power-sharing, under which the municipal bodies in the Serb-majority areas and in Northern Kosovo will

³³ Council for Inclusive Governance, *Searching for Solutions*, 53.

³⁴ Due to such radically opposed political aims, significant influence of the extreme streams from both sides and the high level of the armed population, Northern Kosovo presents a serious security challenge. The priorities of that domain are violence prevention and confidence building.

³⁵ Štefan Lene, "Međunarodna zajednica ne želi podelu Kosova," *Politika* (Belgrade, 23 September 2012), at <http://www.politika.co.yu> (accessed on 26 October 2012).

³⁶ David L. Phillips, "How to heal Balkan wounds for good," op-ed contributor (9 May 2013).

retain autonomy in matters such as health care, education, and culture. In return, the police and courts will apply the laws of the central government in Prishtina. The agreement is an important element of *the first step (short-term)* in searching for a solution for Northern Kosovo's status.

The *second step* seems to be the integration of Kosovo and the ability to participate autonomously and independently in regional cooperation through EU funding and other forms of international cooperation (or regional autonomy). The solution for Northern Kosovo should provide "[e]nhanced rights and status of Serbs in those municipalities of Northern Kosovo where Serbs are in the majority by creating a single region called Northern Kosovo, with special representative rights."³⁷

Under the current circumstances, Northern Kosovo does not participate in any regional cooperation. It can be described as a "black hole," not only of Serbia or Kosovo, but also of the Western Balkans, which sucks in political energy and produces distrust, disagreements, and conflicts. In contrast to this gloomy description, participants in the discussion between representatives of Serbia and Kosovo pointed out that Northern Kosovo could become a generator of regional cooperation, *inter alia*, as one participant proposed, by developing the concept of a "mini European region."

"Mini European region" is not the term that exists among the "key words" of the administration of the European Union, but it would, in terms of content, represent the concept similar to Euro regions and could be an important instrument for Europeanization, not only of municipalities in Northern Kosovo, but also of their neighboring municipalities, both in Kosovo proper—South Mitrovica and Vučitrn, and in central Serbia and Montenegro—the municipalities of Sandžak, but also the municipality of Skadar in Albania. This concept could be implemented by fostering and supporting the cooperation of citizens and local communities across the present dividing borders. It was suggested in the Serb–Kosovar discussion that such a program of cross-border cooperation could be supported by the European Union, both politically, and by financial instruments.

³⁷ Ilir Deda, "The problem of Northern Kosovo," in *"Frozen Conflicts" in Europe: Searching for Pragmatic Solutions and Promoting Reconciliation* (Bled: Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), 15.

Normalization as the Road to a Possible Solution

The dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade is aimed at normalizing relations between Prishtina and Belgrade. Normalization is considered to be the aim of the dialogue, specifically not only normalization of relations *between* Serbia and Kosovo, but also “normalization” of Serbia and Kosovo. In the other context of “normalization” the needs for a higher standard of living, issues of national identity, and other long-term themes should be taken care of. In these terms, the European future is, for the time being, the only point at which Serbia and Kosovo are united and it is necessary to “put pressure” on the European Union to intensify the accession to the membership by the states in the region.

Judging by experience so far, the two sides had the most bitter conflicts over the issues concerning which their respective positions are the most divergent, such as the status of Kosovo. That is why it is recommended that an atmosphere be created that would make possible an opening of themes in the dialogue that would also relax the positions of negotiators, such as progress in joining the European Union. It is necessary to find a way for Serbia and Kosovo to experience normalization of relations as a way to eliminate their respective obstacles to joining the European Union.³⁸

³⁸ Forum for Ethnic Relations, “Perspective of Northern Kosovo in the process of normalization between Belgrade and Prishtina,” Forum No. 1/2013, Policy Paper (Belgrade, April 2013), 9, 10.

CHAPTER 11

Kosova 1912–2000 in the History Textbooks of Kosova and Serbia

SHKËLZEN GASHI

This chapter aims to focus on the approach to events in Kosova over the period of nearly a century (1912–2000) in the primary and high school textbooks of Kosova and Serbia. The Kosovar textbooks are published by the Libri Shkollor publishing house, those of Serbia by Zavod za udžbenike. The history textbooks of the two countries, approved by the respective ministries of education, are a key source for this chapter. The descriptions given in these historiographies are compared, with the similarities and differences between them drawn out. International authors such as Noel Malcolm, Stephen Schwartz, Tim Judah, and Howard Clark dealing with the events in Kosova in this period are likewise set against them with their respective arguments. This chapter deals with some of the most important periods of the history of the last century in Kosova, setting out where the history books do not agree with one another, but also the falsifications of each. In an indirect way the chapter also draws out what the governments of these countries are suggesting as the relations between these neighbour states to the younger generations whom they are educating through the textbooks. I also aim, within the framework of this chapter, to reveal in the clearest possible way, based on facts, what is the basis of the often contradictory allegations between the two peoples who come up against one another in Kosova.

Kosova during 1912–13

The Albanian uprising of 1912

From 1878–1912, the highest point of aspirations for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, Albanians achieved what the historiography of Albania and Kosova calls the *general uprising of 1912*. Starting in spring 1912, this uprising led by Hasan Prishtina aspired to territorial autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. This autonomy was expected to include within it the request for the recognition of the borders of Albania and ethnically Albanian civil and military authorities.¹ History textbooks in Serbia make no mention at all of this uprising, while some history textbooks in Kosova exaggerate the political aims of the uprising from *autonomy* to *independence*.²

Having gained control of the territory of Kosova in the summer of 1912, for reasons of internal divisions,³ and as an alteration to the initial political platform for *territorial* autonomy, the leaders of the Albanian insurgents established a new political platform with 14 demands, which are known as Hasan Prishtina's 14 Points.⁴ These 14 points set out a *non-territorial* autonomy, because there is no explicit mention either of Albania's army or of her borders. The points deal mainly with education, agriculture, trade and transport, but also include the announcement of a general amnesty, reparations for houses that were destroyed and trials of members of the Young Turks' cabinet.⁵

¹ For the demands of the 1912 uprising, see Hasan Prishtina, *A Brief Memoir of the Albanian Rebellion of 1912* (Prishtina: Rrokullia, 2010), 30.

² Fehmi Rexhepi and Frashër Demaj, *Historia 5* (Prishtina: Libri Shkollor, 2009), 69.

³ For the differences between the leaders of the uprising, see the memoirs of Prishtina: *A Brief Memoir*, 33–5. See also Peter Bartl *Shqipëria—nga mesjeta deri sot* (Prizren: Drita, 1999), 123–6.

⁴ The text of Hasan Prishtina's 14 points can be found in Nevilla Nika, *Përmbledhje dokumentesh mbi kryengritjet shqiptare (1910–1912)* (Prishtina: Instituti i Historisë, 2003), 286–8 and 297–9.

⁵ For an analysis of the general Albanian uprising of 1912, and particularly for the Albanian insurgents' talks with the representatives of the Ottoman Empire, see Shukri Rahimi, *Lufta e shqiptarëve për autonomi (1897–1912)* (Prishtina: Enti i Teksteve dhe Mjeteve Mësimore i KSA të Kosovës, 1980), 193–225. See also George Gawrych, *Gjysmëhëna dhe shqiponja—sundimi otoman, islamizimi dhe shqiptarët 1874–1913* (Tirana: Bota Shqiptare, 2007), 291–301.

In Kosova's textbooks, these 14 points are presented as "...new demands and with some changes,"⁶ but without specifying the contents or the changes. The textbooks of Kosova do not identify the change in the political aims of the Albanian insurgents from *territorial* autonomy to *non-territorial* autonomy. According to the Kosovar textbooks, the Albanian insurgents declared the end of the uprising because "...armed provocation was beginning on the Montenegro border."⁷

The fact that the political demands of the Albanian leaders of the time were not achieved is thus attributed in Kosovar textbooks solely to neighbouring countries. These textbooks therefore do not mention anywhere the fact that the Albanians of the time were divided: on one hand, the majority of the representatives from the cities—the beys and the agas—who *opposed* autonomy, and on the other, the leaders of the uprising who were *seeking* autonomy, but who were likewise divided because some of them liked being strongly linked to the Ottoman Empire.⁸ Nor is it mentioned in the textbooks of Kosova that the divisions between the leaders of the Albanian uprising were encouraged by Serbia's representatives in Prishtina, who supplied some of the leaders of the Albanian uprising with arms.⁹

In these textbooks there is no mention of the divisions which relate to the political currents of the time, so all the action of the period is presented as a part of what the books call the Albanian National Movement, which is presented as a homogenous structure with clear demands. Representation of these divisions is pivotal because they had significant implications for the changes in the political demands, from *territorial* autonomy to *non-territorial* autonomy. Nevertheless, the Albanian insurgents did not achieve even *non-territorial* autonomy because, instead of creating the institutions of power, they dispersed immediately after the Ottoman Empire officially accepted the 14 points, with the exception of the initiation of legal proceedings against the Young Turk government.

⁶ Jusuf Bajraktari, Fehmi Rexhepi, and Frashër Demaj, *Historia 10* (Prishtina: Libri Shkol-
lor, 2010), 76.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁸ See Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo—A Short History* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2002), 246. Hasan Prishtina in his memoirs said that Riza Gjakova and Isa Boletini started to say "we don't want autonomy and we cannot split away from the Ottomans."

⁹ For the supplies of arms to Isa Boletini and Riza Gjakova by Serb representatives, see the Serbian document published in Zekeria Cana, *Kryengritja shqiptare e vitit 1912 në dokumentet sërbe* (Prishtina: Instituti Albanologjik i Prishtinës, 2008), 480–8.

The liberation/occupation of Kosova

At the end of September 1912, Ottoman regiments started to leave Kosova, and at the beginning of October 1912, Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Within a week, the other members of the Balkan League, formed on 13 March 1912 initially by Serbia and Bulgaria, and later joined by Greece and Montenegro, did the same. The Balkan League Treaty—protected by Russia—described the division of territory after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, which had also controlled the areas of the Balkans with majority Albanian populations, including Kosova.¹⁰ The Albanians decided not to take part in a war between the Balkan allies and the Ottoman Empire.

In the middle of October 1912, the King of Serbia, Petar Karađorđević, issued a decree titled “To the Serbian people” where, among other things, he said: “In the name of God I have ordered my brave army to wage a holy war for the freedom of our brothers and for a better life. My army will meet in Old Serbia with both Christian and Muslim Serbs, both equally loved, as well as with Christian and Muslim Albanians, with whom our nation has shared joy and bitterness for thirteen centuries uninterrupted. We will bring freedom, brotherhood and equality to all.”¹¹

The Third Serbian Army penetrated into Kosova and further into Albanian lands. For the Serbian textbooks, “with lightning-swift penetration it liberated *Kosova*, and through northern Albania penetrated further, to the *Adriatic Sea*.”¹² Meanwhile, in the Kosovar textbooks “*the Serbian army conquered Kosova* and moved on to other parts of *Northern* and *Central Albania*,”¹³ while the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-East Europe,¹⁴ which attempts to change the traditional approach to teaching modern history in this part of Europe, says in a publication as part of the Joint History Project, titled “The Balkan Wars,” that halfway

¹⁰ For more on the Balkan League, see Stephen Schwartz, *Kosovo: Background to a War* (London: Anthem Press, 2000), 41–2. See also Georges Castellan, *Histori e Ballkanit* (Tirana: Çabej, 1996), 390–6.

¹¹ Leo Freundlich, *Albania's Golgotha* (Prishtina: Rrokullia, 2010), 8.

¹² Đorđe Đurić and Momčilo Pavlović, *Istorija 3* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010), 67 (original emphasis).

¹³ Bajraktari et al., *Historia 10*, 77 (original emphasis).

¹⁴ More on this organization at <http://www.cdsee.org/>.

through October 1912, “the Serbian administrative system came into force in Kosova.”¹⁵

Although the Albanians resisted the Serbian forces, on 23 October 1912, on the field where the 1389 Battle of Kosova had taken place, the Serbs celebrated what the Serbian textbooks call “the liberation of Kosova [. . .] the cradle of the Serbian state . . . that many generations had waited for during the nineteenth century.”¹⁶ While this liberation of Kosova is justified with the claim that Kosova is the “cradle of the Serbian state,”¹⁷ the penetration to the Adriatic is presented just as fulfilling “one of the aims of the war.”¹⁸ This is an example of the promotion of offensive nationalism in the Serbian textbooks.

On the other hand, the fact that Kosova, and other lands where Albanians were living, had come under Serbian rule is justified in the Kosovar textbooks through the difficult position of the Albanians who “had to fight against the Ottomans for liberation and against neighbouring states in defence.”¹⁹ On the other hand, one finds the promotion of *defensive* nationalism in the Kosovar textbooks, specifically in the responses of the Albanian patriots to the Serbian forces who advanced to Central Albania. According to these textbooks, they “raised the national flag to present the Serbian army with a fait accompli”²⁰ or “they were forced to withdraw but the spirit of Albanian persistence continued into later years”²¹ or “Ismail Qemali’s government attempted not to enter into armed conflict with the invading Serbian forces.”²²

War crimes

During the liberation/occupation of Kosova, terrible crimes were committed, but the Serbian textbooks say nothing about these crimes, while the Kosovar textbooks make qualified statements such as “invasion by the

¹⁵ Valery Kolev and Christina Koulouri, *The Balkan Wars* (Thessaloniki: Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, 2009), 17.

¹⁶ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 67.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Fehmi Rexhepi, *Historia* 5 (Prishtina: Libri Shkollor, 2005), 70.

²⁰ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10 [note 6], p. 78.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 84.

²² *Ibid.*, 81.

armies of neighbouring countries was accompanied by bloody terrorist acts against the Albanian people" or "Albanians . . . were subjected to the violence and terror of Balkan state nationalism."²³

Neither the textbooks of Kosova, nor those of Serbia make reference, for example, to the report "Albania's Golgotha" of the Austrian social democrat, Leo Freundlich, which says that the number of Albanians killed at the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913 must have been 25,000. None of the school textbooks from any of the three countries makes reference to the writings of Leon Trotsky, the war correspondent for a Russian daily newspaper, or the data of the Report of the International Commission to inquire into the causes and conflict of the Balkan War, drafted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.²⁴

Likewise, none of the history textbooks refers to the articles of the Serbian social democrats, Kosta Novaković, Dušan Popović, Dragiša Lapčević, and Triša Kaclerović, published in the Belgrade socialist newspaper *Radničke Novine*. Of particular use would have been the articles of the Serbian Social Democrat Dimitrije Tucović, one of which said: "we made a deliberate assassination attempt on an entire nation."²⁵

The independence of Albania

At the same time as these bloody events were unfolding, on 28 November 1912 Albania declared independence in Vlora, a coastal town in the south of Albania, which was the only Albanian city still not occupied by the troops of the Balkan Alliance. According to the Serbian textbooks, "in practice this declaration meant that Serbia would not gain access to the sea,"²⁶ while according to the Kosovar textbooks, "approximately half of Albanian lands and the Albanian people did not enjoy the independence declared in Vlora because these lands were occupied by the *Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek states*."²⁷

²³ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 77 and 79.

²⁴ Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conflict of the Balkan Wars (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914).

²⁵ Dimitrije Tucović, *Zgjedhje punimesh II* (Prishtina: Rilindja, 1981), 346.

²⁶ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 67.

²⁷ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 79. (original emphasis).

After Albania's declaration of independence, the Ambassadors' Conference in London, which began in December 1912 to discuss the Albanian question, decided on the autonomy of Albania within the Ottoman Empire. In January 1913, the Serbian Government sent a memorandum to the Great Powers which consisted of three reasons for the Serbian liberation of Kosova: the *historic* right, the *ethnographic* right, and the *moral* right "as a more civilized nation."²⁸ On 29 July 1913, the Ambassadors' Conference in London decided that Albania should be a sovereign, hereditary, and neutral principality, enjoying the guarantee of the Great Powers.

The Balkan states, supported by Russia, proposed that the territory of Albania should be half as big as it is today, while the government of Ismail Qemali, supported by Austria-Hungary, proposed that the territory of Albania should be twice as large as it is today. The decision of the Great Powers, on the proposal of the English, fell between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian suggestions. In fact, the Great Powers recognised a territory which was greater than the Albanians had managed to bring under their administration. The history textbooks of Kosova, Serbia, and Albania blame third parties for the fact that they were not able to realize their respective political aims. While the Kosovar textbooks see the European powers as the decision-makers for "the carving up of Albanian lands,"²⁹ the Serbian textbooks see Austria-Hungary as the barrier to the strengthening of Serbia because they supported the Albanian declaration of independence which "meant that Serbia would not have access to the sea."³⁰

Kosova between the Two World Wars, 1918–39

Kosova under Austrian/Bulgarian rule

In the autumn of 1915, Bulgarian and Austrian troops entered Serbia and Kosova. Many Serbian soldiers and civilians, together with their king, Petar Karađorđević, withdrew through the mountains of Albania to reach the

²⁸ This fragment of the Memorandum of the Government of Serbia can be found in the book by Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, *Diplomaci mbi tëhun e thikës* (Tirana: Toena, 2010), 292.

²⁹ Rexhepi, *Historia* 5, 77.

³⁰ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 67. For Austro-Hungarian help in the founding of Albania, see Norman Rich, *Diplomacia e Fuqive të Mëdha 1814–1914* (Tirana: Toena, 2006), 423–39.

Adriatic, where their French and British allies were waiting for them. In Serbian textbooks this retreat is presented as one of the most difficult incidents of Serbian history and is called the “Albanian Golgotha.”³¹

Serbian textbooks say that because of the bitterness of the winter and other difficulties, during this retreat, “tens of thousands of Serbian soldiers and civilians” fell³² and that the Serbian soldiers and civilians were attacked by “local bands of Albanians.”³³ The textbooks of Kosova, on the other hand, do not mention enemy action and killings by Albanians of Serbian soldiers and civilians who were leaving Kosova through the Albanian mountains at the end of 1915.³⁴

Kosova, like Serbia, was divided in two: the *Austrian zone*, which allowed Albanian schools and the use of Albanian in administration; and the *Bulgarian zone*, where Albanian schools and the use of Albanian in administration were not allowed and the regime dictated harsh conditions, under which people not only did forced labour but suffered to have enough to eat. The Albanians of Kosova therefore began armed resistance, led in the Bulgarian zone by Idriz Seferi and in the Austrian zone by Azem Bejta.

This is more or less the presentation of this situation in the textbooks of Kosova, although the collaboration of Azem Bejta with local Serbs against Austrian forces is not mentioned anywhere.³⁵ The Serbian textbooks, on the other hand, deal only with the occupation of Serbia by Austrian and Bulgarian troops with Kosova, which only features on the maps published in the chapter on this period, considered as an indivisible part of Serbia.³⁶

At the end of World War I, on the removal of Austrian and Bulgarian troops, Serbian troops were placed in Kosova where they, according to the textbooks of Kosova, “reoccupied Kosova and other Albanian lands” and “state terror and genocide were carried out against Albanians,”³⁷ but they do not offer data to support the use of the term “genocide.” The

³¹ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 96.

³² Đorđe Đurić and Momčilo Pavlović, *Istorija* 8 (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010), 74.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ For these Albanian acts of revenge against Serbs, see Tim Judah, *Kosova—Lufte dhe Hakmarrje* (Prishtina: Koha, 2002), 41–2; and Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 260.

³⁵ On this point, see Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 262.

³⁶ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 95, 124, 155. Noel Malcolm argues that legally Kosova was never incorporated into the Serbian state. See Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 264–6.

³⁷ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 127.

Serbian textbooks do not mention the killings of Albanians by Serbian forces, carried out mainly at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919. Noel Malcolm quotes a document sent by the Kosova National Defence Committee to the League of Nations in 1921, according to which the Serbian forces had killed 12,371 people beginning in 1918.³⁸

The Albanian Kaçak movement

The Kosova National Defence Committee, which had the aim of liberating Kosova and unifying with Albania, sent letters of protest to the Paris Peace Conference about the killing of Albanians by Serbian forces. The conference paid little attention to Albania's interests. Furthermore, Albania was not allowed to participate, even though its borders were discussed there.

In the spring of 1919, the Albanian Kaçak movement, led by Azem Bejta and supported by the Kosova National Defence Committee, therefore began attacks against Serbian troops in Kosova. The Serbian textbooks do not present these attacks at all, while the Kosovar books call them an armed uprising. In the Kosovar textbooks no reason is given for the swift suppression of this uprising by Serbian forces. The exception to this is the textbook for the ninth grade in Kosova where the reason given is the lack of co-ordination of activities, and difficult conditions.³⁹

According to this textbook, the further work of the Kaçak movement became difficult, particularly after the destruction of the base in the village of Junik in the neutral zone between the borders of Albania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. None of the Kosovar textbooks notes that at the end of 1923, the Prime Minister of Albania, Ahmet Zog, sent the Albanian army to this zone to fight the Kaçaks. Neither is it mentioned that joint Albanian-Yugoslav troops were installed to prevent the return of Kaçaks there. Nor do the books say that in Albania, the Kaçak leader Azem Bejta, and later Hasan Prishtina, one of the leaders of the Kosova National Defence Committee, were officially sentenced to death *in absentia*.⁴⁰

³⁸ On this point, see Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 278.

³⁹ Fehmi Rexhepi, *Historia 9* (Prishtina: Libri Shkollor, 2010), 64.

⁴⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 277 and 287. For more on the relationship between the Albanian government under Ahmet Zog and the Kosova resistance movement, see Bernd Fischer, *Mbreti Zog dhe përpjekja për stabilitet në Shqipëri* (Tirana: Çabej, 2000), 29–51.

The Kosovar textbooks make no mention of the agreement made by Azem Bejta with the local Serbian authorities for an untroubled life, on condition that the movement would be active in only three villages.⁴¹ In these textbooks, the actions of the Kaçak movement are presented simply as a war for liberation and national unity, so nor do they present the meeting of the Kaçak leader, Azem Bejta, with senior Serb officials, in which he demanded that Kosova should have the right to self-government.⁴²

None of the Kosovar or Serbian history textbooks mention that a large number of Albanians collaborated with the authorities and worked in local administration, and that therefore some of them were the target for Kaçak attacks, just like the Slavic settlers.⁴³ Likewise, it is not mentioned that the formation of platoons by local Serbs for anti-Kaçak operations encouraged Kaçak attacks on some Serbian villages,⁴⁴ while the rules of the Kaçak movement included, among other things, that local Serbs should not be harmed. These rules are not given in any of the textbooks of the three countries.⁴⁵

The Legal Society for the Defence of Islam

While most of the Kosovar textbooks present Albanian politico-military groups of the time as the Albanian National Movement, they do not specify that as well as rising up, Albanians were also trying parliamentary approaches, represented by the Legal Society for the Defence of Islam (Islam Muhafaza-yi Hukuk Cemiyeti), which was known as the Cemiyet for short. This political group, considered to be a "Beys' party," called for religious autonomy and sometimes also protested about the living conditions in Kosova, which is information which does not figure in either the Kosova textbooks or those of Albania.

The history textbook used in the ninth grade in Kosova is the only one which, albeit superficially, shows the work of the Legal Society for the

⁴¹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 277.

⁴² For Azem Bejta's demand for self-government, see Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 274. In the Albanian edition of this book, the demand for *self-government* is described as a demand for *vetëvendosje*, "self-determination." See Noel Malcolm, *Kosova—një histori e shkurtër* (Prishtina: Koha, 2001), 285.

⁴³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 272–8.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ For the rules of the Kaçak movement, see Schwartz, *Kosovo: Background*, 75.

Defence of Islam.⁴⁶ However, it is not mentioned in any of the textbooks of Kosova that this political group worked with the two main Serbian political parties in Yugoslavia—the Democrats and the Radicals—and sometimes even shared the same electoral list with them.⁴⁷

In the mid-1920s, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, established at the end of 1918, managed to crush the Kaçak movement, and later also the Legal Society for the Defence of Islam, imprisoning and killing the main leaders of these political organisations. The Serbian textbooks make no reference to Albanians' political-military organisation, nor to their suppression. The Kosovar textbooks mention their annihilation and add that the Albanian uprisings nevertheless had an impact in "reinforcing the national morale and pride of the Albanian people."⁴⁸

Agrarian reforms and the displacements

The leaders of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes intended to change the ethnic make-up of the population of Kosova and for this reason they used so-called agrarian reforms to break up former Ottoman property necessary for allocation to local villagers. These lands, including the lands of Kaçaks, were given mainly to settlers from Serbia as well as to Serbian soldiers and volunteers.⁴⁹ This features in the textbooks of Kosova, but not in those from Serbia. However, it is not mentioned in any of the Kosovar or Serbian textbooks that in the allocation of these lands, the local village populations, including Albanians, were not excluded. Nor do these textbooks mention that although the majority of the land was given to Serbian settlers, local Serbs said that they were ready to make a united front with Albanians against these colonizers.⁵⁰

The Serbian textbooks make reference to the agrarian reforms across the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and the only more specific thing they say is that from these "about 500,000 village families gained land."⁵¹ The Kosovar textbooks, on the other hand, claim that between the

⁴⁶ Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 63–4.

⁴⁷ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 270–2.

⁴⁸ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 128.

⁴⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 278–81.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 281.

⁵¹ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 103.

two world wars “400,000 hectares were expropriated and approximately 15,000 Slav settler families, with around 75,000 members, established themselves”⁵² in Kosova. Noel Malcolm, citing Serbian, Albanian, and international authors, says that 200,000 hectares were expropriated—half of which were given to the settlers—while more than 13,000 families with approximately 70,000 members settled in Kosova.⁵³

The Serbian textbooks say nothing about the displacements of Albanians in the period between the two world wars. The Kosovar textbooks say that “approximately 250,000 Albanians were forced to move from their ethnic homeland,”⁵⁴ but they provide no evidence to support this data. On the other hand, Noel Malcolm says that the number of Albanians and other Muslims moved from their land between the two world wars is assumed to be between 90,000 and 150,000.⁵⁵

In the textbooks of Kosova, a special place is given to the agreement reached in July of 1938 between Yugoslavia and Turkey on the displacement of approximately 40,000 families to Turkey during the period 1939–44. However, the eruption of World War II made it impossible to realise this plan. Officially the agreement speaks of the “repatriation” of “Muslim Turk” populations, but it was clear that, from the areas which were specified, the majority of those to be moved would be Albanians.⁵⁶

In the Kosovar textbooks, the people who would be moved to Turkey according to this agreement are called “Albanians” and they are estimated to have numbered around 400,000.⁵⁷ The Serbian textbooks make no reference to the agreement in question, while British authors Tim Judah and Noel Malcolm give the figure as respectively 200,000 and 400,000⁵⁸ and add that the majority of them would have been Albanian.

None of the school textbooks from Kosova or Serbia mention that the agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey was opposed not only by the victims and their fellow countrymen. It inspired 65 students from Kosova, of whom 56 were Serbian and Montenegrin, one was Turk and eight were

⁵² Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 129.

⁵³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 281–2.

⁵⁴ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 129.

⁵⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo* [note 8], p. 286.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 285.

⁵⁷ Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 70.

⁵⁸ Judah, *Kosova*, 45; and Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 285.

Albanian, to circulate in Kosova, as well as in embassies in Belgrade, illegal posters which denounced the plan.⁵⁹

Kosova in Yugoslavia, 1945–92

Kosova under Italian/German/Bulgarian rule

In the summer of 1941, the Italians occupied most of Kosova and united it with Albania, which they had occupied in the spring of 1939. The rest of the territory of Kosova was occupied by the Germans and Bulgarians. The situation of the Kosovar Albanians under Italian and German rule was noticeably better in comparison with the situation under Yugoslavia, while under Bulgarian rule it was practically the same as the experience of the Albanians under Bulgarian rule during World War I.⁶⁰

Some Kosovar textbooks say that the Albanians opposed the Fascist occupation of Kosova,⁶¹ while others claims that, although the Albanians were opposed to fascism in principle, they welcomed it as a liberation, saving them from their domination by the Serbs.⁶² In general, the Kosovar textbooks say that the union of the majority of Kosova's territory with Albania, even though it was a result of the Italian occupiers, had a positive effect for Albanians. All that the Serbian textbooks, on the other hand, say about this is that Kosova and Metohija were included within Italian Albania.⁶³

At the time when Kosova was under Fascist/Nazi occupation, armed Albanians attacked villages inhabited by Serbs to remove the settlers and to return property confiscated during the period between the two world wars.⁶⁴ Foreign authors' accounts of the number of Serbs and Montenegrins evicted from Kosova in this period range from 30,000 to 100,000 and they say that the victims of killings, destruction and theft, although found on both sides, were mainly Serbs and Montenegrins.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ Schwartz, *Kosovo: Background*, 82.

⁶⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 289–313.

⁶¹ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 154.

⁶² Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 110.

⁶³ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 137.

⁶⁴ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 293.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 293–4, 313. For more on these crimes, see Bernd Fischer, *Shqipëria gjatë Luftës, 1939–1945* (Tirana: Çabej, 2000), 124–9.

The textbooks of Serbia say that "the Albanians of Kosova and Metohija committed terrible acts against the Serbs"⁶⁶ or "there are no data on the number of civilians killed during this period."⁶⁷ On the other hand, the Kosovar textbooks say that the Albanians, despite their sufferings under Yugoslav rule, took care of Serbian and Montenegrin minorities and even that "... in many cases they even took them under their protection."⁶⁸

The liberation and reoccupation of Kosova

After the capitulation of the Italian Fascists in Kosova and the establishment of the German Nazis on Kosova's political scene, two critical elements crystallised: the nationalist faction, supported by the German Nazis and organised in the Second League of Prizren, which announced that it was working to keep Kosova united with Albania⁶⁹ and the Communist faction, mainly supported by the Yugoslav communists and organised into the National Liberation Council for Kosova and Metohija, which, at the Bujan Conference, announced its desire for Kosova's unification with Albania, suggesting the right for self-determination.

The Serbian textbooks do not deal with this element at all. The textbooks of Kosova do not present the independent nationalist groups who opposed the occupation, such as that of the Kryeziu brothers in Gjakova. Nevertheless, although in the textbooks of Kosova these two elements are superficially present, in no textbook is there a description of the armed clashes between them, nor of the fact that one had support from Nazi Germany and the other from the Yugoslav communists.

After the withdrawal of German troops from Kosova, the Partisan forces established themselves in the cities of western Kosova, while the Bulgarian Partisans arrived in eastern Kosova, together with the Yugoslav Partisans. Leaving Kosova, along with the German troops, were most of the armed groups created by the Second League of Prizren, and including members of the Skanderbeg division which, before it left, took part in

⁶⁶ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 137.

⁶⁷ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 208.

⁶⁸ Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 118.

⁶⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 305.

the rounding up and expulsion from Kosova of communists, including a number of Jews.⁷⁰ This is not presented in the textbooks of Kosova.

In some of the Kosovar textbooks, the withdrawal of the German troops is presented as a liberation of Kosova by the Partisan units of Kosova and Albania.⁷¹ In some others, it is presented rather as liberation by Serbian and Bulgarian units.⁷² However, according to these textbooks, the Albanians of Kosova and other areas were attempting, alongside the battle for liberation from the German troops, also to liberate themselves from the Yugoslav occupiers who, after the capitulation of German troops, established “power which was steely and discriminatory towards the Albanians.”⁷³ These textbooks invent an organisation named “the National Liberation Army of Kosova (UNÇK),”⁷⁴ although it is known that Kosova’s communists were part of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.

However, the textbooks of Kosova do not mention that the Kosovar Partisans were divided: on the one hand the Partisans led by Shaban Polluzha, who refused orders to fight German troops in the north of Yugoslavia and decided to stay in Kosova to protect the Albanian population from Yugoslav partisans; and on the other hand, the partisans led by Fadil Hoxha, who accepted a position as deputy to Sava Drlečić, the commander of the Yugoslav military forces in Kosova. Nor is there mention in these textbooks of the fact that Shaban Polluzha’s partisans, concentrated mainly in Drenica, were swiftly annihilated by the Partisans of Fadil Hoxha and Yugoslavia, helped by divisions of Partisans from Albania.⁷⁵

According to the Kosovar textbooks, after the German troops left, there came to Kosova and other Albanian areas “Serbian/Montenegrin and Macedonian partisan units which used violence and terror on the Albanian population” and as a consequence of “this terror and Serbian/Montenegrin and Macedonian genocide in Kosova, around 45,000 Albanians were killed.”⁷⁶ The Serbian textbooks make no mention of these crimes. Noel

⁷⁰ Ibid., 310–1.

⁷¹ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 156.

⁷² Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 115.

⁷³ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 156; and Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 115.

⁷⁴ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 156.

⁷⁵ The textbook of Isa Bicaj and Isuf Ahmeti, *Historia* 12 (Prishtina: Libri Shkollor, 2005), 124–5 is, to some extent, an exception to this. For the clashes between the forces of Shaban Polluzha and those led by Fadil Hoxha, see the account of Fadil Hoxha: Veton Surroi, *Fadil Hoxha në vetën e parë* (Prishtina: Koha, 2010), 233–55.

⁷⁶ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 157.

Malcolm, who analyses the data from a range of authors, comes to the conclusion that the figure of approximately 45,000 killed is exaggerated.⁷⁷

The hope expressed at the Bujan Conference was thus ignored. The textbooks of Kosova blame the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPK) and the Communist Party of Albania (PKSh).⁷⁸ Those who had taken part in the Bujan Conference became a target for the Yugoslav authorities, according to the Kosovar textbooks; some were killed, some were deported to Albania, and some were imprisoned.⁷⁹ However, these textbooks do not mention that in July 1945 some of the participants of this conference took part in the so-called Prizren Assembly where the resolution for the annexation of Kosova by federal Serbia was approved by acclamation.⁸⁰ The Serbian textbooks claim that this resolution was approved after the withdrawal of military rule and at a time of ever greater co-operation with Albania.⁸¹ But the textbooks do not say that in this assembly only 33 out of 142 members were Albanian, nor that the members of the assembly were purposely reminded of the fact that there were 50,000 troops in Kosova to defend the fruits of the war.⁸²

From 1945 until the middle of the sixties, a range of organised political groups of Albanians in Kosova resisted Yugoslav rule. Of these, the most significant was the illegal organisation, the Albanian National Democratic Committee which, like other groups, swiftly disintegrated. The textbooks of Kosova do not mention the illegal organisations which resisted Yugoslav rule, of which one of the most significant was the Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unification (LRBSH). At this time, the Yugoslav authorities forced tens of thousands of Albanians in Yugoslavia to move to Turkey, using a range of forms of pressure, such as the weapons gathering campaign. There is no mention in the Serbian textbooks of the families who were moved, while the textbooks of Kosova give an inflated figure, estimating that some 250,000 Albanians were forced to move.⁸³

⁷⁷ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 293–4, 312.

⁷⁸ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 156; and Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 115.

⁷⁹ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 193–4.

⁸⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 315.

⁸¹ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 235.

⁸² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 315.

⁸³ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 194.

The 1974 constitution

During the 1960s, amendments were approved almost every year to the Constitution of Serbia and that of Yugoslavia in favor of Kosova. In July 1966 at the Brioni Plenum the decision was taken that the person second only to Tito in the Yugoslav hierarchy, the Minister for Internal Affairs Aleksandar Ranković would be removed from power. After the fall of Ranković there were no more iniquitous actions such as the mass weapons search, nor anything similar to the atmosphere of control of Ranković. On 27 November 1968, an illegal organisation, the so-called 68 Group, many of whose members had been part of the LRBSH, organised demonstrations in a number of cities in Kosova, with the main demand of "Kosova a Republic."

The Kosovar textbooks speak superficially of these demonstrations and make no mention either of their organisers, or of the fact that the legal political officers of Kosova described them as enemy nationalists.⁸⁴ These textbooks attribute the progress in Kosova's constitutional position within Serbia and Yugoslavia exclusively to these demonstrations, ignoring the fact that the re-establishment of Albanian-Yugoslav relations had had an impact on this progress for the legal political officers of Kosova.⁸⁵ The Serbian textbooks represent these demonstrations as being of a separatist nature, after which there typically unfolds a harsh discussion on the alteration of the character of the federation, with greater independence for the regions which "could take part in the decision-making of the republic, while the republic did not have the right to be involved in their activities."⁸⁶

This independence for the regions was formalised in 1974 with the approval of the Constitution of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which ensured for the two Autonomous Regions, Kosova and Vojvodina, which were part of the Republic of Serbia, a status in many ways similar to that of the six Yugoslav republics, particularly in economic decision-making and some fields of foreign policy. The Kosovar

⁸⁴ Ethem Çeku, *Demonstratat e vitit 1968 në Arkivin e Kosovës* (Prishtinë: Brezi 81, 2009), 30–214.

⁸⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 325.

⁸⁶ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 243.

textbooks mention only the approval of the Kosovar constitution in 1974, and this as an effect of the demonstrations in 1968, but they do not make any mention of the rights guaranteed to Kosova.

On the basis of this constitution, the territory of the SFRY was made up of the territory of the republics, and the territory of the republics could not be changed without the agreement of the republics. The Assembly of the SFRY was made up of the Federal Chamber, to which each republic had the right to send 30 delegates, and each of the provinces to send 20 delegates, and the Chamber of the Republics and Regions, where the republics had the right to send 12 delegates each, and the provinces to send 8 delegates each.⁸⁷

The Serbian textbooks focus mainly on the strengthening of the autonomy of the provinces which, according to them, gained wide authorisation in legislative and executive powers and equal status in the federation, with decision-making rights equal to the republics for matters of the federation.⁸⁸ However, although they say that Serbia gained elements of confederation, these textbooks do not specify that, while the introduction of the SFRY constitution and the constitution of Serbia mention the rights of each nation for self-determination including secession, these do not figure in the constitution of the autonomous province of Kosova. Furthermore, on the basis of these 1974 constitutions, the Albanians were considered a nationality but not a nation, a legal distinction in socialist Yugoslavia between those entitled to have their own constituent republic (*narodi* or "nations") and those not so entitled (*narodnosti* or "nationalities").

In the textbooks of the three countries, there is mention of the demonstrations that erupted in March and April 1981, initially organised by students of the University of Prishtina (UP) for better conditions, and later by a range of political and illegal groups of Kosovar Albanians, with the demand for "Kosova a Republic." As for the demonstrations of 1968, the textbooks of Kosova do not give the names of the organisers of these demonstrations, nor the allegations from senior Albanian political officials in Kosova of nationalism, separatism, hooligan crowds, and counter-revo-

⁸⁷ For the rights set out in the 1974 Constitution for Kosova, see Heike Krieger, (ed.), *The Kosova Conflict and International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2–8.

⁸⁸ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 245.

lutionary Albanian organizations.⁸⁹ The Kosovar textbooks do not mention that, after these demonstrations, thousands of demonstrators were imprisoned and hundreds fined, and some of them do not even mention the demands of the demonstrations.⁹⁰ The imprisonments and fines are not mentioned in the textbooks of Serbia either, which say only that the first signs of Yugoslavia's destabilisation were seen in Kosova where "the eruption of Albanian nationalism and separatism in the spring of 1981 showed the awakening of a fatal dormant nationalism."⁹¹

Civil resistance in Kosova

Relations between the Albanians and Serbs deteriorated further after the 1981 demonstrations, when Serbia began plans to abrogate Kosova's autonomy, starting propaganda campaigns in the media against what the Serbian textbooks describe as "pressure against Serbs, rapes, destruction of property, and even killings, from national hatred."⁹² However, the study of an independent committee of Serbian jurists, published in 1990, came to the conclusion that the rape rate in Kosova was the lowest in all Yugoslavia and that in the vast majority of cases both the rapist and the victim were Albanian.⁹³ The Serbian textbooks mention Serbs moving out, which had reduced the number of this population to a total of 13.2%, but they do not stress that one of the main reasons for these moves was the mismanagement of the economy in Kosova and an unemployment rate which was the highest in Yugoslavia.

At the end of 1988, hundreds of thousands of Albanians protested in Kosova against the withdrawal of Kosova's autonomy by Milošević's Serbia. The Kosovar textbooks do not clarify that the protesters opposed the change of the communist leadership in Kosova, those who are presented as "instruments in the hands of Serb policy. . . who realised too late the game for the suspension of autonomy."⁹⁴ Likewise, the strikes of miners in

⁸⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 335–6. See also Mehmet Hajrizi, *Histori e një organizate politike dhe demonstratat e vitit 1981* (Tiranë: Toena, 2008), 196–216.

⁹⁰ Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 160–1.

⁹¹ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 248.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 339.

⁹⁴ Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 162; and Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 199.

Kosova, who in February 1989 were holed up for ten days in mineshafts protesting the fall of Kosova's autonomy, is presented in these textbooks without the demands for "brotherhood and unity and Tito's road ahead."⁹⁵ These protests and strikes are not presented at all in the Serbian textbooks. After these strikes and protests, a state of emergency was established in Kosova and hundreds of intellectuals, professors and leaders of social enterprises were arrested. These arrests are mentioned only in the Kosovar textbooks, which make no reference to the arrest and trial of the Kosovar Albanians' former political leader, Azem Vllasi, who was freed from prison after nearly a year in detention.

Despite these protests and strikes by Albanians in Kosova, Serbia completed the process of suspending Kosova's autonomy when it was approved on 23 March 1989 by the Kosovar Assembly with an Albanian majority. While the Serbian textbooks do not mention this at all, those of Kosova say that the Kosova Assembly building was surrounded by Serb police and military. But none of the textbooks say that, despite this, ten Albanian deputies in the Kosovar Assembly voted against the withdrawal of the 1974 autonomy.

Some months after the suspension of Kosova's autonomy, the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) was formed, and, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, in a short time it became clearly the largest political party in Kosova. Its manifesto, although it was initially for autonomy, is presented in the Kosovar textbooks as a programme for "resolving the issue of Kosova and the Albanians in other regions of the former Yugoslavia on the basis of the principle of self-determination."⁹⁶ The Serbian textbooks make no mention at all of the LDK and its programme.

In March and April 1990, thousands of Kosovar pupils were sent to hospital, straight from school, because of stomachache, headache, and vomiting as a result, it was said at the time, of a mass poisoning of Albanian children. A toxicological expert from the United Nations later came to the conclusion, on the basis of blood and urine samples, that he had found evidence of sarin and tabun agents. In 1995, it was made public that the Yugoslav Army had produced sarin. However, this is not mentioned in the Serbian textbooks. The Kosovar textbooks say that one of the

⁹⁵ For the miners' ten demands, see Shkëlzen Maliqi, *Nyja e Kosovës—as Vllasi as Milloshëviqi* (Ljubljana: Knjižna zbirka KRT, 1990), 254.

⁹⁶ Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 163; and Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 200.

most difficult forms of police repression was “the poisoning of more than 7,000 pupils and students with a chemical weapon.”⁹⁷ However, in none of these textbooks is it mentioned that in some parts of Kosova there were dozens of attacks against local Serbs by Albanians who believed that their children had been poisoned by the Serbian occupiers in Kosova.⁹⁸

On 2 July 1990, the deputies of the Kosova Assembly, supported by the LDK, and in front of the Kosova Assembly, declared Kosova a republic *within Yugoslavia*. After this declaration, Serbia suspended all legislative, executive and judicial organs in Kosova; the vast majority of Albanians in employment were sent home from work; television, radio, newspapers, hospitals and factories were closed and Albanian students and teachers were stopped from using the University of Prishtina campus. After two months, on 7 September 1990, the Kosova Assembly declared the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova *within Yugoslavia*⁹⁹ and between 26 and 30 September 1991 a referendum was organised for the recognition of Kosova as a sovereign and independent state *with the right to link with Yugoslavia*.¹⁰⁰

The Serbian textbooks do not discuss these developments at all; while in the textbooks of Kosova the declaration of Kosova as a republic within Yugoslavia is presented more accurately. As for the Kosovar constitution, the Kosovar textbooks do not mention that it was also a constitution for Kosova as a republic within Yugoslavia. Equally, it is not mentioned anywhere in these textbooks that immediately after the act of declaring this constitution, the majority of the Assembly deputies fled Kosova. The textbooks of Kosova present the referendum as a referendum for a sovereign and independent state of Kosova, removing from it the right to link with Yugoslavia. On 19 October 1991 the Republic of Kosova Assembly changed the Republic of Kosova constitution and cut this link with the state of Yugoslavia.¹⁰¹ This is mentioned in neither the Serbian textbooks, nor those of Kosova.

⁹⁷ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 200.

⁹⁸ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 345; and Howard and Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 58.

⁹⁹ Rexhep Ismajli, Hivzi Islami, Esat Stavileci, and Ilaz Ramajli, *Akte të Kuvendit të Republikës së Kosovës—2 korrik 1990–2 maj 1992* (Prishtina: Akademia e Shkencave dhe Arteve të Kosovës, 2005), 7–8 and 9–41.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 98–101.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 119, 141–2.

In this period Kosova, under the leadership of the LDK, a parallel system was created in various fields: education, health, finance, media, culture and sport, and presidential and parliamentary elections were organised, and diplomatic lobbying took place for the internationalisation of the Kosova issue. This is not mentioned in the Serbian textbooks. This parallel organisation is included in the Kosovar textbooks, but there is an addition of organisation in the field of "defence and self-defence, thus creating a challenge for the occupying Serb powers."¹⁰²

Kosova during 1998–99

The peaceful and the military factions

Until the middle of the nineties, the passive peaceful resistance led by the LDK under Ibrahim Rugova was unrivalled. At this time, Adem Demaçi, who had suffered 28 years in the prisons of Tito's Yugoslavia because of his involvement in working for the union of Albanian lands under Yugoslavia with Albania, was included in the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (PPK) to start active peaceful resistance. This was because, according to him, there was a generation of people being born in Kosova who were dissatisfied with the policy of passive peaceful resistance and were seeking a military solution.¹⁰³ This division in Kosova's politics is not presented in the textbooks of Serbia, nor in those of Kosova itself.

Demaçi did not achieve his aim of active peaceful resistance. In September 1996, with the mediation of the Shën Exhidio Association, Ibrahim Rugova signed an agreement with Slobodan Milošević on the return of Albanian pupils and students to school and university premises which had been taken over by organs of the Serbian state. This does not figure in the textbooks of any of the three countries. The Serbian/Yugoslav side did not observe the agreement and so, on 1 October 1997, the students of the University of Prishtina (UP) organised a protest calling for the return to lectures at the UP campus. These protests are mentioned only in the Kosovar textbooks and only with this sentence, "Serbian repression

¹⁰² Bajraktari et al., *Historia 10*, 204.

¹⁰³ Shkëlzen Gashi, *Adem Demaçi: Unauthorised Biography* (Prishtina: Rrokullia, 2010), 118–40.

meant that on 1 October 1997 protests by UP students and the general population erupted against the occupying powers.”¹⁰⁴

The repression by the Serbian regime is thus called “Serbian repression”; the student protests, in which a number of Albanian citizens became involved, are called “protests by students and the general population,” while the stated aim of the student protests, return to the university campus, is mentioned nowhere. This presentation could create the impression that these protests were organised for the liberation and independence of Kosova from Serbia.

Human rights abuses by the Serbian regime against Kosovar Albanians during the 1990s¹⁰⁵ are presented in the Kosovar textbooks as massacres by the Serbian regime across Kosova, which “inspired the emergence of the KLA to protect the people of Kosova.”¹⁰⁶ The Serbian textbooks do not give any evidence of these abuses, and they present the deterioration in the situation in Kosova as a consequence of the “robbery and confrontations of Albanian terrorist groups, declared as the Kosova Liberation Army, with associated forces, who impacted ever more on civilians”¹⁰⁷ but they do not provide data on the ethnicity of these civilians.

The Serbian textbooks do not mention the division between the peaceful and the military factions in Kosovar politics. This is also missing in the Kosovar textbooks, as is reference to the three political and military conceptualisations of war in Kosova: 1) the conceptualisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova (FARK), established by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Kosova government, which was in favour of war, led by professional officers; 2) the conceptualisation of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova (LKÇK), created mainly by former political prisoners, which envisaged the creation of a wide political and military front for the organisation of general armed uprising, where all political and military groups aiming for the liberation of Kosova from Serbia would be included; and 3) the conceptualisation of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA), created by the Kosova People’s Movement (LPK), which favoured guerrilla war with the aim of provoking NATO’s intervention against Serb forces. The lack of this conceptualisation of the three

¹⁰⁴ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 205. See also Rexhepi, *Historia* 9, 168.

¹⁰⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 349–56. See also Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 70–157.

¹⁰⁶ Rexhepi and Demaj, *Historia* 5, 104.

¹⁰⁷ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 251. See also Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 186.

strands resulted in lack of information on the friction and clashes between them.

War crimes

The textbooks of each of the two countries present only the crimes of the “other side.” For example, the Serbian textbooks mention not a single Albanian killed by Serbian/Yugoslav forces during the armed conflict in Kosova, while in the textbooks of Kosova there is mention of not a single Serb killed by the KLA and NATO forces during and after the armed conflict. The textbooks of Kosova and Serbia also exaggerate the crimes of the ‘other side’ and create room for misunderstanding.

The Serbian textbooks refer to a letter of the FRY, sent to the UNSC in February 2000, which said that since the entry of NATO forces in Kosova “899 had been killed and 834 had been kidnapped,”¹⁰⁸ but they do not give the ethnicity of these people and the fate of those kidnapped. The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC),¹⁰⁹ whose headquarters are in Belgrade, notes that 1,123 Serb civilians killed were in the period January 1998–December 1999, of whom 786 were killed following the entry of NATO forces (12 June 1999–December 1999).¹¹⁰

On the other hand, the Kosovar textbooks say that during the armed conflict in Kosova, only in the period January–December 1998 “more than 2,000 Albanians were killed, not counting here a very large number of missing persons.”¹¹¹ However, also for this period, the HLC’s multi-volume *Kosova Memory Book (1998–2000)*¹¹² registers 1,660 Albanians killed

¹⁰⁸ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 252. See also Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 187.

¹⁰⁹ There is more on this organisation at <http://www.hlc-rdc.org/>.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Sandra Orlović, deputy executive director of the Human Rights Fund, conducted by email, 16 December 2011. For the killings of Serbs following the war in Kosova, see also Nataša Kandic, *Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosova* (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Centre, 2001), 3.

¹¹¹ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 206.

¹¹² The *Kosova Memory Book (1998–2000)* is an HLC publication in several volumes which gives the relevant data for every person killed or missing from the last war in Kosova: Albanian, Serbian, Roma, Bosniak, and other civilians; members of the Serbian/Yugoslav military and police forces and of Kosova Albanian armed groups, but also members of political groups of various ethnicities. The sources for the information in this publication are taken from witness or family statements, court proceedings, the notes from autopsies, newspaper articles, data from ICRC, UNMIK, KFOR, KLA, and Serbian institutions.

(including 678 KLA soldiers) and 296 Serbs (including 167 members of the Yugoslav Army and the Ministry for Internal Affairs).¹¹³ According to the Kosovar textbooks, in the period of the NATO bombings (24 March to 10 June 1999) “the Serbian army killed approximately 15,000 Albanians.”¹¹⁴ The *Kosova Memory Book* gives the numbers of Albanian civilians killed in the period January 1998–December 2000, including the 78-day NATO bombing, as 7,864 in total. The number of those killed is thus doubled in the Kosovar textbooks, and the sources for their data are not given.

More or less the same issue as with the presentation of those killed occurs with the presentation of deportations/displacements. The Kosovar textbooks do not note the figures for Serb and non-Albanian displacements after KFOR took control, while in the Serbian textbooks this figure is given as more than 220,000,¹¹⁵ and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) gives it as 210,000.¹¹⁶ Similarly, the Serbian textbooks do not report the deportations of Albanians from Kosova during the NATO bombing which, according to UNHCR, included 862,979 people.¹¹⁷ In the Kosovar textbooks this number is more than one million Albanians.¹¹⁸

The Kosovar textbooks describe the crimes of Serb forces against Albanians during the war in Kosova as genocide.¹¹⁹ Instead of the definition of the UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, or any arguments as to whether genocide occurred in Kosova, these textbooks offer phrases such as “the horrible scenes of barbarism of the bloody squadrons”¹²⁰ for children of 15–16 years old.

¹¹³ Nataša Kandić, *Libër Kujtimi i Kosovës 1998–2000* (Prishtina: Fondi për të Drejtën Humanitare, 2011), 457.

¹¹⁴ Bajraktari et al., *Historia 10*, 207. Also: Bicaj and Ahmeti, *Historia 12*, 202.

¹¹⁵ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija 3*, 251.

¹¹⁶ For more information, see: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d9f6.html>.

¹¹⁷ “UNHCR Country Updates—Former Yugoslavia, UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Situation Report: Kosova,” 65–70.

¹¹⁸ Bajraktari et al., *Historia 10*, 206.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 207. Some of the Kosovar textbooks even say that the Reçak massacre was described as *genocide* by William Walker, the head of the OSCE mission in Kosova. For this, see Bicaj and Ahmeti, *Historia 12*, 202. However, William Walker described this act as a *crime against humanity* in the speech he gave at the burial of those massacred. For the speech of Ambassador William Walker and more on the Reçak massacre, see Wolfgang Petritsch and Robert Pichler, *Rruga e gjatë në luftë—Kosova dhe bashkësia ndërkombëtare 1989–1999* (Prishtina: KOHA, 2002), 154–62.

¹²⁰ Bajraktari et al., *Historia 10*, 205.

Furthermore, by describing the crimes of the Serbian forces in Kosova as genocide, the authors of the Kosovar textbooks ignore the opinion given by the Supreme Court of Kosova, according to which the actions of the Serbian regime under Slobodan Milošević can be considered crimes against humanity rather than genocide.¹²¹

The Serbian textbooks, as explained above, do not mention the crimes of the Serbian forces against Kosova's Albanians, but they give information that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had indicted major political and military leaders of the FRY and Serbia,¹²² but they do not mention the allegations raised. On the other hand, the Kosovar textbooks do not present the crimes committed by the KLA against Serbs and non-Albanians during and after the armed conflict in Kosova, and also do not mention the ICTY indictments for war crimes and crimes against humanity for the two main leaders of the KLA.

The crimes committed by the KLA against Serbs and non-Albanians during the armed conflict in Kosova are not presented at all in the Serbian textbooks. As for the crimes of the KLA, these textbooks give data only for the crimes committed after the armed conflict and the entry of KFOR troops in Kosova. One would obtain the impression, from these textbooks, that during the armed conflict in Kosova only NATO committed crimes.

During the 78 days of the NATO bombing of the FRY, according to the Serbian textbooks, "between 1,200 and 2,500 civilians were killed."¹²³ However, in the table given by these textbooks for the suffering of civilians from the NATO bombardment, data are provided for only 347 civilians killed. In this table, Albanian ethnicity is mentioned only for the 70 civilians killed by NATO forces near Gjakova, while for the 50 civilians killed in the village of Luzhan near Podujevo, the 20 near Peja and 87 in the village of Korisha near Prizren, there is no mention of their Albanian ethnicity. Likewise, there is no mention in the table of the attack of NATO forces on the Dubrava Prison where, according to the HLC, 112 Albanian prisoners were killed. It may be that this attack is not included in the table because only 29 of the prisoners in Dubrava Prison were killed by the NATO bombs

¹²¹ William Schabas, *Gjenocidi në të Drejtën Ndërkombëtare* (Prishtina: FINNISH-UNHCR Human Rights Support Programme—Kosova, 2003), 467.

¹²² Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 253. See also Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 187.

¹²³ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 251, also 187.

on 19 and 20 May 1999 while the others, again according to HLC, were executed by Serbian forces on 21 and 23 May 1999.¹²⁴

On the killing of civilians by NATO, the report of Human Rights Watch, based on field research, says that during the bombing of the territory of the FRY, NATO killed a minimum of 489 and a maximum of 528 innocent civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, the majority of these innocent civilians were killed in the territory of Kosova, giving numbers of between 279 and 318 people.¹²⁵ The number of civilians killed by NATO is therefore at least doubled in the Serbian textbooks while not being recorded at all in the textbooks of Kosova.

The Rambouillet Conference

Before the Rambouillet Conference, one of the most important events on the political scene was the meeting of the Kosovar delegation, represented by Ibrahim Rugova, with Slobodan Milošević in May 1998, when the parties agreed on a peaceful solution to the Kosova issue. This is not presented in any of the textbooks from the three countries. Without a doubt, one of the most important events leading up to the escalation of armed conflict in Kosova was the conference organised at Rambouillet in France which is presented in the textbooks of Kosova and Serbia, in brief and different ways. The Kosovar textbooks say only that the failure of talks at this conference marked “a new phase for the KLA war.”¹²⁶ However, they do not give the reasons for the failure of these talks, nor the key points of the Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-governance document, signed in Paris on 18 March 1999, by the Albanian representatives from Kosova at the conference and by mediator Christopher Hill (USA) and

¹²⁴ On 28 May 2010, the HLC made a formal accusation at the Serbian War Crimes Court against the 34 people responsible for the killing of more than 90 and the injuring of more than 150 Albanian prisoners in Dubrava Prison on 21 and 23 May 1999 after the NATO attacks on the prison of 19 and 20 May 1999. The charges can be found at: <http://hlc-rdc.org/index.php/en/public-informationoutreach/pressreleases/208-krivina-prijava-za-ratni-zloin-protiv-ratnih-funkcionera-republike-srbije>.

¹²⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Civilian deaths in the NATO air campaign,” at <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/>.

¹²⁶ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 206. See also Bicaj and Ahmeti, *Historia* 12, 202.

Wolfgang Petritsch (EU), but refused by Serbia/ FRY and mediator Boris Majorski (Russia).

The authors of these textbooks offer nothing of the content of this document—the implementation of which was guaranteed by 28,000 NATO troops in Kosova—because it envisaged substantive autonomy for Kosova within the FRY.¹²⁷ In the information they do give, the Kosovar textbooks create the impression that the KLA had not given up on their political position. As well as not mentioning the signing up by KLA representatives to substantive autonomy for Kosova, for the Kosovar textbooks the political platform of the KLA's war was Kosova's freedom and independence.¹²⁸ It is therefore nowhere made clear that initially this platform was—as is stated in the oath sworn by the KLA soldier—"for the liberation and union of the occupied lands of Albania."¹²⁹

On the other hand, for the Serbian textbooks, "the NATO aggression occurred because the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet and Paris refused to sign the ultimatum for the withdrawal of the army and police from Kosova."¹³⁰ It is also not mentioned in these textbooks that the Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-government document envisaged 2,500 FRY police and 1,500 soldiers in Kosovar territory and that substantial autonomy was envisaged within the sovereign territory of the FRY. The impression is therefore created for Serbian pupils that "the Western states that got involved, giving open support to the Albanians,"¹³¹ had the aim of removing Serbia from Kosova.

The Kosovar textbooks do not mention the substantive autonomy which Kosova would have enjoyed within the FRY on the basis of the Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-government document. This document says that "after three years an international meeting will be called to determine a mechanism for a final solution for Kosova, on the basis of the will of the people, the opinions of relevant authorities, the efforts made by each side in relation to the implementation of this agree-

¹²⁷ The Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-government, Paris, 18 March 1999, can be found at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm>.

¹²⁸ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 205.

¹²⁹ The text of the oath of the KLA soldier can be found on the webpage dedicated to Adem Jashari, at <http://www.ademjashari.com/uck.aspx?View=1&SMID=68&CID=19>.

¹³⁰ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 251. See also Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 186.

¹³¹ Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 3, 251. See also Đurić and Pavlović, *Istorija* 8, 186.

ment and the Final Act of Helsinki. . .”¹³² It does not specify anywhere exactly which people it was whose will was being referred to. Besides the phrase “the will of the people”, there is mention also of the Final Act of Helsinki, according to which international borders can only be changed by agreement of the two sides.

The NATO intervention

After Rambouillet, the most important period of the war in Kosova is undoubtedly the time of the NATO bombing of Serbian/Yugoslav military and police targets which was, according to the Serbian textbooks, aggression on the part of NATO. As mentioned above, the international community did not demand the withdrawal of all Serbian/Yugoslav military and police forces from Kosova; so such an account in the Serbian textbooks seems to be presenting Serbia as “a victim of the Western states which openly sided with the Albanians.”

For the Kosovar textbooks, the NATO military interventions were “to stop the wave of crimes committed by Serbia against Albanians.”¹³³ According to these textbooks, Kosova was liberated from Serbia “after the successful liberation struggle of the KLA and the entry of the NATO troops in June 1999.”¹³⁴ If the KLA was not in a position to end the wave of crimes which Serbia was committing against Albanians, and NATO had to intervene militarily, it is difficult to understand how Kosova was liberated after the successful KLA struggle and the entry of NATO troops. Equally, the Kosovar textbooks say that “as well as the battle units of the KLA, NATO forces, with the name KFOR, also entered Kosova.”¹³⁵ It is thus left to be understood that the KLA troops had not been in Kosova, but had entered like the NATO troops, but the Kosova textbooks do not say from where or when they entered.

Some of the Kosovar textbooks say that the Serbian/Yugoslav side withdrew from the territory of Kosova as a consequence of “the NATO

¹³² Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-government, Paris, 18 March 1999, at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm>.

¹³³ Rexhepi and Demaj, *Historia* 5, 105.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 106 (my emphasis).

¹³⁵ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 207.

bombing and the ongoing campaigns of the KLA.”¹³⁶ The Technical-Military Agreement on the withdrawal of Serbian/Yugoslav forces from Kosova, signed on 9 June 1999 in Kumanovo, was agreed only by NATO and the FRY—specifically Serbia. The authors of the Kosovar textbooks do not specify that the KLA was not part of this important agreement on the end of the armed conflict in Kosova. Besides compelling the Serbian/Yugoslav forces to withdraw from Kosova, this agreement guaranteed that a number—limited to hundreds, not thousands, of them—would be allowed to return to Kosova¹³⁷—something else that is not mentioned in these textbooks. Perhaps surprisingly, this guarantee does not figure in the Serbian textbooks either.

Likewise, none of the historiographies say that initially the aim of NATO was not to cause all Serbian/Yugoslav military and police forces to be withdrawn from Kosova, but it became such on 3 June 1999, a few days after the end of the bombings, when the President of the FRY, Slobodan Milošević, accepted a document drafted by Strobe Talbott (USA), Martti Ahtisaari (EU), and Victor Chernomyrdin (Russia), which demanded the withdrawal from Kosova of all police, military and paramilitary forces of FRY/Serbia.¹³⁸ The document included this demand because it was only in this way that refugees would feel safe in returning to their homes, and NATO soldiers would establish a safe environment without the chance of any conflict with those from FRY/Serbia, nor between the latter and the returning population.

The demilitarisation and transformation of the KLA is also presented in the Kosovar textbooks simply as the shift of the KLA to the Kosova Protection Corps (KPC) “on the basis of an agreement signed in September 1999 between General Agim Çeku, the Commander of the KLA, and General Michael Jackson, Commander of KFOR.”¹³⁹ The Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation of the KLA document, which the

¹³⁶ Ibid. See also Bicaj and Ahmeti, *Historia* 12, 202.

¹³⁷ The Technical-Military Agreement document between the International Security Forces (KFOR) and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, Kumanovo, 9 June 1999, can be found at <http://www.nato.int/Kosova/docu/a990609a.htm>.

¹³⁸ The document drafted by Strobe Talbott (USA), Martti Ahtisaari (EU), and Victor Chernomyrdin (Russia) and accepted by the Serbian Parliament on 3 June 1999, can be found at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/peace.htm#plan>.

¹³⁹ Bajraktari et al., *Historia* 10, 207. See also Bicaj and Ahmeti, *Historia* 12, 202.

Political Director of the KLA, Hashim Thaçi, offered Commander Jackson on 21 June 1999, does not feature anywhere. In this document, Hashim Thaçi pledged that the KLA soldiers would disarm and be integrated into civil society, as a civilian organisation for emergency intervention—the KPC. According to this document, the KLA agreed not to interfere with the FRY staff returning to Kosova (in hundreds, not thousands), to complete specific tasks under the authorisation and instructions of the KFOR Commander.¹⁴⁰ In the Serbian textbooks, the disarming of the KLA is not mentioned at all.

On the civilian rule in Kosova, established by the UN, and military control, established by NATO, the Kosovar textbooks offer only the dates and the numbers of troops established. There is no statement anywhere on the aim of the NATO mission in Kosova to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Equally, there are no data relevant to the UN mission in Kosova, UNMIK, which—in accordance with Resolution 1244—guaranteed Kosova a temporary international administration under which the people of Kosova enjoyed substantial autonomy within the FRY. In the Serbian textbooks there is a reference to the guarantee of territorial integrity for the FRY according to Resolution 1244.¹⁴¹

Conclusions

Many clear differences are revealed in the approach of the school history books in Serbia and in Kosova and Albania towards the events in the territory of Kosova. These differences can be grouped as follows:

Possession of the territory

The penetration of the Serbian army into Kosova at the end of 1912 is presented in opposite ways in the Serbian textbooks and those of Kosova. This is because both sides claim sovereignty over the territory of Kosova.

¹⁴⁰ The Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation of the KLA can be found at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/peace.htm>.

¹⁴¹ Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council can be found at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm>.

The way that the liberation, or occupation of Kosova is presented respectively, not only in 1912 but also in 1918 and 1945, follows offensive nationalism in the Serbian textbooks, while, in those of Kosova, it takes the form of defensive nationalism.

- In the Serbian textbooks this penetration of the Serbian army is presented as a liberation of the cradle of the Serbian nation, while the attainment of the Adriatic Sea is seen as achieving one of the aims of the war.
- In the Kosovar textbooks, the encampment of Serbian troops in Kosova is presented as occupation, which is said to have come as a consequence of the Albanians' difficult position.

The crimes committed by the other side

The most important element of Kosova's history between 1912 and 2000 is the crimes committed by the Serbs, organised into regular army and police, against Albanians; as well as the crimes of the Albanians, mainly not organised, against the Serbs. The school textbooks of these two sides present only the crimes of the other side, presenting themselves as victims, and the other as the aggressor.

- The Kosovar textbooks present only the crimes of the Serbs against Albanians in 1912, 1918–19, and then during the period between the two world wars, in 1945, and after World War II, as well as during the 1998–99 war. In these textbooks, these crimes are described as "bloody terrorist acts," "nationalist violence and terror," "national terror and genocide," or "the horrible scenes of barbarism of the bloody squadrons." It is rare that these textbooks offer information to quantify the Serbian crimes, and when it is offered, it is in an exaggerated form.
- The Serbian textbooks present only the crimes of the Albanians against the Serbs in 1915, 1941–43, 1999–2000, describing them as "the attacks of local gangs of Albanians," "Albanian terror against Serbs," or "robberies and the confrontations of terrorist groups with the forces of order." These textbooks generally do not give data for these crimes.

Silent collaboration

Although the penetration of the Serbian army into Kosova and the crimes of the two sides are presented in a variety of ways, in none of the textbooks from the two countries is there mention of the meetings, agreements, and collaboration of the political and military representatives of the Albanians with their Serb counterparts. In the textbooks of these countries there is no mention anywhere of:

- Collaboration between some of the most significant leaders of the Albanian uprising (1912) with the Serbian representatives in Prishtina, from whom they obtained weapons to fight the Ottoman Empire.
- The meeting of the leader of the Albanian Kaçak movement remaining under Yugoslavia (after World War I) with the local Serb authorities about living unharrassed, on condition that his movement extended to only three villages; and later another meeting with senior Serb officials where he asked for Kosova to have the right for self-government.
- Collaboration between the Legal Society for the Defence of Islam (after World War I), which represented the Albanians in the Serbian parliament, and the two major Serbian political parties in Yugoslavia, the Democrats and the Radicals—to the extent that sometimes these political parties even shared the same electoral list.
- Close collaboration between the Albanian communists of Kosova (during and following World War II) with the Serbian/Yugoslav communists; or their participation and acclaim in the parliament where it was decided that Kosova should be part of the Republic of Serbia.
- The agreement of the leader of peaceful resistance among the Albanians of Kosova (1996) with the Serbian president to open up school and university buildings to Albanians in Kosova; and later also the meetings between them on finding a peaceful solution for the Kosova issue (1998).

Distortion of aims

A characteristic of the Kosovar textbooks is exaggeration of the aims of Albanian political and military organisations. The organisations are even sometimes given invented names.

- The demand by the Albanian rebels in 1912 for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire is, in some of the Kosovar textbooks, represented as a demand for independence.
- The actions of the Kaçak movement in 1919–25 are represented only as a battle for liberation and national unity and there is no mention anywhere of its demand for self-government.
- An organisation with the name the “Kosova National Liberation Army” (UNÇK) is invented but the communists of Kosova were part of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.
- The initial manifesto of the LDK for autonomy is presented as a manifesto for self-determination, while the referendum held in September 1991 for Kosova to be a sovereign and independent state with the right to link with Yugoslavia, features only as a referendum for Kosova as a sovereign and independent state.
- The signing up to substantial autonomy for Kosova at the Rambouillet Conference by the political representatives of the KLA is not mentioned anywhere; furthermore, it is said that the KLA’s aim was independence, while the text of the oath of the KLA soldier speaks of liberation and union of the occupied lands of Albania.

Merging of different strands of thought

The Kosovar textbooks generally do not describe the political elements present in Kosova until the end of the 1980s, describing them only under the umbrella “Albanian national movement.” This umbrella is called “the democratic movement in Kosova” until the end of the 1990s. The elements of the most recent war in Kosova are presented only grouped together as the KLA. The Serbian textbooks make no reference to these different strands.

- The textbooks of Kosova make no reference to the fact that in the armed uprising of 1912 for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, there was a majority of representatives from the cities—the beys and the agas—who opposed autonomy, and on the other there were the leaders of the uprising whose aim was autonomy, but who were divided, since some of them wanted to stay strongly connected with the Ottoman Empire.
- The textbooks of Kosova do not specify that, between the two world wars, the Albanians had on the one hand the Kaçak movement following a path of armed resistance, while on the other hand, there existed the political grouping known as the Cemiyet for short, which followed the parliamentary route.
- The textbooks of Kosova do not state that during World War II there was on the one hand a nationalist element, supported by the German Nazis, which declared that it was committed to maintaining Kosova and Albania united, and on the other hand the communist element, supported by the Yugoslav communists, which also declared Kosova's desire to unite with Albania, suggesting the right for self-determination even to secession; nevertheless, in none of the textbooks of Kosova is it mentioned that the communist element was internally riven.
- The textbooks of Kosova do not mention that after World War II in Kosova, on the one hand, there was the work of the legal element, as part of the Yugoslav institutions and system, and on the other the illegal, organised through illegal organisations, which opposed Yugoslav occupation.
- In none of the school textbooks of Kosova is there reference to the division of the peaceful policy into a faction for passive resistance and a faction engaged in active resistance; also there is no reference to the division between the peaceful and the military arms of Kosovar politics.
- Also missing in the textbooks of Kosova are the three conceptualisations of military policy regarding war in Kosova: FARK, LKÇK, and KLA. The lack of the conceptualisations of the three approaches means also a lack of information on the friction and clashes between them.

The aspiration for ownership of the territory of Kosova and the presentation only of the crimes committed by the other side, portraying oneself as the victim and the other as the aggressor, as well as a silence on Albanian–Serbian collaboration, meetings and agreements, show that the countries are not sowing the seeds of reconciliation in the next generation. The distortion of aims and the merging of political elements among the Albanians of Kosova, in the Kosovar textbooks, leaves it to be understood that Albanians have always been united around one ideal. From the Kosovar textbooks a picture emerges that in some way, approximately until the 1980s this *ideal* was national unity, and later the independence of Kosova. In the end, taking into account the above mentioned considerations, it could be said that Serbia and Kosova through these history schoolbooks do not promote civic values because they promote inter-ethnic hatred, not only between the citizens of Kosova and Serbia, but also between the citizens of Kosova itself—Albanians and Serbs—since the history schoolbooks published by the Ministry of Education in Kosovo are used for the Albanian pupils in Kosova, while the history schoolbooks published by the Ministry of Education in Serbia are used, not only in Serbia, but for the Serbian pupils in Kosova as well.

CHAPTER 12

Civic Values in Kosovo within a European Perspective

KRISTEN RINGDAL

Most other chapters in this book are devoted to various aspects of Kosovar society and its recent history. This chapter, however, widens the perspective and aims to describe the contemporary civic values of the people of Kosovo within a European perspective. The analysis will be based on data from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS) fielded in 2008. The EVS has administered surveys of beliefs, values, and attitudes of Europeans every nine years since the start in 1981. The fourth wave includes surveys with identical questions in 47 European countries and regions. In total more than 70,000 persons were interviewed.¹ The surveys cover a range of topics including life satisfaction, attitudes, and values relating to family, work, religion, politics, and society.

The title of this chapter points back to the concept of civic culture launched in Almond and Verba's study of political attitudes and democracy in five nations.² In their landmark study published in 1963, civic culture was seen as the link between the micro and macro levels of the political system. Civic (political) culture is a mixture of modern participatory as well as traditional and parochial values that ensure stability. It is

¹ See <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/about-evs/>. In the sample from Kosovo, Serbs are over-represented. To avoid bias in the description of the average values and attitudes in Kosovo, a weight 0.25 was applied to Serbs as identified by V376=150.

² Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

based on values and attitudes that work to sustain participatory democratic institutions. This includes political interest, feelings of political efficacy, and active participation in civil society and politics. Also relevant are trust in people, and confidence in the political institutions of society, as well as being proud of being a citizen of one's country. Civic culture also includes political tolerance. Some of these aspects of political culture, especially trust in people and participation in civil society, have also been seen as indicators of social capital that is seen as important for the development and sustainability of democratic political systems.³

In a study published in 1988, Ronald Inglehart used data from the World Value Survey to study the relationship between political culture and economic development.⁴ His main finding is that civic culture is a crucial link between economic development and a stable democratic society. His concept of civic culture consists of three elements: interpersonal or social trust, life satisfaction, and attitudes to societal change. In a study from 2005, Inglehart and Baker link modernization and democracy in a more comprehensive way. They see modernization as driven primarily by economic growth and leading societies away from absolute standards of moral values and towards values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory.⁵ This indicates that the dimension of traditional versus modern, secular, and rational values could be seen as an extension of the set of values that are important for developing a democratic society. Part of this is in opposition to Almond and Verba's view of civic culture, since traditional values such as religion are part of the structure of society that fosters stability.

Based on the brief literature above, the following indicators have been chosen to represent activities, attitudes, and values that may sustain a democratic civic political culture. First of all, social and political trust is important. Social and interpersonal trust is measured by questions on whether people in general may be trusted or not. Political trust is measured by confidence in core political institutions, such as the parliament

³ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2000).

⁴ Ronald Inglehart, "The renaissance of political culture," *American Political Science Review* 82 (1988), no. 4: 1203–30.

⁵ Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker, "Modernization and cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (2000), no. 1: 19–51.

and the civil service. Life satisfaction may be seen as based on the output side of politics and is important for social stability. Furthermore interest in politics as well as participation in civil and political activities form the basis of a well-functioning democracy. The EVS includes several questions on the principle of democracy as well as evaluations of the way the democracy is developing in one's own country. Political and cultural tolerance is also important for a well-functioning democracy. Since the European Value Study does not include good indicators of tolerance, I also include data from the European Social Survey 2004 and from the Southeastern Social Survey Program (SEESSP) 2003–04.⁶ Finally, gender role attitudes and religiosity were chosen to represent the dimension of modern versus tradition values.

Where would one expect the people of Kosovo to be located on this variety of indicators of a civic political culture? First of all Kosovo is a new nation. The 2008 survey was conducted shortly after the declaration of independence from Serbia. Therefore, questions related to pride in the nation as well as confidence in institutions may be boosted by the newly won independence. The recent history of the Kosovo War in 1998–99 may also be expected to have influenced the political values of its citizens. Kosovo is a divided nation with a predominantly Muslim population of Albanian ethnicity. In Inglehart-Welzel's cultural map of the world, Kosovo (as a part of Serbia) is located in the group of post-communist countries close to Macedonia with more emphasis on survival values than on self-expression and secular-rational values rather than traditional ones.⁷

Results from the European Values Study 2008

The results from the 2008 survey will be presented in map-like scatter-plots where the location of Kosovo is compared to the other 46 European countries based on pairs of related questions and variables. First of all, we

⁶ More information about data from the European Social Survey is found at <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>. For more information about the SEESSP project, see Albert Simkus, "Guest editors' introduction: The SEESSP project," *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (2007), no. 3: 3–14.

⁷ See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54.


are interested in whether Kosovo shows a unique profile on the various aspects of civil culture or whether Kosovo falls within a cluster of countries sharing such qualitative attributes as being formerly socialist, without a long history of stable democracy, and especially its similarities with other former constituent republics of Yugoslavia.

For each indicator of civic culture, the average scores for Kosovo will be presented in a European perspective. In the scatter plots, Kosovo is easily spotted by a black marker. We start our description of values in Kosovo by considering social trust, national pride and confidence in political and justice institutions. This is followed by a set of indicators that may be seen as measuring the output side of politics: self-efficacy, life satisfaction, and happiness. Next follows a section with indicators of political interest and participation in civil society and politics. The final empirical section describes attitudes to democracy and cultural and political tolerance and ends with two aspects of modern and traditional values—religiosity and gender role attitudes.

Social trust and confidence in political and justice institutions

Social or interpersonal trust, that is, trust in other people in general, is often seen as an important part of the social capital that may foster trust in political institutions and motivate participation in civil and political activities. In the EVS 2008 there are three questions on trust in other people. The results for two of them are shown in Figure 12.1. The first question taps social trust directly “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful when dealing with people?” This is the vertical axis in the figure. The average per cent for each country endorsing the trusting alternative shows wide variation among the countries. At the bottom with the lowest trust in people we find Cyprus, closely followed by Kosovo, Albania, Turkey, and a group of mainly post-communist countries. Not more than 10% in Cyprus and Kosovo answered that “Most people can be trusted,” as compared to 70% for the three Scandinavian countries that are followed by Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Iceland.

The horizontal axis in Figure 12.1 is based on answers to the question on fairness: “Using this card, do you think that most people would try to

Figure 12.1. Social trust.⁸


take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? How would you place your view on this scale?" The scale ranges from 1, "Most people would try to take advantage of me" to 10 "Most people would try to be fair." The bulk of the countries are found in the middle of the scale with average scores from 4 to 7. With the exception of Azerbaijan which shows a relative high level of trust in people combined with the lowest level on the fairness question, the ordering of the countries on the

⁸ "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Response categories: "Most people can be trusted" (1) and "Can't be too careful" (0). "Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? How would you place your view on this scale?" The scale on the card ranges from 1 to 10 with the ends labeled in this way: "Most people would try to take advantage of me" (1) and "Most people would try to be fair" (10).


two dimensions are as expected positively correlated. The countries with high scores on trust in people also score highest on the fairness question. The Scandinavian countries are, however, closer to the other European countries on this dimension than on trust. At the lower left corner with low scores on both dimensions we find Cyprus, Kosovo, Albania, and Turkey. In sum, Kosovo shows a very low level of social trust, but this is a characteristic the countries share with many post-communist countries.

The results for national pride are quite different from that of social trust (Figure 12.2). The question is about how proud the respondents are of being citizens of their country. The list is topped by Kosovo where close to 90% answered that they were very proud or quite proud of being citizens. The next highest scores are found for Ireland, Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus. The lowest level of national pride is found for Germany (around 20%), followed by Lithuania, Moldova, The Netherlands, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Scandinavian countries which scored highest on social trust are scattered in the middle of the scale.

The next theme is political trust measured by the degree of confidence in four political and justice organizations. The exact wording of the questions is: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2) or none at all (1)?" The average score for the "justice system" and the "police" is shown on the vertical axis in Figure 12.3 and the average scores for confidence in the "parliament" and the "civil service" is shown on the horizontal axis. The impression is that the evaluations mostly concur; countries where the respondents express high confidence in the justice system also express high confidence in the two political institutions. In the upper right hand corner with the highest overall confidence in central justice and political institutions, we find Kosovo, Turkey, and Denmark. Kosovo scored highest among all countries on confidence in the parliament and the civil service, and somewhat below the top four on confidence in the justice system and the police. At the lower left hand corner with low confidence in both types of institutions, we find Bulgaria, Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia.

Figure 12.2. Pride in being a citizen of one's country.⁹

⁹ "How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?"

Figure 12.3. Confidence in political institutions.¹⁰


The output side of politics—life satisfaction and standard of living

The output side of politics may be measured in many ways, close to the production of various services for the population or to focus on the quality of life of people at large. In this section, the latter approach is followed and we will take a look at three subjective indicators of quality of life and an indicator of standard of life built on more objective criteria. In Figure 12.4 life satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10 constitute the vertical axis and a question on self-efficacy constitute the horizontal axis. The latter question has this wording: "Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do have no real effect on what

¹⁰ "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them. Is it a great deal (4); quite a lot (3), not very much (2) or none at all (1)?" Items: the justice system, the police, parliament, the civil service.

happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?" The scale ranges from 1, "None at all," to 10, "A great deal." The average score for most countries is between six and eight, which indicates that in most countries people feel that they have considerable freedom of choice in and control over their lives. Also for life satisfaction the distribution is skewed toward high scores. Most countries have average scores between six and nine, which again tells us the majority of people are quite satisfied with life.

Figure 12.4. Self-efficacy and life satisfaction.¹¹




¹¹ "Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do have no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?" The scale ranges from 1 to 10 with the following labels at the ends: "none at all" (1) and "a great deal" (10). "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer." The scale on the card ranges from 1 to 10 with the following labels at the ends: "dissatisfied" (1) and "satisfied" (10).

There are, however, marked differences between the countries, especially for life satisfaction. In the upper right hand corner, with the highest life satisfaction, we find the Nordic countries, but also Switzerland, Northern Ireland, Malta, and Montenegro. In the opposite corner, with relatively low life satisfaction, we find Azerbaijan, which is also an outlier in several other graphs. Among the remaining countries Georgia, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Ukraine show relative low scores on both control over life and life satisfaction. Kosovo is located in the middle of the country swarm close to Slovakia, Serbia, and Germany.

Another indicator of quality of life is happiness. In the EVS 2008, we find the following question: "Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy." In Figure 12.5 the average percentage in each country that answered "Very happy or quite happy" is displayed on the vertical axis. It is well-known that the level of expressed happiness is related to the standard of living. This dimension is measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), displayed on the horizontal axis. The HDI is published yearly by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI is a composite measurement based on indices for life expectancy, education, and income. The HDI-scores in Figure 12.5 have been multiplied by 1000. The score for European countries range from around 750 to around 950. Scores of 800 or more is considered to indicate high human development and scores between 500 and 800 indicate medium human development, that is, most European countries are within the first group.

As may be seen from Figure 12.5, the classification of the countries by the objective HDI scores and by the subjective expression of the degree of happiness, agree to a large extent. This is also reflected in a correlation of 0.74 between the two variables at the country level. In other words, the countries that enjoy the highest standard of living also score high on happiness. In this favorable position, we do find a cluster of small, rich west European countries, with the Nordic countries at the front. In the lower left hand corner, with low scores on both dimensions, we find Moldova apart from the others, followed by Georgia, Ukraine, and Albania. Some countries deviate from the pattern. Bulgaria shows a lower level of happiness than might be expected from its HDI score. Kosovo, on the other hand, scored higher on happiness than expected from its estimated HDI score. Note that a HDI score has not yet (2013) been computed for Kosovo and the score in the figure is set to equal to the value for Macedonia.

Figure 12.5. Happiness and human development.¹²

Participation in civil society and politics


The EVS includes several questions on participation in civil society and politics. Let us start with interest in politics and whether the respondents discuss politics with friends. The question on interest in politics has four response alternatives ranging from “Very interested” to “Not at all interested,” scored 4 to 1. The average scores for each country are displayed along the horizontal axis in Figure 12.6. The average score for most countries is found in the interval 2.0–2.8. Germany, Georgia, Iceland, and

¹² “Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy (1); quite happy (2); not very happy (3); or not at all happy (4).” The Human Development Index (HDI) is published yearly by the United Nations Development Program. The HDI for 2007 from has been multiplied by 1,000. The score for Kosovo is not available and is set equal to that of Macedonia.

Norway top the list of political interest with means cores at about 2.8, which corresponds to being somewhat interested in politics. Kosovo is found at the head of the main swarm of countries with a score of 2.55, at the level of Latvia and Armenia and somewhat below Austria and the Netherlands. The low scores for Portugal, Montenegro, but also for Albania, Northern Ireland, Spain, Romania, and Croatia indicate that the average citizens in those countries are not very interested in politics.

The other dimension in the figure, the percentage that discusses politics with friends frequently or occasionally, is clearly correlated with the score on political interest. In almost all countries 50% or more report that they discuss politics with friends. There is, however, a wide range between

*Figure 12.6. Political interest.*¹³




¹³ "How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested (4), somewhat interested (3), not very interested (2), not at all interested (1)." "When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?"

Northern Ireland at the bottom with below 50% and the highest scores of around 90% for Georgia, Norway, Germany, Iceland, and Denmark. Again Kosovo scores relatively high. Close to 80% of the Kosovar respondents report that they discuss politics with friends frequently and occasionally.

The next theme is involvement in civil society. A strong and varied civil society is normally seen as an important arena for education in organizational work and developing skills that is transferrable to work in political organizations. The EVS 2008 includes questions about belonging to and doing unpaid voluntary work for 14 types of voluntary organizations listed on a card shown to the respondents. The list ranges from "Social welfare services for the elderly, handicapped or deprived people" through "Religious or church organizations" and "Trade unions" to "Women's groups," "Peace movements," and "Voluntary organizations concerned with health." The two aspects of involvement in civil society rank the countries rather similarly with a few exceptions, especially Iceland and Denmark which score lower on doing voluntary work than one would expect from their high scores on membership in voluntary organizations.

According to our indicators, the strongest civil society is found in the Netherlands, followed by the Nordic countries, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Slovenia. The weakest civil society is found in a group of post-communist countries plus Turkey, Portugal, and Spain. In the latter group, fewer than 20% belong to an organization and fewer than 15% do unpaid voluntary work for such organizations. Kosovo is located in this group close to Bulgaria, Portugal, and Serbia. The location of the post-communist countries comes as no surprise, as forming voluntary organizations was clearly discouraged by the communist regimes. A past with authoritarian regimes may also explain the location of Portugal and Spain.

Let us turn to participation in politics. We may distinguish between conventional political participation related to the representative channel and unconventional political activities, also known as political activism. The traditional democracies in Western Europe, as well as in the USA, have all experienced declines in conventional political participation. The successive decline in election turnouts since the 1970s in combination with decreasing numbers involved in party membership and party organizations in most countries has led observers and researchers alike to conclusions that suggest a growing democratic crisis. Some researchers have a more optimistic view of the development. Political participation is not in decline, but taking new

Figure 12.7. Participation in voluntary organizations.¹⁴


forms, especially among young people. Conventional political activities are gradually replaced by unconventional political activism which may be connected to permanent or ad hoc organizations.¹⁵ Unfortunately, the EVS 2008

¹⁴ "Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say a) which, if any, do you belong to? b) which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for? Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; religious or church organizations; education, arts, music, or cultural activities; trade unions; political parties or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, and racial equality; third world development or human rights; conservation, the environment, ecology, and animal rights; professional associations; youth work (e.g., scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc.); sports or recreation; women's groups; peace movement; voluntary organizations concerned with health."

¹⁵ See Russel J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008); Pippa Norris, *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Ronald Inglehart and Gabriella Catterberg, "Trends in political action: The development trend and the post-honeymoon decline," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43 (2002), no. 3–5: 300–16.

does not include any questions on conventional political activities. However, a question on willingness to vote in general elections may serve as an indirect indicator of participation, although it is well-known that respondents tend to overstate both their willingness to participate and their actual participation. The average percentage in each country who answered that they would vote if there were a general election tomorrow constitutes the vertical axis in Figure 12.8. This percentage varies from a low of less than 60 in Kosovo to a high of around 95 in Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden. Again, the lowest levels are generally found in post-communist countries, but the willingness to vote is also relatively low in Switzerland and Portugal. At the high end, we

Figure 12.8. Participation in political activities.¹⁶



¹⁶ "If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote? Yes, I would vote (1); No, I would not vote (2)." "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, occupying buildings or factories."

find, in addition to the countries with long democratic traditions, also Malta, Georgia, and Turkey.

The other dimension in Figure 12.8 is participation in unconventional political activities, that is, political activities outside the representative channel. The respondents were asked whether they actually had participated in the following activities: signing a petition; joining in boycotts; attending lawful demonstrations; joining unofficial strikes; occupying buildings or factories.

Since few of the respondents reported that they had participated in several activities, the main contrast is between those who have participated in one or more activities and those who have not participated in any of the above activities. There is clearly more variation among the countries on this dimension than on willingness to vote. Participation in unconventional political activities is very low in most post-communist countries, and Turkey. At the other end of the scale, in Sweden, Norway, France, and Denmark between 70 and 80 per cent of the respondents reported that they had participated in at least one of the five unconventional political activities on the list. Whereas Kosovo was an outlier in willingness to vote, the participation in unconventional political activities is relatively higher. The percentage of about 45 places Kosovo at the high end for post-communist countries, at the level of Macedonia, Croatia, and Northern Ireland.

Attitudes to democracy and tolerance


The EVS 2008 includes several questions on attitudes about governance and to democracy. Figure 12.9 is based on two them, a general question and one that evaluates the democracy in one's own country. The vertical axis is the figure is based on the following question: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country?" The average percentage in each country that evaluated a democratic political system as good or fairly good is reported in Figure 12.9. The variation among the countries is rather restricted as the majority in all country evaluates democracy very favorably. Democracy is given the least positive evaluation in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, followed by Russia, Latvia, Moldova, and Bulgaria. At the top of the list we find Denmark and

Switzerland closely followed by Greece, Italy Georgia, Spain, Malta, Cyprus, Norway, and Sweden. Kosovo also scores high in that around 90% evaluates democracy as a good political system.

The second dimension in Figure 12.9 is built on the following question: "On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?" The percentage that answered very, or rather satisfied is displayed in the figure. With the exception of Azerbaijan, the rankings of the countries on the two questions do to a large extent concur. Along with Azerbaijan and Switzerland, Kosovo scores highest on satisfaction with democracy with around 80% satisfied. These countries are closely followed by Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Malta. The countries with the most negative evaluation of the way democracy is developing are Bulgaria, Ukraine, Serbia, Albania, and Hungary. Some countries score higher on general evaluation of democracy than on the way democracy is developing, especially Italy, Greece, Georgia, Iceland, and Macedonia, whereas the respondents from Azerbaijan are deviant in the opposite direction, they are more satisfied with the way democracy is developing than with the general question whether democracy is a good political system for their country.


Cultural and political tolerance is essential for a sound democracy. The EVS 2008 does not, however, have any satisfactory indicator of tolerance. The European Social Survey (ESS) 2004 includes two questions on tolerance that may be used. The two questions are found in a battery of four with the following common introduction: "Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. . ." The two relevant statements are: "Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish" and "Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned." The problem is that Kosovo, along with most of its neighboring countries, was not included in the ESS 2004. However, the South East European Social Survey Program (SEESSP) conducted surveys in all countries of former Yugoslavia with the exception of Slovenia (which was represented in the ESS 2004) and Albania. The surveys replicated the questions on tolerance from the ESS.

Thus, Figure 12.10 builds on a combination of results from the two other data sources. The results for the question on attitudes to homosexuals are displayed on the vertical axis and the results for the question on banning extreme political parties are displayed on the horizontal axis.

Figure 12.9. Attitudes to democracy.¹⁷

The spread of the countries in the figure indicates that many countries rank differently on cultural tolerance from the way they rank on political tolerance. The figures for Kosovo are, however, consistent as Kosovo scores lowest on both dimensions. The average Kosovar respondent disagrees that gays and homosexuals should live as they like, and Kosovars tend to agree that extreme political parties should be banned. Also, Turkey and Albania show very low scores on both dimensions of tolerance. The most negative attitudes to homosexuals are found in the post-communist countries and Turkey. The most liberal attitudes are found in Western Europe with The Netherlands, Denmark, and Iceland at the top.

¹⁷ "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country?" "On the whole, are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?"


Figure 12.10. Cultural and political tolerance.¹⁸

As to political tolerance, the picture is somewhat different. Kosovo is the least liberal country in this respect followed by Albania, Turkey, Greece, Germany, and Austria. At the other end, we find Ukraine, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Norway as the least inclined to ban extreme political parties.

Traditional versus modern values

As mentioned in the introduction, the change from traditional values to modern and tolerant values is seen by Inglehart and Baker as driven by

¹⁸ "Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned." The card had the following response categories: agree strongly, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, disagree strongly. The categories scored from 1 to 5; high

Figure 12.11. Secularization and modern gender roles.¹⁹

modernization. Two central dimensions of traditional versus modern values are religiosity and gender role attitudes. Both dimensions are represented by several questions in the EVS 2008. Religiosity is considered to be a multidimensional concept.²⁰ Although the sub-dimensions of religiosity are

scores indicate high tolerance. Data source: European Social Survey 2004, South-East European Social Survey Program 2003–04.

¹⁹ "Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are: a religious person, not a religious person, a convinced atheist." "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Please use the responses on this card (1. agree strongly, 2. agree, 3. disagree, 4. disagree strongly). A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works. A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay." The modern gender role scale is computed as the mean scores on these three questions.

²⁰ See Fames Alan Neff, "Exploring the dimensionality of 'religiosity' and 'spirituality' in the Fetzer Multidimensional Measure," *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 45 (2006), no. 3: 449–59.

positively correlated, the choice of indicators may influence the ranking of the countries. The indicator of religiosity displayed in Figure 12.11 is based on this question: "Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are . . . a religious person, not a religious person, a convinced atheist." The percentage in each country that chose one of the two latter response alternatives is reported in the figure. The most secular countries are found at the top: Belarus, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Sweden, followed by Estonia, France, Norway, and Britain. The least secular country as measured by this indicator is Kosovo followed by Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Modern gender roles attitudes are measured by a scale formed as the mean agreement/disagreement with three statements endorsing traditional general roles: "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works"; "A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children"; "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay." High scores indicate modern gender roles. The highest mean score are found for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, followed by Germany, Finland, and Iceland. In the left hand side of the figure, we find the countries with the most traditional gender role attitudes: Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kosovo, followed by Georgia, Ukraine, and Malta.

Conclusions

With one exception, the analysis of civic values attitudes in Europe with a special focus on Kosovo has been based on the European Value Study fielded mostly in 2008. The theoretical points of departure have been Almond and Verba's classical study on the civil culture from 1963 and the contribution of Inglehart and his colleagues with their emphasis on the relationship between modernization and a democratic political culture.

The first theme was social trust and trust in political institutions. On both indicators of social trust, Kosovo along with most of the other post-communist countries, scored very low, especially compared to the Scandinavian countries. However, the people in Kosovo were more proud of being a citizen of their country than respondents in any other European nation. Also, Kosovo scored very high on confidence in both political and judicial institutions. Thus, Kosovo shows an inconsistency between the low level of social trust and the high level of political trust. The latter is prob-

ably due to a honeymoon effect as the EVS 2008 was fielded just months after the declaration of independence.

The second theme was output from politics in terms of life satisfaction. Kosovo scored at a medium level on both life satisfaction and self-efficacy, and above average on happiness. The third theme was political interest and participation in civil and political activities. Kosovo score high on political interest and on discussing politics with friends. Kosovo shared the low involvement in voluntary organizations with the majority of the post-communist countries. As to political participation, the people in Kosovo showed low willingness to vote in general elections, but scored above many of its neighbors in terms of unconventional political activities.

The next theme was attitudes to democracy where Kosovo scored relatively high on both evaluation of democracy as a political system and the way democracy is developing. As regards cultural and political tolerance, Kosovo was the least tolerant of the 47 countries in the EVS 2008. Finally, Kosovo scored low on secularization, and low on modern gender roles.

The civic values of the people in Kosovo seem mostly to conform to expectations based on their status as a poor post-communist country. There is however an inconsistency between social and political trust that may be explained by a honeymoon effect related to the declaration of independence. It will be interesting to observe if the government is able to keep this political trust at its present level. There is also another inconsistency between the relatively high level of political interest and the rather low level of participation, especially in voluntary organizations. A third inconsistency is between the high support for democracy and the low level of cultural and political tolerance.

CHAPTER 13

Differences in Values between and among Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo

ALBERT SIMKUS and SHEMSI KRASNIQI

A fundamental feature of the nature of values in a society is the degree of diversity in values versus unanimity in values. In this chapter, we explore the degree to which there are social divisions in attitudes towards values in Kosovar society, how great these divisions may be, which kinds of group divisions are most important in explaining differences in attitudes, and how group differences differ depending on the dimensions of values involved. Naturally, we are interested in overall Albanian–Serb differences in the population of Kosovo.¹ Possibilities for cooperation and integration between these two major ethnic groups should be expected to be related to the magnitude of value differences between these groups.

However, we can expect that there may be additional important social divisions *within* these two groups. We examine three different kinds of such divisions: Divisions based on age groups, which, at any given time, are synonymous with “generational” differences across people born and passing through life stages during different historical periods; divisions based on levels of educational attainment; and, differences between those living in cities and those living in towns or villages. With regard to differences based on the population sizes of settlements, we present fewer figures than for age-group differences and differences in education; and,

¹ Our analyses necessarily omit analysis and discussion of the smaller nationality groups, because we are limiting analyses to groups sufficiently represented in large national social surveys.

we devote less attention to these differences for Serbs than for Albanians. The reason for this is that, particularly in 2004, there were very few Serbs living in the capital of Prishina, hardly any in the SEESSP sample, so capital—elsewhere comparisons are not reliable for Serbs. Also, the conditions of living in the Serb enclaves, and the Serb dominated counties of the North, involved special forms and degrees of segregation, isolation, and insecurity which cannot be reduced to the concept of general urban-rural differences for Kosovo as a whole.

Differences in values based on gender will be shown and discussed with regard to relevant attitudes—particularly with regard to attitudes about gender roles; but, these differences are of a special nature, as males and females are segregated and divided in quite different ways from groups based on nationality, age, education, and residence. Our analyses of divisions among Albanians and among Serbs are necessarily more detailed and accurate with regard to ethnic Albanians. The reason for this is not that the population is more than 90% Albanian; but that the sample sizes of the available survey data do not allow such detailed and precise estimates for Serbs as for Albanians, particularly when concentrating on specific age groups, educational groups, and places of residence. However, the data we use, with a special sample of nearly 500 Serbs, provides a larger sample of Kosovar Serbs than is available from any other equivalent survey related to the attitudes and values discussed here.

The title of this book and the series of books to which it belongs, emphasize “civic and uncivic” values. Such values obviously involve explicitly political values related to democratic governance, political pluralism and tolerance, institutions of a “civil society,” support for the state, and identity with the main goals of the society as a whole. However, as Sabrina Ramet, the organizer of this series and co-editor of this book has emphasized, civic and uncivic values extend to issues of tolerance and equality obviously bearing on social cohesion, the legitimation of the major social institutions and society as a whole, and the possibilities of the society becoming more closely integrated with the other societies of the region, and Europe as a whole. The present chapter does not concentrate upon attitudes towards explicit political institutions, as do the preceding and following chapters of this section of the book. Rather, it examines the following kinds of values: first, attitudes towards inter-ethnic group integration, trust, and tolerance; second, attitudes towards women’s gender roles and gender-equality in the labor force; and third,

attitudes towards social mores (moral values) related to sexual behavior, marriage, and reproduction.²

Our analyses of group differences in values and attitudes are based on large-scale representative samples of the Albanian and Serb populations of Kosovo. Given the degree of residential segregation between these nationalities (and political segregation with regard to the northernmost region) these surveys necessarily involved independent representative probability samples within the two populations of ethnic groups; and, in order to allow estimates for the Serbs, comprising only approximately 5% of the population, the few available surveys have sometimes sampled a larger proportion of the Serb population than of the Albanian population.

Our analyses primarily concentrate on analyses of data from the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP), conducted in late 2003–early 2004. There are several reasons for this: The SEESSP survey involved a larger sample size than other available surveys, particularly with regard to the Serb population, but for Albanians as well, allowing the analyses of sub-population groups based on age, education, and residence.³ More important, in comparison to alternative data, the SEESSP surveys also included more variables specifically related to ethnic exclusion, gender roles and equality, and mores related to sexual behavior, marriage, and reproduction, particularly with regard to questions used in earlier survey research specific to the countries of the Western Balkans. Finally, these surveys allow us to compare the magnitude of group differences in

² An earlier version of this paper included differences in values related to state policies concerning economic equality. We have omitted this discussion partly for reasons of the space available for this chapter, but also because we found these differences to be relatively small. Nationality, age, gender, education, and residence all together explain no more than 2% of the differences (in terms of the variance) in answers to attitude questions related to this issue, because an overwhelming and nearly unanimous majority support state egalitarian policies—as in most formerly socialist countries, particularly the poorest.

³ The SEESSP sample included 495 respondents identifying themselves as Serbs and 984–1,967 (depending on the question and sample) Albanians, the European Values Survey (EVS) of 2008 included 357 respondents who participated in the survey in Serbian rather than Albanian language and 1,219 who participated in Albanian. The Gallup Balkan Monitor surveys typically involved 250 respondents in Serbian enclaves and northern counties and 750 respondents from the remainder of Kosovo. And, the 2011 survey by the project “Strategies of symbolic nation-building in West Balkan states,” included 92 Serbs and 1,389 Albanians.

Kosovo relative to similar analyses of the SEESSP data for other countries in the region of the Western Balkans.

We have also made a strategic decision regarding which SEESSP questionnaire items to use. The SEESSP project involved a somewhat complicated survey design in which only a few questions on each attitude topic were included in the interviews for all subjects, while more questions on various attitude dimensions were asked for only half of most of the country samples. In our analyses for this chapter, we have chosen only a few questions (3–4) for each attitude dimension, so that we could have the maximum number of cases for examining differences among small groups within Kosovo.

While we would have liked to have made more use of later survey data, the existing Kosovo surveys since 2004 have not included matching questions allowing comparisons to SEESSP questions; and the range of questions and sample sizes are much less adequate for studying the dimensions of attitudes with which we are concerned in this chapter.⁴ For this reason, the tables and figures we present, are based on the SEESSP data. Those other international projects which have compared attitudes similar to those studied here both across time and countries tend to indicate that shifts over time occur much less quickly than can be observed in political opinion polls involving specific politicians, parties, or policy choices. Cross-national differences in such values may persist across periods of a decade or longer.

Nevertheless, we have also carried out multivariate analyses of data from the 2008 European Values Survey for Kosovo involving questions related to gender role attitudes and sex-related mores. And, we have examined relevant findings from the Gallup Balkan Monitor surveys of 2006–12, as well as calculated comparisons regarding ethnic tolerance based on a Gallup International survey for Kosovo in spring 2012. While we have not included tables and figures based on these analyses, where possible, we discuss the ways in which analyses of those data, by ourselves and others, reinforce or contradict our conclusions based on the SEESSP data.

⁴ Very fortunately, funding has been provided for conducting the sixth wave (2012) of the European Social Survey in Kosovo. Unfortunately, these data will become publicly available for analysis in late 2013–2014, too late for inclusion in this book. Also, only a very few of the topics we address, mostly measures of religiosity, are included. Nevertheless, many direct questions regarding attitudes towards democracy are included, and shall become a precious contribution to the sparse survey data for this country.

The analyses we present here include two different levels of statistical methods. This book is intended to be valuable for a wide group of social scientists, historians, regional specialists, policy analysts, students, and journalists, many of who have relatively little training in statistics. For this reason, most of our conclusions are presented in simple line graphs based on average answers or percentages of respondents giving categories of responses. However, there is also an important substantive reason for presenting simple gross differences based on social groups differentiated by nationality, age, education, and residence. The differences between social groups based on nationality, age, education and residence individually are the real differences which may be directly apparent to the people of the society, and the real bases for group conflict, cooperation, or political organization. They are thus social facts which may have causal effects on social developments.

At the same time, multivariate analyses may be helpful in understanding and explaining the reasons for value changes in the population, and the additive effects of combinations of different individual characteristics. For this reason, we also present and discuss the results of multivariate statistical analyses, showing the separate effects of nationality, age, gender, education, and size of place of residence while “controlling” for the effects of the other determinants. Furthermore, our conclusions are based on the use of significance tests to insure that they are not just artifacts of sampling error. This is particularly important in comparisons of subgroups based on the social divisions examined. The results of the multivariate analyses and tests of significance for all the attitude dimensions examined are presented in Table 13.1, in the appendix to this chapter. We will refer to this table throughout our discussion of different dimensions of value-related attitudes.

Ethnic Tolerance, Exclusion, and Trust

There is a substantial body of prominent publications examining inter-ethnic attitudes in the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and in its successor states based on a small number of attitude questions. Most of these questions were included in one of the only couple of sample surveys of general social attitudes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which included over 10,000 respondents, sufficient for estimates for republics, semi-autonomous regions, and even the larger ethnic groups within

republics. The relevance and reference of some of these questions about ethnic attitudes changed as the successor states became independent, and all major nationalities (save the Bosniaks) came to have one or more states in which their nationality was clearly dominant. Most of these questions were included in the SEESSP surveys, in a series of surveys in Croatia and Serbia, and in a recent set of Gallup International surveys. Those new to this research may be puzzled at the persistence of these questions in surveys and analyses despite questions that might be asked about how to interpret their face validity and the best name for the underlying dimension of attitudes they tap. Nevertheless, despite other various attempts thus far, no other set of questions on this topic has shown higher reliability and been included in so many large surveys in the Western Balkan countries, or been subjected to such sophisticated efforts of quantitative analysis and explanation.

In fact, only about five or six items consistently show up in the same factor across many surveys and seem valid in the present context, and only three of these have been included over the most years and countries. Perhaps surprisingly, a three-statement version of the micro-scale correlates very highly with versions with five or six statements.⁵ This version is available for the largest number of cases and historical time-points. It involves the first three of the following four statements. The fourth statement was added in the SEESSP, correlated well with the other three, and we consider it one of the most relevant statements to the main issue here.⁶ So as to include as many respondents as possible, we concentrate on a simple scale based on the average of responses to the first three questionnaire statements. However, we shall also discuss responses to the fourth

⁵ This is true within countries, but even more so across countries and ethnic groups in the region.

⁶ Presented with these statements, respondents were asked if they "strongly agree," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "disagree," or "strongly disagree." These responses were assigned values of 1–5 in that order, but these values were reversed in analyses such that higher values for the items and scales indicate the more "intolerant/exclusionist" attitudes. All of the SEESSP-based analyses of scales in this chapter involve the same response categories, coded such that high scores reflect more "conservative" or "traditional" values. The scale scores were calculated as the average (arithmetic mean) for the items in the scale. Thus average values of "1" would reflect the strongest and most consistent possible agreement with the most liberal attitudes; an average value of "5" would be the value if the responses were consistently in strong agreement with the most conservative statements; of course, average views for all groups are between these extremes, with the "value" of three indicating that groups are, on the average, ambivalent.

statement by itself. The statements are the following: 1) Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others; 2) Men [in the sense of people] can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to their nation(ality); 3) Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust; 4) It is best that villages, towns, and cities should be composed of only one nationality.

What are Kosovar attitudes on these questions in comparison to other nationalities and states in the Western Balkans? Both simple and multivariate comparisons show that in 2003–04 there is no question that both Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs showed the most distrustful exclusionist attitudes in this regard among major ethnic groups in the Western Balkan region.⁷ Among ethnic groups in the region, Albanians showed the most distrustful/exclusionist attitudes, and among Albanians, Kosovar Albanians showed the highest level. Among Serbs, Kosovar Serbs showed the highest value, higher than any non-Albanian group in the region. These differences were not simply due to Kosovar Albanians or Serbs having relatively low levels of education and urbanization, nor did the differences vary substantially by age groups or birth cohorts. Such differences are predominantly if not exclusively determined by the situation of these specific nationalities within specific countries.

Within Kosovo, how different are such attitudes across age groups and birth cohorts? Figure 13.1 shows the average values for the 3-item scale for ethnic intolerance for Albanians and Serbs by six ten-year age groups. The lines for the two groups are approximately horizontal and parallel, the most apparent feature of the figure is that Albanians consistently show higher values than Serbs, regardless of age group. The minor inflections in the lines are not statistically significant. There is a slight tendency for the values to increase with increasing age. This tendency is statistically significant for Albanians but not for Serbs (only partly due to the smaller sample size of Serbs), but the size of the age differences is trivial (note that the vertical axis is limited to values from 3.0–5.0, even though the scale

⁷ Albert Simkus, "Cross-national differences in the Western Balkans in three dimensions of attitudes: Ethnic exclusionism, gender role conservatism, and conservative sexual mores," *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (2007), no. 3: 15–31; Tanya Ellingsen, Kristen Ringdal, Albert Simkus, and Zan Strabac, "Security dilemmas and ethnic tolerance in the Western Balkans," in *The Aftermath of War: Experiences and Social Attitudes in the Western Balkans*, eds. Kristen Ringdal and Albert Simkus (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), 131–50.

may range from 1.0–5.0). The difference in age effects between Albanians and Serbs is not significant. And, in multivariate analyses, there is no significant overall age effect after controlling for level of education and rural residence (see Table 13.1 in the appendix).

Does level of education make a difference in these attitudes? Figure 13.2 shows average attitudes on this scale by six categories of years of completed education. The lines fluctuate due to the small number of cases in

Figure 13.1. Three-item scale for ethnic intolerance by age and nationality (SEESSP 2003–04).




Figure 13.2. Three-item scale for ethnic intolerance by completed years of education and nationality (SEESSP 2003–04).





Figure 13.3. Three-item scale of ethnic intolerance by size of place of residence and nationality (SEESSP 2003–04).



some categories, especially for Serbs, but the main pattern is still that of two parallel horizontal lines. Higher levels of education are very weakly correlated with lower values on the scale, but the relationship is only statistically significant for Albanians. In multivariate analyses, the effect of education is not significant for Albanians and Serbs combined. Figure 13.3 shows values for the scale by three categories of the population size of the respondents' places of residence. Again Albanian-Serb differences are substantially greater than differences based on urban versus rural residence. More rural residence is only weakly correlated with higher scale values. This effect of residence is statistically significant for Albanians, and for both groups combined, even in the multivariate analyses (see Table 13.1).

In short, nationality differences far outweigh differences based on age, education, and residence, which are all relatively small. Have these attitudes changed in the nearly ten years since the SEESSP survey? We were able to have this three-item scale included in a survey carried out by Gallup International in Kosovo in spring 2012. The average scale value for Albanians was almost exactly the same as in 2003; the value for Serbs was slightly lower than earlier, increasing the nationality difference by a small degree.

Notice that the "ethnic intolerance scores" suggest a kind of asymmetry, where Kosovar Serbs consistently have lower scores than Albanians. A number of explanations may easily be suggested. First, the Albanians,

having recently experienced warfare, forced mass exodus from the country, and an active struggle for independent statehood could be expected to be more insecure about trust and integration than Serbs, even though many Serbs also experienced warfare, forced migration, and struggle over state sovereignty. Second, we note that the ethnic tolerance scale questions do not mention specific nationalities by name. It is possible that Kosovar Albanian respondents responding to these questions automatically answer thinking of Serbs as the other nationality at issue, while Serbs may think of this issue in a more abstract manner, including Macedonians and others among the nationalities implicitly included in these questions.

Finally, we may consider that these attitudes and their determinants depend somewhat on exactly which specific questions are asked, even though answers to such questions are strongly correlated. For this reason, we have conducted further analyses of the items listed above, including the fourth item, which specifically refers to the residential segregation of Albanians and Serbs. As indicated in Table 13.1, while education does not have a significant effect on the three-item scale, nor on the scale item concerning ethnic intermarriage, education does have a significant and clear negative effect on the attitude that places of residence should be ethnically homogeneous. On this issue, increased education seems to have a liberalizing influence.

This stands in contrast to the issue of ethnic intermarriage, where education seems to have had little effect. The SEESSP survey also included an item stating: "In choosing a spouse, nationality should be one of the most important considerations." As seen in Table 13.1, Albanians placed a much higher value on ethnic marital homogamy than did Serbs, and it is the size of the place of residence which had the second most effect, with rural residents showing greater approval of same-nationality marriage than urban residents. So, the importance of age, education, and urban versus rural residence do vary with the specific question asked.

Nevertheless, the overall conclusion is that with regard to attitudes towards ethnic relations, the effect of nationality far outweighs the effects of all other major social divisions. Furthermore, it is of greatest importance to recognize that for this dimension of attitudes and values, we are not simply observing an ethnic group difference related to other dimensions of attitudes, these attitudes are directly concerned with ethnic relations themselves—trust, security, intermarriage, and exclusion in group relations with each other. This being the case, the overall differ-

ence between Albanians and Serbs in average values of these attitudes in Kosovo is less important than the fact that they are both high on these scales, in absolute values and relative to other groups in the Western Balkans, and that these high levels are not being substantially moderated by young age, increasing education, and urbanization.⁸

Gender Role Equality

Values regarding the “proper” roles for women within households, working outside households, and within hierarchical social and economic structures outside the household can be distinguished on different theoretical bases, but are not always distinguished in sets of social survey questions related to gender roles. Previously published analyses of gender roles in the Western Balkans have involved somewhat different distinctions among sets of questionnaire items grouped into different specific scales. However, most of these scales of gender-role traditionalism have been strongly correlated with each other; and most findings about the determinants of gender role attitudes have been consistent. Nevertheless, the selection of scale items can affect the relative magnitudes of the effects of country, nationality, age, education, and residence. The most detailed survey analysis of gender role attitudes for all the Western Balkan countries included in the SEESSP is that of Jelena Pesić, who has presented multivariate analyses showing not only differences across countries, but also country differences in the effects of education, age, place of residence, and religiosity. An article by Marija Brajdić-Vuković, Gunn Birkelund, and Aleksandar Stulhofer has presented the most detailed analyses for Croatia.⁹ Simkus has stressed the importance of specific combinations

⁸ There is one likely difference in these inter-ethnic attitudes among Serbs for which we do not have adequate survey data for precise comparison—the differences between 1) Serbs living in the northernmost counties, largely outside control of the Kosovar government and still highly integrated with Serbian society; and 2) Serbs living in small Serb enclaves in central and southern Kosovo or integrated into large cities. Serbs in the latter situations are reportedly much more accepting and reconciled to improved integration within Kosovar society and government than Serbs in the northern region.

⁹ The best recent analyses concentrating on cross-national and cross-nationality differences in gender role attitudes are those available in Jelena Pesić, “Patriarchal value orientations in the Western Balkans,” in Ringdal and Simkus, eds., 193–216;

of nationality and country in Western Balkan gender role attitudes.¹⁰ The present chapter examines the degree to which age, education, and place of residence do or do not have similar effects among the two major nationalities in Kosovo, similar to earlier analyses for Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹

Our analyses involve gender role attitude scales which overlap with those used in these previous publications. However, our scales differ slightly from those earlier scales for two reasons: First, in order to have the largest possible number of respondents, allowing the most accurate estimates for small groups within both the Albanian and Serb nationalities, we restricted ourselves to questionnaire items which were asked of all respondents in the Kosovar SEESSP surveys, necessarily omitting gender-role items asked for only a much smaller portion of the respondents. Second, we wished to differentiate between two spheres of gender role values which relate to the issue of civic values, as defined in this book, in rather different ways.

With these considerations in mind, we calculated two scales related to gender roles and equality. The first scale involves statements directly related to prejudice regarding whether women make good managers and political leaders, and should be given equal opportunities for higher education. These statements are a smaller subset of five statements in Brajdić-Vuković et al.'s scale of "Attitudes towards gender roles in Croatia." They are also a subset of a slightly different five statements in Pesić's scale of "Attitudes towards women's employment and gender roles outside

see also Simkus, "Cross-national differences," 15–31; and Albert Simkus, "Nationality, state, and values in the Western Balkans," in Ringdal and Simkus, eds., 103–30. For a detailed analysis of Croatia, see Marija Brajdić-Vuković, Gunn E. Birkelund, and Aleksandar Štulhofer, "Between tradition and modernization: Attitudes toward women's employment and gender roles in Croatia," *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (2007), no. 3: 32–53. For cross-national and historical comparisons based on the World Values surveys for many countries worldwide, see Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹⁰ Simkus, "Cross-national differences" and "Nationality, state, and values."

¹¹ Hasan Jashari and Albert Simkus, "Differences in values within Macedonia: Macedonian–Albanian Comparisons," in *Civic and Uncivic Values in Macedonia: Value transformation, education and media*, eds. Sabrina P. Ramet, Ola Listhaug, and Albert Simkus (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 41–63; and Albert Simkus, "Divisions within Bosnia and Herzegovina on core values: Effects of nationality, gender, age, education, and size of place of residence," in *Bosnia-Herzegovina since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values*, eds. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013, 159–182).

the household." We label this scale as "Gender role traditionalism I," but it is best described substantively as a scale of gender prejudice related to equal opportunities for women to participate in roles of leadership and expertise outside the household. The statements are the following: 1) Men are better suited to be managers than women; 2) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do; 3) A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.

The second scale involves items concerned with gender-related attitudes towards authority and work within households, and the encouragement and freedom of women to work outside the household. This scale is labeled "Gender role discrimination II." The questions included overlap with, but are not identical with Brajdić et al.'s scale of "Attitudes towards women's employment in Croatia" and Pesić's scale of "Attitudes towards gender roles within the household"; they are the same items used in Simkus's (2012) scale of "Gender role conservatism." Specifically, the scale is based on agreement or disagreement with the following statements: 1) It is good in marriage if men and women are equal, but best if men have the last word; 2) It is more natural for men to work outside the home, and women to work at home; 3) If in the marriage only one person is employed, it should be the man; 4) Most housework is naturally the job of the woman.

In earlier research comparing the nationalities and the states of the Western Balkans, which variables seem to have had the most effect on gender role attitudes in general? Nationality, state, and nationality groups within states clearly matter. Across countries of the region, Pesić reports gender role attitudes in Kosovo to be the second most traditional in the region—the most traditional being those in Albania. In somewhat similar multivariate analyses, Simkus (2007) compared different major ethnic groups within these same countries, finding Serbs in Kosovo to be traditional compared to Serbs in Serbia, but slightly less traditional than Albanians in Kosovo. And, Albanians in Kosovo were more traditional than Albanians in Albania, but less traditional than Albanians in Macedonia. However, in a similar later analysis based on a different scale and sample selection, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo were not significantly different from each other; and, both groups appeared less traditional than Albanians in Macedonia and Albania.¹² Indeed, they were less traditional than

¹² Simkus, "Nationality, state, and values."

any of the larger nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. Croats in Croatia were the least traditional concerning women's roles, along with Macedonians in Macedonia. So, in a regional comparative perspective, Kosovar Albanians and Serbs are relatively traditional, although not necessarily the very most traditional groups based on country and nationality; and, their ranks among other nationalities and countries in the Western Balkans may vary significantly depending on the exact items included in the scales of gender role attitudes upon which the comparisons are based.

In the studies of Pesić (2012) and Simkus (2012), years of education had the strongest effect on gender role traditionalism of all socio-demographic variables, followed by age, place of residence and sex. As might be expected, higher levels of education were associated with lower levels of traditionalism, while age, rural residence, and being male were associated with higher traditionalism scores. In Pesić's examination of within-country effects of socio-demographic variables, Kosovo was found to show a strong liberalizing effect of education, and a significant liberalizing effect of living in a large city, but, surprisingly, there was no significant effect of age, after controlling for education, residence, religiosity and gender.

Regarding gender role attitudes in Kosovo, what has not been analyzed previously is degree to which the highly segregated Albanian and Serb population groups within Kosovo show different internal differences based on age, education, residence and gender. This is the primary purpose of the analyses presented here. A second issue investigated is the degree to which Albanian–Serb differences in gender role attitudes vary depending on the specific dimensions of gender role differentiation involved.

Figure 13.4 displays the average values for the scale "Gender role traditionalism I" for Albanians and Serbs separately, by six ten-year age groups. Here we can observe a moderate but consistent pattern of increasing traditionalism with increasing age. The pattern of age change seems similar for both Albanians and Serbs; and Albanians and Serbs are quite similar within broad ranges of age. There is no significant difference between Albanians and Serbs, both before and after controlling for age; the linear change associated with age is significant, and there is no significant Albanian–Serb difference in the bivariate correlation between age and traditionalism based on this scale of gender traditionalism. For both nationalities there could be a small potential for conflict between "gen-

erations,” based on younger persons being less traditional about gender roles than older persons. This is a fact of differentiation which exists similarly for both Albanians and Serbs. It seems to us that these similarities between Albanians and Serbs, and the similarities in their changes across age groups, reflect both groups having a legacy of regional isolation and traditionalism—and both groups experiencing urbanization, modernization, and improved education, from the 1970s through the present.

However, multivariate analyses help explain the primary reason for these age differences, and allow us to reassess the Albanian–Serb similarities. If we control for years of education completed, differences based on age are reduced to insignificance, and Serb-Albanian differences become twice as large and statistically significant, with Serbs being more traditional than Albanians on average (Table 13.1). Figure 13.5 illustrates part of the explanation for the pattern seen in Figure 13.4. Figure 13.5 displays the average traditionalism scores for Albanians and Serbs separately by years of completed education. Figure 13.5 shows an even stronger relationship based on education than the relationship based on age seen in Figure 13.4, as higher years of education are associated with decreasing scores for traditionalism. And, in this figure, Serbs are significantly more traditional than Albanians except among those with less than primary school educations. When both age and education are included in a multivariate model, the effect of age/birth cohort disappears while education shows a significant strong negative effect on this form of traditionalism. The size of this effect of education is not significantly different for Albanians from what it is for Serbs.

The explanation behind the patterns we see in Figures 13.4 and 13.5, as well as in the effects in the multivariate analyses shown in Table 13.1 is that in Kosovo as elsewhere, higher levels of education are strongly associated with lower levels of gender-role traditionalism. For the older birth cohorts, Serbs had and have higher average levels of education than Albanians, which seems to have led to Serbs being similar to Albanians with regard to this aspect of gender role traditionalism, despite what might have otherwise been a significant cultural tendency towards greater traditionalism. Even among the younger birth cohorts, among women, Serbs have had higher average levels of education (although the educational levels of Albanian women have been rising rapidly); thus, even for these youngest cohorts, the higher education of Serbs is a liberalizing influence which counters an underlying traditionalism.

Figure 13.4. Three-item scale of "Gender role traditionalism I" by age and nationality (SEESSP 2003).






Figure 13.5. Three-item scale of "Gender role traditionalism I" by years of completed education and nationality.



We would expect that urban-rural differences in residence should also be an important determinant of gender role attitudes. Such differences are shown in Figure 13.6. We can observe a weak positive relationship between more rural residence and gender role traditionalism. Population size of the place of residence is negatively correlated with gender role traditionalism. But the relationship, though statistically signifi-

Figure 13.6. Three-item scale of "Gender role traditionalism I" by urban–rural residence and nationality.



cant, is weak, and the effect of residence becomes insignificant after the other variables are controlled.

We have presented two different scales for attitudes towards gender role traditionalism, "Gender role traditionalism I and II." We distinguished these scales because they allowed us to distinguish different spheres of gender role traditionalism—1) prejudice regarding equality of opportunity for women's occupying higher positions outside households; and 2) attitudes related to authority and the division of labor within households, and the acceptance of women working outside households. As discussed earlier, not only are these different dimensions of women's roles distinguishable on a theoretical basis, but we have also seen that comparisons of differences in such attitudes across countries and nationalities can lead to different conclusions when different questions are included in the attitude scales used.

How different are the effects of nationality, age, gender, education, and residence with regard to the scale "Gender role traditionalism II," compared to "Gender role traditionalism I"? Our analyses show that in the case of Kosovo, these effects turn out to be very similar for both scales. We will not take space to present additional figures quite similar to those of Figures 13.4–13.6. However, the results of multivariate analyses are included in Table 13.1. It is education which has the most effect. (Eight additional years of education have more effect than the gender of

the respondent!) These effects of education are essentially identical for both scales. After controlling for education, there is no significant effect of age, although the increases in average education across birth cohorts have resulted in younger age cohorts being less traditional than the older cohorts. This is true for both scales. Similarly for both scales, persons living in the smallest population centers are more traditional than those living in the largest cities, but this difference is reduced to insignificance when the respondent's level of education is controlled.

In the end, there is only one effect which is different between the two scales in the multivariate analyses—the effect of nationality. After the other variables are controlled, Serbs are clearly significantly more traditional than Albanians on the first scale—the scale concerning women obtaining a university education and having positions as political leaders or managers. However, for the second scale—the scale concerning within-household role traditionalism—, there is no significant Albanian–Serb difference net of the effects of Albanian–Serb differences in levels of education.

Do data from the later 2008 European Values Survey lead to different conclusions? Our analyses of those data led us to be very cautious about the variables related to gender roles and moral values in that survey. The response opportunities involved a scale of 0–10, and while this format for question design seemed logically advantageous regarding the quality of the level of measurement, the responses in the data were so concentrated in the extreme categories that they led us to be skeptical about whether the data did a good job of distinguishing among respondents' attitudes on these questions. Clearly the differences in questionnaire items and answer categories were so different between the SEESSP and this EVS survey that comparisons could not be made to see if there was any significant change during the approximately four-year period between surveys. However, it was possible to see if the EVS data are generally consistent with the findings of the SEESSP data regarding Albanian–Serb differences and the effects of age, sex, education, and residence, despite substantial differences in the specific gender-role items used.

Thus, we also analyzed the 2008 EVS 2008 data for Kosovo, examining those gender-role attitude items which were included. We summarize the results here without presenting details. Multivariate analyses showed that in these data as well, level of education had a bigger effect, in the direction of lower levels of traditionalism, than any other demographic vari-

ables. In the multivariate analyses, Albanian–Serb differences were insignificant, as were age/generation differences.

Albanian Kosovars do not seem so very traditional in comparison to their Albanian neighbors in Macedonia and Albania. Depending on the exact scales used, they are even less traditional than the major nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. However, Kosovar Albanians and Serbs do have traditional attitudes about gender roles, in comparison to Croats in Croatia and Macedonians in Macedonia, who are the most liberal ethnic groupings in the Western Balkans regarding gender roles.¹³

There are a number of possible explanations of why Kosovar Albanians, while having more traditional gender role attitudes than some Western Balkan populations and most Western European populations, have attitudes which are in various ways *less* traditional than those of other populations in the Western Balkans and less traditional than may be assumed in western European stereotypes. Unemployment and foreign employment are, and have been, very high for Kosovars, leaving many families happy for anyone to have a job and leaving households effectively headed by women in the absence of their husbands. Also, during the period before the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and before the repressive measures introduced by Milošević, Albanians in Kosovo had a degree of autonomy, and were less rural, isolated, and poorly educated than those in Macedonia. The westernization of Kosovar Albanians was also accelerated by the waves of external migration and work experiences in Western Europe, from the 1970s through the 1990s.¹⁴

We are also led to consider the possibility that the processes of change discussed in this book by Luci and Gusia are involved in the development of these attitudes among Kosovar Albanians. Here we are thinking of the way males (and females) were forced out of the state sphere of employment by Milošević's policies and into alternative bases for economic activity and services, which were more family- and household-based. This was then followed by women's involvement in mass protests for human rights and independence, and eventual involvement in combat.

¹³ Simkus, "Nationality, state, and values."

¹⁴ For ethnographic studies bearing on related issues, see papers by Kaser, Krasniqi, Lattiffi, Leutloff-Grandits, and colleagues, e.g. at https://static.uni-graz.at/fileadmin/gewi-institute/Geschichte/5%C3%BCdosteurop%C3%A4ische_Geschichte/Carolin-report-finaDATuml.pdf.

These may have been quite important in breaking down the strength of traditional patriarchal attitudes.

Moral Values Related to Sex, Marriage, and Reproduction

Attitudes towards mores related to sexual behavior, marriage, and reproduction may involve diversity in matters of individual choices and the choices of voluntary religious or other communities within civil societies. However, such diversity in attitudes becomes a challenge to the development of a civil society when the attitudes of one group, even a social majority, rise to extremes of social condemnation against individuals and members of other groups who do not share them. This issue clearly becomes important when moral judgments about such mores call for prohibitions and punishments to be included in state law and even extra-legal individual and collective actions. Of course, all societies involve enforcement of sanctions against a range of behaviors and institutions considered outside limits of civility as defined by the dominant social values of the state and society. But this issue becomes problematic for the development of civil society when such attitudes lead to strong conflicts over individual rights, either within a single state, or within the community of states in which a society wishes to share cooperation, integration, and a common enforcement of human rights.

Three specific issues concerning such sexuality-related mores are salient to the development of civic society in Kosovo: the issue of divorce, the issue of abortion, and the issue of homosexual rights. The issue of the legality of divorce is settled in general principle, although not necessarily in details, but still reveals remaining value differences within Kosovo and between Kosovo and the societies of the European Union. The issue of abortion rights is a significant source of social division within Kosovo, as it is within many European societies as well. Finally, the issue of rights for those of gay sexual orientation, is an issue for which there is not so much division of attitudes within Kosovo (as elsewhere in the South-West Balkans, public opinion is very strongly anti-gay), but one for which EU policies conflict with popular sentiment, particularly in terms of outright discrimination and violence against homosexuals.


Nevertheless, there are significant differences on all three issues in Kosovo. What are the most important social differences regarding such

attitudes? We have constructed a scale of conservatism on mores related to sexual behavior, marriage, and reproduction based on the following questionnaire items, using data from the SEESSP surveys for Kosovo. For each of these items, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements, given the same categories of response as for the items in the other scales mentioned previously. Responses were coded or recoded such that higher scores indicated more traditional/conservative views. The three statements used to measure conservatism on this dimension were as follows: 1) Divorce should be against the law; 2) Abortion should be illegal; 3) Homosexuals are criminals and should be punished in the extreme.

Figure 13.7 shows the average values on this scale separately for Albanians and Serbs by ten-year categories of age. Note that average values of 3 indicate a neutral position, while values above or below 3 indicate degrees of agreement or disagreement. In general, Albanians are clearly more conservative than Serbs. But the size of the nationality differences appears to change across birth cohorts. It seems that such attitudes do not differ by age for Albanians but do become more traditional with age for Serbs, being identical to those of Albanians among members of the oldest birth cohort, but being significantly more liberal for the youngest Serbs. The nationality difference and the linear positive age effects are statistically significant as is the pattern of greater change across age groups among Serbs than among Albanians.

Figure 13.8 shows the differences between nationalities by categories of education, indicating that increasing levels of education were strongly associated with increasing liberalization for both Albanians and Serbs, to approximately the same degree. Albanians were clearly more conservative than Serbs, regardless of level of education. The nationality difference is significant, as is the linear effect of years of education, but the size of the effect of education is not significantly different for the two nationalities. The differences based on size of place of residence for both groups are shown in Figure 13.9. Perhaps surprisingly, there seems to have been no residence effect for Serbs, and at best a very moderate effect for Albanians, such that Albanians are more conservative as their population size of the place of residence decreases. Statistical tests show that the nationality differences and size of place differences are significant, but the effect of place of residence is not significantly different between nationalities.

Figure 13.7. Sex more conservatism by age and by nationality (SEESSP 2003–04).



The fact that Albanians are much more conservative/traditional regarding such mores than Serbs is clear from Figures 13.7–13.9, and it is only the differences based on level of education which rival, and even exceed, the nationality differences. Table 13.1 shows the effect of the five socio-demographic determinants in a multivariate analysis including all variables simultaneously. The age differences disappear after controlling

Figure 13.8. Sex more conservatism by years of education and by nationality (SEESSP 2003–4).





Figure 13.9. Sex more conservatism by urban–rural residence (SEESSP 2003–04).



for level of education, but the nationality effect does not. Albanians are much more conservative than Serbs on such issues regardless of controls for the other variables. Indeed, the Albanian–Serb difference, after these controls are included, is much larger than the corresponding Albanian–Serb differences regarding gender roles or even ethnic exclusionism. After controls for nationality and education, the increase in conservative attitudes associated with progressively smaller places of residence is significant, even with the other variables being controlled, and larger than the net effects of residence for either ethnic exclusionism or gender role attitudes.

While responses on the different questionnaire items are correlated highly enough to form a reliable scale, the differences in the degrees of support across questions naturally leads to curiosity about how different the effects of the determining variables may be for different specific questions. This is true not only for the three items included in the scale, but also for more moderate questions related to the same dimension of values. For this reason, Table 13.1 includes multivariate statistics for each item related to sex-related mores individually, and also includes a couple of additional related questionnaire items.

First, in contrast to the extreme question regarding homosexuals being considered criminals and punished harshly, we add additional results based on the SEESSP data using a questionnaire item also used in

the European Social Survey, where respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that “Gays and lesbians should be free to live as they like.” Second, we include an item about whether it is wrong for persons [of the opposite sex] to live together without being married—surely an issue subject to moral judgments, but not one associated with legal sanctions or punitive action within most European contexts.

As seen in Table 13.1, the largest Albanian–Serb difference regarding specific items related to sexual mores is seen for the item about couples living together without being married. Albanians are much more conservative than Serbs on this question, and significantly more conservative than Serbs on all the items regarding sex-related mores. The second largest difference based on nationality involves the most extreme homophobic statement. Here, Serbs are again more liberal than Albanians (but nevertheless not very liberal at all in absolute terms).

Education has a significant effect on decreasing support for the most extreme anti-homosexual views, but not on the more moderate question concerning homosexuality. The largest effect of education on any single question is its liberalizing effect on attitudes towards the legality of divorce. In the realm of these kinds of mores, residence has significance even beyond the effects of education and age. If a person is divorced, or cohabits without marriage, he or she can still expect more approbation in a village than in a city, regardless of the nationality, age, or education of that person’s neighbors. The same applies to a woman who has an abortion. Nevertheless, let us stress that the most important factors for these attitudes related to sex-related mores within Kosovo are nationality and education. And, while Kosovar Albanians are consistently more conservative than Kosovar Serbs, both Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs are conservative relative to most other societies of the region and Europe as a whole.

Conclusions

The intention of the analyses of this chapter was to examine the differences among the two major nationalities in Kosovo, as well as the differences within these nationalities based on age, levels of education, residence, and gender. There are indeed important differences in values between Albanians and Serbs, with Albanians usually having the most traditional values. At the same time both groups tend to have attitudes

which are conservative or traditional compared to other societies in the Western Balkan region; and, traditional in comparison to the societies of Western Europe.

The finding that Kosovar Albanians are more traditional or conservative than Kosovar Serbs with regards to ethnic exclusionism and mores concerning divorce, abortion, and homosexuality is not particularly surprising. However, our analyses may call into question stereotypes of Kosovar Albanians having much more traditional attitudes about gender roles than Kosovar Serbs. It seems that controlling on differences in levels of completed education reduces such nationality differences within Kosovo to insignificance. Furthermore, the nationality differences depend on the particular items used in scales for measuring different dimensions of gender role attitudes. In fact, Albanians seem to have been less traditional than Serbs with regard to gender equality in access to positions of authority and expertise outside the household, given controls for other socio-demographic variables.

Apart from examining Albanian–Serb differences in values, we have also been concerned with examining social differences in values based on age, education, and rural versus urban residence. The results are interesting with regard to which such differences are most important and which are not. With regard to age, while differences across age groups (equivalent to birth cohorts in a single survey) are significant, they are not actually very large, especially in comparison to the gross differences based on nationality and education. These age differences are generally gradual and even (technically, they are approximately “linear”), rather than showing abrupt breaks between historical “generations.” And, if one controls for respondents’ years of completed schooling, the age difference shrinks to the level of being insignificant.

The differences across age groups are evidently entirely, or almost entirely, due to rapid changes across birth cohorts in levels of education. This is *not* the case for all societies of the Western Balkans. An analysis of all the countries and major nationalities in the Western Balkans included in the SEESSP surveys has shown that, on the average, quite significant effects of age groups on such attitude variables as we have examined here remain after including the effects of education, nationality and country, and residence. Similar analyses for Bosnia and Herzegovina have also shown significant age effects remaining after controls for education, nationality, and residence.

Simple differences such as would be expected between large cities, towns, and villages are indeed observable, and remain significant after controlling for education. At least this is true with regard to ethnic exclusionism and sex-related mores. But, surprisingly, such differences are not significant with regard to gender role attitudes, after controlling for levels of education. Throughout these analyses it is the number of years of completed schooling which has the most effect among the socio-demographic determinants of values. And, differences associated with age groups and places of residence, although quite real, owe much to the effects of education.

In conclusion, the most difficult aspect of relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is that they do not interact with each other. In addition, the data show that there are differences between the two groups when it comes to important values, such as ethnic exclusionism and mores related to marriage, reproduction, and sexual behavior. Within nationalities, education is the primary basis for group differences, due to its own direct effects and its consequences for differences across generations and differences between cities and villages. Analyses of Macedonian–Albanian differences in attitudes in Macedonia suggest that the effects of education have been more influential for Macedonians than for Albanians. In contrast, in Kosovo we observe that the liberalizing effects of education have been similar for both Albanians and Serbs.

Appendix

Table 13.1. Multiple regression models for scales and individual questionnaire items with nationality, gender, age, education, and rural residence as predictors (SEESSP data 2003–04).¹⁵

Dependent Variable	R ²	R	Serb		Male		Age		Education		Rural	
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients												
<i>Scales</i>												
Ethnic Exclusionism (3)	0.039	0.198	−0.359	***	0.026		0.001		−0.005		0.050	**
Gender Role Conservatism I (3)	0.070	0.264	0.220	***	0.419	***	−0.001		−0.064	***	0.020	
Gender Role Conservatism II (4)	0.069	0.263	0.083		0.315	***	−0.002		−0.066	***	0.029	
Conservative Sex-Related Mores (3)	0.085	0.291	−0.527	***	−0.088	*	0.000		−0.031	***	0.108	***
<i>Individual Questionnaire Items</i>												
It is best that [places] should be ethnically homogeneous	0.033	0.182	−0.293	***	−0.066		−0.006	*	−0.035	***	0.086	*
Nationality is most important in choosing a spouse	0.084	0.290	−0.629	***	−0.098		0.002		−0.004		0.135	***
Gays should [not] be free to live as they like	0.011	0.106	−0.167	*	−0.144	*	0.005	*	0.000		−0.052	
Gays are criminals and should be punished	0.029	0.171	−0.318	***	−0.059		0.001		−0.036	***	0.060	
Divorce should be illegal	0.065	0.256	−0.159	***	−0.060	**	0.008		−0.149	***	0.051	*
Abortion should be illegal	0.075	0.273	−0.081	***	−0.037		0.000		−0.014		0.166	***
It is wrong for a couple to live together w/o marriage	0.044	0.210	−0.402	***	−0.103		0.007	**	−0.031	**	0.070	*

¹⁵ See the text for the definitions of scales and full wordings of specific questionnaire items. All items and scales are coded such that higher values indicate more traditional/conservative attitudes. For those unfamiliar with interpreting the coefficients in multiple regression analysis, the unstandardized regression coefficients can be compared within columns to see how much effect a given determining variable has across the different scales and individual questionnaire items, because all of the dependent variables are measured on the same scale of 1–5, indicating strong agreement to strong disagreement. Asterisks indicate the levels of statistical significance.

CHAPTER 14

Political Support in Kosovo

KARIN DYRSTAD¹

For democracy to take roots, it depends on at least some degree of political support from the citizens. A clear lack of support indicates that the political system does not work well. The general research literature on political trust suggests that institutional performance is a key determinant of political confidence.² In new democracies, people compare the current political institutions with the previous ones. Thus, more than in mature democracies, support for democracy and political institutions comes to depend on how well these perform.³ Assuming that popular support, both for the principle of democracy and its specific institutions, is necessary for a thriving democracy, the development of such attitudes in Kosovo is a good indicator of the consolidation of Kosovo as a civic state.

As Sabrina Ramet notes in the introduction to this volume, long-term political stability “tends to entail some form of democracy,” while sustainability depends upon the achievement of some level of integration, sociality, and trust. Diamond and Plattner characterize democracy as a system

¹ I am grateful for helpful comments from the editors and two anonymous reviewers on earlier drafts of this chapter. Any remaining errors are mine alone.

² Kenneth Newton, “Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 22 (2001), no. 2: 201–14; and Kenneth Newton, “Social and political trust,” in *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 342–61.

³ Kadri Lühiste, “Support for strongman rule in ethnically divided societies: Evidence from Estonia and Latvia,” *Democratization* 15 (2008), no. 2: 297–320.

of institutionalized competition and conflict.⁴ Powell presents evidence that high voter turnout is negatively correlated with violence and riots, supporting the proposition that well-functioning democracies manage to channel disagreement and discontent into the policy-making process.⁵

Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have a tradition of violent conflict and, as Morozzo della Rocca describes in the present volume, "mutual apartheid," adhering to different organizations and political institutions. For Kosovo, therefore, establishing a functional democracy is crucial for future stability and reconciliation. As Ramet discusses in the introduction of this volume, civic values (i.e., at the system level) entail rule of law, tolerance of minorities, individual rights and duties, and equality between individuals, among other elements.

The conflict literature identifies reinforcing, as opposed to cross-cutting, cleavages in society as a main source of risk of conflict as well as a main obstacle to democratization. In severely divided societies, cleavages tend to be overlapping instead of cross-cutting, and ethnic identity affects the access to and distribution of power and material benefits. In the words of Horowitz, "in severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded. Since the lines appear unalterable, being in and being out may quickly come to look permanent."⁶ In Kosovo, Serbs are locked in a permanent minority position. For a functional state to emerge, the majority population, as well as the minorities, especially the Serb community, needs to develop a common understanding of how the institutions should work. Large differences in attitudes between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority would be an indicator of disintegration and different visions of how the polity currently works and how it should work. Over time, differences in support for key political institutions ought to diminish if the new state is to consolidate.

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the level of support for democracy and trust in political institutions in Kosovo, and how this has developed over time. First, I aim to evaluate the state of support for democracy and trust in key political institutions. This includes general support

⁴ Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

⁵ G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 27.

⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in divided societies," in Diamond and Plattner, eds., 37.

for the idea of democracy, as well as more specific support for the political institutions in Kosovo today. For one of these variables, political trust, it is also possible to track changes over time. How does people's trust in political institutions respond to changes in Kosovo's status? As an expression of actual commitment to the political system, I also look at reported voting behavior. Voting is one of the most basic political acts and a cornerstone in representative democracy. Both political trust and support for democracy are commonly used to explain who votes in national elections, and a large literature discusses macro level determinants of turnout.⁷

The second objective of this chapter is to look at differences in political support between Albanians and Serbs, the two main ethnic groups. This serves as an indicator of the depth of the ethnic cleavage in present Kosovo. Ideally, participation in politics should be equally distributed within society and not follow (or reinforce) existing cleavages. However, on the background of Serbia's continuing denial of Kosovo's independence, as well as calls of Serb politicians to boycott Kosovo's political institutions, there is reason to expect Serbs in Kosovo to be more reluctant in their support of the political system than the Albanian majority. As described by Morozzo della Rocca in this volume, Albanians and Serbs have a long-standing tradition of boycotting each other's institutions.

The next section provides a definition and discussion of the concept of political support in the context of Kosovo. This will serve as a framework for the subsequent empirical analysis.

Support for Democracy and Political Trust

A large research literature has defined and classified political support in various ways. Easton distinguishes between support for the political community, the political regime, and the authorities.⁸ A thorough discussion of typologies of political support is outside the scope of this chapter; here, I follow the definitions and classification of Norris.⁹ Based on contributions

⁷ See, e.g., Pippa Norris, *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

⁸ David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

⁹ Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

from Klingemann¹⁰ and Dalton,¹¹ Norris further develops Easton's typology into five categories or levels of analysis, ranging from more diffuse to more specific support: the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors.¹²

The first level, the *political community*, encompasses a basic attachment to the nation. The political community can also be defined more narrowly based on ethnic, religious, or local identities. This is commonly measured in surveys through questions of national identity and national pride. The second level, *regime principles*, refers to adherence to the key values of the political system. In a democracy, this will typically be measured through questions about support for the idea of democracy, as opposed to other forms of government. The third level, *regime performance*, concerns how well the regime works in practice. In a democracy, satisfaction with democracy refers to how well democracy actually works, rather than support for the idea of democracy *per se*. In new democracies, this might also be measured as how well the regime performs compared to the previous regime.¹³ The fourth level, *regime institutions*, is understood as attitudes toward central state institutions, such as the government, the parliament, the legal system, the police, and the military. Finally, *political actors* refer to the support of politicians and evaluations of the performance of the authorities in office.

The application of a typology such as this one is not straightforward in the case of a new democracy and divided society like Kosovo. As Krasniqi describes it, one of the main problems is the contested statehood of Kosovo, both internally and externally. In Kosovo, the national identity is disputed.¹⁴ Many Albanians in Kosovo share a larger Albanian identity. Especially in northern Kosovo, many Serbs identify strongly with Serbia and

¹⁰ Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis," in Norris, ed., 31–56.

¹¹ Russell J. Dalton, "Political support in advanced industrial democracies," in Norris, ed., 57–77.

¹² Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens*.

¹³ William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Five years after the fall: Trajectories of support for democracy in post-communist Europe," in Norris, ed., 78–101.

¹⁴ Gëzim Krasniqi, "Citizenship as a tool of state-building in Kosovo: Status, rights, and identity in the new state," in *The Europeanization of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia (CITSEE) Working Paper* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, School of Law, 2010); Gëzim Krasniqi, "Country report: Kosovo," in *EUDO Citizenship Observatory* (Edinburgh, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute and University of Edinburgh, 2010).

do not recognize the Kosovo state structure. The question of citizenship is also complicated. Whether for practical or political reasons, about 20% of Kosovo residents have dual or multiple citizenships.¹⁵ Thus, levels of attachment to the Kosovar state vary among the ethnic groups. As many Serbs do not recognize Kosovar institutions, their evaluation of both general regime performance and the more specific regime institutions is poor.

Data and Measurement

Surveys conducted in Southeast Europe are still scarce, which represents a limitation to research on public opinion in the area. Here, three different surveys are combined to examine political support in Kosovo. The surveys were conducted shortly before and shortly after Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008. The main source of data is the most recent wave of the European Values Study (EVS), collected in July–October 2008.¹⁶ The dataset includes responses from 1,601 interviews. In addition, four questions from a late 2003–early 2004 survey, the South East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) are included.¹⁷ For these four questions about political trust, the formulation of both questions and answer categories is identical, which makes it possible to compare the two surveys in order to assess development over time. This survey included 2,504 respondents. I use this survey to assess changes between 2003 and 2008 in political trust in the Albanian-speaking population. For more recent attitudes, I use survey data collected in late 2011 by the project “Strategies of symbolic nation-building in West Balkan states: intents and results.”¹⁸ The survey

¹⁵ Kosovo is currently the only country in the region where the citizens need a visa to travel into the Schengen area, which means that there are good reasons to keep a dual citizenship.

¹⁶ European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset, provided by the GESIS Data Archive (Cologne, Germany, 2010).

¹⁷ Albert Simkus, “Guest editor’s Introduction: The South East European Survey Project (SEESSP),” *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (2007), no. 3: 3–14.

¹⁸ “Strategies of symbolic nation-building in West Balkan states” is a joint project between the Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages of the University of Oslo and the Department of Culture studies, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, supported by the National Research Council in Norway. Data and description of the project are available on <http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan/>.

includes 1,513 respondents and goes into detail on issues of national identity, but includes little information on political institutions and political performance, which limits the comparability with the 2008 EVS data.

The variables analyzed in the present chapter follow Norris' typology of political support.¹⁹ In addition, I include a question on participation in elections, as an indicator of practical commitment to the democratic institutions. This is especially interesting since Kosovar Serbs have mostly boycotted Kosovo's elections. Voting is perhaps the most basic form of political participation, and political support is found to be a key determinant of voting: people who support the political system are more likely to participate in elections.²⁰ Table 14.1 summarizes the forms of support and how they are measured in this chapter. Arguably, some of the questions tap into several dimensions. For example, there is some overlap between evaluations of how democracy works, and satisfaction with the way the regime develops in Kosovo today.

Table 14.1. Measurement of political support.

Support	Question
Political community	How proud of nationality (in the civic sense)
Regime principles	Best political system: strong leader, experts, army, or democratic system, Evaluations of democracy (squabbly, inefficient, better after all)
Regime performance	Rate current political system governing the country Satisfaction with the way democracy develops
Regime institutions	Trust in armed forces, police, justice system, parliament, social security, civil service
Political actors	Trust in government and political parties
Voting	Would vote in general elections tomorrow

The EVS did not include any questions on ethnic identity, so to distinguish between Albanians and Serbs I use the language of the questionnaire, which was produced in Albanian and Serbian. It is therefore not possible

¹⁹ Norris, ed., *passim*.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

to tap the attitudes of other minorities in Kosovo, such as Turks, Gorani, Roma, and Bosniaks.

Analysis


Following Norris' typology, I start with support for Kosovo as a national community, which is classified as the most general form of political support. As Figure 14.1 shows, there are clear differences between Serbs and Albanians.²¹ While more than 80% of the Albanians are very proud of their Kosovo citizenship, more than 80% of the Serb community find that the question is "not applicable", i.e., they are not, or do not, consider themselves to be citizens of Kosovo. Of the few Serbs who find that the question applies to them, a clear majority (65%) report that they are "very proud" of their citizenship. Given the importance of Kosovo in Serbian political discourse and history, one possible interpretation of this would be that these respondents are proud of being from and living in Kosovo, rather than being proud of their legal citizenship in the state of Kosovo. The survey did not include questions that could provide more information on the identity of these respondents. However, there is some evidence in support of this interpretation, as this group does not display any more support for Kosovar institutions than the other Serbs.

The differences between Serbs and Albanians remained stark in 2011. About 80% of the Albanian respondents reported that they were "very proud" of their citizenship, while the same share of Serb respondents responded that they were "not proud at all."

Turning to support for regime principles, Figures 14.2a and 14.2b show how people evaluate different regime types, and how well they think that democracy works. Democracy appears to be the most popular form of government, followed by rule of experts and strong leaders. Most people show strong support for democracy, and only a very small share of the population think that democracy is very bad. While the share of respondents who think that democracy is "very good" is about the same

²¹ In the Albanian version of the questionnaire, the question was formulated "A ndjenien krenarë që jeni shtetas i Kosovës?" In the Serb version, the question was formulated as "Da li ste ponosni na to što ste državljanin Kosova?" Both formulations ask explicitly about nationality in the civic (as opposed to ethnic) sense.



Figure 14.1. Support for the national community among Albanians and Serbs, 2008 and 2011.



in the two communities, there is a clear difference between Albanians and Serbs when it comes to those who do not support democracy. Only 1.5% of the Albanians think that democracy is “very bad”; among Serbs, the share is almost 10%.

However, many people do not reject the other regime types, even if they support democracy. Interestingly, expert rule is evaluated quite positively in a country which for most practical purposes has been an international protectorate for a decade. Among Serbs, support for expert rule is almost as strong as support for democracy, and also among Albanians, more than 60% find that expert rule is a fairly or very good option. About 50%, both among Albanians and Serbs, think that rule by the army or a strong leader is a good option.

Turning to Figure 14.2, it shows that three out of four respondents “agree” or “agree strongly” that democracy is the better system after all. Again, support for democracy is stronger among Albanians than among Serbs. While about 15% of the Albanian respondent strongly agreed with the statements, only 7% of the Serbs did the same. For Albanians, the mean response is higher, and there is less variation. Taking the two figures together, it seems clear that democracy enjoys widespread support in the Kosovar population, even though a majority does not reject other types of government.

Figure 14.2a. Evaluation of different regimes, 2008.**Figure 14.2b. Support for democratic principles, 2008.²²**

²² Variable composed of the following four statements: "In democracy, the economic system runs badly" (reversed); "Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling" (reversed); "Democracies aren't good at maintaining order" (reversed); and "Democracy may have problems but is better."

While there is widespread support for democracy as a principle, the evaluation of the current political system in Kosovo is less favorable (Figure 14.3). Most people support democracy, but they do not agree on the democratic performance of the current regime. Although Kosovo in many ways resembles a liberal democracy, in practice, it continues to be under international supervision. The EULEX replaced the UNMIK with Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, and has more limited executive powers. At the time when the EVS survey was carried out, however, the state continued to be an international protectorate with interim institutions. Moreover, as Günal's contribution in this volume shows, corruption and connections between political actors and organized crime continue to undermine the political system. Yet, when asked to rate the current political system, a majority of the population thought that it worked relatively well. Again, there were clear differences between the Albanian majority population and the Serb minority. Among the Serbs, almost one out of four gave the system the worst possible rating, and only 6% thought that the political system was "very good." This is about the opposite of the Albanian evaluation of the political system.

A similar trend can be found for how people view the development of democracy in Kosovo. According to Figure 13.4, the large majority of Kosovar Albanians are "rather" or "very" satisfied with how democracy

Figure 14.3. Support for regime performance, 2008.





Figure 14.4. Satisfaction with regime performance, 2008.


develops. In contrast, the large majority of Kosovar Serbs are “not very satisfied” or are “not at all satisfied.”

From evaluations of the principle of democracy and democratic performance, the last part of this analysis probes into people’s evaluations of different regime institutions and political actors, which correspond to Norris’ fourth and fifth levels of political support. Here, the data allow not only for comparison between the two main ethnic groups, but also for comparison over time for the majority population. Figure 14.5 shows trust in regime institutions and actors for Albanians (2003 and 2008) and Serbs (2008). According to the figure, the development of political trust in the majority population has been quite favorable. Overall, trust in public and political institutions increased significantly in the five years between the two surveys, especially trust in the justice system and in the civil services. There is less variation in how the different institutions were evaluated in 2008 than in 2003. In 2008, the police and the armed forces enjoyed the highest level of confidence, but there was little variation between the regime institutions. Also more political institutions like the parliament were perceived as quite trustworthy. In 2008, only 5% of the Albanians expressed “no confidence at all” in the parliament. The confidence is also relatively stable over time. The increase in trust in the justice system and the civil services was


quite significant. In 2003 about half of the Albanian respondents expressed confidence in these institutions, whereas in 2008, the shares had increased to 70 and 76%, respectively. It remains to be seen whether the confidence remains high in the future. Previous research has found that in Central and Southeastern Europe, political trust declined a few years after democratization.²³ I will return to this issue in the discussion.

Turning to the Serbs, the picture is less positive. While the predominant answer is “quite a lot” of confidence among Albanians, the most common answer is “not very much” among Serbs. The armed forces enjoy the highest level of trust (56% express some level of trust), while the political institutions and actors have the lowest. Strikingly, less than 20% express any confidence in the political parties. Unfortunately, comparison over time is not possible due to lack of data from 2003.

Figure 14.5. Trust in regime institutions and actors, 2003 and 2008.



²³ Karin Dyrstad and Ola Listhaug, “Citizens’ confidence in European Parliaments,” in *Party Governance and Party Democracy*, eds. Wolfgang C Müller and Hanne Marthe Narud (New York: Springer, 2013). See also Ringdal’s contribution to this volume.




Finally, Figure 14.6 illustrates actual commitment to Kosovo's political institutions through participating in elections. Taking into account how the two groups evaluate the current political regime and the performance of

its institutions, the result is hardly surprising. About half of the Albanians reported that they would vote if there was a general election tomorrow. The remaining 50% split themselves in equal shares between “no” and “don’t know.” This indicates that despite the generally positive evaluation of the political system in Kosovo, many people fail to translate the support into active participation. The share who answered “yes” is about 50%. This reinforces the impression from Figure 14.2a: Most people support democracy, but the support is not necessarily deeply rooted.

Of the Serbs, the large majority would not vote in Kosovo elections: more than 80% of the respondents would not vote “at a general election tomorrow,” while less than 5% would actually vote. Especially in Kosovo north of the Ibar River, Serbs continue to boycott Kosovar institutions, preferring instead parallel institutions maintained by Belgrade.²⁴ It is likely that most of those who did not answer “no” live south of Ibar.

Figure 14.6. Electoral participation, 2008 and 2011.²⁵



²⁴ Apostolis Karabairis, “Will Serbs end tradition of Kosovo election boycotts?,” *Balkan Insight* (Belgrade: Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 2010). See also Morozzo della Rocca’s contribution in this volume.

²⁵ For 2011, data on reported voting exists for the Serb respondents only.

The 2011 survey included questions on Serb electoral participation after 2000. These data show that almost 80% abstained from general elections in Kosovo. This is consistent with the results from 2008. Interestingly, almost 70% reported that they voted in elections in Serbia. That means that despite their somewhat lower support for democracy, more Serbs than Albanians actually expressed commitment to democracy through electoral participation, but they did so confirming their Serb identity. Their lack of participation in Kosovar elections therefore indicates a rejection of the Kosovar state, not a rejection of democracy *per se*.

Discussion

This chapter started out with an assumption that in order to consolidate, democracy depends on popular support and legitimacy. Kosovar citizens' evaluation of democratic principles and the actual political system gives a guideline to the extent of consolidation of Kosovo as a civic state. At the outset of this chapter, I expected divergent attitudes between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority. The subsequent analysis showed that, while both groups share a general support for democracy and democratic principles, their evaluations of the current regime are diametrically opposed. Moreover, their support for democracy fails to translate into actual political participation, measured by the most basic activity: voting in general elections. Interestingly, Serbs have a higher turnout than Albanians, provided that the election is Serbian. Voting thus appears to be a way of reconfirming ethnic identity.

The analysis confirms that the Kosovar statehood continues to be contested. The two politically most influential groups, Albanians and Serbs, share an etho-nationally defined idea of who constitutes the demos, but with a different ethnic prefix, and there appears to be a lack of a common Kosovar identity. Therefore, people's evaluation of regime performance will not converge, even if their ideals of democracy are similar. Democracy enjoys widespread support, but has not established itself as the only game in town,²⁶ as many people continue to hold favorable views

²⁶ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

of other regime types. This is perhaps not so surprising, as there is some evidence that authoritarianism is more predominant in post-communist states, and that violent conflict itself can increase authoritarian values in the population.²⁷

At the macro level, institutional performance, or how well the political system actually fares in terms of basic political goods, is a key determinant of political trust. Generally speaking, trustworthy institutions see higher levels of support.²⁸ Similarly, government instability generally yields lower trust.²⁹ In the extension of this, Mishler and Rose argue that initial political trust in new democracies often is low.³⁰ Lack of democratic experience, as well as the difficulties inherent in the transition process, gives lower institutional performance as the new polity goes through a process of trial and error while learning to govern efficiently.³¹ The disenchantment³² or honeymoon effect,³³ on the other hand, points to a possible dip in political support as people's initially high expectations to democracy are modified when they discover that democracy is not a panacea. Introducing general voting and accountable politicians does not produce Western-style institutions or standards of living overnight. Given the continuing struggle to gain international recognition, high unemployment rates, widespread corruption, and lack of economic growth, the current level of trust in Kosovo is neither very low nor worrisome. Based on the present analysis, the main democratic challenge in Kosovo appears to be the continuing cleavage between Albanians and Serbs.

²⁷ Karin Dyrstad, "Does civil war breed authoritarian values? An empirical study of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia," *Democratization* 20 (2013), no. 7: 1219–42.

²⁸ Jack Citrin and Donald Philip Green, "Presidential leadership and the resurgence of trust in government," *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1986), no. 4: 431–53; Newton, "Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy"; Newton, "Social and political trust."

²⁹ Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg, "Confidence in political and private institutions," in *Citizens and the State*, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

³⁰ William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-Communist societies," *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (2001), no. 1: 30–62.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

³³ See Kristen Ringdal's chapter in this volume.

Electoral turnout varies greatly from country to country and is typically higher in Western Europe than in other parts of the world.³⁴ Also in Kosovo, turnout in decisive elections has traditionally been high. Modernization theories explain democratization and increased political awareness as a consequence of economic development, urbanization and a higher level of education, which create a professional middle class with leisure time, and raises human capital. The proposition is that education and increased literacy generate cognitive skills and political interest that promote political participation.³⁵ Moreover, turnout is typically higher when the political alternatives are clear, and the more decisive the election, the stronger is the incentive to vote.³⁶

Voter turnout is also expected to rise with the duration of democracy.³⁷ Blais reports that most voters tend to be regular voters, i.e., they vote in almost all elections.³⁸ If voting is a habit, it should need some time to establish. Thus, political knowledge and skills as well as the habit of voting are supposed to increase as democracy matures. Again, the “disenchantment” literature on democratic consolidation suggests that citizens in new democracies have high expectations to democracy, and often become disappointed and apathetic when it turns out that democracy is a slow process of negotiations which may not always lead to the desired outcome. In sum, the low turnout in Kosovo is hardly surprising.

A recent report on post-election public opinion in Kosovo presents similar findings.³⁹ The report also provides an additional reason for the low turnout among the respondents, since according to these data, over the last years there has been a decline in the share of people who believe that their vote gives a chance to influence decision-making. In 2011, only 40%

³⁴ Norris, *Democratic Phoenix*.

³⁵ Ibid., 21–3; Ross E. Burkhardt and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, “Comparative democracy: The economic development thesis,” *The American Political Science Review* 88 (1994), no. 4: 903–10.

³⁶ André Blais, *To Vote Or Not To Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).

³⁷ Tatiana Kostadinova and Timothy J. Power, “Does democratization depress participation? Voter turnout in the Latin American and Eastern European transitional democracies,” *Political Research Quarterly* 60 (2007), no. 3: 363–77.

³⁸ Blais, *To Vote or Not to Vote?*

³⁹ Lauren Serpe, *Post-Election Public Opinion in Kosovo: Findings from an IFES Survey* (conducted in February 2011) (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2011).

of the Kosovo Albanians thought that their vote gave them any influence. The same report finds steady levels of trust in Kosovo institutions.⁴⁰

A basic insight in the literature on political trust is that trust will be higher among groups which benefit from the policies of the current government, while groups that are relatively excluded will display less trust.⁴¹ Anderson et al. find that there is a gap in political support between winners and losers in the previous elections.⁴² As noted previously, when ethnicity becomes the dominant political cleavage, the line between those who are excluded and those who are included is often hard to cross. This can generate fewer incentives for supporting the political system and permanently lower political support. While authoritarian regimes simply repress opposition by the use of force or threats of force, democracies should include all groups into the political process, so that there is no need to resort to non-democratic means to achieve power. Evidence suggests that democratizing states are more prone to experience conflict than consolidated democracies and authoritarian regimes, especially nationalist or ethnic conflicts.⁴³ Indeed, the trademark of democracy is that it is able to channel disagreements into the political system through elections.⁴⁴

When ethnic divisions are mobilized into electoral politics, they tend to produce polarization, intolerance, suspicion and distrust.⁴⁵ This could have two opposing effect: If politicians are believed to be all the same, or if groups of voters feel that none of the political parties represent them, it does not matter who wins the election, and the act of voting does not make sense. On the other hand, increased polarization may cause increased mobilization⁴⁶ and a general feeling that important issues are

⁴⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁴¹ Arthur H. Miller, "Political issues and trust in government: 1964–1970," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974), no. 3: 951–72.

⁴² Christopher J. Anderson, André Blais, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Ola Listhaug, *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁴³ Horowitz, "Democracy in divided societies," 37; Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 27.

⁴⁴ Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*, 20.

⁴⁵ Diamond and Plattner, eds., *passim*.

⁴⁶ Larry Diamond, "Introduction," in Diamond and Plattner, eds., xix; Ronald L. Krebs, "In the shadow of war: The effects of conflict on liberal democracy," *International Organization* 63 (2009), no. 1: 177–210; Jean Elisabeth Wood, "The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of social networks," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(2008), 549.

at stake, which could increase turnout. Given the small number of Serbs in Kosovo and their position as a permanent minority, as well as Serbia's continuing opposition to Kosovo's independence, it is not surprising that Kosovo's Serbs refrain from participating. For Kosovo to consolidate as a modern democracy, the majority bears the responsibility of convincing the minorities that they actually have something to gain from participating in the political system. A change in Serbia's policy toward Kosovo would probably also enhance Serb participation. Future studies should see how political support among different groups in Kosovo develops. Smaller minorities, such as Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, and Turks should also be included.

CHAPTER 15

Kosovo as an International Problem

ANTON BEBLER

Since antiquity Kosovo has changed many foreign overlords and until 2008 has had no record of independent statehood. Every change of its masters reflected or expressed a wider international problem involving, at least, two and simultaneously up to two dozen states. Kosovo has been many times dismembered, carved up, and joined with parts of neighboring lands, divided into several occupation zones, occupied by foreign powers, partly or totally annexed—by the Romans, Bulgarians, Byzantines, Serbs, Ottomans, Montenegrins, Serbs again, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Montenegrins again, Germans, Italians, Bulgarians again, Serbs, and Montenegrins, and NATO allies. In Chapter 2, Roberto Morozzo della Rocca has offered a survey of developments in Albanian–Serb relations in Kosovo from 1878 to 1998. My purpose here is threefold: (1) to draw some lessons from the developments in the twentieth century; (2) to examine more closely the problems associated with Belgrade’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence; and (3) to inquire how the past has influenced the application of the values essential for the sustainability of Kosovo’s statehood.

Between the late twelfth century and the second half of fifteenth and again in the twentieth century Kosovo figured prominently in the history of Serbia’s statehood and of the Serbians’ protracted conflicts with their neighbors, particularly with the Ottomans. For about 450 years up to 1913 Kosovo belonged to Ottoman possessions in Europe (Rumelia). At the end of the Ottoman rule the territory of today’s Kosovo was administratively

only part of an obscure Ottoman *vilayet* (province) bearing almost the same name. The land had had in the past several other geographical designations (*inter alia*, as part of Dardania) prior to being given a Slavic name Kosovo by its new settlers, probably in the twelfth century.

Kosovo became a single administrative unit, somewhat smaller than at present, only in 1945 after its annexation by the communist-ruled second Yugoslavia. It was given then a double official name Kosovo and Metohija (K & M). Due to the Kosovar Albanians' rejection of the second word "Metohija" as smacking of colonialism, a single word designation was adopted in 1963, together with the enhanced status of an autonomous province within Serbia. When in 1989 Kosovo's autonomy was *de facto* abolished by the Serbian regime under Slobodan Milošević the double-word name was correspondingly and symbolically reinstated by Belgrade and has since remained the official Serbian designation. This double name is being used today *inter alia* by the Serbia's Office for K & M, by the transplanted municipal offices operating from Serbia's territory and by defiant members and organizations of the Serbian minority in Kosovo. Thus, the land's official name itself constitutes a conflictual issue between the two neighboring states as well as between Serbia and numerous other states and international organizations who use the one-word name.

The origin of the Kosovo problem

At the turn of the twentieth century the destiny of Kosovo constituted only a small part of the Oriental question and a subchapter in the Albanian national question. As a volatile issue, separate from the fate of what became the principality, later Kingdom and still later Republic of Albania, the Kosovo problem was created during the First Balkan War by the Kingdoms of Serbia¹ and of Montenegro. The two governments' key geo-strategic ambitions were territorial expansion into Ottoman possessions and an unimpeded permanent territorial access to the Mediterranean Sea. The annexation of what is now the northern part of the Republic of Albania, of its sea port Durrës (Serbian Drač),² of Shkodër (Serbian

¹ Dimitrije Tucović, *Srbija i Arbanija* (Belgrade and Zagreb: Kultura, 1945), 7, 13–4.

² *Ibid.*, 94, 110.

Skadar), and of the fertile land in the estuary of the Bojana River would have made Serbia a maritime nation, would have expanded the territory of Montenegro, and would have made it economically more viable.

At the time of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, Serbia tried to entice the Russian Empire to join in a military counteraction. Following Russia's refusal, the Serbian government waited for another chance to gain territory at the expense of the Ottoman possessions in the Balkans, including those with only Serbian minorities or even without Serbian population. The much smaller Montenegro followed the same expansionist line. In its competition with the Austro-Hungarian Empire for influence in the Balkans, the Russian Empire³ had actively encouraged and supported the territorial ambitions of Serbia, Montenegro and other predominantly Christian Orthodox states. The Russian diplomacy initiated secret meetings of these states' representatives from which a conspiracy developed. Aware of and hostile to the Albanians' strivings for national self-assertion and emancipation the governments of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro secretly plotted to occupy and partition the Ottoman possessions, with a predominantly or entirely Albanian and Muslim population. The conspirators' clear intention was to preempt the birth of an independent Albanian state on the ruins of the "Sublime Porte." In October 1912, according to synchronized war plans the Montenegrin army first and then the Serbian army invaded and quickly conquered territories in what is today Northern Albania. By the end of October 1912 the Montenegrin army had "liberated" Western Kosovo (Metohija) and on 4 November entered Djakovica, simultaneously with the Serbian army. The Serbian conquest of Kosovo was then only a collateral objective while the 'liberation' of its Serbian minority of the "Ottoman bondage" and of Kosovo's medieval Christian monuments served as a convenient propaganda slogan for its own and international public.⁴

The attainment of the Serbian and Montenegrin strategic objectives was then, however, foiled by Austria-Hungary, which resisted Russia's and its proxies' penetration into the Adriatic. The Russian impe-

³ I. V. Anufrieva et. al., *Албанский фактор в развитии кризиса на территории бывшей Югославии, Документы, Том Первый (1878–1997)* (Moscow: INDRIK, 2006), 57,59–60.

⁴ Tucović, *Srbija i Albanija*, 119.

rial command felt that Russia was still unprepared for a major war. The Serbian government consequently bowed to an Austro-Hungarian war ultimatum. The Serbian Army was ordered to withdraw from Northern Albania. Montenegro persisted longer, but by May 1913 its troops were also forced to leave Shkodër. However, the European powers (Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, and Italy) at a conference in London allowed Serbia and Montenegro, at Russia's insistence, to keep as war booty the occupied Kosovo, Sandžak, and Vardar Macedonia. The European powers did so knowingly against the wishes of Kosovo's majority population. The host of the conference, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, frankly admitted this fact during a debate in the House of Commons. Like a number of Arab lands and Cyprus, Kosovo was forcefully amputated from the Ottoman Empire and immediately subjected to another foreign rule. The Ottoman possessions in the Near East and North Africa were subjugated by France, Great Britain, and Italy,⁵ while Kosovo became *de facto* annexed by small Serbia. The Kingdom of Serbia, which only several decades earlier had been liberated from Ottoman rule, was thus allowed by the European great powers to create its own mini colonial state in the Balkans. In November 1918, Montenegro lost its sovereignty and name. Together with Metohija it became absorbed by the Kingdom of Serbia before entering the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes."

Another kind of involvement by a wider international community in the Kosovo problem was manifested in 1914 in the establishment of an International Commission of Enquiry. This action followed and was provoked by numerous reports in European and US media on atrocities committed by the Serbian and Montenegrin soldiery against the civilian Albanian population in Kosovo. In its findings, published in the USA by the Carnegie Endowment, the International Commission confirmed the veracity of these reports. Moreover the Commission characterized the Serbian state policy in Kosovo during and following the First Balkan War as policy of violent ethnic cleansing aimed at rapid and radical transformation of Kosovo's ethnic composition. In fact the Serbian government employed in Kosovo the same brutal methods of terror and forced expul-

⁵ Serge Sur, *Relations Internationales* (Paris: Montchrestien, 2000), 71–6.

sion as had been used against the Moslems in Southern Serbia after 1878.⁶ In 1912–13 by the then valid international standards the Serbian and Montenegrin armies had grossly violated the rules of warfare. By today's legal standards the Serbian government clearly conducted in Kosovo a policy of genocide accompanied by the commitment of numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Two brutal conquests of Kosovo in 1912 and again in 1918, as well as the subsequent harsh Serbian rule under the Karađorđević dynasty, left a bitter collective memory among the Albanians of Kosovo. The memory was so painful that, as Morozzo della Rocca has recounted, in April 1941 the Kosovar Albanians enthusiastically greeted the invading Italian and German troops as liberators.

Prior to the Italian capitulation in September 1943 only very few Kosovar Albanians joined the communist-led resistance. The Kosovo National Liberation Council which met at its first session in January 1944 adopted a motion according to which Kosovo after the war had to be reunited with Albania. This solution could have been achieved within a Balkan Federation—a project which was on a number of occasions discussed behind the closed doors by Soviet, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, and Albanian communist leaders. In 1947–48 this project became one of the controversies which contributed to the Soviet–Yugoslav quarrel and was subsequently abandoned.

Between 1918 and 1999 Kosovo remained part of three multinational Yugoslavias, for most of the time as a non-self-governing province subordinate to the Serbian officialdom in Belgrade. The overt political discrimination against non-Slavic national groups was built into the very foundation of the first Yugoslavia since its inception in 1918, symbolically as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes only. Between 1919 and 1941 the treatment of the Yugoslav Albanians had been much worse than that

⁶ Vasa Čubrilović, *L'expulsion des Albanais* (Geneve: Centre d'Information de la Republique de Kosove, 1992), 14–6. The well-known Serbian academician Vasa Čubrilović, political counsellor of the royal government and after 1945 Tito's minister for colonization, in 1937 in his *ad memoire* admitted the failure of the previously employed methods of persecution and recolonization in Kosovo to resolve the Albanian question. He advised the Yugoslav government to use more brutal economic, police, cultural, and religious repression, to burn Albanian villages and town quarters and terrorize the Albanians through paramilitaries thus forcing the latter to flee *en masse* from Yugoslavia.

of the German, Hungarian and other Christian minorities. In the communist-ruled second Yugoslavia (FPRY, SFRY) the Kosovar Albanians' position had improved considerably compared with that in the pre-war monarchy. However, contrary to the Yugoslav communists' belief and their public pronouncements, the socialist revolution did not resolve the numerous national questions in that multinational state.

The Kosovo problem in all three Yugoslavias had contained at its kernel a political conflict between the Kosovar Albanians' desire for national emancipation and self-determination⁷ and, on the other hand, the Serbian elites' strenuous endeavors to rule Kosovo. As a result of the general liberalization of Yugoslavia's political system, Kosovo had gained in 1963 a higher measure of internal autonomy and the enhanced legal status of an Autonomous Province. With the adoption in 1974 of the last SFRY constitution, Kosovo became an almost full-fledged member of the federation. By then, the Kosovar Albanians were the third largest nation in Yugoslavia (after the Serbs and Croats). This demographic change and the evolution in Yugoslav politics made politically untenable the Kosovar Albanians' obvious inequality in rights with an even several times smaller Slavic nation—the neighboring Montenegrins.

As a constant source of political and security troubles Kosovo contributed in 1941, 1991, and 2003 to ruining all three Yugoslavias—the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and to their fragmentation into several smaller units, parastates, and independent states. The dismantling of SFRJ started when on 28 March 1989 the Serbian People's Assembly effectively abolished Kosovo's autonomy. By adopting constitutional amendments the Serbian parliament subjected the province to direct rule from Belgrade. This action was accompanied by the brutal police intimidation of Kosovar deputies in the Provincial Assembly, buttressed visibly by the presence of JNA tanks in the streets of Prishtina.⁸ By its unilateral action and by harsh anti-Albanian repression the Serbian government gravely undermined the Yugoslav constitutional order. It raised

⁷ Besfort Rrecaj, *Kosova's Right to Self-determination and Statehood* (Prishtina: Besfort Rrecaj, 2006), 41–50.

⁸ JNA (Yugoslav People's Army)—the federal armed forces in the second Yugoslavia, which disintegrated in 1991–92. In 1992 JNA's remnants were legally reorganized into the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) and the armies of the Serbian secessionist parastates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

not entirely unfounded fears among the Croats and Slovenes that the Serbian leadership, aligned with the federal military, would attempt subsequently to undertake similar actions elsewhere. As a result Milošević's policy in Kosovo badly scarred Serbia's relations with Croatia and Slovenia and worsened the boiling crisis.

As long as the second Yugoslavia existed, Kosovo had been predominantly an internal problem in Yugoslavia and only secondarily an interstate issue between Yugoslavia and Albania, raised occasionally by the latter. So the repression and blatant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo went on unopposed by the Council of Europe and other international organizations, largely because Kosovo was regarded as an internal affair of a sovereign state. The sinister events in Kosovo in 1988-89 had taken place in the already shaky federal state while, outside Yugoslavia's borders, a political upheaval swept Eastern Europe. In about two years, the democratization wave brought about the collapse of Soviet domination in East-Central Europe, the dissolution of its supreme expression—the Warsaw Pact—, and the breakdown of the Soviet Union itself. The fall of East European communist regimes had a very considerable psychological impact also on Yugoslavia. The massive geopolitical change, on the continent had accelerated the demise of the authoritarian communist regime in SFR Yugoslavia as well.

The crisis in Kosovo was followed soon by armed violence in Croatia's Serbian Krajina. The chain of events unleashed in 1991-92 brought down the second Yugoslavia and in the following 17 years resulted in SFRY's disintegration into seven separate states. Unlike in other Eastern European states the implosion of the Yugoslav communist regime had ignited several armed conflicts and outright wars which caused about 130 thousand deaths, between two and three million refugees and displaced persons, as well as huge economic damage.

Kosovo Becomes a Distinct International Problem

The disintegration of the SFRY, to which the conflict in and over Kosovo substantively contributed, had had appreciable wider international reverberations and implications. It attracted exceptional international attention and raised serious worries among the Western powers about its domino effect on the ex-Soviet space. Due to this fear (which turned out to be

highly exaggerated), the Yugoslav drama was catapulted to the top rank of acute international problems.

Already in spring 1991, CSCE and EEC became engaged in handling and moderating the conflicts accompanying the progressing decomposition of SFRY. The EC Conference on Yugoslavia which met in The Hague on 7 September 1991, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, however, avoided, at Serbia's insistence, any mention of the problem of Kosovo. Preoccupied for several years with the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the international community largely downplayed the appalling situation in Serbia's southern province. In August 1992 the London Conference on Yugoslavia, in spite of the FRY's objections, created a Kosovo Special Group, meeting in Geneva and chaired by Ambassador Gert Ahrens of Germany. Having dealt extensively with the problems of segregated education the Special Group became eventually paralyzed by Serbia's intransigence and was formally disbanded. Lord Carrington's call for convening an international conference on Kosovo went unheeded. After only seven months of its presence in Kosovo, an CSCE Observer Mission of long duration was withdrawn from Kosovo. The international community's more forceful involvement in the Yugoslav drama took eventually the form of the first and by far the largest UN peacekeeping operation on the European continent (UNPROFOR), a UN-imposed arms embargo on all Yugoslav successor state and in 1994–95 of the first NATO out-of-area peace-enforcement operation (in Bosnia-Herzegovina). The latter action stopped the war but the Dayton–Paris agreements signed in November–December 1995 left the Kosovo problem out of the peace settlement.

The Kosovo problem surfaced as a distinct, contentious international issue only when it became clear to the Western powers that the pacification of the ex-Yugoslav space would be incomplete without resolving it as well. In spring 1997 this problem was finally explicitly raised in several international *fora*, including the UN and the OSCE. However, attempts by the Western powers to reach a satisfactory peaceful solution through bilateral talks with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, diplomatic pressures and by clear military threats brought no desirable results. The failure of these efforts at a conference in Rambouillet, France, was followed in March 1999 by the first armed attack by NATO against a UN member state.

Already prior to NATO's forceful intervention, the Milošević regime had decided to exploit a "historic" opportunity and to get rid for good of

most of the Albanian and other Muslim population of Kosovo. The displacement of about 350,000 Kosovar Albanians and Turks, carried out by the Yugoslav Army and by the militarized Serbian police already in summer 1998, was described by Zachary Irwin in Chapter 5. The beginning of NATO air attacks in March 1999 was followed by a still more massive wave of terror and of organized expulsion of Kosovars to Macedonia and Albania. The Serbian regime's attempted act of genocide provided legitimacy to NATO's humanitarian intervention⁹ as an expression of the "responsibility to protect"¹⁰ Kosovo's civilian population. This development raised Kosovo to the rank of a burning international problem. The Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia involved the NATO member states participating directly in it as well as indirectly a half dozen other states. Much as earlier in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Kosovo problem would not have been even half-resolved without a determined military action by the USA and NATO.

This intervention in spring–summer 1999, undertaken without the UN Security Council's authorization, resulted in the second occupation, after Bosnia-Herzegovina, of a part of ex-SFRY's territory. The NATO-led peace-enforcing intervention physically detached Kosovo from Serbia and placed the province under temporary UN administration (UNMIK). After the retreat of the Yugoslav army, Serbian police and civilian administration from Kosovo, international organizations, notably the UN High Commissariat for Refugees and International Migration Organization, undertook a large scale operation of humanitarian assistance. During the second half of 1999 about 1.3 million refugees and displaced Kosovar Albanians and Turks returned to Kosovo. They found mostly ruined and burnt-out homesteads without roofs, vandalized and often mined houses, apartments, schools, and other public buildings.

Since summer 1999 an international protectorate over Kosovo has developed with various security, surveillance, control, assistance and other roles played by several international organizations (NATO, OSCE,

⁹ Katariina Simonen, *Operation Allied Force: A Case of Humanitarian Intervention* (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2000), 115–28.

¹⁰ "The responsibility to protect," in John Baylis, *The Globalization of World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 535–9. Also Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

EU, Council of Europe, World Bank, etc.).¹¹ The resulting complicated and awkward system of criss-crossing responsibilities produced a legal limbo in most of Kosovo. All Serbian and former Yugoslav laws there became invalid, most legal archives and other administrative documentation have been missing (evacuated to Serbia proper), and the new UNMIK legislation was widely incomplete. By 2005, the continuation of Kosovo's dubious legal status became politically and security-wise hardly tenable due to the Kosovar Albanians' growing impatience and to the deadlocked negotiations with Serbia. The UN Secretary General requested then that the former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, study the complicated problem and to propose a feasible solution. In his report to the UN Security Council, Ahtisaari recommended Kosovo's limited independence as the only viable solution. It was to be combined with decentralization, strong protection of minorities, and close supervision by the international community. Martti Ahtisaari wrote in his report: "Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts."¹² The text of Ahtisaari's "Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo status settlement" was submitted to the UN Security Council in March 2007, but its adoption was blocked by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

After considerable vacillation, the Western members of the Contact group (USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) concluded that Kosovo's extensive autonomy under only formal Serbian sovereignty would be totally politically unacceptable to and would be violently resisted by its majority Albanian population. Hence, Kosovo's limited and supervised independence would be the least objectionable among all available alternatives. The acute international and political problem was only formally resolved in February 2008 by allowing the proclamation of Kosovo's declaration of independence. Although the action was carried out without an authorization by the UN Security Council, this body has not subsequently annulled Kosovo's independence, as Serbia demanded.

¹¹ Jolyon Naegle, "International peacekeeping in Kosovo: Origins and lessons," in *A Decade of International Peacekeeping and Stabilization in Kosovo: Accomplishments, Problems, Prospects*, ed. Anton Bebler (Ljubljana: Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia, 2010).

¹² *Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in Kosovo's Future Status* (New York: United Nations, 2007), 4.

The Belgrade government angrily responded to Kosovo's declaration not only by a refusal to acknowledge its independence but also by closing Serbia's borders to trade with Kosovo. During demonstrations in Belgrade, the Koštunica government more than tolerated the mob violence against several foreign embassies, accompanied by downtown looting and arson. Serbia also temporarily recalled its ambassadors from most states which recognized Kosovo as an independent state. The latter action was a Serbian variation of the Hallstein doctrine, which was applied in the past by the Federal Republic of Germany to punish selectively some states which recognized and established diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic.

The almost two decades' long dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia has been presumably completed when independence was proclaimed by Kosovo (2008). Similarly as with neighboring Albania in 1912–13, Kosovo was emancipated with the explicit support of Western powers and against the stiff opposition by Serbia, supported on both occasions by Russia. All other Yugoslav successor states (except Serbia) and one former autonomous province separated themselves from the SFRY and the FRY, some of them having suffered huge losses of life and property. Serbia had resisted, with arms, three out of these six secessions and was the last and the only ex-Yugoslav republic which became sovereign (again) against its will. Having lost four wars between 1991 and 1999, Serbia in February 2008 did not dare to use its armed forces again. Since 1992 it gradually and grudgingly recognized the independence of and eventually established diplomatic relations with all other former parts of SFRY, except Kosovo.

Kosovo's Proclamation of Independence as an International Legal Problem

Following Kosovo's proclamation of independence, the government of Serbia started an action which looked like a shrewd diplomatic maneuver. Its immediate political objective was to mollify Serbian public opinion, to gain time, and slow down the process of Kosovo's international recognition. In early October 2008, the Serbian delegation succeeded in obtaining a UN General Assembly's resolution seeking the ICJ's advisory opinion on the accordance of Kosovo's 'unilateral declaration of indepen-

dence' with international law.¹³ The Serbian diplomats, however, formulated the request unwisely. In truth, declarations of independence are facts which concern the internal constitutional and political orders of states. International law, on the other hand, is mute on this subject, neither permitting nor prohibiting such declarations. In addition, the declaration was not really a unilateral act by Kosovo as its substance, wording, and very timing were coordinated beforehand with the five Western members of the Contact group, including three permanent members of the UN Security Council. By adopting this document, Kosovo only declared the intention to gain independence, voluntarily accepted numerous limitations of its sovereignty and did not in fact become an independent state.

According to the submitted Serbian statement,¹⁴ the illegality of the Kosovo declaration resulted from the following: 1) its violation of the principle of the respect for the territorial integrity of states; 2) the inapplicability of the principle of self-determination to Kosovo; and 3) its violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (which presumably affirmed Serbia's continuous sovereignty over Kosovo).

Concerning these assertions, several observations are relevant. Firstly, Serbia itself had grossly violated the principle of territorial integrity of a neighboring state when in 1912 its armed forces attacked and occupied Kosovo. The Sublime Porte and its legal successor, the Republic of Turkey, never recognized the cession of Kosovo and no corresponding international treaty was concluded. Thus, Serbia's possession of Kosovo was in itself illegal. It was also illegitimate since Serbia carried out the aggression against the will of its majority Albanian population. The Serbian military conquest was accompanied by grave violations of international humanitarian law and caused about 25,000 deaths among Kosovar Albanians and Turks. The atrocities against Kosovo's civilian population were vividly described by Leon Trotsky (then a Russian correspondent in the Balkans) and were thoroughly documented by an international commission of enquiry.¹⁵

¹³ UN General Assembly Resolution 63/03 (New York: United Nations, 8 October 2008).

¹⁴ International Court of Justice. Written statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (The Hague, 15 April 2009).

¹⁵ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, 1914).

The Serbian government officially claimed then that its right to occupy Kosovo was justified 1) by the Serbs' superior level of civilization compared with that of the Albanians'; 2) by the Serbian state's historic possession of the province in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries; and 3) by the numerical majority enjoyed then by the Serbs' Slavic ancestors. The first argument has been used in the past by European powers to legitimize their colonial conquests. By modern standards however all three arguments have become, for already some time, totally unacceptable as a justification for aggression against a neighboring state.

Moreover, the Serbian annexation of Kosovo in 1912–13 was not carried out in accordance with proper legal norms, according to the valid Serbian constitution of 1903 and later to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes according to its Vidovdan constitution. The third conquest ("liberation") of Kosovo in 1944–46 was again accompanied by armed violence against the Kosovar Albanians. The act of annexation to Yugoslavia was passed in April 1945 in conditions of martial law, by an appointed Kosmet Regional People's Assembly. The composition of the Assembly was utterly unrepresentative (consisting of 142 appointed members, among them with only 33 Kosovar Albanians). All appointed deputies were communists and mostly Serbs, representing then only about 20% of Kosovo's population. The act was adopted by acclamation, without a vote and without a single speech, let alone a debate. There was no preceding election or a referendum in Kosovo.¹⁶ This Stalinist parody of legality, thus, totally lacked democratic legitimacy.

Secondly, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo had been, according to the last SFRY constitution of 1974, an integral part of the Yugoslav federation. It was represented in its collective Presidency and other federal institutions on an equal footing and in many respects enjoyed equal rights with the six republics, including Serbia. The Badinter Arbitration Commission made a (very questionable) distinction between the six republics and two autonomous provinces as subjects to which the right of self-determination could be applied. The Serbian statement addressed to the ICJ used this distinction to make the point that Kosovo was not entitled to enjoy the right of (external) self-determination, including secession, due to its somewhat lower federal status in ex-Yugoslavia.¹⁷

¹⁶ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 315–6.

¹⁷ International Court of Justice. Written statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (The Hague, 15 April 2009), 203–14.

Its authors conveniently forgot that the FRY and Serbian governments had previously, for many years denied this right (also) to the ex-Yugoslav republics. The Serbian statement furthermore contended that there was "no evidence. . . that Kosovo ever constituted a self-determining unit recognized as a non-self-governing territory." This assertion stood in a glaring contradiction with well-known facts. For most of the twentieth century and particularly in 1989–1999 Kosovo had been a non-self-governing territory, with its Provincial Assembly disbanded by the Serbian Assembly on 5 July 1990, its Kosovar deputies locked out, and many of them arrested. Kosovo's subjugated majority population had been exposed, in some respects to worse discrimination and harsher treatment by the Serbian police and Serbian courts than those used by European powers in some of their colonies in Africa and Asia.

Thirdly, the real and gross violation of Serbia's territorial integrity did not in fact occur in February 2008 but had occurred almost nine years earlier when in March 1999 NATO started its armed intervention. The FRY then filed an application against the NATO members' "illegal use of force." The Court rejected the motion and declined to examine the legality of NATO's "humanitarian intervention." Under the terms of the Kumanovo protocol signed with NATO in June 1999, FRY/Serbia removed its army, police, and civilian administration from Kosovo. Thus, in summer 1999 FRY/Serbia lost three key elements of sovereignty: the control over Kosovo's territory, its population, and control over its borders. The declaration of 18 February 2008 only *ex-post facto* legalized, by an internal act, Kosovo's previous *de facto* detachment from Serbia.

Fourthly, reflecting the process of decolonization, modern international law has relativized the principle of territorial integrity of states. When in collision with this principle the right to self-determination of peoples has been accorded primacy. This evolution has been expressed in a number of international legal documents including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the UN General Assembly Declaration on granting independence to colonial peoples. In its VIII principle, the Helsinki Final Act also allowed for a peaceful change of state borders on the basis of democratically expressed self-determination. The Kosovo proclamation had been indeed preceded by several referenda and was carried out in a peaceful, orderly, and civilized manner. The only acts of violence were committed then by the protesting Serbs, mostly in Serbia proper.

It took ICJ about a year and a half to decide on the UN General Assembly's request. The ICJ opinion was expected to fall somewhere between the two opposite sets of arguments satisfying fully neither of the two sides. Having examined the statements submitted by 32 states the International Court of Justice delivered its non-binding advisory opinion on 22 July 2010.¹⁸ The Court surprised many observers by its conclusion. The strong majority of ten to four votes by which the opinion was adopted became possible by the ICJ's previous procedural decision to limit its task to a strict consideration of the submitted request. The Court intentionally avoided dealing with wider issues of external self-determination raised in Serbia's submission, in the comments by Kosovo and by other states. Within this narrow legal framework the ICJ straightforwardly determined that the declaration of Kosovo's independence did not violate the norms of general international law, the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework enacted by the UN Interim Administration. The ICJ intentionally declined to pronounce on or imply the legality and legitimacy of all declarations of independence. Very importantly, the ICJ did not base its opinion on the right to self-determination and did not at all deal with the question of Kosovo's international recognition. The Court has been criticized for having missed the opportunity to clarify a hotly contentious issue in international law.¹⁹ The political effects of the ICJ decision were, however, immediately and abundantly clear—a painful defeat for Serbian diplomacy and a vindication of Kosovo's position.

The Republic of Kosovo and the International Community

Since 1912 there have been many changes of the frameworks in which crucial decisions related to Kosovo were made by outside powers. The multiplicity of actors and levels above Kosovo has reflected the degree of interest, influence and capabilities of several European powers and since 1999 also USA.

¹⁸ International Court of Justice. Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo (The Hague, 22 July 2010):

¹⁹ Florian Bieber, "The Western Balkans after the ICJ opinion," in *The Western Balkans and the EU: The Hour of Europe*, Chaillot Paper No. 126, ed. Jacques Rupnik (Paris: Euiss, 2011), 135–44.

According to the still valid UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo has been since summer 1999 under the temporary authority of an UN interim administration (UNMIK). It is being guarded today by over seven thousand US, German, French, Italian, Turkish, Hungarian, Slovenian, and other soldiers as well as other military personnel, most of them in the NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR. The international protectorate over Kosovo has been supervised and assisted by about 2,500 UN and EU international civilian personal.

Table 15.1. The Kosovo governance in 2012.

Frequency of dealing with Kosovo	Actors			
Occasionally, outside Kosovo	UN General Assembly Security Council	EU Foreign Affairs Council Commission EP	NATO North Atlantic Council SHAPE	OSCE Permanent Council Parliamentary Assembly
Infrequently, outside Kosovo	International Steering Group at the level of Political Directors, meeting in Brussels or Vienna, twice annually; Tripartite talks in Brussels (Serbia, Kosovo, EU).			
Regularly, in Kosovo	UNMIK	EU Special Representative EULEX	KFOR	Kosovo Mission
	International Steering Group meeting in Prishtina twice annually at the ambassadorial level; Democratically elected Parliament and Government of Kosovo; Informal self-rule among rural Kosovar Albanians.		Contact Group (5m), meeting informally at the ambassadorial level in Prishtina; The Community of Serbian municipalities on Northern Kosovo; Municipal bodies in the Serbian enclaves South of the Ibar River.	

The present system of criss-crossing international tutelage has been expensive, complicated, confusing and quite ineffective in providing for the normalization of inter-ethnic relations and for healthy social and economic progress in Kosovo. The multiplicity of political levels, while reflecting the benevolent involvement and good will by the international community had produced contradictory and largely dysfunctional

effects on the management of the Kosovo problem. The Kosovo case confirms that, unless properly coordinated, multilevel political activities by numerous actors could result in expensive duplications, waste of resources, unnecessary bureaucratic red tape, blockages, increased corruption and in other dysfunctional effects. In order to, at least, reduce these deficiencies the streamlining, clarifying of mandates and better coordination between the most important actors are needed.

Since summer 1999 Kosovo has developed a parliamentary political system separate from Serbia and a free market economy, and has adopted a different currency (the Euro). The economic, social, and political situation in Kosovo has since appreciably improved largely due to international assistance (around 21% GNP) and to the Kosovars' remittances from abroad (roughly 15% of GNP).

By August 2014, Kosovo had been officially recognized by 110 states members of the Organization of the United Nations. Included into this tally are three permanent members of UN Security Council, more than two-thirds of the Council of Europe's membership and all Kosovo's immediate neighbors, as well as all the Yugoslav successor states, with the exceptions of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following the ICJ decision this number has only somewhat increased moving slowly to over a half of the UN membership. This evolution allowed for Kosovo's membership in some international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, as long as Serbia maintains its stance of non-recognition and the Russian Federation (firmly) and the People's Republic of China (more flexibly) support Serbia's position, Kosovo will not be able to gain a seat in the United Nations. It will be also barred for quite some time from joining the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, etc.

Although Kosovo's existence has been protected by international forces and its political survival secured, this newcomer in the family of the European nations remains an incomplete structure and an "unfinished state."²⁰ The Prishtina government lacks control over Kosovo's entire territory, borders, and population. Kosovo has deficient economic viability, suffers from excessive external financial dependence, and has been burdened by the region-wide problems of corruption, illegal trafficking,

²⁰ Veton Surroi, "The unfinished state(s) in the Balkans and the EU: the next wave," in Rupnik, ed., 111–20.

and organized crime. A number of Kosovo's burning political and social problems have remained unresolved. Poverty (about 50% of the population) and very high unemployment (about 45% generally and about 75% among the females and the young),²¹ poor governance, malfunctioning rule of law, and the obstacles to free travel pose daunting problems to Kosovo's majority population.

The "loss" of Kosovo caused also a painful psychological, political, and existential trauma to its Serbian minority, and continues to produce difficult problems for more than a hundred thousand Serbian and Roma refugees in Serbia proper. For Serbia, Kosovo has represented a problem of psychological and political readjustment, a financial "black hole" of several hundred million Euros annually, and a considerable source of illegal smuggling and of organized crime, dealing mostly in drugs. The UN General Assembly's resolution of September 2010, tailored under the EU pressure and officially sponsored jointly by Serbia and the 27 EU members, paved the way for a dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina on practical matters, under the auspices of the European Union.²²

While Kosovo has been seeking international recognition and normalization of relations with Serbia, it looked for some time as if the Serbian government's real objective was not to regain Serbia's sovereignty, even if only formal over Kosovo, but to redraw the present border between the two states. The then Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, had openly advocated the "readjustment" which would have detached from Kosovo the area to the north of the Ibar River, with the town of Kosovska Mitrovica. The Western powers, on the other hand, still stand firmly by the principle of maintaining what had been the internal borders between the federal units of socialist Yugoslavia, including those of the two autonomous provinces. They reject redrawing of any these borders, which became international ones, for the reason that it would open a Pandora's box of territorial revandication elsewhere in the post-Yugoslav space. Secondly, it was feared that the detachment of Northern Kosovo would unleash a mass exodus from the Serbian enclaves to the south of the Ibar River and consequently decimate the Serbian minority in Kosovo.

²¹ Levent Koro, "A decade of socio-economic change in Kosovo," in Bebler, ed., 17–22.

²² UN General Assembly Resolution No. 10980 (New York: United Nations, September 2010).

Another idea has been aired—a condominium in Northern Kosovo, resembling the Good Friday agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom over Ulster. This idea could be however applied also to resolving the status of the adjacent Preševo–Bujanovac area in Southern Serbia which historically used to be part of Kosovo. This area has been predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians who would certainly prefer living under Prishtina's rule. Secondly, an agreement on a condominium could only be negotiated and concluded between two states which recognize one another. Yet the highest Serbian officials, including President Tomislav Nikolić, have vowed many times, primarily for internal political consumption, to never ever recognize independent Kosovo.

The Belgrade–Prishtina talks in Brussels under the EU auspices, initially at the level of political directors and only on non-political and technical matters, began in March 2011. The two sides entered them from very different positions and with conflicting expectations. The overcoming of obstacles on the thorny road of reconciliation and accommodation between the two states has been eased mainly by Serbia's desire to obtain the status of a candidate country and eventually join the European Union. The diplomatic pressure by EU officials and the USA on both sides, mostly on Serbia, produced by May 2013 several agreements on normalization of relations, signed by the two Prime ministers and by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. The agreements envisaged, *inter alia*, the disbandment of Serbia's parallel institutions and integrating their personnel into Kosovo's constitutional system, including the police and judiciary, as well as the establishment of the Community of Serbian municipalities in Northern Kosovo.

The *de facto* normalized coexistence of Serbia and Kosovo, without Kosovo's formal recognition by Serbia, will certainly have positive effects on the political climate and security in the entire region, notably in neighboring Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. By its reasonable and constructive behavior the Republic of Serbia has improved its standing with the European Union, became a candidate country, and in January 2014 started negotiations with the EU Commission. There has been a constructive proposal according to which Serbia and Kosovo would regulate their bilateral relations without formal mutual recognition, much as used to be done in the past between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

Since 1998–99 the Kosovo issue has split the international community, cutting across the former East–West divide. It posed a serious chal-

lenge to NATO's inner political cohesion and badly worsened its relations with the Russian Federation. The Alliance was able then to bridge the differences among its members and to reach a consensus concerning the pending military action against FRY and the KFOR's subsequent deployment since 1999. Eight years after the establishment of international protectorate the problem of Kosovo has again divided the EU and NATO members. In 2008 twenty-two EU and NATO Member States recognized Kosovo's independence. A minority of five EU members, notably Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia, and Romania, have however followed Serbia's position, mostly for their own internal political reasons. On the question of recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia, and Southern Ossetia, most EU and NATO member states as well as the Russian Federation have applied double standards honoring the right to self-determination in one case and disregarding in the other(s). Since the proclamation of Kosovo's independence in February 2008, the Kosovo problem has remained on the agenda of the UN Security Council, NATO's North Atlantic Council, and European Union's Council, as well as the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

On 10 September 2012, the International Steering Group for Kosovo officially terminated the supervision of Kosovo's limited independence and closed the Office of the International Civilian Representative. These symbolic acts have brought, however, little change in the real functioning of the *de facto* international protectorate. Although the Kosovar Albanians (supported by the Kosovo Turks and several other smaller ethnic groups) achieved, with the West's direct support, their historic goal of getting rid of Belgrade's rule, Kosovo remains a controversial regional and wider international problem. Although still a poorly functioning parliamentary democracy the Republic of Kosovo is however immeasurably closer today to practicing democratic civil values than the preceding Autonomous Province of Kosovo as part of Milošević's Serbia. Under the EU supervision Kosovo thus conforms to a considerable degree with the criteria and goals of the Council of Europe. This young and very weak state will however for many years require attention and external assistance in order to assure that the international community's considerable pacifying efforts in the Western Balkans will have effectively contributed to the cause of free and democratic Europe to which all Balkan countries, including Kosovo and Serbia, should rightfully belong.

CHAPTER 16

Can Dialogue Make a Difference? The Experience of the Nansen Dialogue Network

STEINAR BRYN

The main argument in this chapter is that the focus of international peace-building, which has been created to build strong institutions to secure the functionality of the state, is not sufficient when it neglects dialogue and reconciliation between the citizens of the same state. The wars in the Western Balkans in the 1990s left many communities ethnically segregated. In a segregated society, people grow up with reduced knowledge and experience of each other. This lack of knowledge and understanding weakens representative democracy in these societies.

In the case of Kosovo the generations of Serbs and Albanians coming of age are not learning each other's language or enough about each other's cultural and spiritual heritage. This will reduce the functionality of and reduce the effect of democracy in the new state. In addition, the propaganda (defined as one-sided truths) is strong on both sides, supporting almost opposing ethnic narratives of history and the current situation.

This is the main argument for dialogue work; it alters the perceptions of reality by making alternative truths and explanations visible. This chapter draws on my personal experience as a dialogue worker over the course of the past 20 years. The Nansen Dialogue approach includes the "soft" institutions of homes and schools. Joint educational spaces reduce the presence of hate speech and the production of enemy images. My focus in the chapter is on Kosovo, but examples will also be drawn from the other ex-Yugoslav republics, to illustrate that there is a road toward more integrated societies.

The Lillehammer–Sarajevo Connection

The Winter Olympics connected Lillehammer (1994) and Sarajevo (1984) and brought a strong awareness about the ongoing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Lillehammer. Line Urke, a young woman working in the Lillehammer Olympic Committee, was watching the evening news. While the war scenes from Sarajevo were rolling in front of her eyes, she came up with the idea of the Lillehammer Olympic Aid. That effort took the solidarity spirit of the Olympics seriously and collected 71 million NOK.¹

The Nansen Academy in Lillehammer was founded in 1938 as a counterforce to the dehumanizing forces of Nazism and Fascism. When Europe again came on fire more than 50 years later, the challenge was “what can we do?” In the fall of 1995, the Nansen Academy invited 14 potential future leaders from Bosnia-Herzegovina to come and discuss the breakup of Yugoslavia; why did it become so violent and what could be done to rebuild the basis for communication and cooperation?

It is important to recognize that it was the Olympic connection between Lillehammer and Sarajevo and the money from the Lillehammer Olympic Aid that gave the Nansen Academy a door opener into Sarajevo. It was the strong moral and financial support from the Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid, the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that made it possible.

Educational Seminars in Norway, 1995–2000

We immediately realized that to have a proper discussion of the breakup of Yugoslavia we needed voices from Ljubljana to Skopje and in the second

¹ This connection was revitalized recently in the opening ceremony before the unique chess match between Magnus Carlsen and Borki Predojevic, Bosna Chess Club, Sarajevo on 28 June in Lillehammer. The mayors in the two towns were communicating live on big screens in Lillehammer and Sarajevo. The connection was made to the Youth Olympics in Lillehammer in 2016 and the European Youth Olympics in Sarajevo in 2017. The date 28 June was of course consciously chosen. Information and further references about the match on the world's leading website, at <http://www.chessbase.com>.

group all six republics from ex-Yugoslavia were represented. The Nansen Dialogue approach grew out of the experience of listening to the conversations in these initial groups. When people from Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo, Priština, and Skopje came together to discuss this breakup, it started as a bitter fight between people who believed that they had the most appropriate understanding of recent events, while they assumed that the others to a large degree were the victims of political and nationalistic propaganda.

As organizers, we had an important learning experience during these years. We started out placing a high priority on the transfer of knowledge from Norwegian lecturers to the participants, but gradually realized that the main value of the seminars was that the participants were coming together and sharing stories and comparing notes. We therefore shifted the focus to facilitate the interaction between the participants. During the years 1995 to 2000, around 170 people participated in three-month-long dialogue seminars in Lillehammer. Several of these participants have today attained important positions in governments, political parties, and supreme courts or leadership positions within their respective religious or cultural communities.

The Build-up of the Nansen Dialogue Network, 2000–05

During the summer of 2000, there was a real concern that the war in Kosovo would spread to South Serbia and Macedonia. There was also a fear of outbreak of violence in Montenegro. The process of reconciliation did not move forward as expected in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten Nansen Dialogue Centers (NDCs) were set up in Osijek (Croatia), Banja Luka, Sarajevo, and Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Podgorica (Montenegro), Priština and Mitrovica (Kosovo), Belgrade and Bujanovac (Serbia), and Skopje (Macedonia) with both political and financial support from Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). The participation in a Lillehammer seminar was a prerequisite to become a dialogue worker in one of the centers. During these five years, much of the energy was spent on organizing local dialogue seminars and building good communication between the centers. Network meetings were organized once a year and a steering board (Netcom) focused on organizing joint activities between the centers.

The Shift from a Network Focus to Community Peacebuilding, 2005–14

As the competence and capacities were built in each center, there was an organic shift from a focus on the network itself to locally oriented projects that could lead to structural changes. The focus shifted from educational seminars and workshops to institutional changes. The Nansen Centers in 2014 are more concerned with intervention in the fields of education and politics than organizing the old classical dialogue seminars. They are in the forefront of fighting segregation and creating new innovative integrated arenas. The classical dialogue seminars are still continuing out of necessity in some places, particularly in those communities where the segregation has become accepted as a normal condition.

The seminars in Lillehammer continued, but changed from three-month-long seminars to much shorter seminars, and focused on professional groups from target municipalities (i.e., teachers from Vukovar or politicians from Bujanovac). As we built a reputation, we could recruit participants in higher positions, but these could rarely leave home for more than a week at the time. This development led to a huge increase in participants in the Lillehammer seminars. Close to 3000 people have participated in Lillehammer seminars since 1995.

The seminars in Lillehammer worked as a jumpstart of the activities in local communities. Over the last eight years the centers have built up more or less formal Nansen Coordination Boards in the communities where they have been active. These “boards” consist of central citizens with authority and they are people who have entrance to an arena for action (teachers, health care personnel, politicians, journalists). They are responsible for carrying out much of the local activity.


One can envision a leverage stretching from the financial support from the NMFA via the Nansen Academy/Nansen Dialog Centers (NDCs) to the local Nansen Coordination Boards (NCBs). This cooperation became the backbone in the strategy for reconciliation. Each component was essential to secure the desired outcome. The financial support from the NMFA secured continuity and long term planning, but without the strong local groups carrying out the work, we would not have seen the institutional changes in the communities themselves. The seminars in Lillehammer played a crucial role in the formation of these Nansen

Coordination Boards. The combination of a warm host community (Lillehammer), the relaxed atmosphere at the Nansen Academy, time together in a neutral space, and the Nansen “spirit” prepared the ground for thinking new thoughts not always allowed back home.²

Nansen Dialogue: Inter-ethnic Dialogue in Divided Communities

The NCBs are formally organized in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bratunac, Jajce, and Zvornik, but they also exist in a more informal way in Vukovar, Stolac, Prozor-Rama, Kosovo Polje, Obilić, Mitrovica, Bujanovac, and Jegunovce. I have described the content and the methodology in these initial seminars in an earlier publication,³ where I showed how parallel stories, opposing ethnic “truths,” and different perceptions of the same social reality coexist and create an ideological basis for divided communities. Propaganda (defined as one sided truths) flourishes on both sides, and the enemy images are often transferred to the generation coming of age through the soft institutions of the homes and the schools.

Figure 16.1. Divided Communities.



² The most recent external evaluation of the Nansen Dialogue work is Vera Devine, Varja Nikolic, and Hugo Stokke, “Keep on Talking! Review of the Nansen Dialogue Network in the Western Balkans,” *CMI Reports* 16 (2008).

³ Steinar Bryn, “Inter-ethnic dialogue between Serbs and Albanians in Serbia/Kosovo, 1996–2008,” in *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era*, eds. Ola Listhaug, Sabrina P. Ramet, and Dragana Dulić (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2011), 369–97.

The existence of these opposing perceptions of reality is a solid argument for dialogue. How can a perception be corrected if the other stories are excluded? Ann Kelleher and Kelly Ryan⁴ have developed a conceptual framework of the Nansen Dialogue approach that they call "Sustained Dialogue through Relational Power." What characterizes the Nansen Dialogue is an emphasis upon transforming conflicting relationships and not on the more instrumental development of institutions, although the work to change dysfunctional institutions often follows from the changed relationships between people in divided communities. Kelleher and Ryan relate the way the Nansen Dialogue emphasizes changing conflicting relationships into healthy ones with the work done by Harold Saunders and John Paul Lederach.⁵ Amanda Feller and Kelly Ryan give an academic contribution to the understanding of dialogue based on their knowledge of the Nansen dialogue practices.⁶

The essence of the Nansen Dialogue

The very concept of dialogue has been used in too many different contexts, which have resulted in confusion about the meaning of the concept. Superficial interpretations flourish. One diplomat once said, "The problem is, dialogue is too womanish," while another once said, "Anybody will dialogue as long as Norway pays for the coffee." I hope to show that both comments undermine the essence of dialogue.

Jonas Gahr Støre, former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, argues in "Taming summit mania"⁷ that too many of the high-level summit meetings do not lead anywhere. It was reported in parts of the Norwegian Press

⁴ Ann Kelleher and Kelly Ryan, "Successful local peacebuilding in Macedonia: Sustained peacebuilding in practice," *Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* 44 (2012), no. 1: 63–94.

⁵ Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

⁶ Amanda E. Feller and Kelly R. Ryan, "Definition, necessity, and Nansen: Efficacy of dialogue in peacebuilding," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 29 (2012), no. 4: 351–80. These are two serious efforts to apply the Nansen experience to peacebuilding theory.

⁷ Jonas Gahr Støre, "Taming summit mania," *Harvard International Review* 34 (2012), no. 1: 12–5.

that Gahr Støre is tired of dialogue.⁸ This is a frequent misinterpretation of dialogue as equivalent to political talks. When I invited five Palestinian filmmakers to a dialogue meeting with five Israeli filmmakers, they refused. To participate implied a recognition of the other side, which they were not ready to give. After long talks, in which I explained that dialogue is making yourself visible, in their case through showing their movies to them, they responded, "Is that dialogue?" They had been convinced that dialogue was what took place at Camp David. When I explained that political talks and dialogue were different ways of human communication, they accepted the invitation. But I had to promise not to call it "dialogue." This explains the importance of being more specific when we define "dialogue."

"Dialogue" is a tool to understand why the conflict is so difficult to solve and why the emotions are so negative on both sides. I start every dialogue seminar by defining "dialogue" through three concepts: 1) movement; 2) visibility; and 3) relations.⁹ This is done to distinguish dialogue from the often referred to "political talks"—which of course is necessary but it is a different way of communicating characterized by 1) positioning; 2) argumentation; 3) negotiation; and 4) a problem-solving focus. It is this confusion of dialogue with political talks that has led to a frustration with dialogue, and made some people conclude that dialogue doesn't lead anywhere. But the way we define it, dialogue is not a tool to solve problems/conflicts. It is a tool to improve the understanding between the parties in a given conflict.

Dialogue is making movement

When we have "frozen" conflicts, we need to create movement. When negotiations come to a standstill we need to create movement. The curious child is a good example of a dialogue-oriented person. The child moves through the day, both mentally and physically. An essential element of the child's communication is asking questions, not rhetor-

⁸ *Klassekampen* (Oslo), 13 September 2012. Lars Unar Størdal Vegstein, "Nå er Støre lei av dialog."

⁹ These concepts have grown out of experience. After facilitating hundreds of dialogue seminars this is what I often see happening; participation creates movement in positions, the participants become more visible to each other, and their relationship is strengthened.

ical questions but open questions to which the child honestly wants an answer. The child lives in dialogue with its surroundings. Q&A is a fantastic way of communicating, but we often ask the questions too fast and we answer them too fast.

Dialogue is both an attitude toward the world, and a way of communicating. A successful dialogue seminar between Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo does not “solve” the political issues, but most participants leave with a better understanding of why those issues are so difficult to solve. They leave with a better understanding of the pain and the suffering of the other side. This might increase the possibilities of reaching more sustainable solutions in the long run.

Dialogue is making yourself visible

Some participants argue that dialogue is in the interest of those in power, because it doesn't challenge them. My experience is the opposite. Those in power are often visible; it is the minorities that are invisible. When they enter the dialogue with those in power and their life conditions become visible, they challenge the very structure of power that discriminates against them. When those structures are not in accordance with internationally agreed upon principles of democracy and human rights, it creates a political basis for changing the current conditions. To enter into dialogue means to make oneself visible to others and to allow others to become visible to oneself. The Palestinian filmmakers mentioned above were confronted with the question whether they believed their life conditions were visible to the Israelis; they answered “No, that is part of the problem.” Through becoming more visible, they become a challenge to Israeli dominance.

Dialogue is building relations

Henning Bang in his examination of 431 managers from 75 different management teams documents that there is positive relation between dialogue and the quality of relationships.¹⁰ This corresponds with my expe-

¹⁰ Henning Bang and Thomas Nettet Midelfart, “Dialog og effektivitet i ledergrupper,” *Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening* 47 (2010): 4–15.

rience. Dialogue builds respect in a group. Dialogue does not produce agreements or for that matter compromises, but it does strengthen the relationships. The Nansen Coordinators in Kosovo fundamentally disagree on major political issues, but they have developed a deep respect for each other and an understanding of why and how it is possible to reach different conclusions based on one's position in society. In this perspective it is actually very understandable that Serbs and Albanians fight for different political goals.

From such a position where the parties recognize their right to disagree, they develop a deeper respect for each other and develop a more pragmatic attitude toward finding solutions. Based on this understanding it follows that a dialogue worker is relationship-focused. If two neighbors are fighting over the position of a fence, a solution-focused mediator will focus on the fence and feel rather pleased if s/he actually finds the right place for that fence. A dialogue worker will be more focused on the relationship between the neighbors. If the relationship is sour, the conflict will most likely continue after having agreed upon the fence, but shift the focus to something else.

In this perspective it might seem naïve to believe that the Serb-Albanian conflict will be solved with some territorial agreements, it is the very relationship between them that has become poisonous. The same goes for the economic argument, "if we just can join EU, provide jobs, and get the economy going things will fall into place." First of all, to get the economy going is becoming an increasing problem within the EU itself; secondly, although Norway was quickly rebuilt after World War II, our attitude toward Germans has remained distorted. This has been mainly due to the lack of a reconciliation strategy. Kosovo seems to lack a reconciliation strategy today; instead locals seem to accept mutual apartheid, which freezes the conflict and transfers it to the generation coming of age.

Dialogue vs. debate

Figure 16.2 summarizes the differences between dialogue and debate. The participants rather quickly learn this difference, and they recognize that debate strengthens defense and positioning while dialogue creates movement. This does not mean that people say good-bye to the debate and embrace the dialogue. A normal dialogue seminar probably has 80%

debate. The need to argue and to confront is strong, and neither can nor should be avoided. Rather the opposite, intense debates bring out the different viewpoints, release energy, and can prepare the ground for dialogue.

Figure 16.2. The Differences between Debate and Dialogue.

DEBATE	DIALOGUE
Goal: To <u>win</u> • Convience • Argue • Look for the weak argument • Hunter • Moral judge • Make opponent insecure • To change opinion is a sign of weakness • Confronting language	Goal: To <u>understand</u> • Explain • Listen • Look for the strength in the opponent • Self-discipline • Tolerance • Make opponent feel safe • To change opinion is a sign of maturity • Supportive language

In a debate, people defend their positions, and change is often seen as a weakness. One could not argue well enough, was badly informed, or one's argument might seem inconsequential. In a dialogue, change is very acceptable. Through listening to you, I understand you better and your actions make more sense to me. Dialogue will never replace debates or negotiations, but I argue that a strong dialogue component in the beginning of negotiations could increase the chances for movement and more sustainable outcomes.

The Anatomy of a Dialogue Seminar

We started with three-month-long seminars in Norway in 1995. That gave us plenty of time to talk. But obviously such long seminars were rather exclusive. In order to involve working people with family responsibilities, we started already in 1997 with three-day seminars in the Balkan region. These are described in the aforementioned chapter I contributed to a collection published in 2011.¹¹ They had a stronger academic component

¹¹ Bryn, "Inter-ethnic dialogue."

(using Dessler's methodology) than what was normally assumed when people heard the word dialogue.

During the period from 1995–2000 the focus was on the roots and causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia and why it turned into such violent wars. But a decade has passed and we have moved into the 2010s. The focus of the conversations first shifted from the roots and the causes to the more long term consequences and the need for reconciliation, and then toward (re-)integration. The main question became: Is it possible to rebuild a future together? This shift was also reinforced by the fact that a new generation was coming of age, for whom the war was only a vague memory and not necessarily a lived experience. For this generation, the stories from parents, grandparents and teachers became more important than their own memories.

Building trust through not becoming a judge

As a dialogue facilitator I need to spend the first moments to build up trust in the group. That is done through giving a brief introduction to the development of the Nansen Network, and putting this development into the historical context of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the brutal wars that followed. This comes easy since I have listened to first-hand experiences of these events over many years. Indirectly, I present an argument for dialogue. When I stress how the participants from Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo, Priština, and Skopje all had different perspectives, particularly on the breakup of Yugoslavia, people understand my argument. Although all the participants defended their positions in the beginning, it became obvious to them that their own politicians, teachers, and journalists had not told them the whole story. They simply learned through experience the value of listening to the other stories, allowing the others to become more visible to them and thereby experienced how dialogue could create movement in their own mental understanding.

The victim mythology is strong on all sides. Often people believe there is only one truth. We know it. They deny it. We are correctly giving high priority to punishing war criminals. But too many false accusations have been flying around. When people meet again after ten years, their stories have been told and retold so many times that they hardly question their validity anymore. I have witnessed several times how accusations

have crossed the room, "How can you even think about returning after what you did to us?" The structure of segregation allows the false accusations to exist simply because they are never confronted with opposing views. Dialogue challenges this structure.

I am often asked to become a judge, but this is a trap that I must avoid if I want to keep my authority in the room. The way out is to use, "If I were you... I would probably have thought along the same lines." This is a fairly logical sentence. If I fail in creating trust, the dialogue will deteriorate. I have experienced that half the group has gotten up and left the room, but that has only happened when I started arguing with participants. While I felt that I had argued on behalf of basic principles of dialogue, an argument is often perceived as choosing sides.

Three essential conversations

In the dialogue room we start by breaking into smaller groups and the first conversation is sharing how the conflict itself has affected people's lives. This is a conversation not about the causes, but about the consequences of war. "How do you experience these consequences 15–20 years later?" When people share how their personal lives, how their family lives, how their working lives are, how their hopes for the future and how the way they raise their children are affected by the conflict, they often discover through listening that "the other side" has suffered more than they were aware of.

This is the radical dimension of dialogue work; it alters perceptions of reality by making alternative truths and alternative explanations visible. It is harder to argue, "Our police would never do that" when the person in front of you has scars after being beaten by the very same police. As long as one believes that "the others" got away too easily after what they did to us, one is not motivated for a win–win solution. Actually, one can rather sacrifice a little if one knows the other will pay more. Lose–lose is preferable to win–win as long as one believes the other side was not punished enough. When it becomes visible that the others have suffered too, and maybe tasted too much of their own medicine, then it becomes more acceptable to discuss win–win solutions. Dialogue literally moves the positions in a group into more openness toward synergetic solutions.

The second conversation is sharing the perception of the current inter-ethnic communication and cooperation in the fields of politics, edu-

cation, religion, business, sports, culture, and social life, and at times the participants themselves add drugs and gambling. These are participants from divided communities. In February 2013, I sat in three consecutive seminars with participants from Obilić, Vučitrn, and Štrpce. They were asked to rank the level of communication and cooperation from 1–7 in the different arenas. What often happens is that a situation that is perceived as rather normal doesn't seem so when you start to talk about it with the people from the other side. To have separate soccer teams for boys 8 years old or divided kindergardens with ethnically homogeneous staff looks strange when discussed openly and when confronted with the questions, "What is the justification for this segregation?" and "What are the legal criteria on which this is based?"

There are obvious reasons why communities are divided. The war crimes and the evil actions committed are only part of the explanation. Politicians have gained their positions using victim rhetoric and made ethnic division into an organizing principle of everyday life. The argument that an Albanian doctor takes better care of an Albanian than a Serbian doctor can be very seductive when put into political rhetoric. But we do not need to refer to Hippocrates to emphasize any doctor's professional interest in performing optimally on the job. And there are always stories in divided communities about those who cross the ethnic divide when the need for professional help is strong enough and the potential help is on the other side of the river. When you really need the best eye doctor you do not care to know his/her ethnic background.

I often refer to European soccer clubs as examples. They have completely abandoned the ethnic principle. They do not ask to see the passport of a professional player, but they ask to see his professional skills. To a large extent, the dominant soccer clubs like Barcelona and Manchester United have become more popular with their multiethnic teams than the national soccer teams of Spain and England. But the loyalty of the fans is extremely strong anyway. My son is a devoted Manchester United fan. The explanation of that is a simple one. When he was five years old he sat down on my lap when I watched a soccer game and he asked, "Whose side are we on daddy?" I said the red, not the blue. That sentence from his father became decisive for his support to the red for the next 20 years (cf. Figure 16.1).

The third conversation is about how to improve the quality of inter-ethnic communication and cooperation. In this moment something

interesting happens in the dialogue groups. It moves the focus on reconciliation toward one of the largest political challenges in Europe: integration vs. segregation. Through moving reconciliation into this dimension, the local conflict bubble is reduced and it becomes to a larger extent a common human problem. It is like some doors and windows are opened—and things are not as special and unique as one first thought. It even brings out some smiles when I remind participants that the homeland of the EU capital, Belgium, was without a government for 500 days. The reasons for this are complex, but it is clearly related to their segregated school system. Still, Brussels sends out European standards to the rest of us, like the standard of an inclusive school system.¹²

Segregation vs. integration

In the recent seminars the conversations consequently have moved in this direction. The participants belonging to the minority often respond to the discussion about integration with the fear of being assimilated. Inclusion, which in a dialogue perspective would imply becoming visible, is often met with the alternative response of self-exclusion, thereby making oneself less visible to the majority. At this point in the process, I use my American Studies background and share how the United States believed in the politics of assimilation until the late 1960s. The model was the “melting pot,” where new immigrants became Americanized and melted into the American mosaic. The revolt during the 1960s developed the hyphenated American—the African-American, the Norwegian-American, the Native-American, and so forth—, and the metaphor describing American society shifted from the melting pot to the salad bowl. This shift is significant because in the salad bowl one can recognize the different ingredients. The goal is not to melt in, but to recognize and respect the differences.

After the breakup of Yugoslavia, people belonging to the majority population had the nationality which corresponded to the name of the state. The Croats became the majority in Croatia, the Macedonians the

¹² My use of Brussels is not completely correct, since some of these standards come from the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, but it works in lifting the participants’ perspectives on divided communities.

majority in Macedonia, the Serbs the majority in Serbia, etc., and these nationalities behaved as if they had a stronger birthright to the state (first class citizens). The Macedonians made their language the official language, their religion the official religion, their flag the official flag, thereby reducing the other minorities to second-class citizens. This is the danger of democracy when mixed with ethnic politics; it gives a false legitimacy to the ethnic majority's dominance over the ethnic minority. Although democratic theory is developed to protect minority rights, its practices tend to legitimate the majority feeling of being "right." During the breakup of Yugoslavia, referenda were popular among the ethnic majorities, less so among the minorities.

Inclusion is sometimes wrongly perceived as assimilation; to give up one's identity and melt into the dominant culture. Parallel structures, segregated schools, enclaves, and ghettos are developed partly as a defense against being assimilated. In Kosovo, the Serbs who cooperate with the current government are seen as quislings, not protecting Serbian rights or the Serbian identity. But the counter-argument can just as easily be made; it is through making Serbian interests visible in the current government that one keeps the Serbian identity alive. It is through becoming visible to the other citizens that you can make a democracy work, and from a more existential point of view, it is through becoming visible to others that you define your own identity.

The dominant attitude throughout the 1990s was to fight for education in one's mother tongue and minorities' rights to education on their own turf. This led to the OSCE model of "two schools under one roof" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the development of Albanian universities in Macedonia, segregated education in East Slavonia, and complete segregation in Kosovo. This can be called mutual apartheid, voluntary segregation based on ethnicity.

Questions and answers as essential in a dialogue

In the dialogue seminars, I often divide the opposing groups and give them 1–2 hours to formulate essential questions to each other. They hand over the questions and reflect 1–2 hours on how to answer them. In this way, the participants set the agenda; because the questions they raise are the issues they most desperately want and need to talk about. I never use

energizers, ice-breakers, or simulations, since there is more than enough raw material in the conflict itself to energize the group and to stimulate the conversation. The questions often concern guilt and responsibility. "What do you feel guilty for?" "What do you accept responsibility for?" "Why did you allow that to happen when you knew the pain it caused us?" "What kind of solution is acceptable for you?" Such a conversation based on Q&A can last for days. I allow follow-up questions that plow deeper into the issues.

The conversation developing through giving enough time for questions and answers often develops the conversations from predictable fast thinking to a more dialogical slow thinking. In addition, dialogue invites a metalogue, a reflection on how we communicate (Bateson).¹³


Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a relatively recent concept, although the content is rather old. It was first formally introduced by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report to the Security Council, "An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping."¹⁴ In addition to the three pillars mentioned in the title, the report added peacebuilding. In this report, peacebuilding was defined mainly through security issues. Over the next decade the understanding grew to include economic and political development and slowly the international community became more aware of the complexities and contradictions in the area of ethno-political wars. In 2004, a report by PRIO gave a solid and inclusive definition of peacebuilding.¹⁵ In Figure 16.3 of the "peacebuilding palette," the four different areas—security, socio-economic foundations, political framework, and reconciliation—have been included.

¹³ George Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1972; reissued in 2000).

¹⁴ "An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping." Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. Available at http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf (accessed on 20 July 2013).

¹⁵ Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, Norad Evaluation Reports No. 1 (April 2004).

Figure 16.3. The Four Dimensions of Peacebuilding.

The interesting fact is that the study was authored by Dan Smith, the current head of International Alert. During the years 1996–2004, Dan Smith was my closest colleague in the Nansen Dialogue seminars. Between the two of us we facilitated 100+ seminars during this period. His main contribution in the theory of peacebuilding is the additional strong emphasis on reconciliation and justice. But although the palette is composed of four equally important areas, we still hear the echoes from Boutros-Ghali's report from 1992 in many of the international efforts, specifically his assertion that "security is the most important element of peace-building." The major peacebuilding efforts in BH and Kosovo so far in the twenty-first century have focused on institution- and state-building,

and not on reconciliation and dialogue. This is not only an omission, it is directly reducing the impact of the institution-building efforts, i.e., by not instilling loyalty toward the state among the citizens.

The Vice President of the United States, Joe Biden, expressed the concern that peacebuilding efforts did not create the expected results in addressing the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo on 19 May 2009:

Today, we are worried about the direction your country, your future, and your children's future are taking. For three years, we have seen a sharp and dangerous rise in nationalist rhetoric designed to play on people's fears, to stir up anger and resentment. We have seen state institutions—which must be strengthened for Bosnia to meet the challenges of the 21st century and to advance toward EU and NATO membership—openly challenged and deliberately undermined. We have witnessed attempts to roll back the reforms of the last decade—the very reforms that prompted EU and NATO to open their doors to the citizens of this country. We have heard voices speaking the language of maximalism and absolutism that destroys states—not the language of compromise and cooperation that builds them. The results are predictable—deepening mistrust between communities, deadlock on reforms, and dangerous talk about the country's future that is reminiscent of the tragedies the people of this country have worked so hard to overcome.¹⁶

This statement by Joe Biden is quite clear in stressing that the international community, after all its peacebuilding efforts during the period from 1995–2009, is not seeing the results it hoped for. The question at hand is peacebuilding, and there is a discrepancy between all the human resources, money, and research going in and the peace coming out.

Our efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle-East, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have not paid off as expected; one must therefore be allowed to ask, "Has there been something wrong with our peacebuilding

¹⁶ Joe Biden, "Address to the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina," White House website (19 May 2009), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Prepared-Remarks-Vice-President-Joe-Biden-Addresses-Parliament-of-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina (last accessed on 24 July 2013).

approach?" Has it become too heuristic and too instrumental? Has it become too focused on security and state-building—at the expense of the people living in the state? Can it be that we assume we know what to do, while we actually should spend much more time obtaining local knowledge before we start to act?

Has Current Peacebuilding Become Too Instrumental?

The dialogue attitude is based on the understanding that the use of pre-judgments has a limited validity. We do not know all the answers, which is why the art of questioning is so central. The dialogue attitude is an important correction to the more instrumental attitude toward life, spelled out in the instructions, the blueprints and the handbooks. This part of our work is explained by the concepts developed by the Nobel Prize Winner Daniel Kahneman in his book, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*.¹⁷

We base our lives on predictions and expectations. Our knowledge and experience have taught us how life works and most often life works out as expected. When we turn the key in the car, we expect the engine to start and most often it does exactly that. Predictability has become a prerequisite for the modern world to function, and the amazing thing is how predictable the world actually has become. Although we complain about trains and planes being late, the amazing fact is that most of them are not.

The organization and running of airports, hospitals, and postal services are so successful that we actually believe the instrumental approach itself is the magic solution to making things work. Expectations and predictions are a good thing—they make the modern world work. It is the expectations of the four drivers who approach the intersection and the instrumental function of the traffic light that makes the traffic flow safely.

Kahneman describes two ways of thinking, and he calls them system 1 and system 2.¹⁸ The first is things we just know. We switch on the light and the room brightens up. We don't really know how it works. But it

¹⁷ Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (London: Allen Lane & Penguin Books, 2011).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 19–30.

works. If I ask you how much is 2+2 you answer “4,” without even thinking about it. You just know. But if I ask how much is 17 times 35, you have to stop and wonder; you actually have to stop and think.

Let me illustrate further. To run a train you need a specific set of skills and you follow the handbook. That is why the trains mostly run on time. The individual hardly makes a difference—because the way you start and stop, speed up and slow down, follows instrumental rules based on knowledge and experience and not the individual mood swings of the driver. In this context, the rotating principle works well; people work in shifts. The trains come and go independently of the individuals driving them and how well they understand why things work.

The same rotating principle allows for a high fluctuation of individuals in foreign missions (embassies, KFOR, Red Cross, etc.). Rotation is perceived as unproblematic as long as the handbooks, the job descriptions, the routines, and the guidelines are solid. I experienced recently that the whole Norwegian staff in one of our embassies in the Western Balkans were replaced (rotated). We had worked closely with the previous staff in several of the local communities we were involved. The staff had built relations to key individuals in these communities. These relations could not be transferred in an instrumental way to the next team.

In the discussions following the massacre on 22 July 2011 in Norway, the police were criticized for being too instrumental. An example: The police left their first arrival spot, because according to their instructions they could not establish their base so close to a civilian camp ground. They thereby removed themselves farther from the island, while civilians from the same camp ground actually went out on the lake to help. The civilians acted relationally through using the practical wisdom often not accounted for in the more instrumental guidelines.

One of the dramatic consequences of war is the breakdown in trust and communication between people. An important element of peace-building is rebuilding this communication and trust. This is a relational and not an instrumental task. Newcomers often lack local experience, and they discover that their authority is not anchored in the positions they have in the international organization, but in how they develop relations with local people over time. The discussion is not what is better—instrumental or relational thinking—but when to use each facility. The instrumental approach works best when we know the answers beforehand and our expectations are correct.

The ten Nansen Centers that are active in divided communities in ex-Yugoslavia use a more relational approach. Dialogue is a soft, long-term, slow way of working. It is not a magic fix creating results in a fortnight, but over the years reshaping the relationship between previous enemies. Sustained dialogue is not only verbal interaction, it leads to taking action: citizens acting together because they start to realize they have a common interest in changing the institutions.

*A case study illustrating the Nansen Dialogue
approach to peacebuilding*


Several of the Nansen Centers are now deeply involved in the politics of integration. This is a consequence of the dialogue work improving communication and creating a base for joint action. The difference between assimilation and integration is often not recognized, and the fear of assimilation leads to self-exclusion through the establishment of parallel systems. NDC Skopje cracked the code and turned this understanding upside down.

The municipality of Jegunovce experienced war-like actions in 2001. As a result, after the war, the schools became completely segregated. There was little or no communication and cooperation between segregated schools when NDC Skopje got involved in 2005.

They started by listening to the local needs of the citizens. This was done through a need assessment. NDC Skopje selected certain needs to which they could respond. Through cooperation with the Norwegian Embassy, some toilets and some classrooms were fixed. This built trust. They offered classes in IT and English. The classes could only be offered in one village each, but, through long confidence-building conversations with the parents, safe transportation ("bussing") was offered from the other villages to the educational site. The classes in IT and English were given in two separate villages, and advanced classes were offered in another two new villages.

In this way no village was shown special favor and the children got familiar with the situation outside their own village. As a consequence, the children developed a curiosity about each other's language and after a new process including long conversations with the parents, language classes were offered in Albanian in the Macedonian village Zilche and

Figure 16.4. Joint Activities between Macedonian and Albanian pupils in 2008.



in Macedonian in the Albanian village of Shemshovo. The level of inter-ethnic education outside the classroom reached such a high level that it became meaningless to continue with segregated schools.

This led to the establishment of the first bilingual multiethnic school in Jegunovce. It opened on 1 September 2008. It was the first bilingual school in Macedonia. Figure 16.4 shows how the offering of classes offered rebuilt certain networks and connections between the villages, and this process was a prerequisite for making the school possible.

The Nansen Model of Education builds on integration not assimilation. Education in the Western Balkans is most often either an assimilation model (the minority enrolls in the majority schools) or a segregated model (different schools and different curriculum for minority and majority). The Nansen Center in Skopje clearly distinguishes between assimilation and integration. The Nansen Model of Integration is based on respect and awareness of the differences—the salad bowl, not the melting pot. Most of the education takes place in the mother tongue, but joint sessions and multiple extracurricular activities makes both cultures very visible to each other and the children learn each other's language. This model has been embraced by the Ministry of Education and has spread to the Macedonian–Turkish area around Strumica and Valisevo. Assimilation is

a one-way street of becoming adopted into the dominant culture, while integration is a two-way street of mutual development of respect and recognition of differences.

This model correlates with the European Council's definition of quality in education as inclusion. Inclusion is the starting point if you want quality. It further correlates with the Ljubljana guidelines for integration, the set of guidelines developed by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) on the integration of diverse societies.¹⁹ This correlation should surprise no one since NDC Skopje in October 2011 received the Max Van der Stohl prize of 50,000 Euro from the office of the HCNM for its work against segregation. A recent report from the OECD also concludes that integrated schooling is better for the economic development of a given country.

But this work was far from only applauded; there were strong opposing forces. In Macedonia we experienced that Izair Samiu (Commandant Baci) reacted negatively to the fact that Albanian children were going to school with Slavic children. Commandant Baci was the self-proclaimed leader of the village. His authority was anchored in his fighting during the war in 2001. He opposed the integrated school with threats, stopping the school bus and put up road blocks. We contacted all the strong institutions, but the OSCE, the EU, and the UN had no mandate to intervene, the police were afraid they would intensify the conflict, and the embassies could do nothing. It was the parents who showed the strength and saved the school.

They questioned this authority and demanded an election in the village council. This election took place in October 2009. NDC Skopje knew it would need at least five supporters among the nine members of the council, but even then it could be hard to continue the school. With only four members of the council, the school would most likely have to close. It was therefore another break when the counted votes showed seven supporters of the school in the new village council. The commandant realized he did not have support in his own Albanian village.

This "case study" from Macedonia shows that it was the "soft" institution of the home that was strong when the "strong" institutions were too weak to act. It was the solid relationship building between the parents

¹⁹ The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, at <http://www.osce.org/HCNM>.

through numerous dialog seminars, including trips to Lillehammer, which gave them strength to stand firm under pressure. They believed in the school, and that integrated education is the way to secure equal access to resources and opportunities in the state. With such an equal distribution it is easier to enlist loyalty to the state among the citizens. This process should therefore be seen as a contribution to the implementation of the Ohrid agreement, the agreement that stopped the potential war in 2001 by giving the Albanians equal status with Macedonians in Macedonia.²⁰

The development of multiethnic states

The following model divides responsibilities between the nation and the state. It is based on the understanding of integration developed through our dialogue work (see Figure 16.5). It breaks up the nation state that leads the majority to believe they have birth rights stronger than others. Citizens' rights are independent of ethnic or national background. The model further redefines the purpose and meaning of both the state and the nation to cover more separate dimensions. The strength of this model is that the state is built on European standards with a definition of politics as equal distribution of resources and opportunities. But this does not mean that Europe is becoming more equal; the cultural variety expressed in religion, ceremonies, music, dances, food, and literature will of course continue to flourish.

This model is currently presented in all dialogue seminars I have with groups from mixed municipalities in Kosovo. I stress that, while many states in Europe often have a dominant nationality with older roots, and more recent immigrant cultures, Kosovo has an advantage in the sense that both ethnic groups have strong historical roots in the same country. It becomes meaningless to discuss whether Serbs or Albanians have a stronger right to live in Kosovo. Kosovo of course belongs to

²⁰ Ian King and Whit Mason, *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). They argue that the bombing in 1999 was necessary, but that it is basically after the bombing things went wrong. They argue that the failure to include the soft institutions in peacebuilding explains how the hate continues to be cultivated on both sides.

Figure 16.5. A Model for Multiethnic State-building.

Goal: Protect citizens	Goal: Provide identity
• Citizenship • Human Right • Territory • Secure infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools) • Politics (Protect human rights, democratic elections) • Equal distribution of resources and opportunities • Develop European state standards • Develop obligations (taxes, participation, common good)	• Belonging • Choice (Cosmopolitan) • Soul and Spirit • Inspire superstructure (traditions, ceremonies) • Culture (Literature, Music, Dances, Food, Clothing) • Freedom of choice (Religion) • Allow varieties • Develop supportstructures (Clubs and organizations)

both of them. And nobody can take Kosovo away from either of them. It is equally unlikely that Kosovo Serbs will be assimilated. The idea of making Kosovars out of all citizens has not taken off. The model allows for many interesting discussions. Instead of discussing which the right flag to use is, one can use the new state flag on state institutions, but allow for the Albanian and the Serbian flag in cultural celebrations. When the Norwegian flag is used in the United States it is not used as a state flag, but as a national symbol.

The model furthermore stresses that, while different people can agree upon the standards that are the basis for running their common state, at the same time that common state can allow for the flourishing of different cultures. When certain politicians claim that multiculturalism has failed, it is mainly because they have confused integration with assimilation and view the current assimilation as rather unsuccessful.

Reunion—creating spaces for dialogue

The challenge is often how to create the arena where people can meet and talk. My experience is that people do have a strong need to talk. My job is therefore not as difficult as people think. The main challenge is recruitment. How to convince people that it is worth their time to spend

a weekend or a week talking with the enemy? It is not true that everybody wants to come as long as Norway pays the coffee. In South Serbia we waited for four years before the radical Serbs wanted to participate. But when they finally arrived in the room, the conversations flowed more easily than expected. A normal reaction is, "Why did we not come together like this ten years ago?" Or, as a policeman from Prijedor put it, "Imagine if we had had these words in 1992."

We often need a lucky break to get started. One such break was created by the Norwegian filmmaker Jon Haukeland. He filmed a dialogue meeting between Serbs and Albanians facilitated by Dan Smith and myself in Herzeg Novi, March 1999. The film *Before the Bombs Fall* was shown on Norwegian television in April 1999, but due to the war, Jon never got the chance to show it to the participants themselves. Ten years later, he started to think about a reunion and he decided to search for the participants he could find and he invited them back to the same hotel in Herzeg Novi to see the first film. I facilitated this dialogue meeting and Jon Haukeland made the second film *Reunion Ten Years After the War*, which won the Norwegian Amanda Award for best documentary in 2011.²¹

The break came when the film was shown on DocuFest in Prizren in July 2012. It was the first public showing in Kosovo which started a series of showings in the Western Balkans in 2013. In Prizren there were also representatives of the FreeZone Festival in Belgrade and they put Reunion on their program for November 2012. The Cultural House in Belgrade was completely packed; more than 400 people saw the film on 4 November 2012, revealing that the movie responded to what had become a political trauma in Serbia. The next day 300 students from First Beograd School saw the movie.

The film shows the Nansen approach, but might be a disappointment for those who believe dialogue is a magic fix. The film shows clearly how Serbs and Albanians have different perceptions about what happened and why, and shows the obvious difference in how they experienced the events in 1999. But it also points toward the future. Is a joint future possible?

The film is not an illustration of the effectiveness of dialogue; although you see the participants become more visible to each other and slowly build a relationship. The strength of the movie is that it works as

²¹ The film has since then been shown in Cairo, Egypt, and Moscow, Russia.

a door opener for dialogue. It becomes possible to have an exploratory conversation about causes and consequences rather than the more bombastic reproduction of the nationalistic propaganda surrounding the war. The response in Belgrade initiated showings in 35 Serbian towns in April 2013. It was shown on national television in October 2013. Similarly, the film will be shown in Kosovo and stimulate the important conversation, "How do we deal with the past?" and "Where do we go from here?"

Where Do We Go from Here?

The Nansen Dialogue work for integrated educational activities, on reintegration of refugees in their home communities and on developing multiethnic coalitions in politics. On 12 September 2012, NDC Osijek presented its work in a meeting with President Ivo Josipović in Croatia and his Minister of Education, Željko Jovanović. Both expressed, in the press conference after the meeting, the will to support a joint school for Serbs and Croats in Vukovar. This town has been deeply divided since 1991. This was reconfirmed in a meeting on 16 July 2013.

NDC Osijek has worked 10 years for the realization of this school. The municipal assembly in Vukovar in a vote on 5 February 2013 did not support this process. It means that we are still up against strong counter forces. And it might take another 2–3 years before the school is implemented. But Croatia cannot continue to integrate abroad while segregating at home.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the minister of education, Damir Masić, has asked us for help to get rid of "two schools under one roof." The Minister of Education in Herzegovina-Neretva canton, Zlatko Hadžiomerović, asked us in September 2012 to help eliminate divided schools in Čaplina, Stolac, Mostar, and Prozor-Rama. The main reason he asked us is that he has seen how our slow patient dialogue work in Stolac has started to show results. Stolac is a deeply divided community, but dialogue seminars with students, parents, teachers, and local politicians are slowly transforming the conflictual relationship among them. The schools are still divided but joint school papers, joint closing ceremony at the end of the year, joint student exchange programs with Lillehammer, and cantonal cooperation between Herzegovina-Neretva and Oppland county are all small steps in the right direction.

In Macedonia the Ministry of Education has asked us to educate the whole administration within the Ministry in the concepts and ideas of integration. This will be done through the Learning Center for Integrated Education established by NDC Skopje to educate teachers in bilingual and multicultural education. On 12 December 2012, the NDC Skopje presented its model for integrated education in Oslo, Norway. Directors of schools in Norway have visited Macedonia to learn from the NDC model of integration.

The work done by NDC Skopje provides a practical example that integrated education is possible. It has informed the OSCE strategy document for national education that has been developed in cooperation with HCNM in The Hague and this has been embraced by the Macedonian Ministry of Education.

On 8 June 2012, the Albanian mayor of Bujanovac, Nagip Arfeti, formed a multiethnic coalition with two Serbian parties. He got 12 seats in the Assembly but needed nine more to secure a majority. He could have secured those nine seats in a coalition with two Albanian parties, but chose a coalition with Stojanca Arsic (Group of Citizens) and Nenad Mitrović (Serbian Progressive Party–SNS).

In Kosovo, we have been deeply involved in the mixed community of Mikronasalje. A community in North Mitrovica where 48 Albanian families live together with Serb families. We have worked for the last eight years for the return of Serb families to an Albanian village in Kosovo Polje/FKP. Most internationals have expressed lack of belief in this project, but the houses have been financed and rebuilt by the Ministry of Return in the Kosovo government. Whether the return actually will take place depends on how some internal conflicts within the village play out.

The future of Kosovo

To most people involved, it seems difficult to work for integration in Kosovo. We must think long term, probably in terms of generations. The arguments, the dialogue experiences, and the reflections in this chapter lead to the conclusion that the citizens of Kosovo must take integration seriously. To be a member of the European Community involves certain legal obligations, such as inclusion in education. The problem is that it looks too far from here to there. It is too far from the current system of segregation to a future model of integration. But one must start somewhere.

Therefore, the people-to-people approach, involving the ethnically mixed summer camps, the joint activities, multicultural film festivals, go-and-see visits, trips to the coast—it all points in the same direction. But such events must be followed up with strategic thinking around structural changes, particularly in politics and in education.

One reason why I have been drawing on multiple examples from the region is that people in a conflict area tend to believe that their conflict is special, unique, and almost impossible to escape. With a larger horizon, people in Kosovo can see that they struggle with the same issues as all of Europe. If Poland managed to reconcile with Germany and Russia after what its people experienced during World War II, then most people can. If the people of Vukovar can reconcile, then people in Mitrovica can.

Kosovo is not in a political vacuum. All one needs is to think about the triangle, Macedonia, South Serbia, and Kosovo. The Macedonian model of integrated education has already won political support in South Serbia. If we succeed in implementing it in Bujanovac (a Serb–Albanian–Roma community), it has transfer validity to Kosovo. This is not primarily a question of the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, the big mistake both Serbs and Albanians have made is to allow parallel structures to co-exist and through exclusion create a society where the minority does not feel welcome. Sooner or later such policies lead to explosions and change of borders.

As a principle, it is in the interest of a minority to become more visible to the majority, to make its hopes and dreams known. This chapter has shown that there are roads toward reconciliation, no short cuts, no instant solutions or quick fixes, only the slow patient walk down the road of rebuilding trust and communication. I have then tried to show the logical connection how dialogue leads to the conversation about and the efforts to move toward larger integration.

It is an illusion to believe that dialogue has had a high priority in the peacebuilding processes of today. Our target groups are high municipal officials. Too often do I meet people who have never participated in serious conversations over several days with people from the other side. If the international peace-builders had had the courage to examine the mantra of security and hard institutions and had given dialogue between people a higher priority in peacebuilding, my experience tells me that we would have seen more powerful results. As in the famous words by Nansen, nothing is impossible; “the impossible only takes longer.”

Serbs and Albanians must both be able to take an honest look at the recent past before they can consider and develop a more integrative political and educational development. But the international community is an actor in this process as well. It also has to take an honest look at the recent past in order to learn from its mistakes. If all three shared what they saw in the mirror—it could be of great value to future peace building missions.

CHAPTER 17

The Roots of Instability and the Prerequisites of Stability in Kosovo: A Conclusion

SABRINA P. RAMET and ALBERT SIMKUS

I

Kosovo, Europe's youngest state, had a difficult birth. Originally included in the emergent Albanian state more than a century ago, it was overrun by the Serbian army in October 1912 and, for most of the next century, was ruled by Belgrade, in spite of its majority Albanian population. Nonetheless, although Belgrade imposed its rule in disregard of the wishes of the local population, it was not the difference in ethnicity which rendered Kosovo unstable in the decades thereafter. Rather, it was the fact that, with the exception of the years 1968–87, Belgrade tended to treat the Albanians of Kosovo as second-class citizens. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the uncivic values to which the successive regimes in Belgrade subscribed (with a limited, partial exception to be noted below) fed local discontent, making for instability. Civic values are a factor for stability; uncivic values, for the contrary.

Chief among the civic values are tolerance, respect for the principle of equality, and the rule of law. Yet precisely these values were entirely missing in Belgrade's treatment of the Albanians during the interwar years (1918–41) and 1945–66, and applied in a distorted, specifically communist manner in the succeeding two decades, as Roberto Morozzo della Rocca made clear in his historical survey. That chapter started with the establishment of the League of Prizren, by Albanian patriots, in 1878. This event and date are recognized as "the dawning of Albanian nationalism." It is important to recognize the situation of Kosovar Albanians during this period, because it reflected an essential set of conditions which was to be

repeated continually, with great variations, through the present. On one hand, the League of Prizren asserted the importance of Albanian nationalism to the highest degree. Over the decades to follow, Kosovar Albanians pressed for increased autonomy in many dimensions of life within the Ottoman Empire, coming into conflict with the Sublime Porte, causing the Ottoman authorities to fear secession, to the point of engaging in military repression. But, Kosovar Albanians did not and could not press for total independence and sovereignty.

Kosovo's fate on the eve of World War I was ultimately decided by Great Britain and France, which thought that their own interests would be best served by sanctioning the forcible annexation of Kosovo by their ally, Serbia. As Anton Bebler reported (in Chapter 15), an International Commission of Enquiry, established in 1914, determined that the Serbian and Montenegrin armies "had grossly violated the rules of warfare" in Kosovo during 1912–13. Bebler judged that "by today's legal standards the Serbian government clearly conducted a policy of genocide in Kosovo." But Britain and France, emerging victorious from World War I, were content to leave the Albanians of Kosovo in Serbian hands. The result was an Albanian insurgency continuing for several years after that war was concluded.¹ After World War II, the Albanians of Kosovo were divided between those who wanted nothing to do with communist Yugoslavia, seeking to join Albania, and those who were prepared to work within the Yugoslav federation. The chief demand of the latter group was that Kosovo be given the status of a republic, equal in status and prerogatives to Serbia.² This demand was not granted and, instead, Kosovo was incorporated into Serbia as a supposedly autonomous region, later elevated to the status of an autonomous province. Neither status as a region nor status as a province satisfied Albanians and, in addition, there were various forms of harassment, including house searches, as detailed in Chapter 2.

The situation of Kosovar Albanians changed radically following the fall from power of Aleksandar Ranković in July 1966 and widespread protests by Kosovar Albanians in November 1968, during which crowds were

¹ For details, see Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005* (Bloomington, IN and Washington, D.C.: Indiana University Press and The Wilson Center Press, 2006), Chapter 2.

² For details, see Miloš Mišović, *Ko je tražio republiku: Kosovo, 1945–1985* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1987).

shouting "Long live Enver Hoxha!"³ At this point, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito agreed to enhance Kosovo's status and prerogatives, with the result that it enjoyed autonomy and voting rights within federal chambers which were *de facto* equivalent to those of the constituent republics. Now began the best period for Kosovo's Albanians, in post-World War II Yugoslavia, despite the fact that investment in education in Kosovo had been so poor that, even in 1971, 36% of local Albanians were officially illiterate⁴—easily the highest proportion among the country's several national groups. Indeed, investment in education in the province had been slow in coming. Albanian representation in the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo edged upwards to 62.5% in 1974, but this only incited a Serbian backlash. Serbs and Albanians increasingly avoided contact with each other, and inter-ethnic tensions continued. In spite of that, there was emerging a sense of Kosovar Albanian identity, as distinguished from a general Albanian identity. The political and geographical separation of Kosovo from Albania, and the geographical and (much less radical) separation from the Albanian population in Macedonia, combined with cultural influences from the rest of Yugoslavia, led to an increase in the degree to which Kosovo was seen as an entity in itself, rather than as an alienated part of Albania. There were several underground resistance groups active in Kosovo in the 1970s, student demonstrations in Prishtina in December 1974 which resulted in more than 100 arrests, and, finally, violent demonstrations throughout the province in late March and early April 1981 (provoked, apparently, by revelations that the economy in Kosovo was declining *relative to the rest of Yugoslavia*). In the 1981 clashes, more than 1,000 persons lost their lives.⁵ In subsequent years, inter-ethnic tensions in the province escalated and many Serbs (and Montenegrins) moved out of

³ Enver Hoxha was First Secretary of the Labor Party of Albania and ruled Albania from 1944 until his death in 1985. See the report by Dušan Mugoša in *Deveti Kongres Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije* (Beograd, 11–13 III 1969)—*Stenografske beleške* (Belgrade: Komunist 1970), vol. 3, 367.

⁴ Hirzi Islami, "Krećanje nepismenosti u Albanaca u Jugoslaviji," *Sociologija* 20 (1978), nos. 2–3: 315–6.

⁵ On these points, see Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 298–301. See also Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, eds., *Studies on Kosova* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984); and Peter R. Prifti, *Confrontation in Kosova: The Albanian-Serb struggle, 1969–1998* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1999).

Kosovo.⁶ In this climate, ethnic polarization increased and the province was increasingly destabilized.

This period of autonomy ended in the late 1980s, with the rise of Slobodan Milošević to power in Serbia; indeed, in March 1989, under strong police pressure, members of the Assembly of Kosovo ratified the suppression of their province's autonomy. Around this time, the Albanians in Kosovo established the Democratic League of Kosovo under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. After the suppression of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, the Assembly of the now-defunct province met in July 1990 and declared Kosovo's withdrawal from Serbia, remaining, however, within Yugoslavia.⁷ The following year, the by-now suppressed Assembly declared the independence of Kosovo (on 19 October 1991), subsequently electing Rugova president of the republic. These acts were purely declarative, as the Albanians did not have the force to back up their claim of independence. Milošević sought to create a new stability on his terms, but his policies only destabilized the province; moreover, his wholesale firing of Albanians from positions of authority and from state employment (including the firing of Albanian physicians from hospital staffs and of Albanian professors from university employment) induced Albanians to set up parallel structures, independent of state obligations, duties, and taxes organizing their own private enterprises, schools, and health facilities. In tandem, the chapters by Morozzo della Rocca and Bebler showed how the policies pursued by Belgrade during most of the years between 1912 and 1998 worked *against* the values of integration, sociality, and trust, which are essential for the sustainability of a system.

The chapters by James Pettifer, Zachary Irwin, and Johanna Deimel show how the continued instability and escalating conflict (during 1998–99) drew NATO powers into involvement, first with air strikes and later with a role in setting up a complex set of organizations and agencies and preparing Kosovo for eventual independence. If there is a lesson to be learned from this past history, it is that ignoring human rights abuses in order to reward one's friends (as Britain and France did at the London Peace Conference in 1913) runs the risk of backfiring; specifically, the sanc-

⁶ See Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević, *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985–1986* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, 1992).

⁷ *Vjesnik* (Zagreb; 3 July 1990), 1.

tioning of Serbia's conquest at the London conference reaped a harvest of decades of instability, tension, and conflict—a harvest which could scarcely be construed as serving the interests of either Great Power. The period of UNMIK's mandate (covered in Chapter 6) was supposed to build both values essential to sustainability and civic values. However, Chapter 8, by Florian Bieber, showed just how little success was made in this regard.

Whether the international community, acting through UNMIK, actually succeeded in finally bringing stability to Kosovo may be assessed, to some extent, by a close reading of Altuğ Günal's chapter on the political system. What is striking in Günal's analysis is his assessment that all of Kosovo's political parties are situated on the center-right of the European political spectrum⁸—which means that, within Kosovo itself, there is no political spectrum, and hence no substantive programmatic choice for voters. Whether this superficial pluralism can grow into a normal democratic system will depend on a number of factors, including the maturation (and differentiation) of the local electorate, the relative success or lack thereof in combating corruption and organized crime, and of course internal stability. Indeed, Günal wrote that “pervasive corruption and the close relations between politicians and the leading figures of organized crime are two of the major obstacles” to Kosovo's successful democratization and economic development.

II

Needless to say, locals remember history in their own ways and—in the case of Kosovo—Serbs and Albanians remember the past very differently, each side emphasizing its own sufferings and the oppressions unleashed by the other side.⁹ Textbooks are, in all countries, at least potentially the vehicles for official narratives of the past. In the case of Kosovo and Serbia, the history textbooks must be approved by the respective ministries of

⁸ This is confirmed by Bekim Baliqi, “Innenpolitik und Parteiensystem im Kosovo,” in *Die Republik Kosovo—Der jüngste Staat Europas. Eine politische Bestandsaufnahme seit der Unabhängigkeitserklärung*, eds. Olaf Leiße, Martin Roth, and Christian Gesellmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013).

⁹ For further discussion, see Sabrina P. Ramet, “The dissolution of Yugoslavia: Competing narratives of resentment and blame,” *Südosteuropa* 55 (2007), no. 1: 1–44.

education and, thus, may be taken as reflecting the respective official narratives. Local Albanian politicians enjoyed control over textbooks in Kosovo even before independence and the result, as Wolfgang Höpken reported in 2007, was the production and distribution of Albanian history textbooks which were “not just ethnocentric but in many senses outspokenly nationalistic.”¹⁰ What Shkëlzen Gashi showed most perspicuously in Chapter 11 is just how extensive are the differences between the Kosovar Albanian and Serbian narratives, beginning, of course, with whether the Serbian army’s arrival in Kosovo in 1912 should be described as a conquest or as a liberation. These differences in the textbooks anchor rival “memories” in Albanians and Serbs and, thus, perpetuate resentment, distrust, and desires for vengeance, undermining in the process the prospects for reconciliation and long-term stability.

Oliver Schmitt (Chapter 3) offered another perspective on historical memory, distinguishing between histories of Kosovo “as the history of a specific territory within its actual frontiers” thus including both Albanians and non-Albanians, and histories of the Albanian people, thereby associating Kosovo with the history of Albania. As Schmitt noted, the former approach has been preferred by Western authors (such as Noel Malcolm¹¹ and Miranda Vickers¹²), while the latter approach found favor with Albanian authors. What is troubling, when it comes to prospects for building Serb-Albanian trust is that the dominant Albanian narrative today, according to Schmitt, is one in which “the enemy has always been the Serbs, their state and Church.”

This might suggest that reconciliation is nothing but an illusion. It is precisely here, however, that Steinar Bryn’s chapter makes a contribution. Back in 1994, while war was still raging in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bryn came up with the idea of trying to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation by fostering dialogue between members of different nationality groups, affording them the opportunity to come to understand each other’s sufferings. The result was the Nansen Dialogue Network which,

¹⁰ Wolfgang Höpken, “Between civic identity and nationalism: History textbooks in East-Central and Southeastern Europe,” in *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education and Media*, eds. Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorica Matić (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 176.

¹¹ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

¹² Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 1998).

by 2005, had established 10 centers in the post-Yugoslav region—among them, two in Kosovo (in Prishtina and Mitrovica). Bryn brought together people from different nationalities and, as the previous chapter revealed, the participants in these dialogues “slowly realized that their own politicians, journalists, and historians had maybe not told them the whole story.”

III

The Nansen Dialogue Network involves a patient, slow approach to reconciliation, which proceeds by getting people to rethink their original ideas, thereby contributing, incrementally, to peacebuilding. *Slowly* is the by-word since, as Simkus and Krasniqi show in Chapter 13, public opinion surveys from 1989, 2003–04, and 2012 offer remarkable evidence that local Albanians remained unchanged in their distrust of other nationalities and in their rejection of intermarriage. Kosovar Serbs changed their views more than Albanians did, but always remained very distrustful of integration with other nationalities, across states, communities, or families.

However, beyond this very simple comparison, the situation in Kosovo is unique in a variety of ways. And, the situation of the Serb minority here is very different from the situations of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Florian Bieber stressed the degree to which the Kosovar Serbs have been marginalized at the same time as they have been instrumentalized by the larger competing forces of Serbia and Kosovo. This marginalization has been due to a number of developments and circumstances. These include the substantial decrease in the number of Serbs before, during, and after war, reducing their percentage in the population to probably somewhere between 3 and 6% of the residents of Kosovo—approximately half the percentage during the 1980s. But, the geographical distribution of Serbs is as important as their number. Nearly half of the Kosovar Serbs are concentrated in the territory of North Kosovo which has not been under the control of the Kosovar government and is economically, socially, politically, and institutionally more integrated with Serbia than with Kosovo. These Serbs are outside any possible relationships with the Kosovar Albanian population; and, while strongly supported economically by Serbia, they are marginalized in relation to Serbia as well.

The other part of the Serb population resides in the much larger predominantly Albanian territory, but largely in isolated segregated enclaves in rural areas. As a consequence of their geographic separation from Northern Kosovo and Serbia, there is no realistic hope of being reunited with Serbia, and huge logistic difficulties with maintaining integration in a larger Serbian community. Yet, on the local level, they are so segregated in small towns and villages that they are not really atomized and dispersed among Albanians in personal interaction. Given this situation, the Serbs in these southern enclaves have become much more integrated politically, and at least potentially economically, with the Kosovar government than the Serbs in the North, at the same time that they remain almost totally socially isolated from the larger Albanian society. By and large, Kosovar Serbs do not participate in any multi-ethnic large urban environment, nor do they have any substantial city of their own.

As a result of this situation, Kosovar Serbs have not developed any substantial elites, political, economic, or educational. And, while retaining huge symbolic importance in Serbian concerns regarding the sovereignty of Kosovo, they are looked down upon by many in Serbia for their alleged backwardness in education and their traditionalism.

With regard to Albanian–Serb relations, for the three predominantly Serbian municipalities of the North, such relations are not only social but territorial. In Chapter 10, Dušan Janjić pointed out the obstacles that the Serbs in this territory face in ways that may set them at odds with Belgrade as well as Prishtina. These Serbs receive large amounts of economic aid and employment from Belgrade based on their special status, a status they would lose not only with dissolving into Kosovo, but also even as a completely autonomous, even “independent” region. As Janjić writes, the territory can be seen from the outside as a kind of “black hole” within the broader region. No manner of autonomy will make the area a Swiss canton or West European micro-state.

IV

Civic values are a central theme of this book, alongside values essential for sustainability, and it is reasonable to consider the question of how the Albanians and Serbs of Kosovo rank on certain measures, both compared with each other and compared with people in other European countries.

This is the focus of Chapters 12–14, where answers to questions in surveys figure as indicators of individual values, and averages of these answers as indicators of national values. When it comes to civic vs. uncivic values, the relevant measures reported in these chapters relate to ethnic exclusionism (or ethnic distance), patriarchal culture (including both attitudes about women and attitudes about gays and lesbians), trust, support for democracy, and involvement in civic or social organizations.

Kristen Ringdal (Chapter 12) discussed all of these attitudes and values, comparing results in Kosovo with results in 46 other European countries, using data from the most recent wave of the European Values Survey, conducted in Kosovo in 2008. In his analysis, four findings stand out most prominently. First of all, local Albanians are remarkably exceptional in their high pride of citizenship in their country, and in their confidence in parliament, the civil service, the justice system, and police, and a general approval of democracy. Second, in terms of respondents' reports of control over life, life satisfaction, and happiness, they fall loosely in the middle of the cluster of European countries, relatively high compared to other formerly socialist countries and countries at the lowest level of development in Europe. Third, Kosovo ranked relatively low on non-traditional political participation (in 2008), low in voting, and participation in voluntary organizations, and very high on measures of traditionalism regarding gender roles and homosexuality. And fourth—and most significantly for the themes of this volume—Albanians of Kosovo displayed markedly low trust in other people, combined with high trust in their new institutions. The low score on social trust does not bode well for the future, as Ringdal conceded.

Karin Dyrstad (Chapter 14) confirmed Ringdal's findings concerning the level of support for democracy in Kosovo, noting, however, that nearly 60% of Albanians, alongside a tangible number of Serbs, supported "expert rule" as the best solution for Kosovo. Only 1.5% of Albanians, she reported, consider democracy "very bad," while nearly 10% of Serbs shared that viewpoint. Yet, in spite of general support for democracy, both Albanians and Serbs display an unusually low interest in either voting or participating in civic or social organizations, although—as Ringdal noted—they report a relatively high frequency of discussion about politics. We would interpret these findings in the following way. Kosovo demonstrated extraordinary non-traditional political participation leading up to the war, but such participation has not been required since the declaration of independence in 2008. Instead, people's attention could and had

to turn to providing for themselves in one of the very most difficult economies in Europe. There was not much time for NGO meetings. Within countries, the level of participation in everything from NGOs to attending football performances is very heavily determined by incomes and demands for time working. The low level of interest in voting—the lowest among 47 countries—may also reflect the fact, noted by Günal, that all the major political parties defend more or less identical policy positions.

Among the 47 countries surveyed, residents of Kosovo also displayed the lowest tolerance for gays and lesbians, the highest reported religiosity, and the highest support for banning extremist political parties (such as Nazis), as Ringdal reported. Moreover, Kosovo was tied with Azerbaijan as the second most patriarchal society—behind Turkey—in Europe; all three are predominantly Islamic societies. Ringdal's findings concerning attitudes about sexuality and women's roles are confirmed in the chapter by Simkus and Krasniqi. But they also identified some differences *within* Kosovo, pointing to "significant differences" among residents concerning divorce, abortion, and gay rights. These differences prove to be associated to some extent with nationality (Albanian vs. Serb), level of education, and, where Albanians are concerned, the size of the municipality or settlement in which they live. These authors also found that Albanians are more traditional than Serbs concerning sexual mores.

With regard to the attitudes of Kosovar Albanians concerning gay relationships, extremely traditional attitudes are widespread although not particularly different from those of Albanians in the neighboring countries, nor from those of Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. But Kosovar society is not frozen. On the contrary, as Nita Luci and Linda Gusia note in Chapter 9, "the space for creating gendered equality. . . continues to be sought and negotiated." They recount the role of female activists in organizing local protests and in partaking in peaceful resistance, thereby defining new, nontraditional roles for women.

V

Whether democracy can take root in Kosovo depends on many factors, some of which have already been mentioned. These include success in combatting corruption and organized crime, the programmatic pluralization of politics, and the engagement of citizens in active participation in

the political life of the country; these seem to us to be essential prerequisites for a democracy. Economic development and improvements in the educational level of the public are also clearly relevant factors.

Finally, as this volume has stressed, civic values are of central importance for the development of democratic life. As suggested in the introduction, without respect for the harm principle, tolerance, equality (including gender equality), habits of civility, and, most obviously, the rule of law and effective guarantees of individual rights, liberal democracy properly understood is not possible. And these sundry factors conducive to and essential to liberal democracy are also, ipso facto, key ingredients in the formula for political and social stability. And without movement toward integration, sociality, and trust, no socio-political system is sustainable over the long term.

Notes on Contributors

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